A History of Korea (73 page)

Preliminary talks between the American and Soviet commands began in Seoul in January 1946. Each side was deeply suspicious of the other, and apart from agreeing on supplies of electricity from the North to the South, only minor matters were settled such as the exchange of mail.

The U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission held its first meeting in Seoul on 20 March 1946, with five members each from the U.S. and Soviet commands. Major General Archibald V. Arnold and Colonel General Terenti F. Shtikov headed the U.S. and Soviet delegations, respectively. After six weeks of detailed discussion, the two sides were unable to reach any significant understanding concerning which group of Koreans should be consulted to pursue the Moscow agreement to form a provisional Korean government. After 24 fruitless sessions the Joint Commission adjourned in deadlock on 8 May 1946. It reconvened on 21 May 1947 but reached another impasse in July. No agreement could be reached as to which Korean political parties and social organizations were qualified to participate in the Commission’s activities. The Russians demanded that only those accepting the Moscow agreement and trusteeship (which the U.S. side interpreted as “leftists”) were eligible to participate with the Joint Commission in forming a provisional government; the Americans insisted that all credible groups, including anti-trusteeship groups (which the Soviet side interpreted as “rightists”), should be consulted on the basis of the principle of “free speech.” The Joint Commission continued its meetings but progress ceased, and in August 1947 the Commission adjourned for the last time.

In retrospect, the Joint Commission had little chance of success. It could have succeeded only through close U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Unfortunately for Korea, the cooperative spirit among the Allies during World War II had rapidly disappeared, and by early 1947 the United States and the Soviet Union were locked into the Cold War. The newly developed ideological and military stalemate between the two powers adversely affected Korea. The actions of U.S. officials and Koreans in southern Korea made the exact execution of the Moscow agreement impossible, and to guarantee the participation of rightists in the Joint Commission activities, the United States never adhered to the strict
application of the accord. Without the participation of the American-supported rightists, it was crystal clear that the future provisional Korean government would be dominated by leftists or communists, as had happened in Poland. The Soviet Union also opposed any compromises that might possibly cause it to lose its predominant role in northern Korea or the opportunity to gain control over the entire Korean peninsula. The failure of the Joint Commission was a foregone conclusion.

Efforts of the U.S. Military Government to strengthen southern Korea against communist domination led it to establish a separate southern government. Unlike U.S. officials in Washington, Americans on the scene in southern Korea were actually confronted with the leftist revolutionary thrust and thus earnestly pursued both responsible and anticommunist leadership there from the start of the occupation. At first this policy failed to meet positive approval from the U.S. government. Because negotiations with Russians over Korea had bogged down, however, the policy to create a separate southern government increasingly garnered support from top officials in Washington. At the time, fundamental U.S. policy in Korea was to set up a free, unified government for the entire Korean peninsula through a political settlement with the Soviet Union, or at least to keep southern Korea noncommunist with American support against communized northern Korea.

U.S. occupation officials in southern Korea believed that unless they acted swiftly to bolster conservative elements, the Left, particularly communists, would dominate the American zone. By late January 1946 the Military Government had sought to unify Kim Ku’s Korean Provisional Government, the Korean Democratic Party, and other non-leftist political groups under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. With that aim, on 14 February 1946 the South Korean Representative Democratic Council was established as a broad rightist political coalition, with 28 rightist political leaders and with Rhee as chairman.

During early 1946 the Right experienced a steady rise in popularity as a result of American sponsorship as well as popular opposition to trusteeship. In the event of a breakdown at the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission, the U.S. government could implement a program of “Koreanization” in the southern zone alone. Meanwhile, in July 1946, in order to forestall a unilateral Soviet action to create a friendly regime in the northern zone, the U.S. government instructed the Military Government to forsake its exclusive attachment to the Right in
favor of a broad coalition embracing moderates. The Military Government reluctantly attempted to build a moderate coalition around the leadership of Kim Kyu-sik, a leader of moderate rightists. Although the chances of success seemed slim, Kim managed to join forces with Y
ŏ
Un-hy
ŏ
ng. Initially Y
ŏ
refused to participate in the coalition movement, and he was under intense pressure from extreme leftists to quit the coalition effort. He was even kidnapped, beaten, and warned not to participate, but he finally agreed to take part in it. On 7 October 1946 the Left-Right Coalition Committee was formed, with Kim and Y
ŏ
as co-chairmen.
⁴
Kim emerged as the Military Government’s choice for political leadership, but he lacked dynamism and broad support among the Korean masses.

In the meantime, on 1 July 1946, Military Governor Major General Archer L. Lerch announced that the Military Government soon would sponsor the formation of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (
SKILA
). Rightists began immediately to mobilize in an effort to control the forthcoming
SKILA
elections. The Korean Communist Party, under the leadership of Pak H
ŏ
ny
ŏ
ng, on the other hand, denounced the U.S. policy as premature and in violation of the Moscow agreement.

The
SKILA
was established as an advisory legislative body, with half the 90-member assembly elected and the other half appointed by General Hodge. Because followers of Syngman Rhee controlled the administrative apparatus, the rightists scored a sweeping victory. From its opening session on 12 December 1946, Rhee’s rightists dominated the legislature on almost every major issue.

While preparing for the selection of delegates to the interim legislature, U.S. officials also took steps to provide certain Koreans with experience in government and administration. As the Military Government appointed local leaders to work with its bureaus as a prelude to the creation of the South Korean Interim Government, a growing body of rightist Koreans controlled the central bureaucracy of the interim government.

Cooperation between the United States and the Coalition Committee was short-lived. U.S. officials on the scene were preoccupied with limiting leftist political power and increasingly undermined the Coalition Committee, and the moderate alternative in Korean politics failed to realize the anticipated results. The failure of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission in the summer of 1947 had an immediate effect on politics in southern Korea. The moderate coalition that the United States had put together to support its position finally collapsed when Y
ŏ
Un-hy
ŏ
ng was assassinated in Seoul on 19 July 1947. Syngman Rhee, who had
already mounted a campaign to establish a separate government in southern Korea, was confident that the United States would now work with him.
⁵
In short, the political situation was heading increasingly toward the creation of a separate government in the U.S. occupation zone.

When the Korean People’s Republic collapsed under American opposition, the Left created another coalition called the Democratic People’s Front (
DPF
), a group that included all leftists. The opening session of the
DPF
was held in Seoul on 15–16 February 1946. The
DPF
platform and programs were similar to those of the Korean People’s Republic, for it was, after all, the direct successor of the
KPR
.

Americans mistakenly viewed the
DPF
as directed by Soviet-trained Korean communists; none of the key
DPF
leaders, however, had been trained or directed by the Russians. The organization was actually a response to the inauguration in northern Korea, on 8 February 1946, of the North Korean Interim People’s Committee led by Kim Il-sung. It was also a response to the formation of the South Korean Representative Democratic Council by southern rightists on 14 February 1946. The
DPF
was simply an organization for southern leftists and, like the
KPR
and the people’s committees in the South, was a creation of indigenous southern leftists.

The
DPF
was doomed to suppression by the U.S. Military Government. From the opening of the Joint Commission in March 1946, the suppression of the Left went hand-in-hand with U.S. policies aimed at creating rightist Korean leadership. As the Joint Commission deadlocked in early May 1946, the Military Government and Korean rightists were determined to root out leftist opposition in southern Korea.

On 15 May 1946 the rightist-controlled Korean National Police announced that it smashed a counterfeiting ring allegedly involving top Korean Communist Party officials and members. The police charged top party leaders with issuing some 12 million
w
ŏ
n
in counterfeit bills from October 1945 to February 1946 in the Ch
ŏ
ngp’ansa building housing the
KCP
headquarters and the party’s newspaper,
Haebang ilbo,
or Liberation Daily. The party allegedly used the counterfeit notes as its secret fund. The
KCP
charged that the entire affair was a frame-up by the police and asked, in vain, for the evidence upon which the charges were made.
⁶
Despite the party’s denial of all charges, a judge associated with the Korean Democratic Party found the accused persons guilty.

Using the opportunity provided by the “Ch
ŏ
ngp’ansa Incident,” the Military Government accelerated the suppression of leftists throughout the summer of 1946. In early September 1946 the Military Government issued warrants for the arrest of three top officials in the Korean Communist Party—Pak H
ŏ
n-y
ŏ
ng, Yi Kang-guk, and Yi Chu-ha. The three went underground to evade ar rest. At the same time the Americans ordered the closing of three leftist news papers—
Chos
ŏ
n inminbo,
or Korean People’s Newspaper;
Hy
ŏ
ndae ilbo,
or Mod ern Daily; and
Chungang sinmun,
or Central Newspaper. By September 1946 most communist leaders in southern Korea were in jail or being hunted down.

Resistance to the U.S. occupation policy spontaneously burst into violence in the fall of 1946, when the “October People’s Resistance” was precipitated by a railroad strike in Pusan on 24 September. The strike quickly spread to Taegu and Seoul, and combined with protests against forced grain collections and police brutality to completely engulf the southeastern provinces. The unprompted popular uprising lasted into December 1946. Shocked by the magnitude of the violence, General Hodge suspected that communists in northern Korea or the Soviet Union had ordered the riots and were preparing a military attack from the North. He promptly ordered wholesale suppression of the leftists. Other U.S. observers, within and outside the Military Government, recognized that the uprisings were not a well organized, communist-led revolution but were spontaneous, indigenous peasant rebellions.

During the uprisings many people were killed and injured. The wave of wrath was mainly directed at the police, who lost more than 400 of their members in brutal executions.
⁷
Property damage was extensive. The total number of arrests is unknown, but it may have approached 30,000 or more in the three-month period of violence.

The people’s uprisings represented the failure of U.S. military occupation policies, particularly in the economic realm, specifically mounting inflation and forced grain collection. The successful suppression of the October People’s Resistance, however, marked a turning point in the balance of power between the Left and the Right that favored the Right and weakened leftist forces irreparably. After the people’s resistance, the remnants of the
KCP
united with other leftist elements to form the South Korean Workers Party on 23 November 1946.

Throughout 1947 the U.S. Military Government and the Korean police continued their harsh suppression of leftists. In February 1947 police raided the
National Council of the Korean Labor Union, a leftist organization, and the Democratic People’s Front headquarters in Seoul and arrested their leaders. On 22 March the leftist labor union called for a general strike of workers throughout southern Korea. The strike began in Pusan and spread rapidly to Seoul, Taegu, Inch’
ŏ
n, and other cities. In Seoul and Inch’
ŏ
n students went on strike in sympathy, but by 24 March severe police suppression swiftly broke the strikers’ resolve.

The suppression peaked in August 1947. On 27 July thousands of people carrying banners of the Democratic People’s Front gathered in Seoul to celebrate the reconvening of the U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission. This was destined to be the last authorized political assembly of leftists. The participants paid a high price. Workers who attended the meeting were fired on and arrested when they protested. The Military Government and the Korean police initiated the large-scale arrests of leftists throughout southern Korea on 12 August and completed their operation on 23 August, with about 2,000 arrests. Leaders of the Democratic People’s Front and other leftist organizations were arrested, and their headquarters searched and finally closed. Many liberal teachers, writers, artists, newspaper reporters, and lawyers were also rounded up.