A History of Korea (72 page)

The years from 1945 to 1948 was a difficult and uncertain period in Korean history, only to be followed by the country’s division into two Koreas, the North and the South, in August and September of 1948. The three-year U.S. occupation of the area south of the 38th parallel was marked by the absence of a clearly formulated policy for Korea, intense rivalry and confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the polarization of Korean politics between the Left and Right.
¹
Americans, in particular, were ill-prepared for the task of governing Korea and lacked any definite plan of action. Americans were even slow to draw up detailed guidelines for the nation’s military occupation. Nevertheless, the United States played a decisive role in the independence and formation of South Korea. Indeed, this momentous three-year period shaped the economy, society, and domestic politics of present-day South Korea.

Although the division of the Korean peninsula into two occupied zones was temporary at first, a means of accepting the surrender of the Japanese forces, the deepening of the Cold War and the growing antagonism between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Korean peninsula made the division permanent.
Moreover, the American and Soviet approaches to administering their respective zones were different entirely. In the northern zone, Soviet authorities used the indigenous people’s committees and enforced a policy of communization. In the southern zone, on the other hand, the 24th U.S. Army Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, established the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK).The lion’s share of responsibility for the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel was borne by the United States. U.S. officials had consulted no Koreans in making this decision, but the Korean people were still blamed for the political chaos that ensued. In particular, Korean political leaders, sharply divided along ideological lines, engaged in bitter confrontations, and were never able to reconcile their different visions of a future Korea. In the absence of mature leadership, the Korean people failed to unite in presenting a strong alternative course to the occupying powers.

With their surrender only days away, the Japanese in Korea had good reason to fear Korean reprisals after the end of colonial rule. Hoping to get assurances for the safety of Japanese lives and property until Allied forces arrived, Japanese Governor-General Abe Nobuyuki, on 10 August 1945, took immediate steps to form an interim administration controlled by Koreans. Not surprisingly, there were few Koreans he could approach to run the administration who were moderate, commanded respect, and wielded informal power. Endo Ryusaku, Abe’s secretary-general for political affairs, sought to contact Song Chin-u, a rightist, but Song refused even to meet with Endo, fearing that leftists would label him a collaborator. The Japanese then approached left-leaning nationalist Y
ŏ
Un-hy
ŏ
ng, a well-known moderate figure with great prestige among Koreans based on his long anti-Japanese record. Before accepting responsibility for an interim administration, Y
ŏ
demanded the release of all political prisoners and no Japanese interference in the maintenance of peace or with Korean efforts to gain independence. The Japanese accepted and designated him to head an organization to maintain public order. Y
ŏ
organized the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (
CPKI
) on 15 August, and his authority was accepted by most Koreans, including landlords, intellectuals, students, and professionals. With
CPKI
’s encouragement, local notables organized 145 people’s committees throughout the country, with associated volunteer police forces. The local people’s committees effectively maintained law and order
despite the lack of coordination with the central authority.
²
The arrangement between Y
ŏ
and the Japanese maintained order, with no serious violence against the Japanese, and by the end of August Yo was the unchallenged de facto leader of Korea.

Until late August it appeared that Soviet forces might accept Japanese surrender throughout Korea, but in the last week news came that the United States would occupy Korea below the 38th parallel. Obviously this development would profoundly affect the political situation in southern Korea, and so Y
ŏ
’s
CPKI
and his followers called a national convention in Seoul on 6 September to provide his regime with the stamp of legitimacy by hastening the creation of a new government before the Americans arrived. At the convention, Y
ŏ
proclaimed the Korean People’s Republic (
KPR
) as a de facto government, with a cabinet that included distinguished nationalists of all political persuasions, both rightist and leftist. Despite efforts to represent all sides, the cabinet was influenced mostly by the Left, but because of his reputation among Koreans, Syngman Rhee was elected president without his knowledge or consent. Rhee refused the offer and remained an ardent anticommunist leader and a pillar of the Right. Although the Korean Communist Party was revitalized as a coalition of several communist factions on 11 September and was quickly building a substantial following among workers, peasants, and students, rightist organizations were also getting stronger as the United States was expected to come to southern Korea. On 16 September several rightist groups united to form the Korean Democratic Party (
KDP
). As a magnet for rightists in the first few months after liberation, the
KDP
remained the strongest single right-leaning party throughout the period of U.S. military occupation. The
KDP
described itself as a party of patriots, notables, and various circles of Korea’s intellectual stratum, but leftists and moderates viewed it as a party of landlords, businessmen, and collaborators. In the initial U.S. occupation period, a fierce power struggle would arise between the leftist coalition around the
KPR
and the rightist coalition around Syngman Rhee and the
KDP
.

On 7 September 1945 General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, formally established American control in Korea south of the 38th parallel. The next day Lieutenant General John R. Hodge and his 72,000-strong 24th Army Corps landed in Korea. At the time, the U.S. government had no detailed guidelines for the occupation, and the 24th Army Corps,
including the 6th, 7th, and 40th infantry divisions, drew heavy duty in Korea, simply because it was stationed on relatively nearby Okinawa, not because it had any specific qualifications for administering Korean affairs.

On 9 September Lieutenant General Hodge accepted Japan’s formal surrender at the capital building in Seoul, but ignorant of conditions in Korea and with no plan of action, Hodge at first directed the Japanese Government-General to continue governing the country until other arrangements could be made. Hodge urged Koreans to be patient, but the Korean outcry forced the Americans to hastily withdraw the Japanese administration and replace it with a U.S. military government. On 12 September, Major General Archibald Arnold, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, was sworn in as governor-general, and two days later all Japanese officials were removed from office. The title of the administration was changed from Government-General to “Military Government,” as the former denoted a “colonial status.” English became the official language of the occupation, and, naturally, Americans then turned for information and advice to Koreans who spoke English. The U.S. Military Government soon earned the derisive nickname “government by interpreter” and repeatedly made mistakes and misjudgments in administering Korea, ultimately alienating itself from the Korean population.

Soon after U.S. forces arrived in southern Korea to oversee the Japanese surrender and established the Military Government, an atmosphere of anarchy enveloped the U.S. occupation zone. To foster stability, Americans asked the best-educated and wealthiest members of Korean society for advice and support, leading to a close relationship between the Military Government and the conservative
KDP
from the outset of the occupation. In effect, the
KDP
became the Military Government’s ruling party. On 5 October 1945 the Military Government created an 11-member Korean Advisory Council to assist the military governor. Y
ŏ
Un-hy
ŏ
ng, the only representative chosen from the Left, refused to participate. Most Koreans felt that the Advisory Council did not represent them. Preoccupied with the perceived worldwide threat of communism, Americans believed that Y
ŏ
’s Korean People’s Republic was under Soviet domination, and was therefore subversive, and refused to cooperate with it. General Hodge dismissed Y
ŏ
’s claim to legitimacy and outlawed the people’s committees throughout the country. Because the
KPR
was not recognized by the Americans, Y
ŏ
organized the Korean People’s Party on 12 November 1945,
thus implicitly consenting to the American demand that the
KPR
drop its claims to being a government and label itself only a political party.

The Americans brought in Syngman Rhee from the United States and the leaders of the Korean Provisional Government from China. Rhee arrived in Seoul on 16 October 1945, and the
KPG
officials, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, returned to Seoul in late November and early December 1945. Syngman Rhee promptly set about building a political base. He was introduced to the Korean people for the first time at the welcoming ceremony for U.S. forces in Korea, held in Seoul on 20 October 1945, where he stood with the conservatives, particularly the Korean Democratic Party. Indeed, the party and Rhee needed each other. Despite U.S. favoritism toward the
KDP
, most Koreans considered the party unrepresentative, and so
KDP
leaders realized that they needed someone who would give their party legitimacy as a party of patriots. Syngman Rhee was considered the most qualified person to do so. Despite his personal prestige, Rhee had lost contact and command over the organized forces of internal political life at home because of his 40 years of exile. Needing a strong, grass-roots political machine, he allied with the
KDP
because of its newly won power within the Military Government. The alliance between the
KDP
and Rhee was a marriage of convenience.
³
The
KPG
exiles, on the other hand, frowned on the
KDP
and its allies who had seized so many important positions within the Military Government bureaucracy.

The chief concern of the United States in southern Korea was to maintain law and order amid the chaotic situation. To achieve this goal the U.S. Military Government quickly created the necessary police and military forces, and soon thereafter reorganized the police. The first plan was to initially use the Japanese police while training Koreans to take their place, but this proved impossible because the Koreans objected to the continued presence and authority of the hated Japanese police. The alternative plan was to replace all volunteer police and advertise for trained Korean policemen to join the new police force. The result was a wholesale reemployment of Koreans from the former colonial police force. On 21 October 1945 the Korean National Police was formally created and granted significant power, authority, and material and moral support.

In October 1945 the Military Government decided to form a Korean military force, and in early December it began selecting and training Korean military officers. On 15 January 1946, the South Korean Constabulary, the precursor to the South Korean Army, was formally established. Americans called for those who had prior military experience to join as officer candidates. To solve the language
problem in training officers, Americans established the Military English Language School on 5 December 1945. With graduates of the Military English Language School as the nucleus, an extensive recruitment of enlisted men began in the spring of 1946. On 1 May 1946, as a replacement for the Military English Language School, the Korean Constabulary Officer Candidate School was established to produce an officer corps for the expanding army. Graduates of the schools later played important roles in the South Korean Army.

Officers with Japanese military experience dominated the South Korean Constabulary and the succeeding South Korean Army. On 5 December 1948 the government of the Republic of Korea created the Ministry of National Defense, the Army, and the Navy. Simultaneously all Constabulary brigades were reclassified as army divisions.

From the start the United States, particularly the officers of the Military Government, acted with Cold War logic. They sought to maintain the social status quo, building a political bulwark against communism, fostering rightist allies, and organizing the police and military to preserve order and stability. The Military Government preferred the police to the fledgling military force, which they viewed as heavily infiltrated by leftists.

To clarify many problems that arose between Allies after the war, the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union met in Moscow from 16 to 26 December 1945. On 27 December the Foreign Ministers’ Conference reaffirmed a U.S. proposal for a five-year trusteeship of Korea administered by the three states plus China. The United States and the Soviet Union were to establish a joint commission that would consult with the Koreans to create a provisional Korean government.

News of the Moscow agreement reached Korea on the morning of 29 December 1945. Trusteeship was a major affront to Korean national aspirations for immediate independence. The Koreans saw in the trusteeship proposal a renewal of foreign interference, for the Japanese had used the term to justify their rule. The proposal pulled a psychological trigger in the minds of the Koreans, and in southern Korea the initially warm welcome to U.S. forces as liberators cooled. Strikes and demonstrations occurred throughout Korea but were immediately suppressed in the Soviet zone. Following the line of their northern counterparts, from early January 1946 communist and sympathetic leftist groups in southern Korea began to support the Moscow agreement and trusteeship. As
wave after wave of resentment swept the country, dangerous tension was building in Seoul. Specifically Kim Ku mobilized mass demonstrations against trusteeship and finally attempted a coup on New Year’s Eve in 1945, issuing a series of proclamations that amounted to a direct attempt to seize the government. But the coup attempt failed, and his stubborn opposition to a trusteeship cost Kim Ku U.S. support in his struggle to attain power in postwar Korea.