A History of Korea (64 page)

The Koreans, as subjects of the Japanese emperor, could enjoy, in theory, the same status as the Japanese, but in practice Japan treated the Koreans as an inferior and conquered people. The Government-General enacted laws legalizing racial discrimination against the Koreans, making them second-class citizens. Education served as a means of justifying such racism. The Japanese monopolized all supervisory and managerial positions in the government, the police, and the factories, and restricted Koreans to clerical positions. A Korean worker labored much longer hours and received half the wages paid to a Japanese worker.

The average Japanese, whether in Korea or Japan proper, perceived Koreans as inferior and therefore treated them with contempt and cruelty. The Koreans, however, never considered the Japanese to be superior to them; indeed, they viewed themselves as culturally superior to the Japanese. Thus, from start to finish, the Koreans challenged the legitimacy of Japanese colonialism, which resulted in their never-ending resistance to Japanese colonial rule.

Although colonial Korea was generally created to satisfy Japan’s political and economic ambitions, at the same time Japan did play a role in Korea’s modernization. Before 1900 Korea had a relatively backward agricultural economy. Following the annexation of Korea in 1910, Japan brought modern industrial capitalism to its colony, which industrialized and modernized Korea’s once semi-feudalistic agrarian society. Most Koreans have claimed that the benefits of economic growth achieved in the colonial period, if any, went entirely to Japan and that Korea would have developed economically without Japanese help. Some foreign observers argue, however, that remarkable improvements were achieved in colonial Korea, including a state-led economy characterized by strong economic guidance by the administration; the forceful opening of industry and markets, domestic as well as foreign; and the repression of organized labor. They further insist that economic development of the two Koreas in the
post-liberation period was modeled on this colonial experience.
³
In particular, South Korean patterns of economic development after the early 1960s under President Park Chung-hee, a former military officer in the Japanese Imperial Army, closely followed the methodology introduced by the Japanese 50 years earlier—industrialization from above using a strong bureaucracy that formulated and implemented economic plans and policies. Simply put, Japan’s role in colonial Korea’s modernization and development still remains controversial.

After depriving the Koreans of sovereignty and political independence, Japan systematically integrated Korea’s economy into its colonial structure. In the process, the Koreans lost their farmland and other economic resources and accompanying opportunities to improve their economic and social conditions. Further, by introducing “modernization” in economic and social spheres, Japan seriously disrupted traditional economic and social structures.

Already in 1907, before annexation, the Japanese attempted to seize large tracts of Korean land, amounting to one-third of the nation’s entire land, under the pretext of reclaiming uncultivated lands. But Japan withdrew its demand following stiff Korean opposition. After annexation, the Japanese Government-General confiscated public land amounting to 25,800
ch
ŏ
ngbo,
or 66,500 acres, of farmland and 19,400 ch
ŏ
ngbo, or 48,500 acres, of forest land, most of it actually consisting of people’s land, which, under nominal state ownership, was designed to escape heavy taxes and usurpation.

After taking over large tracts of public land without compensation, the Japanese Government-General embarked on a land survey for more effective control over Korean farmland. This survey would reestablish ownership based on written proof. To clarify, register, and classify ownership of farmland, the Government-General established the Temporary Land Survey Bureau in 1910. It began the land survey in August 1912 and required landowners to classify their holdings according to ownership, type, and dimensions.

Many Koreans, however, were negligent about registering their land. Because of previous inadequate land surveys, they were accustomed to holding their farmland without legal proof of ownership and unaccustomed to strict registration proceedings. Their antipathy to Japan and purposeful misinformation also interfered with their registering their land. As ownership was denied to those who could not provide written documentation, all those who failed to register by a set date lost their landholdings.

Because of the absence of registrants, land that had formerly been allocated to post stations and military forts in the border regions, amounting to 132,633 ch
ŏ
ngbo, or 331,583 acres, and land that had belonged to clans rather than individuals, became the property of the Government-General. Many Korean farmers who protested the Japanese confiscation were totally ignored. On the other hand, some Koreans, particularly those of the former yangban and bureaucratic classes, were allowed to establish titles to farmland. In this way, the yangban class was transformed into a new landlord class.

The land survey and registration conducted under the cloak of establishing modern ownership of farmland enabled the Japanese to possess large amounts of Korean farmland. By November 1918, when the land survey was completed, the Government-General became Korea’s largest landowner. By 1930 the combined total of agricultural and forest land held by the Government-General amounted to 8.88 million ch
ŏ
ngbo, or 22.2 million acres, some 40 percent of Korea’s total land area. The Government-General sold this confiscated land at a reduced price or without compensation to Japanese land companies such as the Oriental Development Company, created in 1908 as a semiofficial colonization organ, and to Japanese immigrants. The land, rather than the uncertain annual harvest, became the basis of a land tax system, which was implemented in 1914. As a result, compared to the land tax in 1911, it doubled in 1919. By 1930 the land tax comprised 45 percent of annual government revenues.

Foreign observers argue that most of the land falling into Japanese hands was not formerly held by individual Korean farmers but public land.
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Because public land confiscated by the Government-General was private land in that heredity guaranteed the cultivation rights of peasant farmers, the Japanese actually dispossessed peasants from their land. In fact, the number of Korean peasants who cultivated the land formerly assigned to the post stations and military forts amounted to 331,748. These peasants who were separated from the land were downgraded to tenants. Simply put, although the Japanese land survey was presumably conducted as a way to consolidate Japan’s colonial economic system, in reality it functioned as an instrument for expropriating Korean land.

In addition to controlling Korea’s farmland, Japan also firmly controlled Korea’s forest land, fisheries, mineral resources, industries, and finances. In June 1911 the Government-General enacted a forest ordinance to tighten its control over Korean forest resources. By its terms, the Government-General could classify
any forests in the country as “reserved forests,” which ordinary citizens were prohibited from exploiting for resources. In May 1918 another law was promulgated to conduct surveys of forest land, by which all forest owners were required to register their forest land with the colonial authorities. As a result, all former state-owned forest land became the property of the Government-General. By seizing Korean forest land in the same way as it had taken over the country’s farmland, the Government-General possessed more than 50 percent of Korea’s entire forest land. The Government-General sold the forest land to Japanese lumbering companies, and the latter cut down forests particularly in the reaches of the Yalu and Tumen rivers on a large-scale and made huge profits.

In accordance with a fishery ordinance promulgated in February 1912, the vast fishing grounds, held formerly by the Chos
ŏ
n royal household and private Koreans, were placed under the administration of the Government-General. The colonial government encouraged Japanese fishermen to immigrate to Korea. Because Japanese fishing techniques were far superior to those of Korean fishermen, the Japanese catch per capita was four times larger than that of the Koreans. Overfishing by Japanese fishermen devastated Korean fishing grounds. The illegal incorporation of Tok-to into Japan proper in February 1905 sought to dispossess Korea of marine resources in its neighboring sea area.

Although the southern part of the Korean peninsula had rich farmland that could feed hungry Japanese who mounted large-scale rice riots in Japan in 1918, the northern part had large deposits of mineral reserves of more than 70 different kinds of minerals, including iron, gold, silver, copper, tungsten, zinc, uranium, and coal. A mining ordinance enacted in December 1915 turned Korea’s mineral deposits over to the Japanese mining
zaibatsu
conglomerates, such as Mitsui, for exploitation. In 1920 the Japanese owned more than 80 percent of Korean mines, and the Koreans possessed only 0.3 percent of them.

Virtually all industries were monopolized either by Japanese-based corporations or by Japanese corporations in Korea. To check the growth of native Korean enterprises, the Government-General enacted a company ordinance in December 1910. The law stipulated that the Government-General’s approval was required to establish a company. Even the companies that obtained approval were subjected to frequent suspension or dissolution. The underdevelopment of Korean capital resulted in the rapid growth of Japanese investment in fundamental industries. The law was originally designed to stop the advance of foreign capital into Korea, but Korean capital was also hard hit by the Japanese-imposed law. Such vital industries as electricity, railroads, and finance
were monopolized by Japanese conglomerates, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi. The Government-General had a monopoly on the sale of ginseng, salt, and opium. Korean entrepreneurs mainly engaged in light industries such as rice polishing, leather, ceramics, spinning, and the processing of agricultural and marine products. In 1919 the Japanese possessed some 91 percent of all capital invested in Korea. The rate of Korean-owned capital continued to fall. In 1942 Korean capital constituted only 1.5 percent of the total capital invested in Korean industries.

The Japanese and some Western observers often cite Japanese construction of an extensive transportation infrastructure of railways, ports, and roads as an important Japanese benefit to Korea. They ignore the fact, however, that the extensive railway and port facilities primarily served Japanese interests and were built to extract and exploit Korea’s natural resources, including raw materials, foodstuffs, mineral resources, and industrial products. They were also intended for the strategic purpose of facilitating the transport of large numbers of troops and materials to the Asian mainland.

The first railroad was constructed between Seoul and Inch’
ŏ
n by an American company in 1899, three years after a contract was awarded to the American James R. Morse. A Japanese company built a line between Seoul and Pusan in 1904. As the Russo-Japanese War became imminent, the Japanese hastened the construction of a Seoul-Sin
ŭ
iju line, which was completed in 1905, to carry troops and military supplies to Manchuria. The Pusan-Sin
ŭ
iju line became the main artery of Japanese troop movement for the invasion of the Asian mainland. Upon the annexation of Korea in 1910, all railway control was transferred to the Japanese Government-General. More precisely, it became a Japanese government monopoly. Railroad lines increased from 674 miles in 1911 to 1,777 miles in 1930. Secondary rail lines linked northeastern seacoast Japanese factories in W
ŏ
nsan, Hamh
ŭ
ng, and Najin. Other lines were completed in the southwestern region, home to large Japanese-owned farms.

The Chos
ŏ
n government had already installed telegraph lines in the 1880s linking Seoul with other important cities such as Inch’
ŏ
n,
Ŭ
iju, Pusan, and W
ŏ
nsan. During and after the Russo-Japanese War, control of these telegraph facilities of course fell into Japanese hands. The postal service conducted by the Chos
ŏ
n government since the 1890s was also placed under Japanese control during and after the war.

By 1900 a number of Japanese banks had established branch or agency offices in Chos
ŏ
n. In October 1909 the Bank of Korea was created and functioned as
a central bank. After annexation, in March 1911, the Bank of Korea was transformed into the Bank of Chos
ŏ
n (Chosen in Japanese). There were several Japanese-owned commercial banks whose services were largely limited to the Japanese residents in Korea. After annexation, in other words, the Japanese completely controlled Korea’s finances.

In Korea’s colonial economic structure, Japan virtually monopolized trade. Some 90 percent of Korean exports, mainly rice and other grains and leaf tobacco, went to Japan, and about 65 percent of its imports, chiefly clothing and other light industrial goods, came from Japan. As Japan’s colony, Korea functioned as a source of raw materials as well as a commodity market for Japan.

After the annexation of Korea, the Japanese were ever sensitive to the education of the Koreans. Even before the annexation, Japan assumed actual power over Korean education, reorganizing the educational system by imperial edict. The Japanese sought to place all schools under government control, reduce the number of schools, adapt the substance of education to their colonial policy, and arrest the development of Korean education by lowering its quality. By a decree enacted in 1908, the Japanese tightened their control over private schools and closed many of them. The Education Act, promulgated in September 1911, was mainly designed to secure manpower for the colonial administration in Korea. On the other hand, to extinguish Korean national consciousness, the Japanese kept the Koreans illiterate, affording them little opportunity to learn.