A History of Korea (100 page)

Kim Dae-jung defined his administration as the “national government,” in which all the nation’s people were political participants, masters of the nation. Kim’s most urgent task upon taking office was to overcome the economic crisis, considered by many at the time as the greatest national disaster since the Korean War. Already in November 1997, under the Kim Young-sam administration, South Korea had sought assistance from the
IMF
and secured a bailout totaling $57 billion. The new Kim Dae-jung administration pledged, in return, to carry out drastic economic reforms, including restructuring the corporate and financial sectors. The result was a significant contraction of the economy and a soaring unemployment rate. Large-scale unemployment generated labor disputes and disrupted families. To stimulate the economy, the Kim Dae-jung administration took steps to encourage foreign investment.

Through the united efforts of the government and populace, in 1999 the economy quickly recovered its strength. The economic growth rate that year was as high as 10.7 percent, with unemployment at 6.3 percent. Current account surpluses amounted to some $25 billion, and foreign exchange holdings increased to $70 billion.

Despite the economic recovery, Kim Dae-jung never enjoyed a political honeymoon. Although he came into power through the “
DJP
coalition (Kim Dae-jung + Kim Jong-pil),” in which the president gained the estimated 7–8 percent of the popular vote anticipated by Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal Democrats in return for
ULD
participation in his government, the political coalition was still a minority in the National Assembly. Yi Hoe-ch’ang’s Grand National Party held a majority in the legislature.

Soon Kim Dae-jung’s approval rating declined sharply, not because of his economic policy but owing to a series of corruption scandals involving his inner circle and his sons. Thus Kim Dae-jung followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, Kim Young-sam, and the scandals put his administration on the defensive. The consequences became immediately evident, when Kim Dae-jung’s party failed to take the legislature in the National Assembly elections held on 13 April 2000. The opposition Grand National Party won 133 out of 273 seats, and 115 seats were taken by Kim Dae-jung’s New Millennium Democratic Party (
NMDP
), created on 20 January 2000 to succeed the National Congress
for New Politics. Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal Democrats obtained roughly the difference of 17 seats.

The parliamentary election proved to be a failure for the Kim Dae-jung administration both qualitatively and quantitatively. The ruling
DJP
coalition could not win a single seat in the populous Y
ŏ
ngnam region (Pusan, Taegu, and North and South Ky
ŏ
ngsang provinces). Unexpectedly, even the approaching North-South summit did not give Kim Dae-jung an advantage. Just three days before the elections, on 10 April 2000, both Koreas announced that the North-South summit would be held in Pyongyang in mid-June. The announcement gave rise to suspicion and charges from the opposition that the North-South summit was intended to influence the elections and domestic politics. As it turned out, it had little effect on the National Assembly elections, indicating the political maturity of the South Korean electorate.

In mid-June 2000 Kim Dae-jung traveled to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-il. The North-South summit was held on 13–15 June, and the two leaders signed and promulgated a five-point declaration, promoting national reunification on the Korean people’s own initiative; peace and reconciliation; reunions for separated families; the expediting of economic, social, and cultural exchanges; and the necessity of an ongoing dialogue to implement these agreements. In addition, the declaration promised a reciprocal visit to Seoul by Kim Jong-il.

By the end of the year the two Koreas achieved some success on humanitarian and security issues, including the reopening of rail links severed during the Korean War and of liaison offices in the truce village of P’anmunj
ŏ
m; stopping, or toning down, each country’s harsh propaganda campaigns against the other; exchanging family reunion groups in August; and marching together at the opening ceremony of the Sydney Olympics in September. Thanks to his efforts toward reconciliation with North Korea, Kim Dae-jung was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in early December 2000, boosting his popularity.

But excitement was soon replaced by disappointment. The actions taken by North Korea regarding the humanitarian exchange of separated families fell well short of South Korean expectations, its military deployments along the
DMZ
remained highly offensive, and substantial talks on security matters followed the earlier pattern of progressing at a snail’s pace. In turn, Kim Dae-jung’s public approval once again declined.

Domestic politics were typical of Korean political culture, in which the ruling and opposition parties bickered endlessly over many issues. Eventually internal strife broke up the “
DJP
coalition.” Because the United Liberal Democrats had
won 17 seats in the 13 April 2000 National Assembly elections, the party was short three seats of gaining a bargaining position in the legislature. To make up for the shortfall, four lawmakers of the New Millennium Democratic Party changed their party membership to the
ULD
, helping the splinter party meet the requirements needed to negotiate. The opposition Grand National Party denounced this move as a “lending of lawmakers” that disregarded the will of the electorate.

The ruling and opposition parties also clashed head on over the wisdom of Kim Dae-jung’s North Korea policy. The Grand National Party bitterly criticized Kim’s approaches, known as the “sunshine policy,” as a policy that “gives too much and receives little.” With an eye on the upcoming presidential election, the opposition party worried that Kim and his ruling party might play the North Korea card, specifically Kim Jong-il’s reciprocal visit to Seoul. Kim’s visit would be a black hole absorbing all the people’s attention and placing the president in a position to manipulate the domestic political agenda.

Amid bruising bickering with the opposition Grand National Party, the ruling New Millennium Democratic Party lost in all three National Assembly by-elections (two in Seoul and one in Kangw
ŏ
n province) on 25 October 2001, with the opposition party falling short by one seat of holding a majority in the legislature. These by-elections were necessary to fill up vacancies left by election-law violators. The
NMDP
’s losses in Seoul were especially damaging, as these districts were long regarded as party strongholds.
GNP
victories, however, were seen less as expressions of positive support for the opposition party than erosion of popular support for the ruling party and the Kim Dae-jung administration.

The ruling “
DJP
coalition,” meanwhile, finally collapsed in August–September 2001, beginning with the conservative United Liberal Democrats’ demand for the dismissal of Unification Minister Im Tong-w
ŏ
n, who had been called the “preacher” of Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy, over his alleged bungling in sending a group of South Koreans to participate in the North Korean Liberation Day event. During their visit to North Korea, some South Korean participants broke earlier promises not to attend North Korean events. Certain radical members even visited Man’gy
ŏ
ngdae, Kim Il-sung’s birthplace, which was considered inappropriate by the general South Korean population. Kim Jong-pil publicly called for Im’s voluntary resignation, which both Kim Dae-jung and Im refused. Then both the
GNP
and the
ULD
voted to recommend Im’s dismissal as unification minister in the National Assembly on 3 September 2001, causing a political showdown that resulted in the breakdown of the
NMDP
–
ULD
coalition. On the same day the
ULD
lost its independent status as a bargaining body, as the four former
NMDP
lawmakers withdrew from the party. The
ULD
move was a premeditated action to arrest further erosion of its identity as a conservative party.

As Kim’s presidency approached its end, the presidential election, scheduled for 19 December 2002, dominated South Korean politics. Although increasingly losing popular support, the ruling New Millennium Democratic Party sought to regain political power at all costs. The party made a radical change to the rule for selecting its presidential nominee to the same system governing U.S.-style primary elections. It even allowed ordinary citizens to participate in the selection of its presidential nominee. As the primary progressed, candidates withdrew one by one, and finally Roh Moo-hyun, who, as a human rights lawyer, had been active in the labor movement, was nominated for president on 27 April 2002. The
NMDP
’s new method for nominating presidential candidate was a great success, with the opposition Grand National Party electing Yi Hoech’ang as its presidential nominee on 9 May.

Roh Moo-hyun, whose policy views were all radical or progressive, was popular among the younger generation of South Koreans, particularly the “386 generation,” people in their thirties in the late 1990s who were born in the 1960s and entered college in the 1980s and enthusiastically participated in the democratization movement of the 1980s. Highly educated but disenchanted with old-style politics, Roh’s followers used the Internet to organize a fan club, known as the
Rohsamo,
or Gathering of Those People Loving Roh Moo-hyun, to articulate their political views and recruit public support for Roh. As the “Roh wind” developed into a storm, Roh’s popularity skyrocketed.

The “Roh wind” did not last long, however. By early summer Roh’s popularity took a sudden downturn, and Yi Hoe-ch’ang’s popularity slowly rose. Two primary factors contributed to this reversal of political fortunes. First, Roh’s reckless remarks on sensitive issues, such as South Korean–U.S. ties and inter-Korean relations, alarmed a large segment of the South Korean electorate. During his stumping tour, Roh publicly stated that anti-Americanism was acceptable. On another occasion he was quoted as saying that if inter-Korean relations were well managed, it wouldn’t matter if all other matters were in total disorder. His radical and unconventional views were always sharply criticized.

Roh’s declining popularity was also the result of the scandals involving Kim Dae-jung’s sons and inner circle. As in the previous administration, several of Kim’s closest colleagues were arrested and sentenced to jail for influence
peddling and similar illegal activities. Kim’s second son was convicted of receiving money from businessmen as well as from a high-ranking official of the National Security Planning Agency, and was sentenced to four years in prison. The president’s youngest son was also implicated in a case of influence peddling and served nearly one year in jail. The president’s eldest son, a member of the National Assembly, was featured in the news media for his close ties with gangsters from his hometown and for using his influence to gain favors, further damaging his father’s public image. On 21 June 2002 Kim Dae-jung publicly apologized for the scandals involving his three sons.

Kim’s diminishing popularity led to disastrous defeats for the ruling party in local elections held on 13 June 2002. The Grand National Party elected 5 metropolitan city mayors and 6 provincial governors, including the mayoralty of Seoul, out of 16 such posts. In by-elections for 13 National Assembly seats, held on 8 August 2002, the
GNP
won 11 seats and a majority in the legislature. These were the most serious setbacks that any South Korean ruling party had ever experienced. Later the
GNP
used its enormous political power to reject two of Kim’s candidates for the premiership.

As Yi Hoe-ch’ang’s popularity soared, concerns grew in the ruling party over whether Roh would be able to defeat him. Some in the party, searching for an alternative to Roh, saw Ch
ŏ
ng Mong-jun, a son of the late Ch
ŏ
ng Chu-y
ŏ
ng, emerging as a dark horse who could compete with Yi, and they demanded that he replace Roh in the race for president.

Roh and Ch
ŏ
ng negotiated just a few days before the deadline for registering as a presidential candidate. Eventually they agreed to hold one television debate, and the one scoring higher in a public opinion poll would run as the “unified candidate.” In the post-debate poll Roh defeated Ch
ŏ
ng by a slim margin (46.8 percent versus 42.2 percent).

As Ch
ŏ
ng Mong-jun withdrew and publicly pledged to support Roh Moo-hyun, Roh’s popularity surged once more. But a few hours before the campaign officially ended, Ch
ŏ
ng abruptly withdrew his endorsement. This turnabout gave a boost to Roh, as it alarmed his supporters who instantly flooded the Internet urging younger voters to vote. Eventually Roh won the presidential election by a margin of only 2.3 percent, with Yi obtaining 46.6 percent and Roh 48.9 percent. With his party successfully retaining power, Kim Dae-jung left office on 25 February 2003.

On 25 February 1998, when heading for the Blue House, Kim Dae-jung gave his word that he would become a successful president, declaring that “a triumphal
entry into the Blue House is not what is important; five years from now, when I return to my own house, I want to be rated as a great president.”
³
His presidency, however, for a number of reasons, was not the success he aspired it to be. He is often blamed for using the narrow, regional interests of the people of Ch
ŏ
lla (Honam) region to realize his political ambitions. In the December 1997 presidential election, while receiving only 13.4 percent of the vote in the more populous Ky
ŏ
ngsang (Y
ŏ
ngnam) region, he obtained 94.2 percent in Ch
ŏ
lla province and Kwangju, for which he was ridiculed as the “Honam president” of the “Honam republic,” marring the legitimacy and prestige of his office. His presidency was also infested with the scandals involving his three sons, for which he had to apologize twice during his tenure. Accused of governing South Korea in pursuit of his own interests, he was also denounced as a captive of his “sunshine policy.” It was later revealed, for example, that to realize the North-South summit, he made clandestine dealings with North Koreans, paying them some $200 million. As a result, his close aides were arrested and imprisoned.