A History of Korea (114 page)

Koreans have described Japan as a nation that is close (in distance) and remote (in feeling), demonstrating that the relationship has never been smooth. Grievances arising from the colonial era and Japan’s incomplete efforts to address its past have bred feelings of hostility toward Japan among South Koreans. Moreover, some Japanese, including politicians and intellectuals, have denied Japanese atrocities in Korea.

Wrangling between South Korea and Japan has often been triggered or escalated by several factors embedded in the East Asian context. Those factors, conspiring with sudden changes in the international environment, considerably undermined the very foundation of bilateral relations. First, as the Cold
War ended, the sense of common purpose that had suppressed nationalistic animosities within South Korea’s anticommunist camp became increasingly weak. Second, the rise of China in the region eclipsed, in the eyes of South Koreans, the importance of Japan as a diplomatic partner, and vice versa. Third, North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs and abduction of Japanese citizens elicited fundamentally different responses from South Korea and Japan.

Changes in domestic politics, moreover, have been just as destabilizing as the international factors. In South Korea, as an authoritarian regime gave way to more democratic administrations in the late 1980s, the government could no longer brush aside, in the name of “national interest,” the people’s demand for a more assertive stance toward Japan. At times the government even actively politicized such demands to its own advantage. Japan’s domestic situation became more erratic as well. Muddling through the “lost decade,” many segments of Japanese society, in the 1990s, sought to vent frustration through conservative politics. In the realm of foreign relations, this was translated into an “assertive diplomacy” befitting Japan’s national stature. Japan’s postwar generation of young politicians, in particular, felt uninhibited by its past history of aggressions and strove for a Japan that could proudly exhibit its presence with authority.

It does not suffice, however, to attribute the South Korean–Japanese cacophonous relations to regional settings and domestic politics. Equally important was the human factor; Japanese politicians and commentators frequently made volatile antagonizing comments on South Korean–Japanese relations, and South Korean audiences, for their part, overreacted. Leaders on both sides failed to recognize the importance of bilateral relations and strategically manage thorny issues such as the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro to the Yasukuni shrine, where Japanese war heroes as well as alleged war criminals are honored; the Japanese government’s approval of history textbooks which South Korea has claimed justified and glorified Japan’s wartime military aggression against its Asian neighbors, including Korea; and disputes over the sovereignty of Tok-to. The Japanese leaders’ apparent callousness to Koreans’ historical wounds, along with their Korean counterparts’ angry responses, ultimately strained relations between the two countries.

During the rule of Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, Korean-Japanese ties were relatively smooth. Then President Kim Young-sam, despite his initial pledge to work closely with Japan, became reckless and vowed to “fix their bad
habits” and “teach Japan a lesson.”
¹⁴
In contrast, his successor, Kim Dae-jung, established a milestone in bilateral relations by announcing a “twenty-first-century partnership with Japan,” starting with a pledge to lift the ban against Japanese cultural products and enthusiastically promote civil and economic exchanges. His counterpart, Obuchi Keizo, was the perfect partner for Kim’s drive, as the two leaders worked to improve relations, moving unresolved historical issues to the back burner. In October 1998 South Korea finally began its first phase of cultural exchanges with Japan, starting with movies, videos, and comics. The congenial atmosphere, however, drastically changed upon the inauguration of Koizumi Junichiro as Japan’s prime minister in 2001. Criticized for his visit to the controversial Yasukuni shrine, noted above, and amid the history textbook imbroglio, Kim took a hard-line stance against Japan.

In the Roh Moo-hyun–Koizumi era, Korean-Japanese relations were especially unpleasant. Koizumi’s insistence on paying respects to the spirits of warriors, including war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni, inflamed Korean passions. He also displayed a general insensitivity toward the feelings of Koreans and other Asians. Roh protested Japan’s “glossing over” its atrocious colonization, whereas the Japanese believed that Roh was too willing to make concessions to North Korea and was profoundly hostile to Japan.

Like many of his predecessors, President Lee Myung-bak began his office, in February 2008, with energetic ambitions to put the historical row with Japan in the past and prioritize economic cooperation. His pledge to develop bilateral relations based on a “future-oriented” policy had already been stated by most of his predecessors, but before long the vicious cycle of controversy revolved again when Japan asserted its sovereign rights over Tok-to in its disseminated educational guidelines for young students. For Lee, with his vision of “pragmatic diplomacy,” Tok-to was too tempting an opportunity to pass up. His chance came when, in late May 2008, a new guideline for schoolteachers issued by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology declared that Tok-to, called Takeshima in Japan, was Japanese territory. The guidebook had been widely used as the basic material in compiling textbooks, and whereas previous guidebooks did not mention Tok-to, the description of Tok-to as Japanese territory reflected Japanese right-wing concerns about the disputed islets even as the South Korean and Japanese governments were seeking cooperative ties.

In a revised guidebook for use in 2012 and beyond, however, Tok-to was not directly declared Japanese territory but was described as illegally occupied by
South Korea and should be treated “in a way identical with the Kuril islands.” The guidebook indicated that although Kuril islands “are Japan’s inherent territory, they are illegally occupied by Russia.”
¹⁵

Japan further angered South Korea by renewing its territorial claim over Tok-to in March 2010, when the Japanese ministry approved five elementary school social studies textbooks designating the South Korean islets as Japanese territory. One of the textbooks used by fifth graders in 2011 claimed that South Korea “illegally occupies” the islets. Previously only three of the five Japanese textbooks for elementary students had described Tok-to as Japanese territory, but now all five contained descriptions or maps indicating Japanese ownership of the islets.
¹⁶

The Lee Myung-bak administration answered Japan’s fresh claim over Tok-to by insisting that the islets in the East Sea symbolized Korea’s national independence and territorial integrity. Given the persistent, deeply rooted friction between the two countries, particularly the clash over the sovereignty of Tokto, the bilateral relationship has always been unstable.

On 24 August 1992 South Korea and China normalized their diplomatic relations, ending 43 years of antagonism. Over the years of diplomatic normalization, the relationship between the two countries has been “hot in economics but strange in politics.” In other words, non-economic dimensions of the relationship have not caught up with the existing cooperation in economic dimensions.

Following normalized relations, the economic partnership between the two countries has grown increasingly strong as a result of geographical proximity and flourishing regional economic cooperation between Northeast Asian countries. Over the last decade China has become a land of opportunity for South Korea, with the vast Chinese market serving as a new direction for Korean companies with declining competitiveness in the U.S. market. Bilateral trade between South Korea and China that totaled a mere $6.3 billion in 1992 stretched 22.7 times, amounting to $145.3 billion by 2007. In 2003, China eclipsed the United States as South Korea’s largest export destination. China also outdid Japan to become South Korea’s top import market in 2007. The two-way trade made China Korea’s top trading partner and biggest source of trade surpluses, and made South Korea China’s third-largest trading partner. Investment was another pillar of this increasingly interdependent relationship, as South Korea’s
cumulative investment in China, amounting to $39 billion, already surpassed its investment in the United States. Tourism between the two countries also surged from 9,000 visitors in 1988 to more than 4.8 million in 2006, with over 300 flights a day, easily outnumbering those between South Korea and the United States.

Listing positive accomplishments alone, however, does not reflect the whole of this crucial yet complex bilateral relationship. China remained North Korea’s biggest ally, and it also lost popularity among South Koreans when, recently, it distorted ancient Korean history in order to integrate the ancient Korean kingdoms of Old Chos
ŏ
n, Puy
ŏ
, Parhae, and particularly Kogury
ŏ
into its own history. In late May 2008 China ridiculed the South Korean–U.S. alliance as “a historical relic and a leftover of the Cold War,” an outdated mechanism hardly relevant to today’s international and regional security issues. China also stressed that it would continue to build friendly relations with North Korea. South Koreans replied by pointing out that if the
ROK
–U.S. alliance was a historical relic, then the China–North Korea relationship was also a relic, as the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Assistance between China and North Korea calls for automatic military involvement of the two parties in case of war. China’s criticism reflected its unease with strengthening ties between South Korea and the United States that were bolstered by the Lee Myung-bak administration. Lee’s predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun, had sought closer cooperation with China and looser ties with the United States.

South Korean–Chinese cooperation was mainly limited to the economy, trade, and investment. Whereas North Korea and China were as close as “lips and teeth,” as the catchphrase has it, South Korean–Chinese relations were remote both politically and diplomatically. As China unilaterally supported North Korea’s provocations against South Korea in 2010, South Koreans became discontent with China’s supportive gestures and wished that China would, instead, be curbing its communist ally.

Bilateral relations between South Korea and China would continue to be strained. Although China remains an important trading partner for South Korea and therefore good relations with China are necessary, it is not South Korea’s “friend” politically. China’s strategic goals for dominance in Northeast Asia would not be fully compatible with South Korea’s interests, as China seeks to draw South Korea out of the U.S. orbit and into its own. Under these circumstances, the core of South Korean diplomacy is its relationship with China, not North Korea.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, under President Boris Yeltsin North Korea was seen in Russia as a persona non grata. During this period Russian policy toward the Korean peninsula was strictly a unilateral rapprochement with South Korea. Russia’s self-imposed alienation from North Korea and consequent loss of influence over the communist country harmed the prospects for improvement in North Korean–Russian relations. A change occurred in the second half of the 1990s, as Russia pursued new approaches to the Korean peninsula in order to recover its lost leverage in the region. It sought to improve its relations with North Korea and take a balanced position on the whole Korean peninsula.

At the same time Russia continued to strengthen its ties with South Korea, particularly in economic areas. The two countries worked together on constructing a bilateral industrial complex in the Nakhodka Free Economic Area in Russia’s Far East and on the development of gas fields in Irkutsk. The two sides also agreed to cooperate on reconnecting a planned inter-Korean railroad with the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Russia expressed interest in becoming a conduit for South Korean exports to Europe, which now go by ship, by linking the Korean and Trans-Siberian railroads. South Korea and Russia cooperated in the space program as well. South Korea, with Russian assistance, launched its domestic satellites in 2009 and 2010, respectively, both of which resulted in failure. Politically, since 2003, the two countries have been participants in the six-party talks on the North Korean nuclear weapons issue.

South Korea and Russia have had several overlapping interests and considerable capabilities for developing cooperation in the areas of security, economic modernization, and regional stability. Regarding security, the two countries’ common interests have included denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Economically, the two countries have complemented each other as a major energy consumer and producer. On the issue of regional stability, the rise of China has aroused the keen interest of both South Korea and Russia in either preserving the existing power balance or making even more room for their own participation in shaping the region’s future institutional architecture.

Following the end of the Korean War, the “maritime civilizations” of South Korea, the United States, and Japan clashed with the “continental civilizations” of North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union. After the U.S.–Soviet confrontation collapsed in the early 1990s, the Cold War structure disintegrated.
Since the 2000s, with the rise of China as a global power, the situation has returned to the status quo ante.

How, when, and even whether Korea can be reunified has always been the overarching issue confronting both North and South Korea. Deeply ingrained in the Korean psyche has been the idea that Koreans are a homogeneous people with a proud history dating back some 5,000 years, who have inherited the blood of Tan’gun, the mythical founder of the nation. Korea was a unified nation for more than 1,000 years following the unification of the Three Kingdoms by Silla in 676, or at least since the subsequent reunification of the peninsula under the Kory
ŏ
kingdom in 936. Seen from this historical perspective, Japan’s annexation of Korea in the first half of the twentieth century and its subsequent division since World War II are abnormalities in Korean history, and there is a strong desire to restore the nation as quickly as possible to its historical norm as a unified nation.