A History of Korea (109 page)

In a nuclear showdown, North Korea raised the stakes by conducting a nuclear test. The United States did not respond effectively to this deliberate nuclear gamble, and after North Korea’s nuclear test, in October 2006, the United States scaled back its demands in order to keep negotiations going; the Americans returned North Korean funds that were linked to illicit activities, and they minimized concerns about the
HEU
programs and removed North Korea from the terrorism list.

In January 2009, when the Barack Obama administration was inaugurated, North Korea saw an opportunity for much improved relations with the United States. But it maintained tough negotiating positions, which included both a call for normalizing North Korean–U.S. relations before a final agreement to denuclearize and a demand that a final agreement should include elimination of the “U.S. nuclear threat” to North Korea. It was determined, in other words, to remain a nuclear-armed nation until the United States completely abandoned its “hostile policy” toward the Stalinist state. But the United States would not normalize its relations with North Korea until the latter gave up its nuclear weapons.

On 5 April 2009, in a symbolic defiance of the United States, North Korea test-fired a long-range ballistic missile in the guise of a satellite launch. Although North Korea argued that the launch of this three-stage rocket was designed to propel a satellite into orbit, much of the world viewed it as an effort to prove that North Korea had edged toward the capability of shooting a nuclear warhead on a long-range missile, namely, Taep’odong II. The launch did demonstrate North Korea’s significant progress in rocket engineering, and Kim Jong-il’s motivations for the launch were undoubtedly as much for domestic as for international consumption. He wanted to show his continued virility and defiance to the international community and underscore the atmosphere of crisis that warranted the people’s continued sacrifice in the face of an external threat that only he could guard them against.

South Korea, the United States, and Japan were united in criticizing the rocket launch, whereas China and Russia urged restraint. But nine days after North Korea fired the rocket, the
U.N.
Security Council unanimously adopted a statement accusing the communist country of violating an earlier
U.N.
resolution barring ballistic missile activity. Responding to the statement, North Korea announced that it would resume its nuclear weapons program, never again participate in the moribund six-party denuclearization talks, and even conduct another nuclear test.

On 25 May 2009 North Korea declared that it had successfully conducted its second nuclear test—reportedly many times larger than the 2006 test—as a major provocation in the escalating international standoff over its rogue nuclear and missile programs. The test clearly informed the international community that the recalcitrant communist state would not give up its nuclear weapons program. Now, using its long-range missiles, North Korea could fire nuclear weapons at major U.S. cities, and although North Korea might be deterred from doing so in peacetime, in a war with its neighbors the regime might believe that a nuclear weapon demonstration would coerce the United States into abandoning its “nuclear umbrella” support for South Korea and Japan. The United States would be reluctant to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the superpower knew that North Korea could also use nuclear weapons against U.S. cities. To justify these risks, North Korea might have perceived that any war with its neighbors and the United States would be a war for regime survival.

The second nuclear test triggered a swifter, stronger, and more uniform wave of international condemnation than the first one had in 2006. Denouncing the
U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1874, which imposed financial, trade, and military sanctions on North Korea and for the first time called on
U.N.
member states to seize banned North Korean weapons and technology that were found aboard ships on the high seas, North Korea vowed to go ahead with uranium enrichment—a second track apart from plutonium to develop a nuclear bomb—and weaponize all the new plutonium it had produced. North Korea’s announcement that it would process enriched uranium to make more weapons was an extraordinary public admission of active involvement in a program whose existence had been denied.

If and when North Korea actually begins the denuclearization process, there would be a long way to go for its completion. After disablement was complete and a declaration was accepted by the international community, a third phase
would be needed to address all aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program. Obviously, however, North Korea would not give up its nuclear weapons program without resistance. There are two schools of thought as to why North Korea clings to nuclear weapons development. One holds that North Korea has been trying to create a bargaining chip to induce the United States to offer economic aid and provide formal assurance that it will not attack the country. Another theory is that North Korea has determined that its security is best assured with a potent nuclear arsenal. North Korea’s strategy has been a subtle blending of both aims, keeping its nuclear weapons program even as it seeks to improve ties with the United States.

For Kim Jong-il’s North Korea, weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, were not only an essential security assurance and a bargaining tool, but they were also an irreplaceable instrument of domestic control and political survival. Therefore, North Korea has had no intention of giving up its nuclear ambitions, missile development, and other weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, with Kim Jong-il’s death on 17 December 2011, theft or the trafficking of North Korean nuclear material has become a source of concern for neighboring countries, specifically the United States.

Many South Koreans have viewed North Korea with a complex mix of fear and kinship. While worrying about the North Korean military threat, they also have seen their northern neighbor as inherent to the historic problem of Korean nationalism. Before the 1990s South Koreans usually were fearful of North Korea, but since then the fear has increasingly been replaced by sympathy and kinship in the new environment accompanying the end of the Cold War and the near-collapse of the North Korean economy.

In the early 1990s the South Korean public, with confidence derived from the successful 1988 Seoul Olympics and continued economic growth, put considerable pressure on the government to make progress in inter-Korean dialogue. On the other hand, North Korea felt extremely vulnerable, especially after Kim Il-sung’s death in July 1994. Reflecting the popular will, South Korean President Kim Young-sam took a conciliatory posture toward North Korea in his inaugural address on 25 February 1993, when he said that the allied nations could not overwhelm Korean “ethnicity.” But since March 1993, as the
North Korean nuclear issue became serious, South Korean opinion of North Korea rapidly deteriorated. In trying to appease the South Korean electorate, President Kim reversed himself in June 1993 and said that he could not shake hands with North Korea if it had nuclear weapons. Like much of the South Korean public, President Kim’s views were inconsistent. He alternated between a hard line against North Korea, calculated to bring about its early collapse, and accommodation to bring about a “soft landing” that would gradually lead to reunification. Because he usually pursued the former, relations between the two Koreas were generally acrimonious. He also often collided with the United States which favored accommodation, and so South Korean–U.S. relations were tense during his term of office.

North Korea’s eccentric behavior contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between the two Koreas. In mid-1995, to cope with its chronic food shortages, North Korea quietly asked its southern brethren for help. In June of that year the South Korean government announced a donation of 150,000 tons of rice to North Korea in unmarked bags. But the rice aid only caused anger in South Korea, when a North Korean local official required a South Korean rice ship to hoist a North Korean flag when it entered port on 27 June 1995. In another incident, the North Koreans arrested a sailor on a South Korean rice ship for taking photographs of a North Korean port. These two preposterous events cooled South Korean sympathy for their northern neighbor; when his ruling Democratic Liberal Party suffered a crushing defeat in the local elections, held on 27 June 1995, in which he attempted to manipulate the food aid to North Korea for political gain, President Kim Young-sam reversed his posture on inter-Korean relations in favor of a hard-line stance.

Inter-Korean relations were further damaged by the abortive North Korean submarine incursion into South Korean territorial waters in September 1996. When a North Korean Shark-class submarine ran aground on the rocky coast of the East Sea and was abandoned by its passengers and crew on 18 September, South Korea mobilized 40,000 troops in a massive search for the North Korean intruders. When South Korean forces ended their intensive search in early November, almost all the infiltrators were killed in firefights and one was taken alive.

President Kim Young-sam declared that South Korea would freeze all contact with and assistance to North Korea until the communist neighbor apologized for the submarine incident. In an effort to appease conservative voters, he also declared a comprehensive review of all government policies on North
Korea. On 29 December 1996 North Korea issued a statement of “deep regret” for the submarine incursion and pledged that such an incident would not recur.

Beginning in late February 1998 the Kim Dae-jung administration pursued the “sunshine policy” to actively engage North Korea. Kim Dae-jung frequently invoked the Aesop fable, from which the policy derived its name, explaining that if North Korea felt the warm sun of beneficence from its southern brethren, it would move toward reform and opening. The Kim Dae-jung administration then made a number of conciliatory gestures and also lowered barriers to trade and other official and informal contacts.

As part of Kim’s sunshine policy, Ch
ŏ
ng Chu-y
ŏ
ng, founder of the Hyundai Group, visited North Korea and completed a deal, in October 1998, that would allow South Korean tourists to visit K
ŭ
mgang-san in return for payments totaling $942 million over six years. Although tourism contributed in part to promoting more inter-Korean economic engagement, it was not profitable for Hyundai, which appealed for a bailout from the South Korean government. Moreover, the unrestricted supply of so much cash to North Korea generated severe criticism from South Korean conservatives.

Even as relations between the two Koreas apparently were improving, in June 1999 North Korea provoked a serious naval clash with South Korea in the Yellow Sea. Although officially ignoring the Northern Limitation Line (
NLL
) in the Yellow Sea, North Korea had tacitly recognized this maritime border. When it wanted to increase tensions with the South for its own purposes, however, its forces deliberately violated the
NLL
. After declaring its disapproval of the
DMZ
in April 1996, North Korea’s intrusion across the
NLL
occurred more frequently. In 1999 North Korea claimed a more southerly maritime demarcation line, which would make the five South Korean–controlled islands a part of its territory. Disputes between North and South Korean vessels had often occurred in this area, and the issue of the
NLL
had periodically arisen during inter-Korean dialogue. In June 1999, a deadly skirmish at sea finally took place.

North Korea had sparked the naval confrontation on 13 June 1999 when it crossed the
NLL
. The communist country had not intended to wage a war but instead wanted to make the
NLL
a disputed issue through continuous military confrontation in the zone south of the maritime line. The confrontation, however, did escalate into a mini-war. Threatened by persistent ramming operations by the South Korean Navy, the North Korean patrol boats fired first. They were
answered by a hail of fire from more modern and better-armed southern vessels, initiating a 14-minute gun battle. North Korea not only lost the battle and failed to make the
NLL
a disputed zone but also experienced its first defeat in battle since the Korean War.

In early 2000 Kim Dae-jung was determined to hold a summit meeting with Kim Jong-il at any cost. On 20 January 2000 he publicly proposed a summit with his northern counterpart to discuss issues of mutual cooperation, peaceful coexistence, and peaceful reunification. On 8 April the negotiators from both Koreas secretly agreed in Shanghai that a summit meeting would be held in Pyongyang on 12–14 June 2000.

After a last-minute postponement, Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il began their three-day summit on 13 June. The two leaders discussed a variety of matters and issued a joint declaration, stating their intention to achieve reunification based on the Korean people’s initiative, promptly settle humanitarian issues, build mutual confidence by promoting economic cooperation, promote inter-Korean dialogue between relevant authorities from both Koreas, and plan for Kim Jong-il’s reciprocal visit to Seoul.
⁹

Why did Kim Jong-il accept his southern counterpart’s invitation to a summit? First, Kim Dae-jung skillfully prepared the climate for a meeting. Second, North Korea’s desperate economic needs made a summit attractive. Third, Kim Jong-il expected that an inter-Korean summit would generate U.S. action to remove economic sanctions. Finally, he secretly received $200 million from the Kim Dae-jung administration. The opposition party protested that the Kim government had “bought” the summit. In mid-February 2002 Kim Dae-jung apologized to the South Korean public over the scandal, saying that he had sought only to promote “peace and the national interest.”