Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (7 page)

His initial pessimistic view was based on two points that eventually proved erroneous. The first point was that the Portuguese army and militia would be incapable of playing their part in the defence of Portugal. Fletcher’s view on the quality of the Portuguese troops was common amongst the British officers, Jones commenting ‘I am of opinion we shall embark and leave the French in quiet possession of Lisbon, for I fear we can place but little reliance on the Portuguese fighting’. The second point was that the French would take possession of the south bank of the Tagus, meaning that supplies could not be brought in by sea. This concern was also shared by Wellesley who wrote on 9 April 1809, just before he left for Portugal, ‘I have long determined to fortify the heights of Almada, so as to be able to hold them with a small body of men, as the first step I should take on my arrival’.
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This was eventually done, but not for another eighteen months.

Fletcher commented again a few days later on the planned fortification of Lisbon:

The Portuguese are doing little or nothing to their entrenchments immediately covering the town of Lisbon. Sir John Craddock considers the fortifying and defending this line as exclusively a concern of their own. Upon an extent of six miles they have now a hundred and sixty nine men employed though I have [stated] in the strongest way the necessity of having at least some thousands constantly at work if they mean to fortify it. I have twice seen their Minister at War who promises great things; but I confess I have but little confidence of any good effects from his exertions. I have Lieutenant Wedekind in Lisbon to assist the Portuguese engineers.
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Fletcher initially formed a good working relationship with Sir John Craddock, commenting ‘I have the pleasure of being on the best possible terms with Sir John Craddock, and Mr Villiers [Envoy to the Court of Portugal] certainly treats me with the most unlimited confidence. He and the General do not, perhaps pull remarkably well together, so that I hardly know how to manage between them.’
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Most engineer officers were assigned to the army brigades, but Fletcher did not assign Chapman as he found him very useful and wanted him to stay close to headquarters. Mulcaster was also attached to headquarters as Adjutant. Burgoyne and Boothby were assigned to the right column under General Mackenzie, Williams to the centre column and Hamilton and Rice Jones to the left column. Jones had been originally ordered to remain in Lisbon and work on the defences, much to his disappointment, but Chapman had taken up his case and persuaded Fletcher to send Lieutenant Wedekind back to Lisbon and allow Jones to join Murray’s brigade. In a youthful show of ingratitude, Jones now applied to be assigned to the cavalry brigade of Major-General Cotton as he thought ‘he should like the active service of a dragoon brigade’.
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Craddock started moving his troops north out of Lisbon, establishing his headquarters at Sobral, and Fletcher travelled with him, stopping at Runa on 15 April and Caldas the next day. On 18 April, Fletcher rode to Peniche, with a caustic comment in Mulcaster’s diary that they ‘could not find the level country mentioned by Landmann to exist near this place’.
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This I assume is a reference to the report that Landmann was ordered to produce in 1808 and took some months to be completed. Chapman and Mulcaster were sent to repair a bridge on the army’s route to Alcobaça, but finding it could not be repaired to take the weight of artillery they improved the riverbed at the nearby ford. By 23 April the advance guard under General Hill had reached Pombal. News now arrived that Wellesley was at Lisbon. Fletcher was anxious about how he would get on with Wellesley, writing:

As an individual I am not glad of the change as nothing can exceed the kindness and attention shown me by Sir John Craddock; and as I rather think that any engineer is not likely to be taken into the confidence of his successor. I confess should I not be employed or considered at all. I should be most heartily glad to be removed from this situation, altogether. I find Elphinstone was hardly ever spoken to. However, I hope and trust I may be mistaken.
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Writing a few days after Wellesley’s arrival, Fletcher was clearly still very concerned about how he could work with him: ‘Sir Arthur is very civil to me, but I do not think I shall ever be so much in his confidence … From what I saw in Zealand I do not believe that Sir A attaches much importance to our department.’
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The value of Captain Chapman had been recognised by others and Beresford asked for him to be sent back to Lisbon to co-ordinate the defence of the capital. Wellesley noted in his dispatches, ‘I have sent two officers of Engineers with orders respecting the defence of Lisbon, the Tagus, Palmela and Setuval’.
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Chapman’s brief also included working on the embarkation point at St Julian, a task that was assigned to the second officer, Lieutenant Anthony Emmett. According to Burgoyne this order was to ‘their great annoyance’.
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Wellington joined the army at Coimbra on 2 May for the advance on Oporto. He believed that the capital was safe for the moment and he could concentrate his forces against Soult without any chance of support reaching the French. They advanced with minor skirmishing until 11 May, when there was more determined resistance around Grijó before the French retired across the Douro into Oporto, burning the boat bridge behind them.

On 12 May, Fletcher and his adjutant, Lieutenant Edmund Mulcaster, rode to Oporto ahead of the army to obtain intelligence and then remained with Wellesley during the assault. Burgoyne and Rice Jones moved upriver towards Avintes with General Murray’s brigade to look for boats or crossing-points. The French clearly thought they were safe, with the Douro, 250 yards wide at this point, between the opposing forces, but in an area where boats were used for most transport it was inevitable that some would be found. The inattention of the French just made it easier. Several engineer officers were present at the battle with only one casualty, Lieutenant George Hamilton. Mulcaster recorded ‘He had been sent by General Murray to post the German Riflemen – on his return he met the cavalry on the road about [to] charge. He knew it was impossible to get by them therefore turned about and was the first man wounded at their head’.
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A musket ball passed through one thigh, lodging in the second. It was eventually removed but Hamilton never fully recovered from his wounds and died a year later at Lisbon.

Fletcher took command of replacing the boat bridge at Oporto and work was started that night. With assistance from a number of the Royal Military Artificers the bridge was completed on the following evening.
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The other good news following the capture of Oporto was that the engineer officers Captain Goldfinch and Lieutenant Thomson managed to escape from the French in the confusion. The Allied army pursued the retreating French until 18 May when they abandoned almost all their equipment to avoid being surrounded, Burgoyne and Mulcaster reporting repairing a bridge near Ruivães to assist the pursuit.

The bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, by Boothby
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Fletcher now returned to the routine tasks of an engineer officer and dispatched Burgoyne to survey the course of the river Douro from Oporto to the river Agueda, over 100 miles inland.
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At the same time, Lieutenant Williams was also dispatched to survey the river Tamega. Other engineer officers were carrying out independent roles in central Spain. Lieutenant Frank Stanway was with Sir Robert Wilson and the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, strengthening the defences at the key crossing-point over the Tagus at Alcantara. He also took the precaution of laying a mine on the bridge. When it was approached by a French force on 10 June, Stanway initially commanded the batteries defending the bridge and when there was concern it would be taken, blew an arch.
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Clearly some progress had been made since Corunna, where Charles Pasley complained the engineers had failed to effectively destroy bridges during the retreat. Stanway disabled a bridge that had withstood everything nature and man could throw at it for 1,700 years. I am sure it is something he would not want to be remembered for.

The rigours of field operations were already having an effect, with three engineer officers being unfit for duty and there being too few to meet the demands on them. On 31 May, Fletcher wrote home saying Wellesley had asked for ten more engineer officers to be sent out.
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This request generated a petty response back in England: ‘It seems very extraordinary Sir Arthur should be applying for more Engineers, since it does not appear from his public dispatches that he had made any use of those already with him.’
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Being mentioned in dispatches was important to both individuals and their units. It was the only public recognition of their services and could lead to promotion for the officers involved. The Board of Ordnance was particularly sensitive about how they were reported since they were not part of the army and their relationship with it was often strained. Whilst the Royal Engineers were generally well treated in dispatches, the Royal Artillery had a much more difficult time.

Fletcher’s correspondence shows that he continued to dispatch officers to survey the country. He was clearly trying to build a comprehensive picture as surveys in June and July 1809 included Burgoyne surveying the Minho and the province of Entre-Douro-e-Minho; Jones reported on the route of the river Alagon; Chapman on the fords on the Tagus below Abrantes; Williams reported on the Tagus, Mondego and Sierra Estrella and Jones reported on the River Tietar. The latter reconnaissance was likely done for Wellesley’s planned joint operation with the Spanish General Cuesta.

This constant movement was having a terrible impact on the finances of the engineers, particularly the younger ones. Jones recorded in June 1809 that he bought a pony for 60 dollars as the back of his horse was too sore to ride. The horse that had cost him 90 dollars died later in the month and Jones was faced with the expense of replacing it. When Fletcher ordered him to survey the river Zezere he had to report that he was unable through lack of transport. The nature of the duties they carried out meant that they had to employ a servant to take care of their personal belongings, which as a minimum meant they had to provide three horses or mules. Whilst the military provided basic rations for man and horse, the cost of the horses and servants had to be provided from the officers’ pay. This huge expense was recognised and the basic pay for an engineer officer was doubled when on active service. However, this was still insufficient and there was a constant stream of letters throughout the war from the commanding engineers to the Board of Ordnance complaining about the huge personal expense. This was one of the hidden barriers to being an officer in the military. Without personal wealth it was very difficult to survive on army pay and the higher you rose in the ranks the more difficult it became. An army officer was in a slightly better position as he had some access to regimental transport and could use soldiers as servants, which significantly reduced personal costs.

From Oporto, Wellesley’s army now started moving south, travelling through Coimbra and arriving at Abrantes in early June, the army remaining there whilst the troops concentrated and Wellesley waited for money to be delivered from Lisbon, without which he would be unable to buy supplies as he moved across central Spain. Transport and food remained major concerns for the commander. On 28 June the army moved forward, reaching Plasencia on 9 July. Jones was active through this period surveying the Alagon and Tietar rivers in the vicinity of Plasencia. He noted in his diary that Lieutenant D of the Portuguese engineers accompanied him. There is little evidence that the Portuguese engineers were working outside of their country early in the war, but clearly they were. Jones also recorded being asked by the local junta at Plasencia to identify a spot to place a bridge across the river Tietar. Jones met with Sir Robert Wilson and spent some time at his headquarters. Over the next few days, Jones carried messages between Wilson and Wellesley before arriving at Talavera on 22 July where he was appointed adjutant with a welcome three shillings a day extra pay. Fletcher and Mulcaster also visited the bridge at Alcantara to determine if a repair was possible ‘but seeing [that it] was an undertaking of too great magnitude to be executed without much time, labour, means and money neither of which appeared to be forthcoming the Colonel determined to report accordingly to Sir Arthur.’
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Fletcher had taken the time to find and speak to Senor Miranda, the local master mason, who stated that the repair was beyond him.

On 11 July Wellesley rode to meet Cuesta near Almaraz. A plan of action was agreed and the two armies met at Oropesa, just short of Talavera where the French awaited them. The British army left Plasencia on 17 July and the next day, according to Fortescue, ‘the whole army passed over a flying bridge at La Bazagona’.
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This was the first major bridge built by the Royal Staff Corps, two companies being present under the command of Captain Alexander Todd. Rice Jones’ report, mentioned above, from his reconnaissance of the river Tietar was written on 11 July. In it, he mention the ford at Bazagona as being readily passable, but more importantly states that the roads to the ford were good, I would assume that Wellesley had seen the report before he issued his orders for the placement of the bridge.