Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (15 page)

Bridge over the Tormes at Salamanca

Bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara.

Siege of San Sebastian by Jenkins.

Passage of the Bidassoa by Jenkins.

Contemporary image of an ox cart and driver.

Fragment of memorial to Royal Engineer officers killed at the siege of San Sebastian, including Richard Fletcher.

Away from the Lines of Torres Vedras, the French started 1811 with some success. Soult was finally stung into action by repeated demands from Napoleon that he make an attempt to support Masséna’s beleaguered forces, and proposed a diversionary invasion of Estremadura and the capture of Badajoz rather than direct support of Masséna. With this in mind, he set off from Seville with 20,000 men on 30 December 1810. Wellington, aware of the risk but assuming Soult was advancing to the support of Masséna, asked for the bridges at Merida and Medellin to be destroyed and for the ferries on the Guadiana to be removed, forcing Soult into a lengthy detour. Unfortunately, this was not done and the French took control of the bridge at Merida on 7 January 1811. Whilst Soult waited for his main siege train to arrive, he besieged the weak Spanish fortress at Olivenza, which was defended against Wellington’s wishes by 4,000 good Spanish troops. This decision may have had more to do with politics than strategy. Olivenza had been part of Portugal until 1801 when it was ceded to the Spanish as part of the peace treaty after the War of the Oranges. It was possible that if the Portuguese had thrown a garrison into the fortress, they would have taken advantage of the significant improvements in their armed forces to decline to return it to the Spanish at a later date. Soult’s guns opened against Olivenza on 22 January and the weak walls collapsed immediately, with the Spanish governor surrendering the same day. The Portuguese telegraph system meant that Wellington was informed of this by 24 January. Soult now moved on Badajoz, destroying the large Spanish army under Mendizabal at Gebora on 19 February before the fortress surrendered on 10 March.

This could not have come at a worse time for Wellington. Masséna had finally started his retreat from the Lines on 5 March and Wellington was cautiously pursuing him north, only to find his flank threatened. Wellington had hoped that he could dispatch a force south to relieve Badajoz, but the late arrival of expected British reinforcements meant that he did not have sufficient troops to act against Masséna and Soult at the same time.

The unexpected loss of Badajoz to the French disrupted Wellington’s whole strategy for 1811. His intention when Masséna retreated from the Lines of Torres Vedras was to advance and re-take the fortresses of Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo and then, having secured the northern passage, turn his attention to the south. The loss of Badajoz left both the southern and northern routes into Portugal in French hands, and put Wellington on the defensive. Replying to a question as to his priorities from Lord Liverpool on 7 May 1811, he wrote that retaking Badajoz was his first priority as it dictated his whole strategy for the rest of the year.
¹
Speaking to Earl Stanhope in October 1836, Wellington said ‘Had it not been for the last, [the surrender of Badajoz] I could have blockaded Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo at once; and when I had taken them carried the war to the south’.
²
Strategically, it was vital that Wellington recover the fortress as quickly as possible.

Fletcher and John Jones travelled north with Wellington’s headquarters. A number of engineer officers remained at Lisbon to continue work on the defences north and south of the Tagus, while others, including John Squire and Lieutenant Forster, were with the Allied force on the south bank of the Tagus. As Wellington pursued Masséna north, the French destroyed several bridges to impede pursuit, so the Royal Staff Corps constructed crossings at Pernes, Foz d’Arouce and Ponte de Murcella. The first was constructed from wood taken from local buildings, the second was a trestle bridge thrown across the river Ceira and the third was ‘an ingenious’ raft bridge.
³
Masséna having been chased back across the Coa, the RSC now repaired the bridge below Almeida.

While this was going on in the north, the French continued their operations in the south. They commenced the siege of Campo Mayor on 14 March, which after a brief but heroic resistance surrendered on the 21st. The governor, Tallia, had been told on 19 March that the Allies were marching to his relief but there was no way he could have resisted until they arrived on the 26th.

It was mid-March before Wellington was confident enough about Masséna’s retreat to dispatch a force south for the relief of Badajoz. These troops under Beresford concentrated around Portalegre before moving forward to Arronches on 24 March. The Allied army was now within ten miles of the French at Campo Mayor, who did not appear to be aware of the threat. March 25th saw the French surprised at Campo Mayor and they rapidly retreated back to the safety of Badajoz. Badajoz is located on the river Guadiana and the only bridge in the area ran through the city itself. The next bridge, also under French control, was at Merida, forty miles to the east, so Beresford’s first challenge was to get his army across the river.

The floating bridge over the Douro at Puente Murcella
.

As usual Wellington, although not present, directed operations. Writing to Beresford on 20 March 1811, he said ‘lay down your bridge, and make a tête de [
sic
] pont opposite Jerumenha; and in the first instance invest Badajoz on the left of the Guadiana, doing the same with the cavalry only, or Spanish troops, or militia, on the right’.
⁴

Jerumenha was ten miles south-west of Badajoz and was the closest point to Badajoz where the river was fordable with the least chance of French interference. The plan to rapidly cross at Jerumenha and drive on to Badajoz before the French could finish their repairs now came to a complete halt. Beresford had been assured that a pontoon bridge was available for his use at Jerumenha. Unfortunately, the Allied pontoon bridge had been captured at Badajoz, even though Wellington had asked Mendizabal to remove it during the early part of the French siege. Anticipating the need for pontoons, Captain Wedekind, one of the engineers from the King’s German Legion, had been ordered on 8 March to bring up six pontoons from Lisbon. They arrived at Elvas on the 23rd.
⁵
Unfortunately, these were nowhere near sufficient to bridge the river which was about 200 yards wide at this point. Having surveyed the area, Squire decided that a bridge could be built by putting the pontoons in the deepest part of the river with trestles at either end. Work started on 30 March, with Squire promising to have it ready by 3 April. Through great effort in collecting materials locally, the bridge was completed on time and plans were made for the troops to cross early in the morning of 4 April. Unfortunately, fate once again turned against Beresford’s plans. Overnight, the Guadiana rose three feet, washing away the trestles and making the bridge unusable. Although the first of four flying bridges was set up during the day, it left the picket on the left bank of the Guadiana very exposed. The largest of the ferries could only take 100 men or 25 horses,
⁶
the smallest ‘were not able to carry over more than 16 persons at a time. They were so little buoyant that the smallest weight made them sink.’
⁷

The picket was reinforced slowly over the next three days and nights until the bulk of the army was on the left bank by the morning of 7 April. The French commander, Latour-Maubourg, retreated south to protect his lines of communication, leaving 3,000 troops in Badajoz under the governor, Phillipon. On the morning of 9 April Beresford’s force advanced towards Olivenza. When they arrived there, it became clear that the French had retired, leaving only a small garrison of 400 to block the advance. ‘The Marshal sent Colonel Reynell, his English Adjutant General, to summon the place … the Governor, a Colonel named Neboyer, [said] that he was determined to defend the place to the last extremity; that if his garrison was small he could depend upon it.’
⁸

Although the garrison was totally inadequate to defend the fortress, the decision was made not to risk an escalade and to make a formal approach to the place. A reconnaissance on the afternoon of the 9th determined that the abandoned work to the south of the fortress was the ideal site for a breaching battery. Dickson set off the same afternoon to Elvas to arrange the necessary artillery for the siege. There he selected six 24-pounders which were dispatched on 11 April, each with 300 rounds of ammunition. The same night, the 4th Division, which had remained to carry out the siege, took possession of the abandoned outwork and started work on the battery under the command of Squire, who was still working on securing the passage of the Guadiana at Jerumenha. He reported:

We have completed an infantry bridge of casks across the Guadiana which may be passed by a front of three and have [built?] a tête du pont on the left of the Guadiana for 15 or 1600 men and leave Captain Wedekind to take charge of these works while I am engaged in establishing a breaching battery of five guns against Olivenza.
⁹

It took until 14 April for the guns to arrive, due to the difficulty of getting heavy artillery across the Guadiana at Jerumenha. General Cole, who had been left in charge of the siege, reported:

Having succeeded in getting the guns into the battery during the night, and got everything ready before daybreak on the 15th … I sent a summons to the Governor, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose with his answer, which being a refusal to accept the terms I offered, our fire immediately commenced, and was returned with some spirit from the town. At 11 o’clock a white flag was hoisted by the enemy, and an officer came out with a letter from the Governor, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose with my answer and the Governor’s reply, to which I sent none, and recommenced our fire. After a few rounds a white flag was again hoisted, and they surrendered at discretion, and the Franciscan gate was taken possession of by the grenadier company of the 11th Portuguese Regiment.
¹⁰

The French gained no benefit whatever from the defence of Olivenza, and lost 400 good troops.

The First Siege of Badajoz

The focus now turned to the greater challenge of Badajoz, which was a major fortress with a strong garrison and an able governor. The main problem Wellington faced was that because the loss of Badajoz had been unexpected, no provision had been made for siege equipment in that area. Oman criticised the British government for not providing a siege train for Wellington’s use, writing, ‘The British army in Portugal was absolutely destitute of artillery destined for and trained to the working of siege guns’.
¹¹
On this point he was wrong. At that time, there was a brand-new British siege train aboard the transports at Lisbon. Wellington knew it was there and planned to (and did) use it for the future siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. There was simply no practical way to move it quickly from Lisbon to Badajoz, even if its safety could be guaranteed.

Wellington, still in the north, was considering his next move. He ordered Fletcher to carry out a close reconnaissance of the fortress of Almeida to determine if it could be carried by escalade. Fletcher’s opinion was that this could not be achieved without significant loss. Having discarded that possibility, Wellington and Fletcher now hurried south to review the situation at Badajoz, arriving on 20 April 1811.
¹²
After speaking to Dickson and Squire about the artillery and engineering requirements, he decided to make a personal reconnaissance of Badajoz and arrangements were made for Alten’s brigade of the King’s German Legion light infantry and two squadrons of Portuguese dragoons to escort him. Coming across a French working party, Wellington’s escort was caught between them and a relieving force from Badajoz and roughly handled. George Ross, who had recently arrived from Lisbon, described the incident as follows:

The Duke of Wellington crossed the Guadiana at the ford of Lavadora (just below the Caya) from Elvas and reconnoitred Badajoz. The morning was fine, the ford passable notwithstanding considerable rains had fallen, and the reconnaissance was completed. But I plainly saw an instance of what I had often heard. His Lordship’s unwillingness to leave the slightest operation to any of his generals. General Alten had moved … to cover the reconnaissance. Which instead of being left to him to manage; and notice given him of the points from whence the noble commander meant to view the place, he was desired occasionally to send on two companies as his Lordship was going to such a point, which he did without waiting a moment. To General Alten’s evident surprise he found by this means his little corps quite dispersed. When we came to the first ground before the place, information was given that a detachment of the garrison was in our rear; having gone out with a number of wagons to cut timber on the Valverde road. This was sneered at, and not even a patrol sent to ascertain it. But as his Lordship was returning from his recce on the east side of the place, he had the pleasure of seeing this small detachment with a number of heavy wagons drawn by horses, pass through his scattered troops and enter the place, covered by a detachment which came out of the garrison. Instead of taking this escort which would have depressed the spirits of the garrison, our reconnaissance cost us above 30 killed, wounded or prisoners and I do not hear of more than 2 Frenchmen being taken. Of course the garrison must laugh at such bungling, as it must have appeared to them, and will gain confidence.
¹³

Wellington returned north on 24 April but left three instructions with Beresford. The first outlined the strategy he should follow for the siege and how he should respond if a French relief force was sent. The most important point in this letter was that Wellington authorised Beresford to fight a battle if he felt it was appropriate. It also included clear instructions that if the siege was raised, any stores from Elvas must be returned as the fortress’ resources had been severely depleted to furnish stores for the siege.

The second detailed the siege operations which were to be carried out against Badajoz. As was typical of Wellington, the instructions were very detailed and left nothing to chance. The main points were:

• To establish a flying bridge over the Guadiana below the junction with the Caya.

• To simultaneously lay siege to the outworks of San Christobal, Picurina and Pardaleras.

• Only when these three outworks were taken was Beresford to start operations against Badajoz itself.

• Wellington suggested that the most likely point of attack would be the south face, but left the decision to Beresford.

Most of the responsibility for the failure of the first two sieges against Badajoz must lie with Wellington, as these orders were clearly not practical, as we shall see.

The third memorandum was a letter to three senior Spanish generals in the area, Castaños, Blake and Ballesteros, asking for explicit acceptance of Wellington’s operational plan. Any move against Badajoz was dependent upon their agreement.
¹⁴
Wellington made his views absolutely clear to Beresford on 6 May, writing ‘If General Blake does not positively agree to everything proposed in my memorandum, and does not promise to carry it strictly into execution, I think that you ought not to be in a hurry with the siege of Badajoz’.
¹⁵
The following day he informed Liverpool that he had told Beresford to delay the siege until agreement had been received from the Spanish generals.
¹⁶
It is significant that Beresford did not take any positive steps to start the siege until 8 May, following the Spanish generals’ agreement to the proposals in Wellington’s memorandum. Beresford had been ready to start a few days earlier and the artillery and engineer officers were puzzled by the delay. Overall, the siege was not off to a good start. The lack of siege stores at Elvas, the loss of the temporary bridge at Jerumenha, which provided their primary means of communication across the river Guadiana, and the delays in resolving issues of command meant that eight weeks had passed since the French had taken Badajoz. Beresford heard that Soult was marching to relieve the fortress on 10 May, before the first gun had even opened fire. The day the first gun fired, 11 May, Beresford was already making preparations to raise the siege.

There is some debate about the plan chosen for the siege of Badajoz. According to John Jones, when Wellington arrived at Elvas on 20 April he was

determined to lay immediate siege to Badajoz, if any plan of attack could be offered which should not require more than sixteen days open trenches, as in that period, and the time required to make the necessary preparations for the siege, it was calculated that Marshal Soult would be able to collect a force equal to its relief.
¹⁷

The preference of most of the officers, including Wellington, was for an attack on the southern front. No plan could be developed that would meet the sixteen-day target, normal calculations for such an attack indicating that twenty-two days would be required. Jones continued that ‘it was of the greatest consequence to the future operations of the army that Badajoz should be retaken’.
¹⁸
Probably under pressure from Wellington, Fletcher proposed a plan that he felt could be achieved within the sixteen days. The plan was to take the fort of San Christobal which overlooked the castle and once it was taken, to form batteries to batter the old castle walls which would then be stormed when there was a practicable breach. It was also proposed to make simultaneous feint attacks on the other two outworks to mask their real intentions. According to Jones’ diary, these discussions occurred before Wellington’s reconnaissance on 22 April, and Wellington approved this plan after he had examined the fortress.

There is a confusing difference in the accounts at this point. Jones’ published
Journal
described Fletcher’s plan above. This
Journal
also printed Wellington’s memorandum of 23 April, but crucially left out his last point, which stated that all three outworks must be taken before the attack on the fortress began. He also made no mention of feint attacks and suggested an attack on the southern front. Wellington’s instructions do not appear to be the same as Fletcher’s plan. Jones’ original diaries, which he kept at the time, do not specifically detail Fletcher’s proposal. He did, however, detail Wellington’s memorandum including the crucial last point, which was not printed in his published
Journal
. On 8 May, he noted in his diary ‘Fletcher marked out a work against the Picurina redoubt and to conceal from the enemy the real point of attack, it was decided to carry out a false attack against the Pardaleras’.
¹⁹
Later in the diary entry for that day, he noted troops breaking ground for the feint attack against the Pardaleras fort, but no mention was made of the attack on the Picurina being a feint. In his published
Journal
, and in his original diary, Jones made continued reference to feint attacks on the Pardaleras.
²⁰
Alexander Gordon, who was one of Wellington’s aides-de-camp travelled with him to Badajoz. He commented on 23 April, the day Wellington inspected Badajoz, that he expected the attack would come from the south side, after opening against the three outworks.
²¹
A later letter still talked about taking all three outworks.
²²