War Without Garlands: Operation Barbarossa 1941-1942 (46 page)

‘[
The Russian tank
] starts firing with its machine guns, but half-heartedly, as if it merely wanted to test them. It advances swiftly down the slope toward us, then, without warning, it describes a wide half-circle and doubles back on its tracks, blazing away with its cannon. One could almost believe that it was looking for someone, that it was calling someone.’

The Russian infantry attack that followed was similarly surreal:

‘Presently some men emerge from the corn and proceed to wander about the hillside, making no attempt to conceal themselves. Others emerge at various points. All told they must number about a hundred. Evidently this is some rearguard detachment or perhaps a detachment that has been cut off from the main body. The men seem to hesitate. They are seeking a way of escape.’

Leutnant Weil, the officer accompanying Malaparte, unlike the majority, knew the plan.
‘Arme Leute
[poor fellows] – poor bastards,’ he said. The Russian soldiers spotted the Panzer column and advanced down the hill towards it, firing as they came.

‘Then suddenly they vanish. There must be a dip in the ground at that point, a depression in the hillside. Around the tank can be seen the tiny chunks of turf thrown up by the shells of our mortars. The stutter of machine gun fire spreads along the flank of the column like a message tapped out in morse. Then some German soldiers appear over to our right, walking with their heads down, firing at the Russians. They advance in a line, blazing away with their sub-machine guns. An anti-tank gun fires a few rounds at the Russian tank. And now the outlines of two Panzers appear on the brow of the hill, immediately behind the Russian tank.’
⁽⁴⁾

Scores of such flanking and minor tactical encirclements made up the flow of the German Panzer advance. They were unstoppable, but progress was not necessarily easy.

Occasionally there was time for pathos. After the skirmish, Russian bodies alongside the knocked-out tank were checked for signs of life. There’s nothing we can do,’ concluded the medical orderly.

‘One of the Germans looks around for some flowers; there are only red flowers in the corn, a species of poppy. The soldier hesitates before these flowers, then he gathers an armful of corn, with which he covers the faces of the two dead Russians. The others look on in silence, nibbling hunks of bread.’

Interestingly, Malaparte observed he did not bother to cover the faces of the Mongolian soldiers.
⁽⁵⁾

Despite the signs of impending encirclement at Kiev and the consequent likelihood of a catastrophic situation developing on the southern front, Stalin rejected suggestions that Russian troops be withdrawn to more defensible positions. On the contrary, he sought to increase the already over-manned Ukrainian capital garrison, being prepared to strip other sensitive sectors of the front to do so. German moves were interpreted as a diversionary feint to focus attention away from Moscow, the main objective, which he expected to receive an all-out attack prior to the autumn rains. A speedy resolution of the immense and technically complex issues which the German side would have to solve to create an envelopment was beyond the comprehension of Soviet staff officers with far less experience. There was, indeed, no historical precedent – which may have stimulated suspicion – to compare. Michael Milstein, an officer on General Zhukov’s staff, gave his view on the impending catastrophe after the war:

‘Firstly, the German Army had a colossal and overwhelming superiority. Secondly, we lacked the necessary combat experience. The third factor was Stalin’s interference, which like Hitler [
later
] was to have tragic consequences for the German Army’s advance. In this instance it appeared we did not withdraw from the area in time.’
⁽⁶⁾

The potential for catastrophe was not appreciated. Zhukov was relieved as Chief of the Red Army General Staff and down-graded to a reserve front at Leningrad for having the temerity to suggest surrendering Kiev and withdrawing the exposed South-west Front to more defensible positions. Marshal Budenny, who commanded this sector of the front, was given an unambiguous order: not a step backwards, hold and if necessary die’. Dimitrij Wolkogonow, a young Soviet staff officer, assessed the likelihood of anyone questioning such an order:

‘All dictators are similar in certain respects. Victories are explained in terms of genius and of personal merit. But when dictators experience defeat, they attempt to pass the guilt to those executing their orders – the generals, for example.’

Stalin had already relieved about 100 military commanders in 1941, including an array of generals. General Pavlov was removed after the initial catastrophic week on the western frontier and was arrested alongside Klimowskich, the front signals commander, with one other army commander and several other generals. They were executed. Wolkogonow summed up, pointing out that ‘Stalin forced his military commanders to produce successes through such stern measures.’
⁽⁷⁾

On 9 September Col-Gen Michael P. Kirponos, commanding Soviet forces around Kiev, was ordered by Marshal Budenny, the front commander, to begin preparing for an ‘orderly phased withdrawal’ to escape the approaching encirclement and prepare to counter-attack. Stalin was familiar with this theatre of operations, having served there in 1918. He took close interest, having determined to fight in its defence. As a precaution he ordered the evacuation of industrial plant eastwards. He further conferred regularly with the Kiev High Command hierarchy, and installed a telegraph machine in the Kremlin for this purpose. Kirponos, Budenny and Nikita Khrushchev, the political commissar commander (and later Soviet premier) constantly raised the issue of withdrawal at these conferences. Alexander M. Wassiliwski, Stalin’s Deputy Chief of the Red Army General Staff, recalled his ruler ‘flying into a rage’ on hearing of the ‘absolute necessity’ to give up Kiev recommended by his commanders. Orders were issued to cancel the withdrawal set in motion. ‘Take all possible and impossible measures,’ he ordered, ‘to defend Kiev.’ Two days later Kirponos appealed again for flexibility, but Stalin was uncompromising. He adamantly declared:

‘Kiev is not to be given up and the bridges are not to be blown without STAVKA authority. Kiev was, is and will be – Soviet. No withdrawal is allowed. Stay and hold, and if necessary die! Out!’

Kirponos, at the other end of the telegraph, responded with a tired resignation. ‘Your orders are clear – out. Farewell.’
⁽⁸⁾

Generaloberst Guderian’s Panzergruppe 2 had started south on 23 August on a blisteringly hot summer day. Armoured columns began raising immense clouds of impenetrable dust. The 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions moved with the 10th Motorised Infantry Division, supported directly behind by the 2nd SS Division ‘Das Reich’. They attacked due south. The 3rd Panzer Division was typically subdivided into three mixed
Kampfgruppen
(battle groups) of Panzers, motorised infantry and artillery with anti-tank units. Primitive sandy road conditions reduced progress to no more than 70km before columns had to be refuelled. After 40km the lead battle group – Kampfgruppe ‘Lewinski’ – passed the first road sign bearing the distinctive Cyrillic characters which indicated they were entering the Soviet Socialist Republic of the Ukraine. General Guderian’s initial response on hearing his army was to move into the Ukraine and then back toward Moscow was, ‘I doubt if the machines will stand it, even if we are unopposed.’
⁽⁹⁾
Encirclement battles at Minsk and Smolensk had already exacted a considerable toll. His Panzer divisions were on average only at 45% effective strength. Exceptions were the 10th Panzer Division at 83% and the 18th at 57%.
⁽¹⁰⁾

The troops, nevertheless, were in buoyant mood. Roads were firm with few swampy areas and the weather was sunny and clear. It was Sunday, typical ‘cavalry weather’ or in other words ‘Panzer weather’, according to the 3rd Division official historian. After three hours’ driving, a Russian transport column was surprised and caught on the road. The enemy abandoned their
Panje-wagons
and fled into the sunflower fields. As the Panzer spearhead breasted another rise they came across a huge column of Russian lorries passing left to right. The line of vehicles consisted of artillery batteries, logistic units, engineers, tractors,
Panje-wagons
and mounted Cossacks riding security supported by two armoured cars. Lead Panzers shot a gap through the column and the spearhead passed on through the stream of milling Russian vehicles.
⁽¹¹⁾

On 24 August an advance battle group from the 3rd Panzer Division captured the 700m-long bridge spanning the River Desna at Novgorod Seversk. So rapid was the assault that the Pionier platoon commander was overtaken by the lead Panzer company as he removed high explosive charges from the bridge and tossed them into the water. Having crossed, strong resistance was encountered from units of the Soviet Twenty-first Army. Its commander was becoming increasingly alert to the sinister implications of this powerful Panzer force, driving south-east, well over 200km east of Kiev.

The 2nd SS Division ‘Das Reich’ captured another bridge on the division’s right flank at Makoshim, after a daring assault by its motorcycle infantry reconnaissance battalion. Stuka dive-bomber air support had been frustratingly delayed. As the SS soldiers began to prepare the bridgehead against inevitable Russian counter-attacks, the missing Stukas appeared and howled into the attack, dive-bombing their own troops. Forty Waffen SS soldiers were killed.
⁽¹²⁾

Between 25 August and 7 September the 3rd Panzer Division fought a number of heavy battles south of Shostka, advancing only a further 55km south.

Generalfeldmarschall von Bock, the commander of Army Group Centre, monitoring Guderian’s progress from afar, was becoming increasingly frustrated at the imposed redirection of his main armoured thrust away from Moscow. Army Group Centre’s stalled infantry were now enduring intense punishment from Russian counter-attacks directed at the Yelnya salient, where some ground had to be given up. On 30 August he sullenly confided to his diary, ‘the idea of an offensive on my front thus appears to be dead’. He noted the next day, ‘the Panzer group [Guderian] is being attacked on both flanks and is in a difficult situation’. On 2 September Guderian was demanding more forces to support his southern advance, following the loss of the 10th Motorised Infantry Division bridgehead south of the River Desna. ‘Guderian’s description of the situation was so pessimistic,’ declared von Bock, ‘that I had to decide if I should propose to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army [Halder] that the armoured group be pulled back across the Desna.’

Even the Führer felt the tension emanating from this ambitious enterprise. Guderian, he insisted, should be concentrating his forces for the drive south. Generalfeldmarschall Keitel telephoned von Bock twice on 4 September and stated, ‘if the Army Group and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army don’t intervene with orders, the Führer will do it.’ Guderian became so headstrong and irritated at the perceived lack of support from his army commander that von Bock felt, ‘I finally had to ask for his relief.’ On 5 September he admitted, ‘I cannot hide my worries about new difficulties with this outstanding and brave commander.’
⁽¹³⁾
Tension was not a solely Russian prerogative. On the following day, the weather broke. Torrential summer storms turned the roads into a quagmire.
Kriegsmaler
Theo Scharf observed, ‘half an hour of deluge would turn the unmade roads in the rich red soil into knee-deep melted chocolate, bogging down every vehicle, except the fully tracked ones.’
⁽¹⁴⁾
Movement began to grind to a halt.

General Halder visited von Rundstedt’s Army Group South headquarters on 7 September and agreed final details for a plan involving both Army Group South and Army Group Centre. It directed that all enemy in the Kiev–Dnieper–Desna bend were to be destroyed and the city of Kiev taken. The Panzer envelopment shaping up like Cannae 2,000 years before was imminent. Guderian was to continue his 12-day-old thrust southward to Romny and Priluki with Second Army (infantry) covering his right flank. Army Group South’s Seventeenth Army would pin Soviet forces on the lower Dnieper below Cherkassy and establish a bridgehead across the river at Kremenchug. Von Kleist’s Panzergruppe 1 was to drive northward and link up with Guderian in the Romny-Lokhvitsa area. Six Soviet armies could then be cut off and isolated. Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Reichenau’s Sixth Army was to cross the 650m-wide River Dnieper opposite Kiev and attack the now encircled enemy forces in the city. Panzergruppe 1 was down to 331 armoured fighting vehicles, which was 53% of its campaign start-state.
⁽¹⁵⁾
By 12 September he was over the River Dnieper and the race northwards to link up with Guderian was on.