Two Peasants and a President (6 page)

But such a vast undertaking took more than planning and compliant, naive supporters.  It took money, lots of it, and he really didn’t much care where he got
it or what he had to trade off –
his military, his nation’s triple-A credit rating, the r
espect of the rest of the world.  No
thing mattered more than his grand world vision, nothing, that is, save his own personal power.  It had not gone unnoticed by some that a pose he often struck, lips tightly pursed, chin thrust upward, bore an uncanny resemblance to Mussolini. 

The few of his advisors who weren’t mere sycophants had become more alarmed by the day as he grew further and further removed from the ramifications of his rigid ideology.  He on
ce
said that while at
Boston Co
l
lege
, he preferred hanging out wi
th Marxists
.  Given the abysmal and disa
s
trous results of Marxism in the real world, that alone should have sent up a red sky rocket.  But few of his adoring fans pro
bably even knew who Marx was or how many tens of millions of human be
ings lost their lives due to Mar
x
ism’s
tenets.
  Those who did, like their leader, either blithely ignored or r
a
tionalized away the obvious, meanwhile viciously attacking any dissenting voice. 

The fact that China was calling most of the shots these days was an annoying detail that could have gotten in the way of the president’s grand dream had he not found it so easy to overlook.  He was only too happy to usher the Dalai Lama out the back door lest it offend Beijing to see him coming out the front.  Meanwhile, periodic trips to Beijing by his peripatetic treasury secretary were pawned off on the public as lectures to the Chinese on how they must stop manipulating their currency.  In reality, he was trading
off assurances for more borrowing from the bank of China, assurances that the United States would not interfere in the South China Sea in any meaningful way.  

But the president was making one of the gravest miscalculations of his presidency: underestimating the Chinese.

Thomas Benedict, Director of Central Intelligence, sat quietly in his seat with only a hint of a smile reflecting his thoughts.  He had come to the conclusion tha
t he was one of only three people
in the room, the other
s
being the National Security Advisor
and the Secretary of Defense
, who were neither deluded by the president’s charisma and oratory nor corrupted by the promise of future personal gain.

The CIA chief
had been a four star general with an impeccable record who had been tapped to lead the Agency.  Many thought it more logical for him to lead the nation’s military, but
the president’s advisors had pointed out the he needed Benedict’s
unblemished stature fo
r the nomination to succeed.  They
also knew that as DCI, it would be far easier to hang some future failure around his neck should it become expedient to jettison him.  Equally i
m
portant, from the president’s perspective, he would be
unavailable to be drafted as a
presidential candidate.  Benedict sat quietly
,
watching the wheels turn in the president’s head as he framed a response.

“Tom, find out what you can about what happened out there and get back to me,” the president said.

So that’s it,
thought the director. 
You’ve decided that unless someone can prove the Chinese sank the Philippine vessel, nothing sticks to your suit.  Just sweep it under the rug with everything else.  Somehow, Mr. President, I don’t think that’s the way this one is going to play out.

“Yes, Sir,” he answered. 

8

An hour after leaving the White House briefing, Benedict was in his seventh floor conference room at Langley.  Huddled there with analysts from his East Asia/China teams, he was listening to what his experts theorized may have occurred in the Far East. 

S
arah Ferguson, one of newest in the department, had begun to earn the respect of her peers for her intellect, though she had also stirred resentment for her outspokenness and the director’s perceived inclination to hear what she had to say over some of her more senior colleagues.  Her striking good looks, while not a problem for some, had a predictable effect on others.

“Sir,” she began, “up to this point, the Chinese seem to have focused their activities closer to home, mainly the coast of Viet Nam and to
a lesser
extent Japan.  Aside from asserting sovereignty, their goal appears to be primarily focused on discouraging others from attempting to harvest the abundant natural resources in the area.  But there does appear to be an esc
a
lation.”

“An Indian company signed a three-year deal with
PetroVietnam
and accepted Vietnam's offer of exploration in certain specified areas in the South China Sea.  One
of India's amphibious assault vessels,
the
INS
Airavat
,
while visiting Vietnam, was reportedly hailed at a distance of forty-five nautical miles from the Vietnamese coast by someone identifying himself as the C
hinese Navy and warning that his
ship was in Chinese waters.  The Indian ship took no action and proceeded unhindered.”

“Later though, a Chinese fishing vessel rammed a
PetroVietnam
ship's survey cables while the latter was conducting a seismological survey of South China Sea oil reserves.
Of course, as you are all aware, there was also that incident south of
Chingua
Reef where more than seventy Vietnamese sailors were killed.”

“In regard to the Philippines, previously the Chinese have fired war
n
ing shots near their fishing boats.  Last night that may have changed.  China seems to have been, for the most part, reluctant to engage in outright hostil
i
ties.  The Indian Navy ship that was challenged was a capable warship from a nation with a powerful navy, and it is possible that may have tempered the Chinese actions.”

“On the other hand, the Philippine Navy is a navy in name only and the vessel that was apparently sunk was a relic of WWII and could have posed
little threat to a modern Chinese frigate.  As an interesting aside, nearly every country in SE Asia with a coastline is fortifying its submarine fleet.  Japan alone is adding eight to its sixteen boat fleet.  The Philippines, however, has not a single submarine and are only now making preliminary inquiries into acquiring one.  To China, the Philippines may have appeared to be low-hanging fruit, so to speak, a way to make a point with little danger to itself.”

“But do we have any concrete evidence that the Chinese naval vessel sank the Philippine craft?” asked the director. 

Perry Sparks, the analyst with the most experience in Asian navies responded: 

“Sir, while evidence that it was a Philippine frigate that went down seems compelling, there is no way at this time to connect it with a Chinese warship, aside from radio traffic.  Frankly, I’d be surprised if there were anything concrete at all.  The Chinese typically prefer to maintain deniability or at least uncertainty unless they decide that it is in their interest to be overt.  And right now, demonstrating that they are capable of sinking a far inferior naval vessel would not seem to give them any benefit that a simple threat wouldn‘t accomplish.”

“I disagree with that, Perry,” interjected another analyst.  “By actually sinking a warship, albeit clandestinely, China has upped the fear factor by several notches.   If I were serving on a warship in the South China Sea, I’d want to make damn sure my life insurance was paid up.”

“So the Chinese,” said the DCI, “may have been able to make a po
w
erful statement at little cost to themselves.”  Scratching his temple, he added:  “Thinking out loud here . . . what about the possibility of a Chinese sub in the area at the time?  If the sub did the dirty work while their surface craft maintained deniability . . .”

“I’m
not sure how that would work, S
ir,” the analyst said
.

“If I wanted to sink a ship without taking a chance that it could be pinned on me,
” the DCI replied, “
I might have my sub torpedo it and then claim, perhaps rightfully, that the fri
gate only fired shots across its
bow.  This could provide cover just in case the whole thing blew into more than the Chinese planned for.  Perry, what is the approximate depth of the sea in that area?”

“If it wasn’t
over the shoal itself, S
ir, we’re talking better than three thousand meters.”

“Little chance of recovery or proof of a torpedo hit at that depth,” the director said, almost to himself.  “Perry, contact DOD and see what we have
in the area . . . and if they’ve heard any Chinese boats.”

9

March 10
th
2013 – 0130 hrs
–
50 Miles West of
Mindoro
–
So.
China Sea

The USS Hawaii (SSN-776), on routine patrol off the Philippine coast, was moving silently at a depth of 400 feet.  Third of a currently authorized 18 Virginia Class nuclear submarines, she and others of her class are intended to replace the ageing Los Angeles class attack submarines currently being d
e
commissioned.  Designed as an alternative to the costlier Sea Wolf, she nonetheless incorporates technology not seen before on any submarine.

It was day 71 of
a
90 day patrol.  For a nuclear submarine, the length of time at sea is limited only by the amount of food that can be carried.
 
During a normal cruise, a nuclear submarine typically remains submerged all the time since she is hardest to detect when at depth.  But time on patrol is far more than simply cruising the ocean depths. 

In waters where there is abundant maritime shipping, those who ope
r
ate her sonar may hear a dozen or more (sometimes many more) contacts in a single 24 hour period, ranging from small fishing boats to giant oil tankers and container ships.  These contacts are noted, but without alarm.  The detection of a warship, though, even when no trouble is expected, always elevates the attention level in the control room to a degree.

“Sonar.   Conn.   Contact bearing 1-7-
0, range 16,000 yards.  Twin screws, running at
15 knots.  Sounds like a Type
53 Chinese Frigate, Sir, probably on patrol
,
” the sonar man announced to the executive officer ma
n
ning the
conn
. 

“Conn.  Sonar.  Designate contact 1, identify and commence trac
k
ing
,
” replied the XO.

“Sonar.  Conn.  Tracking contact 1.  Computer thinks it’s the
Yulin
,”  added the sonar man, simultaneously feeding the data for that ship to the command console. 

The XO carefully scanned the information now on his monitor. 
Type 053H3 (
Jiangwei
II Class) Missile Frigate. 100mm deck gun, dual 37mm anti-aircraft artillery, 2 type 87 six-tube anti-submarine rocket launchers.  Not one of their newest,
he thought
, but potent enough. 
At his submarine’s current depth and speed, it was unlikely that the Chinese vessel would detect him. 

“Sonar.  Conn.  Contact 1 has increased revolutions, bearing still 1-7-
0.”

Wonder what our friend’s up to that he’s in such a hurry?
thought the XO.

Typically, a warship moves at the speed which provides the greatest cruising range and fuel economy.  Suddenly increasing speed usually means that it is either investigating or about to attack something.
 

“Sonar.  Conn.  New contact bearing 1-
6
-
0, range 14,000 yards.  Single screw, speed 18 knots.  Likely submarine.”

“Conn.  Sonar.  Designate contact 2, identify and commence trac
k
ing,” replied the XO. 

The game had just become more complex.  Both vessels being tracked are theoretically capable of sinking the USS Hawaii, so respect is due.  But although the control room crew was now more alert than they were a few moments ago, there was still no sense of alarm.  No hostile intent had been evidenced, and the USS Hawaii is one of the most capable and dangerous subs on the planet.  But the surface contact
had
increased speed.  This necess
i
tated evaluation.