The Super Summary of World History (77 page)

Japan knew the Marianas must be held or disaster would ensue. Their fall would cut off oil, rubber, and other war supplies to the homeland from the conquered Southern Pacific areas. Capturing those resource rich regions was the reason Japan started the war. Japan’s Imperial Navy planned an all out air attack on the US fleet to protect the islands. On June 19 and 20, 1944, Japanese Combined Fleet attacked the US fleet, fighting the
Battle
of
the
Philippine
Sea
. During the engagement the
US
Navy
lost
123
aircraft
(80 percent of the crews were recovered), and the Japanese lost approximately
600
aircraft
and
3
fleet
carriers
. Japan’s losses were heavy due to a poor plan and green pilots. After the battle, only thirty-five Japanese aircraft were fit for action. The losses Japan suffered at the Battle of the Philippine Sea were irreplaceable. It was over for the Japanese Imperial Navy. At
Leyte
Gulf
the Japanese navy would sortie out once more, but the carriers were bait, and the surface ships were on a suicide mission.

The Philippines—The Return of the USA

On 15 September 1944, just prior to the invasion of Leyte in the Philippines, the marines and army landed on the islands of
Peleliu
and Angour respectively. The battle for Peleliu and Angour lasted two months and cost an inordinate number of American lives. This landing was a Philippine invasion covering operation to secure the Allied flank from attack. Admiral Halsey thought the Japanese were too weak for offensive action from this quarter and recommended cancellation; unfortunately, the Joint Chiefs allowed the operation to continue. On Peleliu, the Japanese implemented a
new
plan
for
defense
they would adhere to for the remainder of the war. The Japanese defenders settled into well prepared deep-cave positions and awaited the attackers. No suicide attacks, counterattacks, or aggressive maneuvers to hurl the enemy into the sea. Winning entailed killing the maximum number of Americans and nothing else. The best way to accomplish this goal was to avoid exposure to massive American firepower by digging in and forcing the enemy to assault well prepared positions. Fighting on Peleliu decimated the First Marine Division. The battles before Peleliu were bad, but every battle after Peleliu became horrific. Japan’s new tactic significantly drove up the cost of war.

Figure 68 US Assault on the Philippines 1944

American forces under General Douglas MacArthur began operations to retake the Philippines by landing at Leyte Island at the midpoint of the island group on
October
20,
1944.
This landing precipitated the
Battle
of
Leyte
Gulf
(see below). Japan was well aware that holding the Philippines was essential, and months of hard fighting were required to secure the central Philippines. In January of 1945, the US Army landed on the main island of
Luzon
and advanced to the capital, Manila, which was recaptured in March after a cruel struggle. Fighting in the mountains of Luzon north of Manila went on until the end of the war, but the harbor and capital were in US hands again after protracted difficulties with Manila’s defenders.

Hammering
Toward
Victory—The
Pacific

The
Pacific:
1944
to
1945

By the end of 1944 in the Pacific, America was winning in the Philippines and threatening to cut the supply line of oil and other war making materials back to Japan. The capture of Saipan put the home islands within reach of America’s mighty B-29 bombers. Japan had lost the war;
[298]
however, the Japanese Military held a different view. The military believed Japan might be saved from invasion; therefore, they would continue fighting. The Americans and British had demanded unconditional surrender for all Axis forces since the Casablanca Conference. To the Japanese this meant America would
depose
their
emperor
, which was wholly unacceptable. They would die to the last man, woman, and child to preserve the emperor, their god on earth. The unconditional surrender pledge by Roosevelt at Casablanca, made to reassure the Soviets that the West would not make a separate peace with Hitler, backfired when considered against the backdrop of Japanese history and culture. Nothing would make Japan fight on more assuredly than a threat to remove their emperor.

Because of the importance of the Philippines, and the Allied threat to Japan’s supply lines if captured, the Japanese fleet made one more attempt to strike at American naval supremacy
.
On October 23 to 26, the Japanese launched the last of their sea power toward the American landings at
Leyte
Gulf.

The Japanese plan was complex, but it wisely took into account the aggressiveness of the US Navy.

Battle of Leyte Gulf—the Philippines

The key element of the Japanese plan was for its carriers, devoid of aircraft, to sail in from north of the Philippines as bait for the US Carrier fleet. (The Japanese Northern Force) The hope was that the US Navy, and its powerful carrier task force, would sail north to battle the carriers. Then two powerful surface forces would converge on the landing areas. Coming from the south, through the Surigao Strait, was a Japanese force of two large battleships, a cruiser, and four destroyers. (The Southern Force) From the north, through the San Bernardino Strait, came Japan’s force of five battleships, twelve cruisers, and thirteen destroyers. (The Central Force) The Central and Southern Forces were to converge on Leyte Gulf where the US Transports were located and blast them to bits. Attacking transports was a new tactic for the Japanese. They began to see the importance of supplies and, at last, focused their energy on destroying those vital elements of American power.

The plan went better than expected for the Japanese. The Americans, under Admiral Halsey, did chase the Japanese carriers, the San Bernardino Strait was left open, and the powerful Japanese Central Force sailed through and made for the landing zone at Leyte. Everything was set for a total Japanese victory, in that the cargo ships at the beach were unprotected. But, along the way to the landing zone, the Japanese encountered a diminutive force of small jeep carriers and destroyer escorts off
Samar
that was supplying close air and sea support for the troops ashore. The sudden appearance of Japanese cruisers and battleships caused great alarm among the little ships.

Commander of the central force,
Admiral
Kurita
, then blew it by ordering a general attack. He had mistaken the escorts for the larger fleet carriers. In a display of courage beyond belief, the US destroyers counterattacked the Japanese fleet with their tiny five-inch guns and deadly torpedoes. Aircraft from the escort carriers attacked the Japanese ships with machine guns and antipersonnel bombs. During the fight, three US destroyers and three of the escort carriers were sunk. The much larger and stronger Japanese fleet lost three heavy cruisers. The remaining US vessels were escaping when they noticed the Japanese had turned north,
away
from
the
landing
zone.
What happened? Admiral Kurita had ordered his force north to regroup. After gathering his ships, he made a stunning decision. Kurita, concerned about the US Fleet’s return from their wild goose chase,
decided
to
retreat
through the San Bernardino Strait!
[299]
This decision defies all reason. Kurita knew his ships would be of no use later. His ONLY viable course of action was to continue and destroy the American transports and supplies at Leyte.

Meanwhile, the Japanese Southern Force approached Surigao Strait. The Americans were forewarned
[300]
and awaited the Japanese in the darkness at Surigao. US Admiral
Oldendorf
laid the perfect trap. As the trap was sprung the Japanese ships were wrecked by concentrated fire from numerous destroyers, cruisers, and the old battleships of Oldendorf’s line.
[301]
Meanwhile, the decoy Japanese carrier force lost two carriers from American aircraft attacks. Looking at what was accomplished by the successful deception of the Northern Carrier Force, the Japanese plan should have succeeded. If Kurita had destroyed the transports and the supplies it would have spoiled the US capacity to remain on Leyte.

Yet
another
missed
opportunity
for
Japan
. Remember
Savo
Island
? The Japanese cruiser force battered the Allied cruisers guarding Guadalcanal’s supply ships. The transports were dead ahead and unprotected when the Japanese admiral failed to advance and destroy the cargo ships. The reader may recall that at
Pearl
Harbor
Nagumo failed to launch a third strike, fearful of being detected by the missing US aircraft carriers. Another missed opportunity was the
Battle
of
the
Coral
Sea
. The Japanese invasion force turned back after the encounter with American carriers, an encounter the Japanese had not lost. Admiral Yamamoto wanted the fleet to continue on and invade Port Moresby. Had they done so, the Japanese stood an excellent chance of capturing the last Allied bastion on New Guinea. Then, Kurita’s Leyte retreat. At three key moments a major tactical victory was within the grasp of Japanese admirals, and they missed each one (the Coral Sea, Savo, Leyte). What caused the lapses of judgment on the part of these men? In each case the missed opportunity was substantial, and nothing stood between them and victory. Couple the destruction of fuel and harbor facilities at Pearl, the capture of New Guinea, winning at Guadalcanal, plus winning at Leyte, and Allied plans could have been significantly delayed.

The individual decisions of four admirals dramatically hurt Japan’s cause. History illustrates that
often
a
few
people
control
the
hinge
point
of
events
. Different decisions by these four men, while not winning the war, would hand their leaders a better chance at controlling later events. The strategic decision for or against war is the most critical because it is foundational; however, numerous poorly made decisions at the decisive point of battle can doom any nation. The Allies made good decisions throughout the war at the strategic level,
[302]
and the Allied fighting men made good decisions at the tactical level. Given the totality of decisions made by the Allies and the Axis, the Allies did far better.

Submarine
Efforts—Axis
and
the
Allies

Any discussion of the Pacific and Atlantic wars must refer to the US Submarine efforts against Japan and German efforts in the Atlantic against Britain. At the start of the war, US Navy torpedoes were defective. Reports of their defectiveness reached ranking admirals in the navy, but they were ignored. Only after the admiral of the submarine forces threatened to resign were tests run on the torpedoes, and they
were
defective. The problem was the magnetic detectors on the warhead that were supposed to recognize when the torpedo was directly under a ship failed. In WWI the torpedoes had mechanical detonators. The torpedo hit the side of a ship, the mechanical detonator fired, and a hole was blown in the ships’ side. Between WWI and II, torpedoes were improved and a magnetic detonator was invented which detected when the torpedo was beneath the keel of the ship causing the torpedo to explode. This difference was critical because when the torpedo exploded under the keel of a ship it broke the ship’s back (so to speak), the ship would sink faster, and it would take fewer torpedoes to sink a ship—usually only one (for a merchant ship).

The Germans encountered the same problems with their torpedoes; thus, they switched to WWI mechanical detonators and the German submarines had to fire more torpedoes to sink a ship when one should have sufficed. German Type VII subs only carried twelve torpedoes. A German investigation discovered the officers in charge of testing the torpedoes in the Kregsmarine were the same people that investigated any later-alleged flaws. The quality control testers covered up the fact that the detonators were malfunctioning. In Germany, these men were quickly put to death (after a trial, of course). In the US, Navy investigators determined the men originally in charge of testing the torpedoes were the same men looking for later problems with those torpedoes. If these men disclosed the flaws in their original testing they could get into trouble, so they kept quite. Do the facts ring a bell? Only here, the US Navy failed to outwardly punish the men. They just fixed the problem and moved on.