The Sleepwalkers (251 page)

To
quote
a
last
analogy,
we
find
"faulty
linkages"
in
evolution
which
remind
one
of
certain
ideological
mésalliances
.
The
central
nerve
chain
of
an
invertebrate
such
as
the
lobster
runs
beneath
its
alimentary
canal,
whereas
the
main
portion
of
its
rudimentary
brain
is
placed
above
it,
in
its
forehead.
In
other
words,
the
lobster's
gullet,
from
mouth
to
stomach,
has
to
pass
through
the
midst
of
its
brain
ganglia.
If
its
brain
were
to
expand
–
and
expand
it
must
if
the
lobster
is
to
grow
in
wisdom
–
its
gullet
would
be
squeezed
and
it
would
starve.
In
spiders
and
scorpions
something
like
this
did
actually
happen:
their
brain
mass
has
so
compressed
their
alimentary
tube
that
only
fluid
food
can
pass
through:
they
had
to
become
blood-suckers.
Mutatis
mutandis
,
something
on
these
lines
happened
when
the
stranglehold
of
Neoplatonism
prevented
man
from
taking
in
any
solid
empirical
food
for
thought,
and
forced
him
to
feed
throughout
the
Dark
Ages
on
a
liquid
diet
of
other-worldliness.
And
did
not
the
stranglehold
of
mechanistic
materialism
in
the
nineteenth
century
produce
the
opposite
effect,
spiritual
starvation?
In
the
first
case,
religion
had
entered
into
a
misalliance
with
a
nature-rejecting
ideology;
in
the
second,
science
became
allied
to
an
arid
philosophy.
Or
again,
the
stranglehold
of
the
dogma
of
uniform
motion
in
perfect
circles
turned
the
Copernican
system
into
a
kind
of
crustacean
ideology.
The
analogies
may
seem
far-fetched,
which
indeed
they
are,
but
all
they
are
meant
to
demonstrate
is
the
fact
that
such
faulty
linkages
of
a
self-defeating
nature
occur
in
the
realms
of
both
biological
and
mental
evolution.

2.
Separations and Reintegrations

The
process
of
evolution
may
be
described
as
differentiation
of
structure
and
integration
of
function.
The
more
differentiated
and
specialized
the
parts,
the
more
elaborate
co-ordination
is
needed
to
create
a
well-balanced
whole.
The
ultimate
criterion
of
the
value
of
a
functional
whole
is
the
degree
of
its
internal
harmony
or
integratedness,
whether
the
"functional
whole"
is
a
biological
species
or
a
civilization
or
an
individual.
A
whole
is
defined
by
the
pattern
of
relations
between
its
parts,
not
by
the
sum
of
its
parts;
and
a
civilization
is
not
defined
by
the
sum
of
its
science,
technology,
art
and
social
organization,
but
by
the
total
pattern
which
they
form,
and
the
degree
of
harmonious
integration
in
that
pattern.
A
physician
has
recently
said
that
"the
organism
in
its
totality
is
as
essential
to
an
explanation
of
its
elements
as
its
elements
are
to
an
explanation
of
the
organism."
This
is
as
true
when
we
talk
about
the
supra-renal
gland
as
it
is
when
we
talk
of
the
elements
of
a
culture
–
Byzantine
art,
or
medieval
cosmology,
or
utilitarian
ethics.

Conversely,
a
diseased
state
of
an
organism,
a
society
or
culture,
is
characterized
by
a
weakening
of
the
integrative
controls,
and
the
tendency
of
its
parts
to
behave
in
an
independent
and
self-assertive
manner,
ignoring
the
superior
interest
of
the
whole,
or
trying
to
impose
their
own
laws
on
it.
Such
states
of
imbalance
may
be
caused
either
by
the
weakening
of
the
coordinating
powers
of
the
whole
through
growth
beyond
a
critical
limit,
senescence,
and
so
forth;
or
by
excessive
stimulation
of
an
organ
or
part;
or
its
cutting
off
from
communication
with
the
integrative
centre.
The
isolation
of
the
organ
from
central
control
leads,
according
to
circumstances,
to
its
hyper-activity
or
degeneration.
In
the
realm
of
the
mind,
the
"splitting
off"
of
thoughts
and
emotions,
of
some
aspect
of
the
personality,
leads
to
similar
results.
The
term
schizophrenia
is
directly
derived
from
this
splitting-off
process;
"repressed"
and
"autonomous"
complexes
point
in
the
same
direction.
In
the
obsessional
neuroses,
in
the
"fixed
ideas"
and
"fixed
behaviour
patterns",
we
see
parts
of
the
personality
dissociating
themselves
from
the
whole.

In
a
society
or
culture
the
degree
of
integration
between
its
parts,
or
fields
of
endeavour,
is
equally
decisive.
But
here
the
diagnosis
of
dis-integrative
symptoms
is
vastly
more
difficult
and
always
controversial,
because
there
exists
no
criterion
of
normality.
I
believe,
nevertheless,
that
the
story
outlined
in
this
book
will
be
recognized
as
a
story
of
the
splitting-off,
and
subsequent
isolated
development,
of
various
branches
of
knowledge
and
endeavour
–
sky-geometry,
terrestrial
physics,
Platonic
and
scholastic
theology
–
each
leading
to
rigid
orthodoxies,
one-sided
specializations,
collective
obsessions,
whose
mutual
incompatibility
was
reflected
in
the
symptoms
of
double-think
and
"controlled
schizophrenia".
But
it
is
also
a
story
of
unexpected
reconciliations
and
new
syntheses
emerging
from
apparently
hopeless
fragmentation.
Can
we
derive
some
positive
hints
from
the
conditions
under
which
these
apparently
spontaneous
cures
occur?