THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES (137 page)

14
. “A variety of motives lay behind this support: ideological commitment, patriotism… The rhetoric of class warfare in terms of which the [Five-Year] Plan was implemented struck a responsive chord. It promised a return to the heroic tradition of October and the Civil War, an attack on Bourgeois deformities, on NEP-men, kulaks and privileged members of the intelligentsia.” Edward Acton, “State and Society under Lenin and Stalin,” in
Themes of Modern European History, 1890 – 1945
(Routledge, 1992), 162-163. Note the similarity between this rhetoric and the Nazi attacks on Weimar society.

15
. Rosenberg, 164 – 165.

16
. Eugene Genovese, “The Squandered Century,”
Current
(July – August 1995): 36.

17
. Henig,
The Origins of the First World War
, 14.

18
. Vladimir I. Lenin,
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism
(International, 1988 [1916]).

1
. In
Mein Kampf
Hitler gave such an account. Adolf Hitler,
Mein Kampf
(F. Eher Nachf 1941).

2
. Paul Hayes, “The Triumph of Caesarism: Fascism and Nazism,” in
Themes in Modern European History
1890 – 1945, ed. Paul Hayes (Routledge, 1992), 176.

3
. Fritz Fischer,
From Kaiserreich to Third Reich
(Allen & Unwin, 1986), 97; the interior quotes are from his work cited as n. 122 in that book.

4
. Alan Bullock, Hitler:
A Study in Tyranny
(Bantam Books, 1958).

5
. David E. Kaiser,
Economic Diplomacy and the Origins of the Second World War
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

6
. A.J.P. Taylor,
Origins of the Second World War
(Hamilton, 1961).

7
. William L. Shirer,
The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960).

8
. See, for example,
The Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: The A.J.P. Taylor Debate after Twenty-five Years
, ed. Gordon Martel (Allen & Unwin: 1986); and
Paths to War: New Essays on the Origins of the Second World War
, ed. Robert Boyce and Esmonde M. Robertson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

9
. “The march on Rome [was in fact] a mere symbol of a triumph of political intrigue, though in order to satisfy both the squadristi and the need for a myth, it was depicted as a real and important event involving the violent seizure of power.” Hayes, 177 – 178.

10
. May 1924 (6.5%); December 1924 (3%); May 1928 (2.6%); September 1930 (18.3%); July 1932 (37.3%); November 1932 (33.1%). Richard F. Hamilton,
Who Voted for Hitler?
(Princeton University Press, 1982), 476.

11
. Jacek Jedruch,
Constitutions, Elections, and Legislatures of Poland, 1493 – 1977: A Guide to Their History
(University Press of America, 1982); Rett R. Ludwikowski and William F. Fox, Jr.,
The Beginning of the Constitutional Era
(Catholic University of America Press, 1993); Timothy Wiles, ed.,
Poland between the Wars, 1918 – 1939
(Indiana University Polish Studies Center, 1989); Jan Karski,
The Great Powers & Poland, 1919 – 1945: From Versailles to Yalta
(University Press of America, 1985).

12
. Kenneth B. Pyle,
The Making of Modern Japan
, 2nd ed. (D. C. Heath, 1996), 78, 87, 122 – 124.

13
. Ibid., 116 – 117.

14
. Ibid., 125 – 138.

15
. Bernard Eccleston, “The State and Modernization in Japan,” in
The Rise of the Modern State
, ed. James Anderson (Brighton, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1986), 204.

16
. For example, with the Peace Preservation Law of 1925.

17
. James B. Crowley,
Japan's Quest for Autonomy
(Princeton University Press, 1966), 116 – 121. For an opposing view, see Richard Storry,
A History of Modern Japan
(Pen-uin Books, 1960), 186 – 187.

18
. “Teikoku Zaigo Gunjinkai Sanjunenshi,” in Richard J. Smethurst,
The Social Basis for Japanese Militarism
(dissertation, University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, 1968), 22.

19
. Diane Shaver Clements,
Yalta
(Oxford University Press, 1970); Richard F. Fenno,
The Yalta Conference
(Heath, 1955); Edward R. Stettinius,
Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference
(New York: Doubleday, 1949).

1
. W.S. Churchill, Speech at Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946.

2
. H. S. Truman, Address to the U.S. Congress, March 12, 1947.

3
. G. M. Malenkov, September 22, 1947, quoted in Edgar Geoffrey Rayner,
The Cold War
(Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), 17.

4
. NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950, reprinted in
American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68
, ed. Ernest May
(Bedford Books, 1993), 32; see also Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds.
U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader
(New York University Press, 1989).

5
. David N. Schwartz,
NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas
(Brookings Institution, 1983), chapters 1 and 2; Jane E. Stromseth,
The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

6
. See statement by Arthur Henderson, British Secretary for Air, May 11, 1949.

7
. Known as Jiang Jieshi in later transliterations of Chinese nomenclature.

8
. N. S. Khrushchev,
Khrushchev Remembers
, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

9
. This assessment was first broached by a senior Chinese diplomat in conversations with the author.

10
. Although the circumstance of Nagy's judicial murder remain uncertain, the best recent scholarship can be found in György Litván, “A Nagy Imre per politikai háttere,”
Vilá-gosság
, vol. 10, 1992, 743 – 57; and János M. Rainer, “Nagy Imre életútia,”
Multunk
, vol. 4, 1992, 3 – 14.

11
. Letter of President Eisenhower to Marshal Bulganin, November 5, 1956.

12
. Kai Bird,
The Color of Truth
(Simon & Schuster, 1998), 203 – 206.

13
. This doubled U.S. forces in Germany. In the 1950s allied forces levels in Germany were between 240,000 and 250,000. During the “flexible response” period of the mid to late sixties, force levels were just over 200,000. See Horst Menderhausen, “Troop Stationing in Germany: Value and Cost, Memorandum 588 – 1 PR” (Santa Monica: RAND, 1968), 8; and James D. Hessman, “U.S. Forces in Europe,”
Armed Forces Journal
(July 11, 1970): 20.

14
. See the Soviet Reply to Western Notes on Berlin, August 3, 1961.

15
. N. S. Khrushchev, television broadcast, August 7, 1961. See also Lawrence Freedman,
Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam
(Oxford, 2000), 45 – 111.

16
.
Khrushchev Remembers
, 460. This report invites skepticism in light of Khrushchev's antipathy toward Mao. See, e.g., pp. 461– 479, discussing Mao Zedong and the schism.

17
. Bobbitt,
Democracy and Deterrence
, 201 – 202.

18
. In English as “… without firing a single shot” and “… without having to fire a single shot” in
Khrushchev Remembers
, 460 and 504, respectively.

19
. Frederick the Great wrote in his 1747
Instructions for His Generals
: “The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy. Hunger exhausts men more surely than courage, and you will succeed with less risk than by fighting. But since it is very rare that a war is ended by the capture of a depot and matters are only decided by great battles, it is necessary to use all these means to attain this object… War is decided only by battles and is not finished except by them. Thus they have to be fought, but it should be opportunely and with all the advantages on your side… The occasions that can be procured are when you cut the enemy off from his supplies and when you use favourable terrain.” Reproduced in
The Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics
, ed. T. R. Phillips (Military Service, 1955), 173, 213.

20
. Donald Kagan,
On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace
(New York: Doubleday, 1995).

21
. “Son of Late Soviet Premier to Become U.S. Citizen,”
Agence France-Presse
, July 11, 1999.

22
. Charles Bohlen, memo to Secretary of State, April 5, 1950,
Foreign Relations of the United States 1
(1950), 222.

23
. See the views of McGeorge Bundy in this regard, as reported (with some skepticism) in Kai Bird,
The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms
(Simon & Schuster, 1998), 354, citing Department of State Bulletin, February 5, 1968 (speech by Bundy).

24
. Speaking at the Ninth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing, April 1, 1965. Quoted in E. G. Rayner,
The Cold War
(1992), 63 – 64.

25
. Compare Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War,”
International Organization
48 (Spring 1994): 185.

26
. Vladimir Tismaneanu,
Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel
(New York: Free Press, 1992).

27
. Michael Howard, “Hardship, Famine, and Fear,”
The Financial Times
, May 6/7, 1995.

28
. Eric Hobsbawm,
The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914 – 1991
(Pantheon Books, 1991), 12.

29
. Francis Fukuyama,
The End of History and the Last Man
(New York: Free Press, 1992).

30
. Richard Kugler,
Commitment to Purpose: How Alliance Partnership Won the Cold War
(Santa Monica: RAND, 1993).

31
. G. Craig and F. Gilbert, “Strategy in the Present and Future,” in
Makers of Modern Strategy,
ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 870 – 871. This might also be applied with justice to the “limitations determined by political considerations”—though much criticized—applied by the U.S. in the Viet Nam War.

32
. Carl von Clausewitz,
On War
, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976 [1832]), 87.