The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (103 page)
Read The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany Online
Authors: William L. Shirer
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Emphasis in the original document.
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Typical was a vivid report Attolico sent of a talk he had with Ribbentrop on July 6. If Poland dared to attack Danzig, the Nazi Foreign Minister told him, Germany would settle the Danzig question in forty-eight hours—at Warsaw! If France were to intervene over Danzig, and so precipitate a general war, let her; Germany would like nothing better. France would be “annihilated”; Britain, if she stirred, would be bringing destruction on the British Empire. Russia? There was going to be a Russian-German treaty, and Russia was not going to march. America? One speech of the Fuehrer’s had been enough to rout Roosevelt; and Americans would not stir anyway. Fear of Japan would keep America quiet.
I listened [Attolico reported] in wondering silence, while Ribbentrop drew this picture of the war
ad usum Germaniae
which his imagination has now established indelibly in his head … He can see nothing but his version—which is a really amazing one—of an assured German victory in every field and against all comers … At the end, I observed that, according to my understanding, there was complete agreement between the Duce and the Fuehrer that Italy and Germany were preparing for a war that was
not
to be immediate.
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But the astute Attolico did not believe that at all. All through July his dispatches warned of imminent German action in Poland.
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At one point, Ribbentrop, with obvious exasperation, told Ciano, “We don’t need you!”; to which Ciano replied, “The future will show.” (From General Halder’s unpublished diary, entry of August 14.
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Halder says he got it through Weizsaecker.)
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Though the German minutes explicitly state that Ciano agreed with Hitler “that no communiqué should be issued at the conclusion of the conversation,” the Germans immediately double-crossed their Italian ally. D.N.B., the official German news agency, issued a communiqué two hours after Ciano’s departure and without any consultation whatever with the Italians, that the talks had covered all the problems of the day—with particular attention to Danzig—and had resulted in a “hundred per cent” agreement. So much so, the communiqué added, that not a single problem had been left in suspense, and therefore there would be no further meetings, because there was no occasion for them. Attolico was furious. He protested to the Germans, accusing them of bad faith. He tipped off Henderson that war was imminent. And in an angry dispatch to Rome he described the German communique as “Machiavellian,” pointed out that it was deliberately done to bind Italy to Germany after the latter’s attack on Poland and pleaded that Mussolini should be firm with Hitler in demanding German fulfillment of the “consultation” provisions of the Pact of Steel and under these provisions insist on a month’s grace to settle the Danzig question through diplomatic channels.
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THE
NAZI-SOVIET PACT
T
HE “TELEGRAM FROM
Moscow” whose contents Hitler disclosed to Ciano at Obersalzberg on the afternoon of August 12 appears to have been, like certain previous “telegrams” which have figured in this narrative, of doubtful origin. No such wire from the Russian capital has been found in the German archives. Schulenburg did send a telegram to Berlin from Moscow on the twelfth, but it merely reported the arrival of the Franco–British military missions and the friendly toasts exchanged between the Russians and their guests.
Yet there was some basis for the “telegram” with which Hitler and Ribbentrop had so obviously tried to impress Ciano. On August 12 a teleprint was sent to Obersalzberg from the Wilhelmstrasse reporting the results of a call which the Russian chargé had made on Schnurre in Berlin on that day. Astakhov informed the Foreign Office official that Molotov was now ready to discuss the questions raised by the Germans, including Poland and other political matters. The Soviet government proposed Moscow as the place of these negotiations. But, Astakhov made it clear, they were not to be hurried. He stressed, Schnurre noted in his report, which apparently was rushed to Obersalzberg, “that the chief emphasis in his instructions from Molotov lay in the phrase ‘by degrees’ … The discussions could be undertaken only by degrees.”
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But Adolf Hitler could not wait for negotiations with Russia “by degrees.” As he had just revealed to a shocked Ciano, he had set the last possible date for the onslaught on Poland for September 1, and it was now almost the middle of August. If he were to successfully sabotage the Anglo–French parleys with the Russians and swing his own deal with Stalin, it had to be done quickly—not by stages but in one big leap.
Monday, August 14, was another crucial day. While Ambassador von der Schulenburg, who obviously had not yet been taken fully into the confidence of Hitler and Ribbentrop, was writing Weizsaecker from Moscow advising him that Molotov was “a strange man and a difficult character” and that “I am still of the opinion that any hasty measures in our relations with the Soviet Union should be avoided,” he was being sent a
“most urgent” telegram from Berlin.
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It came from Ribbentrop and it was dispatched from the Wilhelmstrasse (the Foreign Minister was still at Fuschl) at 10:53
P.M
. on August 14. It directed the German ambassador to call upon Molotov and read him a long communication “verbatim.”
This, finally, was Hitler’s great bid. German–Russian relations, said Ribbentrop, had “come to a historic turning point … There exist no real conflicts of interests between Germany and Russia … It has gone well with both countries previously when they were friends and badly when they were enemies.”
The crisis which has been produced in Polish–German relations by English policy [Ribbentrop continued] and the attempts at an alliance which are bound up with that policy, make a speedy clarification of German–Russian relations necessary. Otherwise matters … might take a turn which would deprive both Governments of the possibility of restoring German–Russian friendship and in due course clarifying jointly territorial questions in Eastern Europe. The leadership of both countries, therefore, should not allow the situation to drift, but should take action at the proper time. It would be fatal if, through mutual ignorance of views and intentions, the two peoples should finally drift apart.
The German Foreign Minister, “in the name of the Fuehrer,” was therefore prepared to act in proper time.
As we have been informed, the Soviet Government also feel the desire for a clarification of German–Russian relations. Since, however, according to previous experience this clarification can be achieved only slowly through the usual diplomatic channels, I am prepared to make a short visit to Moscow in order, in the name of the Fuehrer, to set forth the Fuehrer’s views to M. Stalin. In my view, only through such a direct discussion can a change be brought about, and it should not be impossible thereby to lay the foundations for a final settlement of German–Russian relations.
The British Foreign Secretary had not been willing to go to Moscow, but now the German Foreign Minister was not only willing but anxious to go—a contrast which the Nazis calculated quite correctly would make an impression on the suspicious Stalin.
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The Germans saw that it was highly important to get their message through to the Russian dictator himself. Ribbentrop therefore added an “annex” to his urgent telegram.
I request [Ribbentrop advised Schulenburg] that you do not give M. Molotov these instructions in writing, but that they reach M. Stalin in as exact a form as possible and I authorize you, if the occasion arises, to request from M. Molotov on my behalf an audience with M. Stalin, so that you may be able to
make this important communication directly to him also. In addition to a conference with Molotov, a detailed discussion with Stalin would be a condition for my making the trip.
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There was a scarcely disguised bait in the Foreign Minister’s proposal which the Germans, not without reason, must have thought the Kremlin would rise to. Reiterating that “there is no question between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea which cannot be settled to the complete satisfaction of both counties,” Ribbentrop specified “the
Baltic States
, Poland, southeastern questions, etc.” And he spoke of the necessity of “clarifying jointly territorial questions of Eastern Europe.”
Germany was ready to divide up Eastern Europe, including Poland, with the Soviet Union. This was a bid which Britain and France could not—and, obviously, if they could, would not—match. And having made it, Hitler, apparently confident that it would not be turned down, once more—on the same day, August 14—called in the commanders in chief of his armed forces to listen to him lecture on the plans and prospects for war.
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“The great drama,” Hitler told his select listeners, “is now approaching its climax.” While political and military successes could not be had without taking risks, he was certain that Great Britain and France would not fight. For one thing, Britain “has no leaders of real caliber. The men I got to know at Munich are not the kind that start a new world war.” As at previous meetings with his military chiefs, the Fuehrer could not keep his mind off England and he spoke in considerable detail of her strengths and weaknesses, especially the latter.
England [Halder noted down the words], unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war lasting for years … Such is the fate of rich
countries … Not even England has the money nowadays to fight a world war. What should England fight for? You don’t get yourself killed for an ally.
What military measures, Hitler asked, could Britain and France undertake?
Drive against the
West Wall
unlikely [he answered]. A northward swing through
Belgium
and Holland will not bring speedy victory. None of this would help the Poles.
All these factors argue against England and France entering the war … There is nothing to force them into it. The men of Munich will not take the risk … English and French general staffs take a very sober view of the prospects of an armed conflict and advise against it….
All this supports the conviction that while England may talk big, even recall her Ambassador, perhaps put a complete embargo on trade, she is sure not to resort to armed intervention in the conflict.
So Poland, probably, could be taken on alone, but she would have to be defeated “within a week or two,” Hitler explained, so that the world could be convinced of her collapse and not try to save her.
Hitler was not quite ready to tell his generals just how far he was going that very day to make a deal with Russia, though it would have immensely pleased them, convinced as they were that Germany could not fight a major war on two fronts. But he told them enough to whet their appetite for more.
“Russia,” he said, “is not in the least disposed to pull chestnuts out of the fire.” He explained the “loose contacts” with Moscow which had started with the trade negotiations. He was now considering whether “a negotiator should go to Moscow and whether this should be a prominent figure.” The Soviet Union, he declared, felt under no obligation to the West. The Russians understood the destruction of Poland. They were interested in a “delimitation of spheres of interest.” The Fuehrer was “inclined to meet them halfway.”
In all of Halder’s voluminous shorthand notes on the meeting there is no mention that he, the Chief of the Army’s General Staff, or General von Brauchitsch, its Commander in Chief, or Goering questioned the Fuehrer’s course in leading Germany into a European conflict—for despite Hitler’s confidence it was by no means certain that France and Britain would not fight nor that Russia would stay out. In fact, exactly a week before, Goering had received a direct warning that the British would certainly fight if Germany attacked Poland.
Early in July a Swedish friend of his, Birger Dahlerus, had tried to convince him that British public opinion would not stand for further Nazi aggression and when the Luftwaffe chief expressed his doubts had arranged for him to meet privately with a group of seven British businessmen on August 7 in
Schleswig-Holstein
, near the Danish border, where
Dahlerus had a house. The British businessmen, both orally and in a written memorandum, did their best to persuade Goering that Great Britain would stand by its treaty obligations with Poland should Germany attack. Whether they succeeded is doubtful, though Dahlerus, a businessman himself, thought so.
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This curious Swede, who was to play a certain role as a peacemaker between Germany and Britain in the next hectic weeks, certainly had high connections in Berlin and London. He had access to Downing Street, where on July 20 he had been received by Lord Halifax, with whom he discussed the coming meeting of British businessmen with Goering; and soon he would be called in by Hitler and Chamberlain themselves. But, though well-meaning in his quest to save the peace, he was naïve and, as a diplomat, dreadfully amateurish. Years later at Nuremberg, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, in a devastating cross-examination, led the Swedish diplomatic interloper to admit sadly that he had been badly misled by Goering and Hitler.
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And why did not General Halder, who had been the ringleader in the plot eleven months before to remove Hitler, speak up on August 14 to oppose the Fuehrer’s determination to go to war? Or, if he thought that useless, why did he not renew plans to get rid of the dictator on the same grounds as just before Munich: that a war now would be disastrous for Germany? Much later, in his interrogation at Nuremberg, Halder would explain that even at mid-August 1939 he simply did not believe that Hitler would, in the end, risk war, regardless of what he said.
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Also, a diary entry of August 15, the day after the meeting with Hitler at the Berghof, shows that Halder did not believe that France and Britain would risk war either.