The New Nobility of the KGB (25 page)
Read The New Nobility of the KGB Online
Authors: Andrei Soldatov
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #International Relations, #Security (National & International), #Intelligence & Espionage, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Social Classes
The battered republic of Abkhazia appeared to be the first target after the bills were approved. Situated at the northwestern corner of Georgia, Abkhazia had once been a desirable holiday destination, but its war for independence from Georgia has reduced the country’s economy to ruins and turned the republic into a close satellite of Russia. Abkhazia is isolated in every sense of the word—except from Russia, which maintains a border crossing and has reopened the railway line to Sukhumi, the capital. To strengthen ties with Abkhazia, Moscow made it easy for local people to obtain Russian citizenship, and most now hold two passports.
At 1:30 P.M. on August 17, 2007, Khamzat Gitsba, a prominent local leader of the radical Muslim community, was shot dead in the center of the tiny town of Gudaouta. Gitsba, nicknamed Rocky because of his intense interest in boxing, was well known in the republic as a war hero during the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict of 1992-1993. He was a member of Shamil Basayev’s Chechen battalion during the war and was one of the terrorists who took Russian and foreign tourists hostage on the Avrasia ferry in Turkish waters in January 1996. After 2000, Gitsba returned to Abkhazia, where he led the radical Muslim group in the region. At the same time Gitsba kept close ties with Chechen rebels and personally with Shamil Basayev, who was married to Gitsba’s sister.
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It was well known that Abkhaz Muslims received financial support from Turkey, where there is a large Abkhaz community, but it is the North Caucasian insurgency that is really interested in this help. Khamzat Gitsba had close ties with the Chechen rebels and their supporters in Turkey, and he was regarded by the Russian secret services as a financial intermediary between the Turkish and Chechen rebels. According to the authors’ information, Gitsba was also responsible for providing asylum for the militants who attacked Nalchik in October 2005 and fled to Abkhazia thereafter. Abkhazia tolerated his presence, partly because of his role during the war for independence, partly due to the weakness of the Abkhaz law enforcement agencies.
Khamzat Gitsba was machine-gunned in front of a mosque by two assassins who waited for him in a Chrysler vehicle. An hour later the Chrysler was found burning. The local police established that the car had been driven across the Russian-Abkhazian border at the Psou River some days prior to the murder. Video cameras at the Abkhazian customs station identified the Chrysler’s registration plates, but because Abkhazia did not keep records of all those driving into the republic, the identities of the drivers were impossible to prove. The Abkhazians turned to the Russian border guards, but the Russians said that such a vehicle never crossed the border.
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One official close to government circles in Abkhazia, who asked not to be named, told the authors: “We have no doubt it was the FSB’s operation: Gitsba was the head of a Wahhabi radical Muslim community, and the government had no other way to deal with it.”
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One official close to government circles in Abkhazia, who asked not to be named, told the authors: “We have no doubt it was the FSB’s operation: Gitsba was the head of a Wahhabi radical Muslim community, and the government had no other way to deal with it.”
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Around the same time, a spate of murders of Chechens occurred in Azerbaijan. Imran Gaziev, deputy chief of the representative office of the unrecognized Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in Azerbaijan, was killed in the capital, Baku, on November 18, 2007. The killer shot as Gaziev was getting out of his car. The gun was left at the crime scene; it turned out to be a Baikal pistol with a silencer. The Baikal is a small, snubnose, black handgun that looks almost like a toy, developed in the 1970s for the top brass of the Army, but Interior Ministry troops and the KGB favored it, too. Fighters from different counterterrorist units use Baikals as an auxiliary weapon, as do many criminals. Due to its ability to pierce bulletproof jackets, this gun became known in the West as “the gangsters’ gun.”
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This first spectacular assassination of a Chechen in Baku was not the only attempt to intimidate the local Chechen diaspora. In early 2007 the Council of Chechen Refugees in Azerbaijan had sent an appeal to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, stating that the situation for Chechen refugees in Azerbaijan had “seriously worsened,” particularly as a result of “threats to the personal safety of our citizens who came to this country in search of refuge and protection.”
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The council referred to incidents involving “the abduction of people,” specifically citing the case of Ruslan Eliev, who went missing in Baku in November 2006. In March 2007, his dead body was found in Chechnya near the village of Samashki.
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FSB agents have been conducting operations in Azerbaijan for years. The most famous case occurred in 2002, when relations between the two countries were significantly worse; five FSB officers were caught in Baku with false documents and surveillance equipment.
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They were expelled to Russia without being charged.
31
The council referred to incidents involving “the abduction of people,” specifically citing the case of Ruslan Eliev, who went missing in Baku in November 2006. In March 2007, his dead body was found in Chechnya near the village of Samashki.
32
FSB agents have been conducting operations in Azerbaijan for years. The most famous case occurred in 2002, when relations between the two countries were significantly worse; five FSB officers were caught in Baku with false documents and surveillance equipment.
33
They were expelled to Russia without being charged.
In the past, Azeri authorities had tolerated Chechens on their soil. But after the Nord-Ost siege, the Chechen office in Baku was closed down. Following the murder of Gaziev, the Ministry of National Security in Azerbaijan had no comment. The finger was pointed at Russia by the local Chechen diaspora, and it seemed to be more than just a conspiracy theory.
By 2007 relations between Russia and Azerbaijan had improved, and the authors’ sources in the Interior Ministry confirmed the existence of an agreement with the law enforcement bodies of Azerbaijan that allowed actions by Russian special units and free passage across the border.
34
When the authors published this information in
Novaya Gazeta
, no denial was ever made by either Russia or Azerbaijan.
34
When the authors published this information in
Novaya Gazeta
, no denial was ever made by either Russia or Azerbaijan.
In 2008-2009, a series of assassinations of Chechens took place in Turkey. Turkey had long been accused by the Russian secret services of providing support to Chechen rebels, as many Chechen refugees had found asylum in the country, mostly in Istanbul. In September 2008, Gaji Edilsultanov, a former Chechen field commander, was assassinated in Istanbul. He was shot dead in the street in the Basaksehir district of the city. Three months later, on December 10, 2008, former Chechen warlord Islam Janibekov was assassinated in front of his wife and children there. He received three gunshot wounds to his head and died on the spot. The Russian magazine
Spetsnaz
, which has close ties to Russian special operations forces, alleged that Islam Janibekov was known in Russia as Urasul and was wanted by Russian authorities for terrorist attacks in the cities of Yessentuki and Mineralnyye Vody and in the republic of Karachay-Cherkessia in the early 2000s.
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Musa Atayev (also known as Ali Osaev), another Chechen rebel, was killed in Istanbul on February 26, 2009.
Spetsnaz
, which has close ties to Russian special operations forces, alleged that Islam Janibekov was known in Russia as Urasul and was wanted by Russian authorities for terrorist attacks in the cities of Yessentuki and Mineralnyye Vody and in the republic of Karachay-Cherkessia in the early 2000s.
35
Musa Atayev (also known as Ali Osaev), another Chechen rebel, was killed in Istanbul on February 26, 2009.
Russia claimed that these were killings due to financial disputes.
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But this explanation left many unanswered questions, and there was some evidence that the killings were troubling to officials outside Turkey. On March 21, 2009, the Turkish newspaper
Sabah
reported a confidential meeting between the Turkish and French secret services in Istanbul. The meeting reportedly focused on the series of killings of Chechens.
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The newspaper quoted the liaison judge Philippe Dorcet from the French delegation, who said: “We have received information from our secret police, the DGSE, that assassinations of Chechens would be carried out in France. . . . Chechen murders that occurred one after another in Turkey attracted our attention; we think the murders in Turkey show similarities to each other. We have established a special intelligence team for Chechens living in France. A Russian connection is being closely examined due to the intelligence that we have received.”
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Sabah
stated that French intelligence services believed the assassinations were planned by the Russian FSB and that the French had moved some of the Chechen leaders living in France to other locations and changed their identities. Istanbul Deputy Chief Prosecutor Turan Cholakkad, who participated in the meeting with the French delegation, told
Sabah
that the murders of Chechens were unrelated to organized crime. But the assassinations did not damage Russian-Turkish relations.
36
But this explanation left many unanswered questions, and there was some evidence that the killings were troubling to officials outside Turkey. On March 21, 2009, the Turkish newspaper
Sabah
reported a confidential meeting between the Turkish and French secret services in Istanbul. The meeting reportedly focused on the series of killings of Chechens.
37
The newspaper quoted the liaison judge Philippe Dorcet from the French delegation, who said: “We have received information from our secret police, the DGSE, that assassinations of Chechens would be carried out in France. . . . Chechen murders that occurred one after another in Turkey attracted our attention; we think the murders in Turkey show similarities to each other. We have established a special intelligence team for Chechens living in France. A Russian connection is being closely examined due to the intelligence that we have received.”
38
Sabah
stated that French intelligence services believed the assassinations were planned by the Russian FSB and that the French had moved some of the Chechen leaders living in France to other locations and changed their identities. Istanbul Deputy Chief Prosecutor Turan Cholakkad, who participated in the meeting with the French delegation, told
Sabah
that the murders of Chechens were unrelated to organized crime. But the assassinations did not damage Russian-Turkish relations.
THE LITVINENKO POISONING made the Russian secret services’ image abroad even more sinister. Alexander Litvinenko, a former FSB lieutenant colonel, had been assigned to a unit targeting organized crime; the group was eventually disbanded but questions had long been raised about its brutal methods. Litvinenko also took part in an open press conference in 1998, at which he claimed the FSB had ordered him to kill the oligarch Boris Berezovsky. Two years later, Litvinenko fled to London and sought political asylum. Russia in turn accused him of breaking FSB rules. In London, Litvinenko was supported financially by Berezovsky.
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Litvinenko kept up the public criticism of the Russian authorities and in a press conference in London he accused the FSB of organizing the 1999 Moscow apartment building bombings. Later he also declared that the FSB was working with Al Qaeda and had been involved in the assassination of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya.
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Litvinenko kept up the public criticism of the Russian authorities and in a press conference in London he accused the FSB of organizing the 1999 Moscow apartment building bombings. Later he also declared that the FSB was working with Al Qaeda and had been involved in the assassination of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya.
Litvinenko died in London in November 2006; British experts determined that he had been poisoned by the highly radioactive substance polonium-210. In his last statement, made from his hospital bed, Litvinenko accused Putin of ordering his killing. The British investigation showed that the nuclear material had come from Russia, and resulted in an extradition request for Andrei Lugovoi, a former KGB officer turned successful businessman in the 1990s, who met with Litvinenko in London on November 1, 2006, and then returned to Russia. The Russian authorities refused to extradite Lugovoi because it was at odds with the Russian constitution. Lugovoi, in turn, flatly denied he was guilty and said someone tried to frame him, and he was deliberately marked with polonium.
The British Crown Prosecution Service has never suggested a motive for Litvinenko’s killing. Unofficially, British journalists briefed by the counterintelligence service MI5 were told that the poisoning had been organized by the Kremlin, but the government did not accuse Russia directly.
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When Russia refused to extradite Lugovoi, the United Kingdom expelled four Russian diplomats from the Russian embassy in London.
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In response, Russia expelled four British diplomats. A joint Russian-British counterterrorism group was disbanded. In Russia, Lugovoi was elected to Parliament, where he was invited to serve on the Security Committee, the same committee that oversees the Russian secret services and writes the laws that govern them.
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When Russia refused to extradite Lugovoi, the United Kingdom expelled four Russian diplomats from the Russian embassy in London.
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In response, Russia expelled four British diplomats. A joint Russian-British counterterrorism group was disbanded. In Russia, Lugovoi was elected to Parliament, where he was invited to serve on the Security Committee, the same committee that oversees the Russian secret services and writes the laws that govern them.
Litvinenko’s murder was one of the highest-profile examples of a Russian assassinated abroad in a decade. The polonium clearly originated in Russia, and it was impossible to bring the nuclear material into the United Kingdom without the help of Russian officials. But there is no information about whether Litvinenko’s death was ordered by the Russian leadership or had been carried out by people who were bribed and hired as mercenaries. Russia’s lack of cooperation with the British investigation, as well as the election of Lugovoi to the Russian Parliament, were seen in the West as clear indications of the government’s support for the poisoning. But within Russia, the events were interpreted as proof that the country would not be pushed around by the outside world—a sentiment that was effectively turned into a propaganda campaign playing on anti-Western sentiments. No conclusive evidence has been seen by the authors about why Litvinenko was killed and who might have ordered it. Lugovoi’s election to Parliament, which granted him immunity, pointed to staunch support from an uncompromising leadership.
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FSB INTELLIGENCE
W
HEN THE SOVIET KGB was divided into different agencies in the early 1990s, the new Russian leaders were determined to create an intelligence system that resembled its Western counterparts, one in which the jurisdiction of each agency would be both geographically and constitutionally distinct.
1
Foreign intelligence would be handled by one agency and internal security by another. The foreign intelligence agency would resemble the CIA in the United States or MI6 in the United Kingdom. The internal security agency would be analogous to the FBI or the British MI5.
HEN THE SOVIET KGB was divided into different agencies in the early 1990s, the new Russian leaders were determined to create an intelligence system that resembled its Western counterparts, one in which the jurisdiction of each agency would be both geographically and constitutionally distinct.
1
Foreign intelligence would be handled by one agency and internal security by another. The foreign intelligence agency would resemble the CIA in the United States or MI6 in the United Kingdom. The internal security agency would be analogous to the FBI or the British MI5.
There was speculation early in Putin’s presidency that he would allow the FSB to swallow up the foreign intelligence agency. While the FSB did obtain some additional departments, in the end no effort was made to merge them. The FSB seemed not to need it—indeed, over time, it was secretly transformed into the third national external intelligence agency, one largely focused on the countries that had once been part of the Soviet Union.
In Soviet times, intelligence and counterintelligence branches of the KGB were closely interconnected, both in the center at Moscow headquarters and at the regional level across the country. In addition to its espionage abroad, the KGB was always busy collecting “intelligence from the territory,” a euphemism for recruiting foreign nationals in the Soviet Union, with an eye to subsequently running them as agents in their home countries. This system worked because the Soviet Union, as a police state, had an opportunity to watch literally every foreign national in the country.
Regional departments of the KGB were tasked with dealing with foreign visitors traveling throughout the country. Each regional department had what was called a First Section in charge of recruiting foreigners. Later, after the Soviet collapse, when the KGB was dismantled and divided up, the First Sections were left at the FSB’s disposal, having maintained their functions. But they lacked the overarching coordination that would have made them effective. This lack of an umbrella organization was used by the FSB as a pretext to create a department by which it could dramatically expand its reach—and operate abroad.
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