The New Nobility of the KGB (22 page)
Read The New Nobility of the KGB Online
Authors: Andrei Soldatov
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #International Relations, #Security (National & International), #Intelligence & Espionage, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Social Classes
In the Soviet and later Russian armed forces, the second-highest rank is general of the army, the equivalent of four-star general in the United States. FSB director Patrushev received the rank of general of the army in July 2001. It was a remarkable achievement. In the 1990s the rank was a rare mark of prestige and not all FSB directors were awarded it; Putin himself did not achieve such a high rank while he was FSB chief. During the Andropov years, the KGB passed an important milestone with four generals of the army in service all at the same time. This was achieved once again when Putin became president. In May 2005, Pronichev, the FSB deputy director and border guards chief who had been in charge of the operations staff at the Dubrovka siege, was promoted to general of the army. In December 2005, Sergey Smirnov, an FSB first deputy director, was also made a general of the army. In March 2007, two FSB deputy directors—Alexander Bortnikov (in charge of economic security) and Oleg Syromolotov (counterintelligence)—similarly received that same rank.
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At this point the FSB had four generals of the army, the military intelligence had one, and the Interior Ministry had two.
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At this point the FSB had four generals of the army, the military intelligence had one, and the Interior Ministry had two.
IN RUSSIA, THE public usually doesn’t know when an FSB officer commits a crime. The service prevents any external investigation without its involvement.
In lieu of outside controls, in the early 1990s all the parts of the old KGB created special bodies, called Internal Security Directorates, as a check against corruption. The KGB successor created one in 1992.
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It soon became established practice for Interior Ministry operatives, on discovering employees of the security services complicit in criminal activity, to inform the leadership of that service. The service must be in the know from the very beginning: The arrest of the suspect must be conducted by a joint group of operatives from the Interior Ministry and the respective internal security directorate.
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The only external control over the security services, established in the 1990s, was the General Prosecutor’s Office, a special body responsible for overseeing all the secret services, including the FSB. But the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was limited from the beginning by a stipulation in a February 1995 law:
Information regarding people who provide or have provided FSB organs with confidential assistance regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and means of implementing the activity of FSB organs shall not be subject to oversight by the prosecutor’s office.
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The FSB restricted the general prosecutor’s jurisdiction even further in April 2002, when General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov and FSB director Patrushev signed a joint decree establishing new boundaries for the prosecutor’s oversight. The document underlined that “oversight must equally ensure both the guarantee of human rights and the order of conducting operations,” and established that “official operational and other work-related documents are to be examined according to the laws governing the established procedure for classified records, and as a rule, on the premises of the Federal Security Service (the FSB), fulfilling the secrecy requirements. Only in exceptional cases is the Prosecutor’s office allowed to demand access to such documents.”
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On February 11, 2006, Putin signed a new decree on information considered to be a state secret. While the old version had consisted of 87 points, the new one included 113. Three new points, numbered 90, 91, and 92, stipulated that the identities of personnel serving with intelligence, counterintelligence, and units fighting organized crime were all secret. The stipulations, allegedly aimed at protecting officers working undercover in criminal or terrorist groups, were soon put to another use.
In 2007 the authors of this book were preparing a story for the
Novaya Gazeta
on the criminal records of individuals within the Russian secret services. The authors sent an official request to the General Prosecutor’s Office asking for statistics on criminal cases involving officials in the FSB, Federal Protective Service, and foreign intelligence. No names were requested, only details of criminal activity. In response the authors received a letter from the Military Prosecutor’s Office claiming that “all requested information is in accordance with points 90-92 of the list of information covered by the State Secret Privilege [decree], which is considered to be a state secret, and thus cannot be presented.” In turn Alexander Beznasyuk, chairman of the Moscow District Military Court, responded to the same request by saying that data about verdicts on the personnel of the secret services are classified “Top Secret.”
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Novaya Gazeta
on the criminal records of individuals within the Russian secret services. The authors sent an official request to the General Prosecutor’s Office asking for statistics on criminal cases involving officials in the FSB, Federal Protective Service, and foreign intelligence. No names were requested, only details of criminal activity. In response the authors received a letter from the Military Prosecutor’s Office claiming that “all requested information is in accordance with points 90-92 of the list of information covered by the State Secret Privilege [decree], which is considered to be a state secret, and thus cannot be presented.” In turn Alexander Beznasyuk, chairman of the Moscow District Military Court, responded to the same request by saying that data about verdicts on the personnel of the secret services are classified “Top Secret.”
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In the end, the authors wrote the story about the problem, but without the information they sought.
IN PUTIN’S FIRST speech as president to a joint session of Parliament, he declared, “We insist on the only possible dictatorship—a dictatorship of law.”
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Eight years later, when Dmitry Medvedev succeeded Putin, he declared in his inaugural speech, “We must gain full respect for the law and overcome legal nihilism.”
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Both comments pointed to one of the most profound failures of Russia in the years after the end of Communism—the establishment of the rule of law. The Soviet Union was a state ruled by a party, but it was supposed to be different in Russia, where a democracy would be founded on the rule of law, in which the rules would bind everyone and there would be no arbitrary use of power and no individuals above the law. New laws governing capitalism, crime, and the conduct of government were passed in these years. But the rule of law was exceedingly difficult to establish. Along with outlining the laws and determining the judicial system, another integral part of the rule of law was the role of the security agencies—they had the power to enforce the law and to investigate violations of it. But the services were far from effective in their task. They were still caught up in the practices of earlier times, escaping accountability and serving as an agent of the state rather than of the law.
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Eight years later, when Dmitry Medvedev succeeded Putin, he declared in his inaugural speech, “We must gain full respect for the law and overcome legal nihilism.”
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Both comments pointed to one of the most profound failures of Russia in the years after the end of Communism—the establishment of the rule of law. The Soviet Union was a state ruled by a party, but it was supposed to be different in Russia, where a democracy would be founded on the rule of law, in which the rules would bind everyone and there would be no arbitrary use of power and no individuals above the law. New laws governing capitalism, crime, and the conduct of government were passed in these years. But the rule of law was exceedingly difficult to establish. Along with outlining the laws and determining the judicial system, another integral part of the rule of law was the role of the security agencies—they had the power to enforce the law and to investigate violations of it. But the services were far from effective in their task. They were still caught up in the practices of earlier times, escaping accountability and serving as an agent of the state rather than of the law.
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EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS
H
ISTORICALLY, THE KGB had very little experience dealing with terrorists because of the almost complete absence of terrorist attacks on Soviet soil. The KGB had focused instead on hunting down spies and dissidents. The violent actions that might be considered terrorism were mostly carried out by criminals. In the 1980s, only six terrorist attacks occurred in the Soviet Union, all of them plane hijackings by individuals trying to escape the country. The most famous incident was the attempt on March 8, 1988, by the Ovechkin family—a mother with ten sons—who tried to force the crew to take them to London. Instead of the British capital, the plane landed at a military airbase near Leningrad, where it was stormed. Three passengers, a flight attendant, and five members of the family were killed.
1
ISTORICALLY, THE KGB had very little experience dealing with terrorists because of the almost complete absence of terrorist attacks on Soviet soil. The KGB had focused instead on hunting down spies and dissidents. The violent actions that might be considered terrorism were mostly carried out by criminals. In the 1980s, only six terrorist attacks occurred in the Soviet Union, all of them plane hijackings by individuals trying to escape the country. The most famous incident was the attempt on March 8, 1988, by the Ovechkin family—a mother with ten sons—who tried to force the crew to take them to London. Instead of the British capital, the plane landed at a military airbase near Leningrad, where it was stormed. Three passengers, a flight attendant, and five members of the family were killed.
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The new decade of terrorism began in earnest in 1991 with the hijacking of a plane by Shamil Basayev, who carried out the action in the name of Chechen independence. Thereafter attacks took place annually. Terrorists captured planes, helicopters, buses, and even a kindergarten. The attacks grew even more spectacular in 1995 when the entire city hospital in Budennovsk was captured by Basayev, who wanted to push Russian forces out of Chechnya.
The security services that replaced the KGB were faced with new challenges as terrorism increased; they had to change their structure and methods to deal with the new reality. The first problem was to find people to create a counterterrorism section. The Soviet KGB had had two departments designated to deal with terrorists: The first was a part of the Fifth Directorate, responsible for political investigations and keeping an eye on domestic terrorist groups; the second was included in the K Directorate, responsible for overseas counterintelligence and preventing penetration by foreign terrorists.
When a new directorate on combatting terrorism was formed in 1991, employees were drawn from the old Fifth Directorate. Many officers previously involved in the disruption of dissident groups were given the new task of fighting terrorists. The skills and practices of the old KGB may not have been a good match for the years of battling terrorists. As a rule, KGB agents played out their strategies over long periods, while the effort to prevent and combat terrorism often demanded rapid action and reaction.
On August 13, 1998, the lobby of the FSB headquarters at Lubyanka was blown up, with two FSB guards slightly wounded. On April 3, 1999, a second attack occurred at almost exactly the same place when a bomb containing the equivalent of 1.5 kilos of TNT was detonated, although this time without deaths or injuries. Both bombings were executed by left-wing extremists from the group called “New Revolutionary Initiative,” headed by four idealistic young women in their twenties and inspired by the German Red Army Faction. The culprits were identified soon after the first explosion, but the FSB preferred to keep the group under surveillance rather than apprehend them—a measure that would most likely have prevented the second bombing.
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At their trial the FSB claimed it had discovered a powerful terrorist organization of nearly 500 members that intended to overthrow the government. By the mid-1990s the FSB was desperate to find new personnel to fight terrorism. Historically suspicious of ethnic North Caucasians, the FSB had largely failed to recruit Chechens.
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Eager to add fresh blood to its desk-office staff, it turned to the Interior Ministry, whose officers were regarded as more ruthless, given their history of fighting Chechen and other ethnic organized crime groups in Moscow. This experience was considered to be helpful, since the FSB believed Chechen warlords obtained financing and weapons through Chechen organized crime groups based in Moscow.
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At their trial the FSB claimed it had discovered a powerful terrorist organization of nearly 500 members that intended to overthrow the government. By the mid-1990s the FSB was desperate to find new personnel to fight terrorism. Historically suspicious of ethnic North Caucasians, the FSB had largely failed to recruit Chechens.
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Eager to add fresh blood to its desk-office staff, it turned to the Interior Ministry, whose officers were regarded as more ruthless, given their history of fighting Chechen and other ethnic organized crime groups in Moscow. This experience was considered to be helpful, since the FSB believed Chechen warlords obtained financing and weapons through Chechen organized crime groups based in Moscow.
Special departments at both the FSB and the Interior Ministry were tasked to deal with Chechens. The FSB unit attempted to infiltrate the groups by any means necessary, including protecting loyal ringleaders. Not surprisingly, the department was accused of being highly corrupt.
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At the same time, it was highly efficient—fat with priceless information.
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At the same time, it was highly efficient—fat with priceless information.
As a result, by the end of the 1990s the Russian security services had adopted harsh methods to deal with terrorism. The emphasis was on using ruthless, brutal extrajudicial operations that, for fear of leaks, were to be conducted by ultra-secret and out-of-control special units.
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These methods were to be expanded in Chechnya when in 1999 the second Chechen war started.
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These methods were to be expanded in Chechnya when in 1999 the second Chechen war started.
After a short period of Army operations, the FSB took control of Chechnya in January 2001. The FSB was in charge for only thirty-one months—from January 2001 to July 2003—and then control and responsibility were handed over to the Interior Ministry.
During its Chechen reign and afterward, the FSB’s special units in Chechnya carried out extrajudicial killings. The Interior Ministry and the military intelligence agency simultaneously deployed units with similar objectives.
Military intelligence conducted these operations with two
spetsnaz
(special ops) brigades, named East and West, comprised of ethnic Chechens. Their primary role was the elimination of suspected insurgents. In August 2004 Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov met with the
spetsnaz
commanders to declare his support and supply them with more advanced weapons.
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spetsnaz
(special ops) brigades, named East and West, comprised of ethnic Chechens. Their primary role was the elimination of suspected insurgents. In August 2004 Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov met with the
spetsnaz
commanders to declare his support and supply them with more advanced weapons.
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The Interior Ministry also sent elimination groups to the region, usually for one-month tours. These so-called “temporary operation groups” were deployed in the Chechen Republic but also in Dagestan and Ingushetia. One officer involved in such activities told the authors: “Our group consisted of only four people: a driver and three operatives with the rank of major and higher. We were required to report only to our leadership in Moscow. We were sent to the area with a list of targets, and when the mission was accomplished, all we had to present as proof were Polaroid photographs of the bodies.”
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The FSB had two different structures engaged in this area. First, the so-called summary special groups (SSG) consisting of operatives of regional FSB divisions and soldiers from
spetsnaz
groups of the Interior Ministry. Ten of the SSG groups were created in April 2002 to target and kill Chechen rebel leaders. To carry out liquidations of insurgents, they operated independently of the FSB Department in Chechnya.
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spetsnaz
groups of the Interior Ministry. Ten of the SSG groups were created in April 2002 to target and kill Chechen rebel leaders. To carry out liquidations of insurgents, they operated independently of the FSB Department in Chechnya.
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