The Invention of Ancient Israel (44 page)

4 The Creation of an Israelite State

  
1
  Even in the post-First World War period, an influential time in the development of biblical studies, the idea of a continuum between past and present is evident. Sidebotham (1918) refers to the defeat of the Turks
in Mesopotamia and the need to secure a defensive frontier in Egypt which may lead to the ‘re-establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine'. The devaluation of the indigenous population and its culture is spelled out in the strongest terms:

  
2
  Weinstein (1981) has demonstrated that Egyptian power was more dogged and lasted in the region much longer than previously thought.

  
3
  Bright (1976) expands on his view of the Israelite empire confirming the shared assumptions with Alt and Noth on the construction of the monarchy.

  
4
  This period is dominant in narrative terms as well. In Bright's account of some 444 pages of text, approximately 123 are devoted to the emergence of Israel (‘the period of the Judges') and the formation of an Israelite state culminating in the reigns of David and Solomon: approximately a third of the narrative. By comparison, his account covers the period c. 2000–164 BCE, some 1800 years, of which the emergence of Israel to the death of Solomon (c. 1200–922 BCE) spans roughly two and a half centuries: a mere 13–15 per cent of the time span.

  
5
  See Khalidi (1971: xxi–lxxxiii) for a discussion of the political manoeuvrings by the British and American governments from the beginning of the century to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

  
6
  This presupposes that the Aegean groups were also a tribal organization. However, it is not clear what evidence he has to support such an assertion.

  
7
  He refers later to the Philistines as commanding an ‘extensive empire' (1966: 182).

  
8
  There is a voluminous literature on state formation: see Cohen and Service 1978; Claessen and Skalnik 1978; 1981; Jones and Kautz 1981; Haas 1982.

  
9
  Chomsky (1983: 99–103; 181–328) exposes the reality of the claims of the ‘defensive' wars of modern Israel, particularly the 1978 invasion of Lebanon and the 1982 ‘Operation Peace for Galilee'.

10
  1 Samuel 8 and 12, among other traditions, stress a negative assessment of the formation of the monarchy as a rejection of the theocracy of Yahweh. Eslinger (1985), by contrast, offers an alternative literary analysis which examines the different voices in the text.

11
  Noth (1960: 238) notes that the Philistines tried to take advantage of the break-up of what he erroneously terms ‘the empire of David and Solomon' and even though ‘the earlier power of the Philistines had been broken by David once and for all' what ensued were border skirmishes with no far-reaching effects. Mazar (1984: 53) outlines the importance of Philistine settlement in the tenth century BCE. The most comprehensive treatment of Philistine culture is by T. Dothan (1982). For more
recent findings and assessments, see M. Dothan (1989), T. Dothan (1989), and M. and T. Dothan (1992).

12
  Recent archaeological work, which undermines such constructions, will be considered later in the chapter.

13
  The period after the Arab conquest is represented typically as a period of decline: ‘Jerusalem simply declined to the status of a provincial town. Its only importance stemmed from its religious significance to Islam, focusing upon the mosque and shrine built in the Temple Enclosure' (1983: 260). The implication here appears to be that Islam is of marginal importance.

14
  This is equivalent to Ben-Gurion's ‘vision' of the borders of Israel as described on p. 126.

15
  Noth tries to distinguish, unsuccessfully, between Oriental ideas of divine kingship and Israelite royal ideology. He claims that the use of the adoption formula in Psalm 2 verse 7 shows that ‘whilst the Davidic monarchy made just as great claims in Israel as the monarchy did elsewhere in the ancient Orient, it was different in quality' (1960: 224). His view that the conception of Israel's god acting within history was different to conceptions of the divine nature of kingship in the ancient Near East has been undermined by Albrektson's study (1967) and subsequent work.

16
  J. van Seters (1983) offers a radically different understanding of the development of Israelite historiography, while Harris's (1989) study on literacy in Greece and Rome throws serious doubt on the blithe assumption that the production of major historiographical works was developed before the Hellenistic period.

17
  Interestingly, Herrmann (1975: 141) refers to ‘Saul and his central Palestinian followers'.

18
  Herrmann (1975: 171 n. 38) acknowledges that the description is taken from Alt's earlier study ‘Das Grossreich Davids'.

19
  His justification (1984: 42) for this is that the economic and political information seems so relevant that it is hard to believe that it could have been invented. However, this is an argument for proof based on verisimilitude alone.

20
  She does not use the term ‘Palestine' but a careful circumlocution to describe the area: ‘the narrow strip of land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea'. Her careful avoidance of the term ‘Palestine' in the context of arguing for the defensive nature of the Israelite empire suggests very strongly that she is aware of the political implications and context of her work but refuses to articulate this.

21
  It is interesting to note that Ahlström (1993: 438), who rightly criticizes other scholars for interpreting archaeological evidence on the basis of the biblical text, interprets Khirbet ed-Duwwara with the rise of Saul even though there is nothing to point to such an understanding.

22
  Ahlström (1993: 449 n. 2; 1986: 96) notes that Engnell designated Saul as the first empire-builder.

23
  The fact that he uses the term ‘empire' in quotation marks in a subheading (1993: 480; 488 n. 1) suggests that he does not accept this general description.

24
  
These narratives are described as ‘folk legends. Certainly they are not to be read as historical record' (1986: 152). They admit that any attempt to reconstruct the ‘historical' David will necessarily be ‘highly speculative' (1986: 159). But, despite their description of the narratives as folk legends, they believe that they are based ‘ultimately on actual historical persons and events' (1986: 159). Miller and Hayes are aware that their presupposition cannot be proved; their construction represents only a ‘best guess' (1986: 160).

25
  Miller (1991b) outlines some of the methodological problems involved in trying to assess the historical reliability of the biblical traditions for constructing the reign of Solomon. This is part of an exchange with Millard (1991) who argues for a positive appraisal of the historicity of the biblical traditions. Wightman (1990) questions the network of assumptions which has sustained the idea of ‘Solomonic archaeology'. He is extremely critical of Aharoni's (1972: 302) claim that six-chambered gateways constituted a fixed chronological datum point for the archaeology of the tenth century BCE as one of the rare cases where it is possible to date a building exactly without inscriptional evidence. Wightman (1990: 9), by contrast, describes it as ‘one of the not-so-rare examples in biblical archaeology where the exact date of a building is determined through circular reasoning'. Miller and Hayes (1986: 210) give a sober appraisal of the major archaeological material relating to the Solomonic period both in terms of the difficulties of interpretation and the ‘impressiveness' of the building projects.

26
  Miller (1991a: 95) points out that there is no evidence for a Davidic-Solomonic monarchy independent of the biblical traditions. Historians who refer to this entity are presupposing information which is drawn from the Hebrew Bible.

27
  This is also true of the collection of essays edited by Gottwald (1986), despite the fact that they challenge many standard assumptions about the formation of an Israelite state. Coote and Whitelam (1987: 113) argue that this process should be studied as part of a continuum in the context of a wider Palestinian history. However, it is noticeable that this is still a history of the region which is dominated by Israel and which in effect is little more than a history of ancient Israel and not ancient Palestine.

28
  Flanagan (1988) cites four reasons for the ‘lapse of confidence regarding David and the monarchy' (1988: 18); Mendenhall and Gottwald showed the monarchy to be alien; Davidic stories came under attack after half a century of relative certainty contributing to a loss of confidence in biblical history; archaeology failed to yield signs of centralization that could be firmly dated to the tenth century BCE. Flanagan does, however, appreciate the importance of this period in shaping the past and that there are alternative constructions of this past:

Flanagan (1988: 75–6) tries to define what he terms ‘social world studies' to take into account the many different sources available for exploring the Iron Age. He moves away from a narrow focus on a biblically inspired history of Israel but does not go so far as to refer to Palestinian history.

29
  Garbini (1988: 16–19) highlights the startling fact of the lack of Israelite and Judaean epigraphy for the period of the monarchy. Garbini's statement has to be tempered now by the discovery of the Tel Dan inscription (see pp. 166–8), but it does not alter the fact that this so-called glorious empire of David and Solomon has left little or no archaeological trace, particularly in terms of the output of its supposed bureaucracy.

30
  He cites (1993: 541 n. 3), seemingly with approval, the words of Herrmann (1984: 268) that David's state ‘would not have been possible without David'. This is the history of great men
par excellence.

31
  Arnold (1990) provides a detailed description and critique of the history of the search for the identification of Gibeah with its manifold textual and archaeological problems.

32
  See Noth (1960: 168) or Bright (1972: 186) who says that Saul's ‘seat at Gibeah was a fortress rather than a palace'.

33
  This would be accepted by many as an uncontroversial statement until very recently. He goes on to argue (1984: 55–6) that the burial and water systems were uniquely Israelite, along with the design of certain fortifications, such as casemate walls and six-chambered gates from the tenth century BCE. But the walls and gates of the ninth century resemble Syrian fortifications.

34
  Avi Ofer is conducting the Judaean Highland Project survey. The results of his work, which are as yet unpublished, will need to be compared with Jamieson-Drake's conclusions. The data he has collected and alluded to in conference addresses will, like the data provided by Finkelstein, Zertal, Gal, and others involved in major surveys, provide the basis for future investigations of the history of the region. It still remains to examine the interpretation of this data and the interests and motivations which have determined the design of research strategies.

35
  The inscription was originally published by Biran and Naveh (1993). It immediately attracted considerable attention, generating heated debate as to its date and interpretation (Davies 1994; Rainey 1994; Lemaire 1994; Cryer 1994; Shanks 1994). The article attributed to Shanks is said to be based upon Biran and Naveh (1993) supplemented by other material supplied by Biran.

36
  It is admitted that there are major difficulties in excavating Jerusalem given the fact that it has been occupied constantly, coupled with religious sensibilities which have often hindered archaeological exploration. Mazar (1984) points to these difficulties and the problems with ‘Davidic archaeology'. However, these circumstances should have led to greater caution and not less in terms of the construction of the past.

37
  
McEvedy and Jones (1978: 228) provide the basis for a broad comparison. The data from regional surveys will form the basis for a more detailed study of the demography of Palestine.

38
  The fact that the modern state, as a world ranking power, appears to be an exception to this is to be explained by the massive subsidization of its military economy by the USA. Chomsky (1983) provides detailed figures. The modern period can be compared with the material prosperity of the Roman and Byzantine periods which was the result of massive external investment.

5 The Continuing Search

  
1
  H. and M. Weippert (1991) have provided a detailed review of recent literature which can be supplemented by Coote's (1990) extensive bibliography. The collections of essays in Edelman (1991) and in
Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament
(1991) illustrate the direction of the debate along with the growing differences between the various positions.