The English Works of Thomas Hobbes (1839) 2 vols. - Vol. 8 (44 page)

62.
“And thus much for the profit that will be found, by advising wisely concerning the Athenians. But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter or preserve the former, to both: or that it hath not honours and eminence more free from danger, or whatsoever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief as it is contrary to his hope
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: knowing that many men ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others trusting, by some strength they have had, to take away another’s right; have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own. For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done, it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure, because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune, that is most predominant in things to come; which though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence. 63. Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking
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these for hindrances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect, let us send away our enemies that hover over us; and make an eternal peace amongst ourselves, or if not that, then a truce at least for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this: that following my counsel, we shall every of us have our cities free; whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit such as do us good or harm: whereas rejecting it and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, [if it be], we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies, and enemies to such as we ought not.

64.
“For my part, as I said in the beginning, I bring to this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed; and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies, as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite
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will I look to be followed as absolute in my will, and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but will also give way where it is reason. And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. For it is no dishonour to be overcome kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian; and one Chalcidean of another of his own race; or in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by common conferences make peace by our own selves. But when foreigners invade us, we shall, if wise, unite all of us to encounter them; inasmuch as being weakened singly, we are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians and of domestic war, for the present; and to be inhabited by ourselves with liberty, and less insidiated by others, for the time to come.”

65
Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice; and agreed amongst themselves, that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed; and that the Camarinæans should have Morgantina, paying for the same unto the Syracusians a certain sum of money then assessed. They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians unto them as were in authority, told them that they also were willing to compound, and be comprehended in the same peace
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. And the Athenians approving it, they did so; and hereupon the Athenians departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely Pythodorus and Sophocles; and laid a fine upon the third, which was Eurymedon: as men that might have subdued the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to return. So great was their fortune at that time, that they thought nothing could cross them; but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprises, with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their designs, subministering strength unto their hope
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.

66.
The same summer the Megareans in the city of Megara: pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegæ
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, who in a sedition driven out by the commons grievously afflicted them with robberies: began to talk one to another, how it was fit to call them home again, and not to let their city by both these means to be ruined. The friends of those without perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly now than before, required to have it brought to council. But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should not be able to carry it against the other side
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, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Ariphron, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the Athenian army, to deliver them the city; as esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed, that first the Athenians should possess themselves of the long–walls, (these were about eight furlongs in length, and reached from the city to Nisæa their haven); thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, in which (the better to assure Megara to their side) there lay no other soldiers in garrison but they: and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above; which would the more easily succeed
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, if that were effected first. 67. The Athenians therefore, after all was done and said on both sides, and every thing ready, sailed away by night to Minoa, an
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island of the Megareans, with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates; and sat down in a certain pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they that were with the other commander Demosthenes, light–armed Platæans and others called peripoli
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, lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know the passages of this same night
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. When it was almost day, the Megarean traitors did thus. They had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty, with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices the opening of the gates, to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the watermen used an oar in either hand; and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea–side in a cart, and
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in a cart to bring it back again and set it within the gates: to the end that the Athenians which lay in Minoa, might not know where to watch for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time was that cart at the gates, which were opened according to custom as for the boat. And the Athenians seeing it, (for so it was agreed on), arose from their ambush, and ran with all speed to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open
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. And first those Platæans and peripoli that were with Demosthenes, ran in, in that same place where the trophy is now extant; and fighting presently within the gates, (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest heard the stir), the Platæans overcame those that resisted; and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after. 68. After this the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up every one to the wall. And a few of the Peloponnesians that were of the garrison, made head at first and fought, and were some of them slain; but the most of them took their heels; fearing in the night, both the enemy that charged them, and also the traitors of the Megareans that fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them
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. It chanced also that the Athenian herald of his own discretion made proclamation, that if any Megarean would take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms
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. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they stayed no longer: but seriously believing that they jointly warred upon them, fled into Nisæa. As soon as it was day, the walls
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being now taken and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them the rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates opened, and to go out and give the enemy battle. Now it was agreed on between them, that when the gates were open, the Athenians should rush in: and that themselves would be easily known from the rest, to the end they might have no harm done them; for that they would besmear themselves with some ointment
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. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety: for the four thousand men of arms of Athens and six hundred horsemen, which according to the appointment were to come to them, having marched all night were already arrived. When they had besmeared themselves and were now about the gates, one of those who were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These joining their strength came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight; for that neither in former times when they were stronger than now, durst they do so: or to put the city into so manifest danger: and said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be thereright. Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as having given good advice, meant to maintain it. And they stayed at the gates
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, insomuch as the traitors could not perform what they intended.

69.
The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened, and that they could not take the city by assault, fell to enclosing of Nisæa with a wall: which if they could take before aid came, they thought Megara would the sooner yield. Iron was quickly brought unto them from Athens, and masons, and whatsoever else was necessary. And beginning at the wall they had won, when they had built cross over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side Nisæa: and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled trees and timber, they supplied what was defective with a strong palisado
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. The houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they wrought: the next day about evening they had within very little finished. But then they that were in Nisæa, seeing themselves to want victual, (for they had none but what came day by day from the city above), and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to relieve them; conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies; compounded with the Athenians on these terms: to be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money; to deliver up their arms; and the Lacedæmonians, both the captain and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians. Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians, when they had broken off
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the long walls from the city of Megara, and taken in Nisæa, prepared for what was further to be done.