Read The Defence of the Realm Online
Authors: Christopher Andrew
To maintain regular contact with Putlitz, Ustinov found a job as the European correspondent of an Indian newspaper with an office in The Hague. During the summer of 1938 Whitehall received a series of intelligence reports, some of them from Putlitz, warning that Hitler had decided to seize the German-speaking Czech Sudetenland by force.
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There were contradictory reports, however, on when Hitler planned to attack.
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Putlitz apart, Ustinov's most important source from mid-August onwards was âHerr von S'.
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One evening, while he was studying at drama school, Peter Ustinov arrived home to find Klop in âan unusual state of agitation', with an open cigar-box on the table and a bottle of champagne on ice. Peter was sent off to spend the evening in the cinema, passing on his way out a mysterious group of visitors who were still in the flat wreathed in cigar smoke when he returned. Years later, Klop revealed to Peter that the leader of the mysterious visitors had been the former German military attaché in London, General Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg (âHerr von S'), who had told him: âWe simply must convince the British to stand firm . . . If they give in to Hitler now, there will be no holding him.'
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Among the material handed over to Ustinov by Schweppenburg which the Security Service forwarded to the Foreign Office was a memorandum by Ribbentrop of 3 August, reporting that a decision to settle the Czechoslovak question
in unserem Sinne
(âin accordance with our wishes') would be taken before the autumn, and expressing confidence that Britain and France would not intervene. Even if war followed, Germany would be victorious.
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At the beginning of September Sir Alexander Cadogan, who had succeeded Vansittart as PUS in January, arrived back in the Foreign Office after a disturbed French holiday to find âenough in the Secret Reports to make one's hair stand on end'. âIt's obviously touch and go,' he believed, âbut not gone yet.' On 6 September Whitehall received the most direct warning so far. The German chargé; dÈaffaires, Theodor Kordt, previously one of Van's âprivate detectives' and, in Cadogan's view, a brave man who
âput conscience before loyalty', paid a secret visit to 10 Downing Street, where he was admitted through the garden gate, and warned Chamberlain's close adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, that Hitler had decided to invade Czechoslovakia. Next day he returned to Number 10 and repeated the same message to Lord Halifax. Kordt called for a firm statement to be âbroadcast to the German nation' that Britain would help the Czechs resist a German attack.
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He failed to convince his listeners. On 8 September Chamberlain announced to an inner circle of advisers â Halifax, Horace Wilson, Simon and Cadogan a secret âPlan Z' for him to visit Hitler in person to try to settle the crisis without war. To Vansittart, brought into the meeting at Halifax's request after Plan Z had been announced, âit was Henry IV going to Canossa again.' But Van had become a voice crying in the Whitehall wilderness. âWe argued with him', Cadogan smugly told his diary, âand I think demolished him.'
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On 15 September the Prime Minister made a dramatic flight to Munich to parley with the Führer in his grandiose mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden.
Le Matin
caught the mood of both the French and British press when it applauded the courage of âa man of sixty-nine making his first aeroplane journey . . . to see if he can banish the frightful nightmare which hangs over us and save humanity'. Within Van's entourage, Chamberlain's attempts at appeasement by shuttle-diplomacy gave rise instead to the cynical ditty:
If at first you can't concede
Fly, fly, fly again.
On the day of Chamberlain's first flight to Munich, Schweppenburg contacted Ustinov with an updated account of Hitler's war plan, which the Security Service forwarded to the Foreign Office:
It is Hitler's intention to bring about the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state by all or any means . . . Secret mobilisation will have been developed by Sunday, 25th September, to a stage at which it is only necessary for Hitler to press the button to set the whole military machine in motion with a view to destroying the Czechoslovak state by force.
It is part of Hitler's plan that up to and until the 25th September every possible means should be adopted to put pressure on Czechoslovakia and the other powers . . . and if by that date he has not gained his object he intends to order the attack on Czechoslovakia on or at any time after that date.
But Hitler did not need to âpress the button', although he seems to have been disappointed not to. After Chamberlain had made three round-trips
by air and attended a disorganized four-power conference at Munich, the Prime Minister returned to a hero's welcome in London on 30 September, brandishing an agreement which surrendered the Czech Sudetenland to Germany and meant, he claimed, not only âpeace with honour' but âpeace for our time'. Jack Curry later recalled the âgrowing sense of dismay' in the Security Service as the negotiations with Hitler continued: âWhen Chamberlain returned from Munich waving his piece of paper we all had an acute sense of shame.'
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SIS saw things differently. Before and during the Munich Crisis, Quex Sinclair â probably to a greater degree than ever before â set out to influence government policy. SIS's own policy was set out in a memorandum of 18 September entitled âWhat Should We Do?', drafted by the SIS head of political intelligence Malcolm Woollcombe and personally approved by Sinclair. SIS argued strongly that the Czechs should be pressed to accept âthe inevitable' and surrender the Sudetenland. They should ârealise unequivocally that they stand alone if they refuse such a solution'. Britain, for its part, should continue with a policy of calculated appeasement. It should not wait until German grievances boiled over and threatened the peace of Europe. Instead the international community should take the initiative and decide âwhat
really legitimate
grievances Germany has and what surgical operations are necessary to rectify them'. Some of Germany's colonies, confiscated after the last war, should be restored. If genuine cases for self-determination by German minorities remained in Europe they should be remedied:
It may be argued that this would be giving in to Germany, strengthening Hitler's position and encouraging him to go to extremes. Better, however, that realities be faced and that wrongs, if they do exist, be righted, than leave it to Hitler to do the righting in his own way and time â particularly if, concurrently, we and the French unremittingly build up our strength and lessen Germany's potentialities for making trouble.
Britain should try to ensure
âthat Germany's “style is cramped”, but with the minimum of provocation'
. Sir Warren Fisher, head of the civil service and chairman of the currently inactive Secret Service Committee, told Sinclair that âWhat Should We Do?' was âa most excellent document'.
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MI5 disagreed. B Branch followed the Munich Crisis by preparing a very different report on the intelligence from Putlitz and other German sources (none of them identified by name) which it had forwarded to the Foreign Office over the previous few years.
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On 7 November the note was handed to Kell, who personally delivered it to Vansittart. Van, who earlier
in the year had been kicked upstairs to the post of (not very influential) chief diplomatic adviser to the Chamberlain government, forwarded the note to Cadogan, who made a few comments on it, then passed it to Lord Halifax, the Foreign Secretary.
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This unprecedented report represented probably the first (albeit implicit) indictment of government foreign policy by a British intelligence agency. Page 1 of the MI5 report included the provocative statement that, in view of the intelligence the Service had provided from âreliable sources' over the past few years:
There is nothing surprising and nothing which could not have been foreseen in the events of this summer in connection with Czechoslovakia. These events are a logical consequence of Hitler's Nazi Weltanschauung and of his foreign policy and his views in regard to racial questions and the position of Germany in Europe.
The report went on, with unusual frankness, to record the frustration of Putlitz (âHerr Q') at the failure of the British government to stand up to Hitler:
Our intermediary [Klop Ustinov] has frequently found that, on occasions when the attitude or actions of the British Government have seemed to indicate their failure to see the real nature of what he describes as the Machiavellian plans of Hitler, [Putlitz] has given expression to the greatest exasperation and even to feelings of dismay. There have been times when he has said that the English are hopeless and it is no use trying to help them to withstand the Nazi methods which they so obviously fail to understand, but after reflection he has always returned to the attempt.
. . . It is important to emphasise that the information which we have received from him has always proved to be scrupulously accurate and entirely free from any bias in the presentment of facts.
Apart from Putlitz, the MI5 report placed most emphasis on the intelligence received from âHerr von S', who had also called for a âstiff attitude on the part of Great Britain' to resist Hitler's demands:
It need hardly be emphasised that in giving us . . . information Herr von S. has been risking his life. On the 28th September so strong was his desire to do everything possible to bring about the defeat of the Nazi regime in the event of war â that he was attempting, in spite of the immense difficulties in the way of rapid and safe communication, to send through information which he hoped would have given the British Air Force a few hours more warning than they would otherwise have received.
Schweppenburg reported that, in the event of war, the German General Staff intended to launch âimmediate aerial attacks' against France and Britain. This information was confirmed to MI5 by âa [Nazi] Party source'
in London.
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Curry later recalled that, though feeling âan acute sense of shame' at the Munich agreement, âwe felt too some relief that we were not to be subjected to an immediate aerial bombardment.'
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On this point Schweppenburg's information, which perhaps derived from boasting by Göring, was wrong. The Luftwaffe was in no position to launch a serious air attack on Britain until it gained forward bases after the conquest of France and the Low Countries in 1940. The illusion persisted, however, until the outbreak of war in September 1939, reinforced by a series of subsequent intelligence reports from various sources, that the Luftwaffe would attempt an immediate âknock-out blow' against London as soon as hostilities began.
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British policy during the Munich Crisis, MI5 reported, had convinced Hitler of âthe weakness of England': âThere now seems to be no doubt he is convinced that Great Britain is “decadent” and lacks the will and power to defend the British Empire.' The aim of the report was to stiffen Chamberlain's resolve by demonstrating that appeasement had encouraged rather than removed Hitler's aggressive designs:
Hitler . . . remarked in a circle of his friends and ministers: âIf I were Chamberlain I would not delay for a minute to prepare my country in the most drastic way for a “total” war, and I would thoroughly reorganise it. If the English have not got universal conscription by the spring of 1939 they may consider their World Empire as lost. It is astounding how easy the democracies make it for us to reach our goal.'
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Hitler, the Security Service correctly concluded, was only in the early stages of a massive programme of territorial expansion:
It is apparent that Hitler's policy is essentially a dynamic one, and the question is â What direction will it take next? If the information in the [report], which has proved generally reliable and accurate in the past, is to be believed, Germany is at the beginning of a âNapoleonic era' and her rulers contemplate a great extension of German power.
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In order to try to ensure that the MI5 report attracted Chamberlain's attention, it was decided, at Curry's suggestion, to include samples of Hitler's insulting references to him.
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Halifax underlined three times in red pencil Hitler's reported description of Chamberlain as an âarsehole' (arschloch)
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and was reported to have shown it to the Prime Minister.
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According to Curry, the insult made, as he had intended, âa considerable impression on the Prime Minister',
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who was known to be infuriated by mockery and disrespect.
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Hitler was also reported to have mocked Chamberlain's trademark umbrella as a symbol of his feebleness and to be
âvery fond of making jokes about the “umbrella-pacifism” of the once so imposing British world empire'.
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The impact of the MI5 report was heightened by evidence from one of its informants that George Steward, Number Ten press spokesman, had secretly hinted to Fritz Hesse, the press attaché at the German embassy, that Britain would âgive Germany everything she asks for the next year'. On 28 November 1938 Kell called personally at the Foreign Office to show Cadogan the secret evidence. Cadogan could scarcely bring himself to repeat Kell's message to Halifax, who, he believed, was âgetting rather fed up' and contemplating resignation, but decided he had to do so. âWe must stop this sort of thing,' he told his diary. When Halifax tackled the Prime Minister next day, Chamberlain appeared âaghast'. Cadogan suspected Sir Horace Wilson of complicity in the contact with Hesse, but he agreed with Kell that Steward should be âspoken to' by Wilson. âThis', he believed, âwill put a brake on them all.'
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