The Circle (58 page)

A
. We spoke on the wing, as I described yesterday.

Q
. At what point did you leave the ship?

A
. As I said, after leaving the bridge, I went about the ship, down to the second deck to release a man from the brig. I helped others find their way topside. Then I went over the side.

Q
. Would you describe the situation after the collision?

A
. It was chaotic. Because of the fire and the fact we were cut in half, there was no opportunity to muster at life-boat stations. Each man went over on his own. Fortunately, there were plenty of life jackets. But they didn't protect us against the cold. That was why the absence of the ship's boat is disturbing.

Q
. Have you any criticism to make of the search-and-rescue effort?

A
. Of the search-and-rescue, no. I have two questions, though, one concerning the return of the carrier; the other concerning where
RYAN
's boat went after the ship went down. If this is the place to raise them.

Q
. It is.

A
. My first question concerns
KENNEDY
's return. Lieutenant Evlin and others were still fighting the fire when the carrier hit us again. There were still men aboard and many in the water nearby. Then, after that, the ship's boat disappeared. The combination of these two events is why there were so few survivors. Most of the men who died did so after the initial collision. I hope we will find out why.

The witness requested a short break. A fifteen-minute recess was granted.

*   *   *

EXAMINATION recommenced.

Q
. You have referred to a message directing
RYAN
and other screening units to expedite getting on station?

A
. Yes, sir.

The counsel for the Court requested the reporter to mark a message Exhibit B. It was so marked and submitted to the parties and to the Court.

Q
. I hand you a message marked Exhibit B. Would you read it, please?

A
. “From: CTG 21.1. Action: TU 21.1.2. Subject: Maneuvering. This exercise will test and hone our performance of screening and close-in maneuvering. At 2000Z all units will set and adhere to wartime conditions including radar silence and dimmed lighting. All commanding officers bear in mind that when units are not actually on station they are not contributing to fighting effectiveness of task group. They will accordingly eschew sluggish maneuvering and change stations in the most expeditious manner. In war as in love timing is everything. Prompt and resolute action even at the expense of an occasional mistake is a hallmark of smart destroyer outfits. Admiral Hoelscher sends.”

Q
. That is the message to which you were referring?

A
. Yes. I think this was the reason Commander Packer decided on a risky maneuver rather than the safer one Lieutenant Evlin recommended.

Q
. Can you explain why, feeling as you do, you did not object?

A
. Well, Mr. Evlin already had, and the captain overruled him pretty strenuously. Maybe I should have spoken up, too, but I was not confident enough in my understanding of the matter to do so.

Q
. After Commander Packer gave his order to come left, then increased his rudder to left full, did it not occur to you to warn him that it would bring him into the path of
KENNEDY?

A
. I should have. I did not. I thought he knew better than I did what was going on.

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: This concludes my reexamination of this witness. Do the other counsels desire to cross-examine?

COUNSEL FOR CDR PACKER
: I so desire, yes.

*   *   *

CROSS-EXAMINED by counsel for Commander Packer.

Q
. Mr. Lenson, when
RYAN
came left to course zero-nine-zero, you left the pilothouse to check the captain's solution, is that correct?

A
. No, sir. I crossed the bridge to use the alidade on the port wing. It was Lieutenant Evlin who checked the course at the chart table.

Q
. And your conclusion was that he would pass close to the
KENNEDY
?

A
. Again, that was what Lieutenant Evlin said. His solution showed us passing her within 400 yards, which at night, at sea, without radar, is too close.

Q
. In which direction?

A
. On
KENNEDY
'S port side.

Q
. Is that why you intimated in your previous testimony that you were surprised that the captain turned left?

A
. Yes, sir. If he had just held his course, there would have been a close passage, but we would have all been safe.

Q
. Now, when you were out on the wing: Could you see the running lights of the
KENNEDY?

A
. I could see lights.

Q
. “Lights”?

A
. Yes, sir. As I testified, there were many small dim lights on the carrier's bearing. I could not distinguish the running lights among the others.

Q
. During the time
RYAN
was on zero-nine-zero, did you get any reports from the lookouts?

A
. No, sir.

Q
. Did you have any reports from your lookouts at all between the turn to one-three-zero and the collision?

A
. Not that I recall.

Counsel for Commander Packer had no further questions of this witness.

*   *   *

CROSS-EXAMINED by counsel for Lieutenant Evlin.

Q
. Mr. Lenson, I am coming in in the middle of this case and we will perhaps go over some material already covered. I would appreciate your correction if I err. Now, during the period you were on watch, you said the captain was off and on the bridge. How often was he off?

A
. He was on the bridge from about—from when I came on at 0100; he went to his sea cabin for a while, till Lieutenant Evlin called him about the turn; then he came back up at 0200 or 0205. He was on the bridge from then on, except for the short time when he went aft to get his pipe, about 0210.

Q
. So that while you were in the screen, steaming in close proximity to other ships, the captain was off the bridge more than he was on it, during the period of your watch?

A
. That is misleading on two points, sir. First, we were not “in close proximity” when we were in our screen station. Second, although he wasn't there every minute, he was in phone contact and came back immediately when we began our course change.

Q
. Was the executive officer on the bridge at any time during your watch?

A
. No, sir. Occasionally he came to CIC, but I have never seen him on the bridge.

Q
. What kind of information were you getting from CIC?

A
. None. CIC was secured because the radars were not operating.

Q
. Mr. Lenson, are you a qualified conning officer?

A
. No, sir.

Q
. You have had extensive training, then?

A
. At the Academy, but this was my first time in actual fleet steaming.

Q
. How long had you been on
RYAN?

A
. About two and a half weeks.

Q
.
RYAN
was your first afloat duty?

A
. Yes, sir.

Q
. So that about two and a half weeks is the sum total of your Navy experience?

A
. Well, yes.

Q
. Isn't it a little odd that you would be assigned to such an important watch with no training?

A
. I did—that is, I had some training.

Q
. Was
RYAN
shorthanded?

A
. Not in terms of number of officers. But the captain wanted Lieutenant Talliaferro, the chief engineer, off the watch bill. The plant was old and needed attention. So he did not stand bridge watches.

Q
. How long had Mr. Evlin been aboard?

A
. He said to me once he had been aboard for almost two years.

Q
. Did you have confidence in him?

A
. Yes, sir, he was a very good officer.

Q
. Can you tell us how much experience the bridge team in general had in formation maneuvering?

A
. Well, that calls for a comparison I'm not—I can't answer that. I had not been in formations before. I suppose Mr. Evlin had. I'm sure the captain had.

Q
. But he was only on the bridge sporadically. Would it be fair to say, Mr. Lenson, that in terms of any assistance or backup whatsoever, Lieutenant Evlin was essentially alone on the bridge of USS
RYAN
that night?

COURT
: You have just established that your witness is incapable of answering that question intelligently, Mr. Barrett.

COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN
: I withdraw the question. Would you describe the lights burning on
RYAN
on the night of the collision?

A
. Dimmed navigation lights.

Q
. Please describe them.

A
. It would be masthead and range, and port and starboard and stern lights.

Q
. But that is the normal lighting for a ship under way.

A
. Well, dimmed I guess would be cutting down the illumination from them. There's a switch on the light panel that you throw to turn on the navigation lights, and it has a Dimmed position.

Q
. Did you check them when you came on watch?

A
. The boatswain's mate did that. He reported to me that the lights were burning.

Q
. Did you verify that?

A
. No, sir.

Q
. So in fact, one or more of the lights might have been out?

A
. It is possible, if Pettus did not bother to check them. But I'm sure he did.

Q
. Correct me if I am wrong, but is it not one of the duties of the junior officer of the deck to check the running lights personally when he comes on watch?

A
. [witness paused.] I believe it is.

Q
. And you did not?

A
. No, sir. I was late relieving and I did not check the lights.

Q
. Let's go on. What was
RYAN
's turning radius?

A
. I think—I think about 1,200 yards.

Q
. At what speed?

A
. At standard—at fifteen knots.

Q
. And how fast was the ship traveling when Mr. Evlin and the captain were doing their calculations?

A
. Twenty-seven knots.

Q
. What is the turning radius at that speed?

A
. I'm not sure. Probably less than 1,200 yards.

Q
. But you're not sure?

COUNSEL FOR THE COURT
: Mr. Barrett, the ensign has said clearly that he was not.

COUNSEL FOR LT EVLIN
: Thank you, sir. I withdraw that question, as well.

Let us go on now to the maneuver that Evlin recommended versus the one Packer ordered. Can you reproduce from memory the maneuvering-board solution that he and Commander Packer discussed, as you said in your testimony?

A
. Yes, sir, I think I can. [Witness illustrates.] Commander Packer asked him what he would do if the carrier came to a recovery course around two-six-zero. He told him he had worked it out and that he—

Q
. Who?

A
. Lieutenant Evlin. He intended to slow to fifteen knots and turn right, away from
KENNEDY,
all the way around to two-six-zero; wait for her to pass us; then fall in astern. The captain said that was too slow. He wanted him to come only slightly right instead and head down the carrier's port side at flank speed, making a hard left turn into station when he was past her. They had a disagreement about it, and the captain told him to do the maneuver his way.

Q
. Did you hear Lieutenant Evlin object to the solution?

A
. Yes, sir. That's what I meant by a disagreement.

Q
. Did you feel that the maneuver the captain ordered was dangerous?

A
. Well, not exactly. But it sounded riskier than the solution Mr. Evlin wanted.

Q
. But you didn't make your misgivings known to anyone.

A
. As I said, it was the first time I'd been in this situation.

Q
. In other words, you had not been adequately trained?

A
. I don't know.

Q
. But you said nothing?

A
. I said nothing.

Q
. Let's go on. If you had been watching
KENNEDY,
could you have seen her at all times?

A
. That's an unfair question, sir. Mr. Evlin wanted a bearing on her every ten minutes. I did that. I also had other things to do on the bridge.

Q
. I stand corrected. Now, do you recall what Mr. Evlin, your OOD, did after the captain relieved him of the conn?

A
. He went to check the new course on the maneuvering board.

Q
. He no longer was in charge of the ship?

A
. No, sir, the captain had taken the conn.

Q
. What precisely does that mean?

A
. That Commander Packer was responsible for subsequent maneuvers.