The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (53 page)

¹
52.

²
Where he apparently identified ‘the participant’ with ‘the great and the small’; cf. 1. 35.

³
208
^b
2.

⁴
Cf. 212
^b
14–16.

⁵
209
^b
22–32.

⁶
211
^a
17–
^b
5.

^7
a
32.

⁸
209
^a
2–30.

⁹
De Gen. et Corr.
i. 3.

¹⁰
Expected by those who believe in a separately existing place or void.

¹¹
211
^b
19 sqq., 213
^a
31.

¹²
A Pythagorean of Croton.

¹³
The argument would be clearer if we could say ‘during’ itself. If the existent perished ‘in’ itself, it would never exist without perishing.

¹⁴
Aristotle is probably referring to Plato and the Pythagoreans respectively.

¹⁵
e. g. if you come in when I go out, the time of your coming in is in fact the time of my going out, though for it to be the one and to be the other are different things.

¹⁶
e. g. ‘many years’.

¹⁷
202
^a
4.

¹⁸
220
^a
5.

¹⁹
221
^b
1.

²⁰
220
^b
28.

1
      Everything with changes does so in one of three senses.
(21)
It may change (1)
accidentally,
as for instance when we say that something musical walks, that which walks being something in which aptitude for music is an
accident.
Again (2) a thing is said without qualification to change because
something belonging to it
changes,
(25)
i. e. in statements which refer to part of the thing in question: thus the body is restored to health because the eye or the chest, that is to say a
part
of the whole body, is restored to health. And above all there is (3) the case of a thing which is in motion neither accidentally nor in
respect of something else belonging to it, but in virtue of being
itself
directly in motion. Here we have a thing which is
essentially
movable: and that which is so is a different thing according to the particular variety of motion: for instance it may be a thing capable of alteration: and within the sphere of alteration it is again a different thing according as it is capable of being restored to health or capable of being heated.
(30)
And there are the same distinctions in the case of the mover: (1) one thing causes motion accidentally, (2) another partially (because something belonging to it causes motion), (3) another of itself directly, as, for instance, the physician heals, the hand strikes. We have, then, the following factors: (
a
) on the one hand that which directly causes motion, and (
b
) on the other hand that which is in motion: further, we have (
c
) that in which motion takes place,
(35)
namely time, and (distinct from these three) (
d
) that from which and (
e
) that to which it proceeds: for every motion proceeds from something and to something, that which is directly in motion being distinct from that to which it is in motion and that from which it is in motion: for instance, we may take the three things ‘wood’, ‘hot’, and ‘cold’, of which the first is that which is in motion, the second is that to which the motion proceeds, and the third is that from which it proceeds.
[224b]
This being so, it is clear that the motion is in the wood, not in its form: for the motion is neither caused nor experienced by the form or the place or the quantity.
(5)
So we are left with a mover, a moved, and a goal of motion. I do not include the starting-point of motion: for it is the goal rather than the starting-point of motion that gives its name to a particular process of change. Thus ‘perishing’ is change
to not-being,
though it is also true that that which perishes changes
from being:
and ‘becoming’ is change
to being,
though it is also change
from not-being.

Now a definition of motion has been given above,
^1a
from which it will be seen that every goal of motion,
(10)
whether it be a form, an affection, or a place, is immovable, as, for instance, knowledge and heat. Here, however, a difficulty may be raised. Affections, it may be said, are motions, and whiteness is an affection: thus there may be change
to
a motion. To this we may reply that it is not whiteness but whitening that is a motion.
(15)
Here also the same distinctions are to be observed: a goal of motion may be so accidentally, or partially and with reference to something other than itself, or directly and with no reference to anything else: for instance, a thing which is becoming white changes accidentally to an object of thought, the
colour
being only accidentally the object of thought; it changes to colour,
(20)
because
white is a part of colour, or to Europe, because Athens is a part of Europe; but it changes essentially to white colour. It is now clear in what sense a thing is in motion essentially, accidentally, or in respect of something other than itself, and in what sense the phrase ‘itself directly’ is used in the case both of the mover and of the moved: and it is also clear that the motion is not in the form but in that which is in motion,
(25)
that is to say ‘the movable in activity’. Now accidental change we may leave out of account: for it is to be found in everything, at any time, and in any respect. Change which is not accidental on the other hand is not to be found in everything, but only in contraries, in things intermediate between contraries,
(30)
and in contradictories, as may be proved by induction. An intermediate may be a starting-point of change, since for the purposes of the change it serves as contrary to either of two contraries: for the intermediate is in a sense the extremes. Hence we speak of the intermediate as in a sense a contrary relatively to the extremes and of either extreme as a contrary relatively to the intermediate: for instance, the central note is low relatively to the highest and high relatively to the lowest, and grey is light relatively to black and dark relatively to white.
(35)

And since every change is
from
something
to
something—as the word itself
metabole
indicates, implying something ‘after’ (
meta)
something else, that is to say something earlier and something later—that which changes must change in one of four ways: from subject to subject,
(5)
from subject to non-subject, from non-subject to subject, or from non-subject to non-subject, where by ‘subject’ I mean what is affirmatively expressed.
[225a]
So it follows necessarily from what has been said above that there are only three kinds of change, that from subject to subject, that from subject to non-subject,
(10)
and that from non-subject to subject: for the fourth conceivable kind, that from non-subject to non-subject, is not change, as in that case there is no opposition either of contraries or of contradictories.

Now change from non-subject to subject, the relation being that of contradiction, is ‘coming to be’—‘unqualified coming to be’ when the change takes place in an unqualified way, ‘particular coming to be’ when the change is change in a particular character: for instance, a change from not-white to white is a coming to be of the particular thing,
(15)
white, while change from unqualified not-being to being is coming to be in an unqualified way, in respect of which we say that a thing ‘comes to be’ without qualification, not that it ‘comes to be’ some particular thing. Change from subject to non-subject is ‘perishing’—‘unqualified perishing’ when the change is from being to
not-being, ‘particular perishing’ when the change is to the opposite negation, the distinction being the same as that made in the case of coming to be.

Now the expression ‘not-being’ is used in several senses: and there can be motion neither of that which ‘is not’ in respect of the affirmation or negation of a predicate,
(20)
nor of that which ‘is not’ in the sense that it only
potentially
‘is’, that is to say the opposite of that which
actually
‘is’ in an unqualified sense: for although that which is ‘not-white’ or ‘not-good’ may nevertheless be in motion
accidentally
(for example that which is ‘not-white’ might be a man), yet that which is without qualification ‘not-so-and-so’ cannot in any sense be in motion: Therefore it is impossible for that which
is not
to be in motion.
(25)
This being so, it follows that ‘becoming’ cannot be a motion: for it is that which ‘is not’ that ‘becomes’. For however true it may be that it
accidentally
‘becomes’, it is nevertheless correct to say that it is that which ‘is not’ that in an unqualified sense ‘becomes’. And similarly it is impossible for that which ‘is not’ to be at rest.

There are these difficulties, then, in the way of the assumption that that which ‘is not’ can be in motion: and it may be further objected that,
(30)
whereas everything which is in motion is in space, that which ‘is not’ is not in space: for then it would be
somewhere.

So, too, ‘perishing’ is not a motion: for a motion has for its contrary either another motion or rest, whereas ‘perishing’ is the contrary of ‘becoming’.

Since, then, every motion is a kind of change, and there are only the three kinds of change mentioned above; and since of these three those which take the form of ‘becoming’ and ‘perishing’,
(35)
that is to say those which imply a relation of contradiction, are not motions: it necessarily follows that only change from subject to subject is motion.
[225b]
And every such subject is either a contrary or an intermediate (for a privation may be allowed to rank as a contrary) and can be affirmatively expressed, as naked, toothless, or black. If, then,
(5)
the categories are severally distinguished as Being, Quality, Place, Time, Relation, Quantity, and Activity or Passivity, it necessarily follows that there are three kinds of motion—qualitative, quantitative, and local.

2
     In respect of Substance there is no motion,
(10)
because Substance has no contrary among things that are. Nor is there motion in respect of Relation: for it may happen that when one correlative changes, the other, although this does not itself change, is no longer applicable, so that in these cases the motion is accidental. Nor is there motion in respect of Agent and Patient—in fact there can never be motion of
mover and moved,
(15)
because there cannot be motion of motion or becoming of becoming or in general change of change.

For in the first place there are two senses in which motion of motion is conceivable. (1) The motion of which there is motion might be conceived as subject; e. g. a man is in motion because he changes from fair to dark. Can it be that in this sense motion grows hot or cold,
(20)
or changes place, or increases or decreases? Impossible: for change is not a subject. Or (2) can there be motion of motion in the sense that some other subject changes from a change to another mode of being, as e. g. a man changes from falling ill to getting well? Even this is possible only in an accidental sense. For, whatever the subject may be, movement is change from one form to another.
(25)
(And the same holds good of becoming and perishing, except that in these processes we have a change to a particular
¹
kind of opposite, while the other, motion, is a change to a different
²
kind.) So, if there is to be motion of motion, that which is changing from health to sickness must simultaneously be changing from this very change to another. It is clear, then, that by the time that it has become sick, it must also have changed to whatever may be the other change concerned (for that it should be at rest, though logically possible, is excluded by the theory). Moreover this other can never be any casual change,
(30)
but must be a change from something definite to some other definite thing. So in this case it must be the opposite change, viz. convalescence. It is only accidentally that there can be change of change, e. g. there is a change from remembering to forgetting only because the subject of this change changes at one time to knowledge, at another to ignorance.

In the second place, if there is to be change of change and becoming of becoming, we shall have an infinite regress.
[226a]
Thus if one of a series of changes is to be a change of change,
(35)
the preceding change must also be so: e. g. if simple becoming was ever in process of becoming, then that which was becoming simple becoming was also in process of becoming, so that we should not yet have arrived at what was in process of simple becoming but only at what was already in process of becoming in process of becoming. And this again was sometime in process of becoming, so that even then we should not have arrived at what was in process of simple becoming. And since in an infinite series there is no first term, here there will be no first stage and therefore no following stage either.
(5)
On this hypothesis, then, nothing can become or be moved or change.

Thirdly, if a thing is capable of any particular motion, it is also
capable of the corresponding contrary motion or the corresponding coming to rest, and a thing that is capable of becoming is also capable of perishing: consequently, if there be becoming of becoming, that which is in process of becoming is in process of perishing at the very moment when it has reached the stage of becoming: since it cannot be in process of perishing when it is just beginning to become or after it has ceased to become: for that which is in process of perishing must be in existence.

Fourthly, there must be a substrate underlying all processes of becoming and changing.
(10)
What can this be in the present case? It is either the body or the soul that undergoes alteration: what is it that correspondingly becomes motion or becoming? And again what is the goal of their motion? It must be the motion or becoming of something from something to something else. But in what sense can this be so? For the becoming of learning cannot be learning: so neither can the becoming of becoming be becoming,
(15)
nor can the becoming of any process be that process.

Finally, since there are three kinds of motion, the substratum and the goal of motion must be one or other of these, e. g. locomotion will have to be altered or to be locally moved.

To sum up, then, since everything that is moved is moved in one of three ways, either accidentally, or partially, or essentially,
(20)
change can change only accidentally, as e. g. when a man who is being restored to health runs or learns: and accidental change we have long ago
³
decided to leave out of account.

Since, then, motion can belong neither to Being nor to Relation nor to Agent and Patient, it remains that there can be motion only in respect of Quality, Quantity, and Place: for with each of these we have a pair of contraries.
(25)
Motion in respect of Quality let us call alteration, a general designation that is used to include both contraries: and by Quality I do not here mean a property of substance (in that sense that which constitutes a specific distinction is a quality) but a passive quality in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted on or to be incapable of being acted on. Motion in respect of Quantity has no name that includes both contraries,
(30)
but it is called increase or decrease according as one or the other is designated: that is to say motion in the direction of complete magnitude is increase, motion in the contrary direction is decrease. Motion in respect of Place has no name either general or particular: but we may designate it by the general name of locomotion, though strictly the term ‘locomotion’ is applicable to things that change their place only when they have not the
power to come to a stand,
(35)
and to things that do not move
themselves
locally.

[226b]
Change within the same kind from a lesser to a greater or from a greater to a lesser degree is alteration: for it is motion either from a contrary or to a contrary, whether in an unqualified or in a qualified sense: for change to a lesser degree of a quality will be called change to the contrary of that quality, and change to a greater degree of a quality will be regarded as change from the contrary of that quality to the quality itself.
(5)
It makes no difference whether the change be qualified or unqualified, except that in the former case the contraries will have to be contrary to one another only in a qualified sense: and a thing’s possessing a quality in a greater or in a lesser degree means the presence or absence in it of more or less of the opposite quality. It is now clear, then, that there are only these three kinds of motion.

The term ‘immovable’ we apply in the first place to that which is absolutely incapable of being moved (just as we correspondingly apply the term invisible to sound); in the second place to that which is moved with difficulty after a long time or whose movement is slow at the start—in fact,
(10)
what we describe as hard to move; and in the third place to that which is naturally designed for and capable of motion, but is not in motion when, where, and as it naturally would be so. This last is the only kind of immovable thing of which I use the term ‘being at rest’: for rest is contrary to motion,
(15)
so that rest will be negation of motion in that which is capable of admitting motion.

The foregoing remarks are sufficient to explain the essential nature of motion and rest, the number of kinds of change, and the different varieties of motion.