The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (238 page)

15. Another line of argument is this: The things people approve of openly are not those which they approve of secretly: openly,
(30)
their chief praise is given to justice and nobleness; but in their hearts they prefer their own advantage. Try, in face of this, to establish the point of view which your opponent has not adopted. This is the most
effective of the forms of argument that contradict common opinion.

16. Another line is that of rational correspondence. e. g. Iphicrates, when they were trying to compel his son, a youth under the prescribed age, to perform one of the state duties because he was tall,
(35)
said ‘If you count tall boys men, you will next be voting short men boys’. And Theodectes in his
Law
⁸⁰
said, ‘You make citizens of such mercenaries as Strabax and Charidemus, as a reward of their merits; will you not make exiles of such citizens as those who have done irreparable harm among the mercenaries?’

17.
[1399b]
Another line is the argument that if two results are the same their antecedents are also the same. For instance, it was a saying of Xenophanes that to assert that the gods had birth is as impious as to say that they die; the consequence of both statements is that there is a time when the gods do not exist.
(5)
This line of proof assumes generally that the result of any given thing is always the same: e. g. ‘you are going to decide not about Isocrates, but about the value of the whole profession of philosophy.’ Or, ‘to give earth and water’ means slavery; or,
(10)
‘to share in the Common Peace’ means obeying orders. We are to make either such assumptions or their opposite, as suits us best.

18. Another line of argument is based on the fact that men do not always make the same choice on a later as on an earlier occasion, but reverse their previous choice.
(15)
e. g. the following Enthymeme: ‘When we were exiles, we fought in order to return; now we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight.’
⁸¹
On one occasion, that is, they chose to be true to their homes at the cost of fighting, and on the other to avoid fighting at the cost of deserting their homes.

19. Another line of argument is the assertion that some
possible
motive for an event or state of things is the
real
one: e. g. that a gift was given in order to cause pain by its withdrawal.
(20)
This notion underlies the lines:

Or take the passage from the
Meleager
of Antiphon:

Or the argument in the
Ajax
of Theodectes, that Diomede chose out Odysseus
⁸²
not to do him honour, but in order that his companion
might be a lesser man than himself—such a motive for doing so is quite possible.
(30)

20. Another line of argument is common to forensic and deliberative oratory, namely, to consider inducements and deterrents, and the motives people have for doing or avoiding the actions in question. These are the conditions which make us bound to act if they are for us, and to refrain from action if they are against us: that is, we are bound to act if the action is possible, easy, and useful to ourselves or our friends or hurtful to our enemies; this is true even if the action entails loss,
(35)
provided the loss is outweighed by the solid advantage. A speaker will urge action by pointing to such conditions, and discourage it by pointing to the opposite.
[1400a]
These same arguments also form the materials for accusation or defence—the deterrents being pointed out by the defence, and the inducements by the prosecution. As for the defence,… This topic forms the whole
Art of Rhetoric
both of Pamphilus and of Callippus.

21. Another line of argument refers to things which are supposed to happen and yet seem incredible.
(5)
We may argue that people could not have believed them, if they had not been true or nearly true: even that they are the more likely to be true because they are incredible. For the things which men believe are either facts or probabilities: if, therefore, a thing that
is
believed is improbable and even incredible, it must be true, since it is certainly not believed because it is at all probable or credible. An example is what Androcles of the deme Pitthus said in his well-known arraignment of the law.
(10)
The audience tried to shout him down when he observed that the laws required a law to set them right. ‘Why’, he went on, ‘fish need salt, improbable and incredible as this might seem for creatures reared in salt water; and olive-cakes
⁸³
need oil, incredible as it is that what produces oil should need it.’

22. Another line of argument is to refute our opponent’s case by noting any contrasts or contradictions of dates,
(15)
acts, or words that it anywhere displays; and this in any of the three following connexions. (1) Referring to our opponent’s conduct, e. g. ‘He says he is devoted to you, yet he conspired with the Thirty.’ (2) Referring to our own conduct, e. g. ‘He says I am litigious, and yet he cannot prove that I have been engaged in a single lawsuit.’
(20)
(3) Referring to both of us together, e. g. ‘
He
has never even
lent
any one a penny, but
I
have
ransomed
quite a number of you.’

23. Another line that is useful for men and causes that have been really or seemingly slandered, is to show why the facts are not as
supposed; pointing out that there is a reason for the false impression given. Thus a woman, who had palmed off her son on another woman,
(25)
was thought to be the lad’s mistress because she embraced him; but when her action was explained the charge was shown to be groundless. Another example is from the
Ajax
of Theodectes, where Odysseus tells Ajax the reason why, though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought so.

24. Another line of argument is to show that if the
cause
is present, the
effect
is present, and if absent, absent. For by proving the cause you at once prove the effect, and conversely nothing can exist without its cause.
(30)
Thus Thrasybulus accused Leodamas of having had his name recorded as a criminal on the slab in the Acropolis, and of erasing the record in the time of the Thirty Tyrants: to which Leodamas replied, ‘Impossible: for the Thirty would have trusted me all the more if my quarrel with the commons had been inscribed on the slab.
(35)
’

25. Another line is to consider whether the accused person can take or could have taken a better
⁸⁴
course than that which he is recommending or taking, or has taken. If he has
not
taken this better course, it is clear that he is not guilty, since no one deliberately and consciously chooses what is bad.
⁸⁵
[1400b]
This argument is, however, fallacious, for it often becomes clear after the event how the action could have been done better, though before the event this was far from clear.

26. Another line is, when a contemplated action is inconsistent with any past action, to examine them both together. Thus,
(5)
when the people of Elea asked Xenophanes if they should or should not sacrifice to Leucothea and mourn for her, he advised them not to mourn for her if they thought her a goddess, and not to sacrifice to her if they thought her a mortal woman.

27. Another line is to make previous mistakes the grounds of accusation or defence. Thus, in the
Medea
of Carcinus the accusers allege that Medea has slain her children; ‘at all events’, they say,
(10)
‘they are not to be seen’—Medea having made the mistake of sending her children away. In defence she argues that it is not her children, but Jason, whom she would have slain; for it would have been a mistake on her part not to do this if she
had
done the other. This special line of argument for enthymeme forms the whole of the
Art of Rhetoric
in use before Theodorus.
(15)

28. Another line is to draw meanings from names. Sophocles, for instance, says,

This line of argument is common in praises of the gods. Thus, too, Conon called Thrasybulus
rash in counsel
. And Herodicus said of Thrasymachus, ‘You are always
bold in battle
’; of Polus,
(20)
‘you are always
a colt
’; and of the legislator Draco that his laws were those not of a human being but of
a dragon
, so savage were they. And, in Euripides, Hecuba says of Aphrodite,

and Chaeremon writes

The Refutative Enthymeme has a greater reputation than the Demonstrative,
(25)
because within a small space it works out two opposing arguments, and arguments put side by side are clearer to the audience. But of all syllogisms, whether refutative or demonstrative,
(30)
those are most applauded of which we foresee the conclusions from the beginning, so long as they are not obvious at first sight—for part of the pleasure we feel is at our own intelligent anticipation; or those which we follow well enough to see the point of them as soon as the last word has been uttered.

24
     Besides genuine syllogisms, there may be syllogisms that look genuine but are not; and since an Enthymeme is merely a syllogism of a particular kind,
(35)
it follows that, besides genuine Enthymemes, there may be those that look genuine but are not.

1. Among the lines of argument that form the Spurious Enthymeme the first is that which arises from the particular words employed.
[1401a]

(
a
) One variety of this is when—as in dialectic, without having gone through any reasoning process, we make a final statement as if it were the conclusion of such a process, ‘Therefore so-and-so is not true’, ‘Therefore also so-and-so must be true’—so too in rhetoric a compact and antithetical utterance passes for an enthymeme,
(5)
such language being the proper province of enthymeme, so that it is seemingly the form of wording here that causes the illusion mentioned. In order to produce the effect of genuine reasoning by our form of wording it is useful to summarize the results of a number of previous reasonings: as ‘some he saved—others he avenged—the Greeks he freed’.
⁸⁷
(10)
Each of these statements has been previously proved from other facts; but the mere collocation of them gives the impression of establishing some fresh conclusion.

(
b
) Another variety is based on the use of similar words for different
things; e. g. the argument that the mouse must be a noble creature, since it gives its name to the most august of all religious rites—for such the Mysteries are.
(15)
Or one may introduce, into a eulogy of the dog, the dog-star; or Pan, because Pindar said:

or we may argue that, because there is much disgrace in there
not
being a dog about, there is honour in
being
a dog.
⁸⁸
Or that Hermes is readier than any other god to go shares, since we never say ‘shares all round’ except of him.
(20)
Or that speech
⁸⁹
is a very excellent thing, since good men are not said to be worth money but to be worthy of esteem—the phrase ‘worthy of esteem’ also having the meaning of ‘worth speech’.

2. Another line is to assert of the whole what is true of the parts, or of the parts what is true of the whole. A whole and its parts are supposed to be identical, though often they are not.
(25)
You have therefore to adopt whichever of these two lines better suits your purpose. That is how Euthydemus argues: e. g. that any one knows that there is a trireme in the Peiraeus, since he knows the separate details that make up this statement. There is also the argument that one who knows the letters knows the whole word, since the word is the same thing as the letters which compose it; or that, if a double portion of a certain thing is harmful to health,
(30)
then a single portion must not be called wholesome, since it is absurd that two good things should make one bad thing. Put thus, the Enthymeme is refutative; put as follows, demonstrative: ‘For one good thing cannot be made up of two bad things.’ The whole line of argument is fallacious. Again, there is Polycrates’ saying that Thrasybulus put down thirty tyrants, where the speaker adds them up one by one. Or the argument in the
Orestes
of Theodectes, where the argument is from part to whole:

’Tis right that she who slays her lord should die.
(35)

‘It is right, too, that the son should avenge his father. Very good: these two things are what Orestes has done.’
[1401b]
Still, perhaps the two things, once they are put together, do not form a right act. The fallacy might also be said to be due to omission, since the speaker fails to say by whose hand a husband-slayer should die.

3. Another line is the use of indignant language, whether to support your own case or to overthrow your opponent’s.
(5)
We do this when we paint a highly-coloured picture of the situation without having proved the facts of it: if the defendant does so, he produces an impression of his innocence; and if the prosecutor goes into a passion, he produces an impression of the defendant’s guilt. Here there is no genuine Enthymeme: the hearer infers guilt or innocence, but no proof is given, and the inference is fallacious accordingly.

4. Another line is to use a ‘Sign’, or single instance, as certain evidence; which, again, yields no valid proof. Thus,
(10)
it might be said that lovers are useful to their countries, since the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton caused the downfall of the tyrant Hipparchus.
⁹⁰
Or, again, that Dionysius is a thief, since he is a vicious man—there is, of course, no valid proof here; not every vicious man is a thief, though every thief is a vicious man.

5. Another line represents the accidental as essential.
(15)
An instance is what Polycrates says of the mice, that they ‘came to the rescue’ because they gnawed through the bowstrings. Or it might be maintained that an invitation to dinner is a great honour, for it was because he was
not
invited that Achilles was ‘angered’ with the Greeks at Tenedos. As a fact, what angered him was the
insult
involved; it was a mere accident that this was the particular form that the insult took.

6. Another is the argument from consequence. In the
Alexander
,
(20)
for instance, it is argued that Paris must have had a lofty disposition, since he despised society and lived by himself on Mount Ida: because lofty people do this kind of thing, therefore Paris too, we are to suppose, had a lofty soul. Or, if a man dresses fashionably and roams around at night, he is a rake, since that is the way rakes behave.
(25)
Another similar argument points out that beggars sing and dance in temples, and that exiles can live wherever they please, and that such privileges are at the disposal of those we account happy; and therefore every one might be regarded as happy if only he has those privileges. What matters, however, is the
circumstances
under which the privileges are enjoyed. Hence this line too falls under the head of fallacies by omission.

7.
(30)
Another line consists in representing as causes things which are not causes, on the ground that they happened along with or before the event in question. They assume that, because B happens
after
A, it happens
because
of A. Politicians are especially fond of taking this
line. Thus Demades said that the policy of Demosthenes was the cause of all the mischief, ‘for after it the war occurred’.

8. Another line consists in leaving out any mention of time and circumstances. e. g. the argument that Paris was justified in taking Helen,
(35)
since her father left her free to choose: here the freedom was presumably not perpetual; it could only refer to her first choice, beyond which her father’s authority could not go.
[1402a]
Or again, one might say that to strike a free man is an act of wanton outrage; but it is not so in every case—only when it is unprovoked.

9. Again, a spurious syllogism may, as in ‘eristical’ discussions, be based on the confusion of the absolute with that which is not absolute but particular. As, in dialectic, for instance, it may be argued that what-is-not
is
,
(5)
on the ground that what-is-not
is
what-is-not; or that the unknown can be known, on the ground that it can be known to
be
unknown: so also in rhetoric a spurious Enthymeme may be based on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability. Now no particular probability is universally probable: as Agathon says,

For what is improbable does happen, and therefore it is probable that improbable things
will
happen. Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable’. But this is not true absolutely. As, in eristic, the imposture comes from not adding any clause specifying relationship or reference or manner; so here it arises because the probability in question is not general but specific.
(15)
It is of this line of argument that Corax’s
Art of Rhetoric
is composed. If the accused is not open to the charge—for instance if a weakling be tried for violent assault—the defence is that he was not likely to do such a thing. But if he
is
open to the charge—i. e. if he is a
strong
man—the defence is still that he was not likely to do such a thing,
(20)
since he could be sure that people would think he
was
likely to do it. And so with any other charge: the accused must be either open or not open to it: there is in either case an appearance of probable innocence, but whereas in the latter case the probability is genuine, in the former it can only be asserted in the special sense mentioned. This sort of argument illustrates what is meant by making the worse argument seem the better. Hence people were right in objecting to the training Protagoras undertook to give them.
⁹¹
It was a fraud; the probability it handled was not genuine but spurious,
(25)
and has a place in no art except Rhetoric and Eristic.