The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (20 page)

22
     Whenever the extremes are convertible it is necessary that the middle should be convertible with both. For if
A
belongs to
C
through
B,
then if
A
and
C
are convertible and
C
belongs to everything to which
A
belongs,
(30)
B
is convertible with
A,
and
B
belongs to everything to which
A
belongs, through
C
as middle, and
C
is convertible with
B
through
A
as middle. Similarly if the conclusion is negative, e. g. if
B
belongs to
C,
but
A
does not belong to
B,
neither will
A
belong to
C.
If then
B
is convertible with
A, C
will be convertible with
A.
(35)
Suppose
B
does not belong to
A;
neither then will
C:
for
ex hypothesi B
belonged to all
C.
And if
C
is convertible with
B, B
is convertible also with
A:
for C is said of that of all of which
B
is said. And if
C
is convertible in relation to
A
and to
B, B
also is convertible in relation to
A.
For
C
belongs to that to which
B
belongs: but
C
does not belong to that to which
A
belongs.
[68a]
And this alone starts from the conclusion; the preceding moods do not do so as in
the affirmative syllogism. Again if
A
and
B
are convertible, and similarly
C
and
D,
and if
A
or
C
must belong to anything whatever,
(5)
then
B
and
D
will be such that one or other belongs to anything whatever. For since
B
belongs to that to which
A
belongs, and
D
belongs to that to which
C
belongs, and since
A
or
C
belongs to everything, but not together, it is clear that
B
or
D
belongs to everything, but not together. For example if that which is uncreated is incorruptible and that which is incorruptible is uncreated, it is necessary that what is created should be corruptible and what is corruptible should have been created.
(10)
For two syllogisms have been put together. Again if
A
or
B
belongs to everything and if
C
or
D
belongs to everything, but they cannot belong together, then when
A
and
C
are convertible
B
and
D
are convertible. For if
B
does not belong to something to which
D
belongs, it is clear that
A
belongs to it. But if
A
then
C:
for they are convertible. Therefore
C
and
D
belong together. But this is impossible.
(15)
When
A
belongs to the whole of
B
and to
C
and is affirmed of nothing else, and
B
also belongs to all
C,
it is necessary that
A
and
B
should be convertible: for since
A
is said of
B
and
C
only, and
B
is affirmed both of itself and of
C,
it is clear that
B
will be said of everything of which
A
is said,
(20)
except
A
itself. Again when
A
and
B
belong to the whole of
C,
and
C
is convertible with
B,
it is necessary that
A
should belong to all
B:
for since
A
belongs to all
C,
and
C
to
B
by conversion,
A
will belong to all
B.

When, of two opposites
A
and
B, A
is preferable to
B,
(25)
and similarly
D
is preferable to
C,
then if
A
and
C
together are preferable to
B
and
D
together,
A
must be preferable to
D.
For
A
is an object of desire to the same extent as
B
is an object of aversion, since they are opposites: and
C
is similarly related to
D,
since they also are opposites. If then
A
is an object of desire to the same extent as
D,
(30)
B
is an object of aversion to the same extent as
C
(since each is to the same extent as each—the one an object of aversion, the other an object of desire). Therefore both
A
and
C
together, and
B
and
D
together, will be equally objects of desire or aversion. But since
A
and
C
are preferable to
B
and
D, A
cannot be equally desirable with
D;
for then
B
along with
D
would be equally desirable with
A
along with
C.
But if
D
is preferable to
A,
then
B
must be less an object of aversion than
C:
for the less is opposed to the less.
(35)
But the greater good and lesser evil are preferable to the lesser good and greater evil: the whole
BD
then is preferable to the whole
AC.
But
ex hypothesi
this is not so.
A
then is preferable to
D,
and
C
consequently is less an object of aversion than
B.
If then every lover in virtue of his love would prefer
A,
viz. that the beloved should be
such as to grant a favour,
(40)
and yet should not grant it (for which
C
stands), to the beloved’s granting the favour (represented by
D
) without being such as to grant it (represented by
B
), it is clear that
A
(being of such a nature) is preferable to granting the favour.
[68b]
To receive affection then is preferable in love to sexual intercourse. Love then is more dependent on friendship than on intercourse. And if it is most dependent on receiving affection, then this is its end.
(5)
Intercourse then either is not an end at all or is an end relative to the further end, the receiving of affection. And indeed the same is true of the other desires and arts.

23
     It is clear then how the terms are related in conversion, and in respect of being in a higher degree objects of aversion or of desire.
(10)
We must now state that not only dialectical and demonstrative syllogisms are formed by means of the aforesaid figures, but also rhetorical syllogisms and in general any form of persuasion, however it may be presented. For every belief comes either through syllogism or from induction.

Now induction,
(15)
or rather the syllogism which springs out of induction, consists in establishing syllogistically a relation between one extreme and the middle by means of the other extreme, e. g. if
B
is the middle term between
A
and
C,
it consists in proving through
C
that
A
belongs to
B.
For this is the manner in which we make inductions. For example let
A
stand for long-lived,
B
for bileless,
(20)
and
C
for the particular long-lived animals, e. g. man, horse, mule.
A
then belongs to the whole of
C:
for whatever is bileless is long-lived. But
B
also (‘not possessing bile’) belongs to all
C.
If then
C
is convertible with
B,
and the middle term is not wider in extension, it is necessary that
A
should belong to
B.
For it has already been proved that if two things belong to the same thing,
(25)
and the extreme is convertible with one of them, then the other predicate will belong to the predicate that is converted. But we must apprehend
C
as made up of all the particulars. For induction proceeds through an enumeration of all the cases.

Such is the syllogism which establishes the first and immediate premiss: for where there is a middle term the syllogism proceeds through the middle term; when there is no middle term,
(30)
through induction. And in a way induction is opposed to syllogism: for the latter proves the major term to belong to the third term by means of the middle, the former proves the major to belong to the middle by means of the third.
(35)
In the order of nature, syllogism through the middle term is prior and better known, but syllogism through induction is clearer to
us.

24
     We have an ‘example’ when the major term is proved to belong to the middle by means of a term which resembles the third. It ought to be known both that the middle belongs to the third term,
(40)
and that the first belongs to that which resembles the third. For example let
A
be evil,
B
making war against neighbours,
C
Athenians against Thebans,
D
Thebans against Phocians.
[69a]
If then we wish to prove that to fight with the Thebans is an evil, we must assume that to fight against neighbours is an evil. Evidence of this is obtained from similar cases, e. g. that the war against the Phocians was an evil to the Thebans.
(5)
Since then to fight against neighbours is an evil, and to fight against the Thebans is to fight against neighbours, it is clear that to fight against the Thebans is an evil. Now it is clear that
B
belongs to
C
and to
D
(for both are cases of making war upon one’s neighbours) and that
A
belongs to
D
(for the war against the Phocians did not turn out well for the Thebans): but that
A
belongs to
B
will be proved through
D.
(10)
Similarly if the belief in the relation of the middle term to the extreme should be produced by several similar cases. Clearly then to argue by example is neither like reasoning from part to whole, nor like reasoning from whole to part, but rather reasoning from part to part, when both particulars are subordinate to the same term,
(15)
and one of them is known. It differs from induction, because induction starting from all the particular cases proves (as we saw
¹²
) that the major term belongs to the middle, and does not apply the syllogistic conclusion to the minor term, whereas argument by example does make this application and does not draw its proof from all the particular cases.

25
     By reduction we mean an argument in which the first term clearly belongs to the middle,
(20)
but the relation of the middle to the last term is uncertain though equally or more probable than the conclusion; or again an argument in which the terms intermediate between the last term and the middle are few. For in any of these cases it turns out that we approach more nearly to knowledge. For example let
A
stand for what can be taught,
B
for knowledge,
C
for justice.
(25)
Now it is clear that knowledge can be taught: but it is uncertain whether virtue is knowledge. If now the statement
BC
¹³
is equally or more probable than
AC,
we have a reduction: for we are nearer to knowledge, since we have taken a new term,
¹⁴
being so far without knowledge that
A
belongs to
C.
Or again suppose that the terms intermediate
between
B
and
C
are few: for thus too we are nearer knowledge.
(30)
For example let
D
stand for squaring,
E
for rectilinear figure,
F
for circle. If there were only one term intermediate between
E
and
F
(viz. that the circle is made equal to a rectilinear figure by the help of lunules), we should be near to knowledge.
(35)
But when
BC
is not more probable than
AC,
and the intermediate terms are not few, I do not call this reduction: nor again when the statement
BC
is immediate: for such a statement is knowledge.

26
     An objection is a premiss contrary to a premiss. It differs from a premiss, because it may be particular, but a premiss either cannot be particular at all or not in universal syllogisms.
[69b]
An objection is brought in two ways and through two figures; in two ways because every objection is either universal or particular, by two figures because objections are brought in opposition to the premiss,
(5)
and opposites can be proved only in the first and third figures. If a man maintains a universal affirmative, we reply with a universal or a particular negative; the former is proved from the first figure, the latter from the third. For example let
A
stand for there being a single science,
B
for contraries. If a man premisses that contraries are subjects of a single science,
(10)
the objection may be either that opposites are never subjects of a single science, and contraries are opposites, so that we get the first figure, or that the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of a single science: this proof is in the third figure: for it is true of
C
(the knowable and the unknowable) that they are contraries, and it is false that they are the subjects of a single science.

Similarly if the premiss objected to is negative.
(15)
For if a man maintains that contraries are not subjects of a single science, we reply either that all opposites or that certain contraries, e. g. what is healthy and what is sickly, are subjects of the same science: the former argument issues from the first, the latter from the third figure.

In general if a man urges a universal objection he must frame his contradiction with reference to the universal of the terms taken by his opponent,
(20)
e. g. if a man maintains that
contraries
are not subjects of the same science, his opponent must reply that there is a single science of all
opposites.
Thus we must have the first figure: for the term which embraces the original subject becomes the middle term.

If the objection is particular, the objector must frame his contradiction with reference to a term relatively to which the subject of his opponent’s premiss is universal, e. g. he will point out that
the knowable and the unknowable are not subjects of the same science: ‘contraries’ is universal relatively to these.
(25)
And we have the third figure: for the particular term assumed is middle, e. g. the knowable and the unknowable. Premisses from which it is possible to draw the contrary conclusion are what we start from when we try to make objections. Consequently we bring objections in these figures only: for in them only are opposite syllogisms possible,
(30)
since the second figure cannot produce an affirmative conclusion.

Besides, an objection in the middle figure would require a fuller argument, e. g. if it should not be granted that
A
belongs to
B,
because
C
does not follow
B.
This can be made clear only by other premisses.
(35)
But an objection ought not to turn off into other things, but have its new premiss quite clear immediately. For this reason also this is the only figure from which proof by signs cannot be obtained.

We must consider later the other kinds of objection, namely the objection from contraries, from similars, and from common opinion, and inquire whether a particular objection cannot be elicited from the first figure or a negative objection from the second.
[70a]