The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of Security (5 page)

As the stories in this chapter have shown, seemingly innocuous information can be the key to your company's most prized secrets.

Many social engineering attacks are intricate, involving a number of steps and elaborate planning, combining a mix of manipulation and technological know- how.

But I always find it striking that a skillful social engineer can often achieve his goal with a simple, straightforward, direct attack. Just asking outright for the information may be all that's needed - as you'll see.

AN MLAC QUICKIE Want to know someone's unlisted phone number? A social engineer can tell you half a dozen ways (and you'll find some of them described in other stories in these pages), but probably the simplest scenario is one that uses a single phone call, like this one.

Number, Please The attacker dialed the private phone company number for the MLAC, the Mechanized Line Assignment Center. To the woman who answered, he said:

"Hey, this is Paul Anthony. I'm a cable splicer. Listen, a terminal box out here got fried in a fire. Cops think some creep tried to burn his own house down for the insurance. They got me out here alone trying to rewire this entire two hundred- pair terminal. I could really use some help right now. What facilities should be working at 6723 South Main?"

In other parts of the phone company, the person called would know that reverse lookup information on non pub (non published) numbers is supposed to be given out only to authorized phone company MLAC is supposed to be known only to company employees. And while they'd never give out information to the public, who would want to refuse a little help to a company man coping with that heavy- duty assignment?. She feels sorry for him, she's had bad days on the job herself, and she'll bend the rules a little to help out a fellow employee with a problem. She gives him the cable and pairs and each working number assigned to the address.

MITNICK MESSAGE It's human nature to trust our fellow man, especially when the request meets the test of being reasonable. Social engineers use this knowledge to exploit their victims and to achieve their goals. Analyzing the Con As you'll notice repeatedly in these stories, knowledge of a company's lingo, and of its corporate structure - its various offices and departments what each does and what information each has - is part of the essential bag of tricks of the successful social engineer.

YOUNG MAN ON THE RUN A man we'll call Frank Parsons had been on the run for years, still wanted by the federal government for being part of an underground antiwar group in the 1960s. In restaurants he sat facing the door and he had a way of glancing over his shoulder every once in a while that other people found disconcerting. He moved every few years.

At one point Frank landed in a city he didn't know, and set about job hunting. For someone like Frank, with his well-developed computer skills (and social engineering skills as well, even ,though he never listed those on a job application), finding a good job usually wasn't a problem. Except in times when the economy is very tight, people with good technical computer knowledge usually find their talents in high demand and they have little problem landing on their feet. Frank quickly located a well � paying job opportunity at a large, upscale, long-term care facility near where he was living.

Just the ticket, he thought. But when he started plodding his way through the application forms, he came upon an uh-oh: The employer required the applicant to provide a copy of his state criminal history record, which he had to obtain himself from the state police. The stack of employment papers included a form to request this document, and the form had a little box for providing a fingerprint. Even though they were asking for a print of just the right index finger, if they matched his print with one in the FBI's database, he'd probably soon be working in food service at a federally funded resort.

On the other hand, it occurred to Frank that maybe, just maybe, he might still be able to get away with this. Perhaps the state didn't send those fingerprint samples to the FBI at all. How could he find out?

How? He was a social engineer--how do you think he found out? He placed a phone call to the state patrol: "Hi. We're doing a study for the State Department of Justice. We're researching the requirements to implement a new fingerprint identification system. Can I talk to somebody there that's really familiar with what you're doing who could maybe help us out?" And when the local expert came on the phone, Frank asked a series of questions about what systems they were using, and the capabilities to search and store fingerprint data. Had they had any equipment problems? Were they tied into the National Crime Information Center's (NCIC) Fingerprint Search or just within the state? Was the equipment pretty easy for everybody to learn to use?

Slyly, he sneaked the key question in among the rest.

The answer was music to his ears: No they weren't tied into the NCIC, they only checked against the state's Criminal Information Index (CII).

MITNICK MESSGAE Savvy information swindlers have no qualms about ringing up federal, state, or local government officials to learn about the procedures of law enforcement. With such information in hand, the social engineer may be able to circumvent your company's standard security checks.

That was all Frank needed to know. He didn't have any record in that state, so he submitted his application, was hired for the job, and nobody ever showed up at his desk one day with the greeting, "These gentlemen, are from the FBI and they'd like to have a little talk with you."

And, according to him, he proved to be a model employee.

ON THE DOORSTEP In spite of the myth of the paperless office, companies continue to print out reams of paper every day. Information in print at your company may be vulnerable, even if you use security precautions and stamp it confidential.

Here's one story that shows you how social engineers might obtain your most secret documents.

Loop-Around Deception Every year the phone company publishes a volume called the Test Number Directory (or at least they used to, and because I am still on supervised release, I'm not going to ask if they still do). This document was highly prized by phone phreaks because it was packed with a list of all the closely guarded phone numbers used by company craftsmen, technicians, a others for things like trunk testing or checking numbers that always ring busy. One of these test numbers, known in the lingo as a loop-around, was particularly useful. Phone phreaks used it as a way to find other phone phreaks to chat with, at no cost to them. Phone phreaks also used it a way to create a call back number to give to, say, a bank. A social engineer would tell somebody at the bank the phone number to call to reach at his office. When the bank called back to the test number (loop-around) the phone phreak would be able to receive the call, yet he had the protection of having used a phone number that could not be traced back to him.

A Test Number Directory provided a lot of neat information that could be used by any information-hungry, testosteroned, phone phreak. So when the new directories were published each year, they were coveted by a lot of youngsters whose hobby was exploring the telephone network.

MITNICK MESSAGE Security training with respect to company policy designed to protect information assets needs to be for everyone in the company, not just any employee who has electronic or physical access to the company's IT assets.

Stevie's Scam Naturally phone companies don't make these books easy to get hold of, so phone phreaks have to be creative to get one. How can they do this? An eager youngster with a mind bent on acquiring the directory might enact a scenario like this.

Late one day, a mild evening in the southern California autumn, a guy I'll call him Stevie phones a small telephone company central office, which is the building from which phone lines run to all the homes and businesses in the established service area.

When the switchman on duty answers the call, Stevie announces that he's from the division of the phone company that publishes and distributes printed materials. "We have your new Test Number Directory," he says. "But for security reasons, we cant deliver your copy until we pick up the old one. And the delivery guy is running late. If you wanna leave your copy just outside your door, he can swing by, pick up yours, drop the new one and be on his way."

The unsuspecting switchman seems to think that sounds reasonable. He does exactly as asked, putting out on the doorstep of the building his copy of the directory, its cover clearly marked in big red letters with the "COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL - WHEN NO LONGER NEEDED THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE SHREDDED." Stevie drives by and looks around carefully to spot any cops or phone company security people who might be lurking behind trees or watching for him from parked cars. Nobody in sight. He casually picks up the coveted directory and drives away.

Here's just one more example of how easy it can be for a social engineer to get what he wants by following the simple principle of "just ask for it."

GAS ATTACK Not only company assets are at risk in a social engineering scenario. Sometimes it's a company's customers who are the victims.

Working as a customer-service clerk brings its share of frustrations, its share of laughs, and its share of innocent mistakes - some of which can have unhappy consequences for a company's customers.

Janie Acton's Story Janie Acton had been manning a cubicle as a customer service rep f Hometown Electric Power, in Washington, D.C., for just over three years. She was considered to be one of the better clerks, smart and conscientious

It was Thanksgiving week when this one particular call came in. The caller, said, "This is Eduardo in the Billing Department. I've got a lady on hold, she's a secretary in the executive offices that works for one of the vice presidents, and she's asking for some information and I can't use my computer I got an email from this girl in Human Resources that said 'ILOVEYOU.' and when I opened the attachment, I couldn't use my machine any more. A virus. I got caught by a stupid virus. Anyways, could you look up some customer information for me?" "Sure," Janie answered. "It crashed your computer? That's terrible." "Yeah." "How can I help?" Janie asked.

Here the attacker called on information from his advance research to make himself sound authentic. He had learned that the information he, wanted was stored in something called the Customer Billing Information System, and he had found out how employees referred to the system. He asked, "Can you bring up an account on CBIS?"

"Yes, what's the account number.? " "I don't have the number; I need you to bring it up by name." "Okay, what's the name?" "It's Heather Marning." He spelled the name, and Janie typed it in. "Okay, I have it up." "Great. Is the account current?" "Uh huh, it's current." "What's the account number?" he asked. "Do you have a pencil?"

"Ready to write."

"Account number BAZ6573NR27Q."

He read the number back and then said, "And what's the service address?"

She gave him the address.

"And what's the phone?"

Janie obligingly read off that information, too.

The caller thanked her, said good-bye, and hung up. Janie went on to the next call, never thinking further about it.

Art Sealy's Research Project Art Sealy had given up working as a freelance editor for small publishing houses when he found he could make more money doing research for writers and businesses. He soon figured out that the fee he could charge went up in proportion to how close the assignment took him to the sometimes hazy line between the legal and the illegal. Without ever realizing it, certainly without ever giving it a name, Art became a social engineer, using techniques familiar to every information broker. He turned out to have a native talent for the business, figuring out for himself techniques that most social engineers had to learn from others. After a while, he crossed the line without the least twinge of guilt.

A man contacted me who was writing a book about the Cabinet in the Nixon years, and was looking for a researcher who could get the inside scoop on William E. Simon, who had been Nixon's Treasury secretary. Mr. Simon had died, but the author had the name of a woman who had been on his staff. He was pretty sure she still lived in D.C., but hadn't been able to get an address. She didn't have a telephone in her name, or at least none that was listed. So that's when he called me. I told him, sure, no problem.

This is the kind of job you can usually bring off in a phone call or two, if you know what you're doing. Every local utility company can generally be counted on to give the information away. Of course, you have to BS a little. But what's a little white lie now and then - right?

I like to use a different approach each time, just to keep things interesting. "This is so-and-so in the executive offices" has always worked well for me. So has "I've got somebody on the line from Vice President Somebody's office," which worked this time, too. MITNICK MESSAGE Never think all social engineering attacks need to be elaborate ruses so complex that they're likely to be recognized before they can be completed. Some are in- and-out, strike-and-disappear, very simple attacks that are no more than.., well, just asking for it.

You have to sort of develop the social engineer's instinct, get a sense of how cooperative the person on the other end is going to be with you. This time I lucked out with a friendly, helpful lady. In a single phone call, I had the address and phone number. Mission accomplished.

Analyzing the Con Certainly Janie knew that customer information is sensitive. She would never discuss one customer's account with another customer, or give out private information to the public.

But naturally, for a caller from within the company, different rules apply. For a fellow employee it's all about being a team player and helping each other get the job done. The man from Billing could have looked up the details himself if his computer hadn't been down with a virus, and she was glad to be able to help a co- worker.

Art built up gradually to the key information he was really after, asking questions along the way about things he didn't really need, such as the account number. Yet at the same time, the account number information provided a fallback: If the clerk had become suspicious, he'd call a second time and stand a better chance of success, because knowing the account number would make him sound all the more authentic to the next clerk he reached.