Supreme Commander (71 page)

But the Allies made some errors too. At Omaha Beach the landings nearly failed because the Big Red One ran directly into the German 352d Infantry Division. Neither the SHAEF nor the Twenty-first Army Group G-2 had spotted the 352d, even though it had been in place for almost three months. Thus, the troops at Omaha were pinned down and on the verge of being driven back into the sea. But the Germans never delivered the final blow, in part because of the lack of direction from the top, in part because the local commanders felt they had already repulsed the invasion. Still, for the whole of June 6, the Germans had an excellent opportunity to defeat OVERLORD. A concentrated attack at Omaha would have put the Germans between the American forces on Utah and the British and Canadian units to the east. But the Germans had been misled by the airborne landings the previous evening and they grossly overestimated the Allied strength. They were in any case centering their attention on Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches, because the Allies had gotten farther inland there and because the British and Canadians threatened Caen.
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By noon much of these situations were clear to Eisenhower. He had returned to the war tent where he anxiously watched the maps and listened to the disturbing news coming from Omaha. A messenger
brought a note from Leigh-Mallory; the air commander said that it was sometimes difficult to admit that one was wrong, but he had never had a greater pleasure in doing so than on this occasion. He congratulated Eisenhower on the wisdom of his command decision in sending the airborne troops in, despite his own warnings, and apologized for having added to the Supreme Commander’s worries.
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For the remainder of the day Eisenhower paced, his mood alternating between joy and worry as he received news of the situation on the British and Canadian beaches and on Omaha. After eating, he retired early to get a good night’s sleep. At a cost of only 2500 casualties, his men had gained a striking victory. More than 23,000 airborne troops had entered Normandy the night of June 5–6, and 57,500 Americans and 75,215 British and Canadian troops had come ashore during the day. More than 156,000 Allied soldiers had breached Hitler’s much-vaunted Atlantic Wall.
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After breakfast the next morning Eisenhower boarded the British mine layer
Apollo
, under Captain J. A. Grindle, to cross the Channel and visit the beachhead. Ramsay and other naval officers came along. The
Apollo
went in close to Omaha Beach and dropped the anchor; Bradley came aboard, along with Admiral Kirk, to discuss the situation. It was generally good, but there was cause for concern. All the five divisions ashore were seriously deficient in transport, tank support, artillery, and supplies generally. The worst situation was at Omaha where, of the 2400 tons of supplies planned to be unloaded during D-Day, only 100 tons had actually made it. The ammunition shortage was grave. The beach obstacles had cut holes in the bottoms of many landing craft, and fire from the Germans interfered with the unloading. Both Utah and Omaha were still under enemy artillery fire, and on Omaha pockets of enemy riflemen still held out at various points along the coast. Beach obstacles were only about a third cleared, beach exits had not been opened, and vehicle parks had not been established inland. The 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions had created havoc in the German lines, but they had not come together as fighting units. The 82d especially was scattered far and wide in enemy territory. Tanks were needed to spearhead the drive inland but at Omaha, of the thirty-two swimming tanks launched on D-Day, twenty-seven floundered at sea.

All these deficiencies could be overcome, given time. Thanks to the Transportation Plan, the Allies had time. The Germans were finding it increasingly difficult to move reinforcements to the battle zone because of bombed-out bridges and railroad centers, and the French Resistance,
now unleashed, was adding seriously to their problems. Air power had not been effective in neutralizing the coastal fortifications, which continued to pour artillery shells into the beachhead, but naval gunfire support here was making an increasingly successful contribution.
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The most serious immediate problem was the gap between the forces at Utah and those at Omaha. Eisenhower discussed this situation with Bradley and decided to change the plan, which had called for both the 4th Infantry at Utah and the Big Red One at Omaha to drive inland. Instead, Eisenhower told Bradley to have them concentrate on moving toward each other, with Carentan as the immediate objective, in order to link up and provide a solid, continuous front. It was his only major command decision of the entire first week of the battle; all others he left to Montgomery and Bradley.
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After Bradley left to carry out his orders, Eisenhower’s ship, the
Apollo
, moved east along the British beaches. Stopping alongside H.M.S.
Hilleary
, the
Apollo
received the local British naval officers, who told Eisenhower that, over all, things were going well on their beaches. Heavy seas slowed the unloading but, looking through his binoculars, Eisenhower could see tanks and lorries moving inland. Montgomery came aboard, said he was happy, and indicated that he thought the battle was going well. After he left the
Apollo
began moving east again, with Eisenhower and Ramsay urging Captain Grindle to take them closer inland so they could see more. They watched the British unloading and saw some of the artificial breakwaters and harbors being towed toward their destinations. Aircraft were overhead all the time; the air forces had flown 10,500 sorties on June 6 and nearly as many the next day. Wherever Eisenhower looked he saw only Allied ships and Allied planes.

Suddenly there was a lurch—Grindle had gone too close and his ship was stuck on a sand bar. He tried to force his way across it, which set the entire ship to jerking, grinding, and bouncing, but with little success. The
Apollo
finally floated free, but the propellers were bent and Eisenhower and Ramsay had to transfer to H.M.S.
Undaunted
for the trip back to England. Eisenhower knew that Grindle would have to face a court of inquiry and was concerned about his fate. The Supreme Commander said the fault was his for urging Grindle to swing closer in. Ramsay reassured Eisenhower by saying Grindle would get off with a reprimand from the Admiralty and “most good naval officers have a reprimand or two on their records.” Eisenhower got back to Portsmouth at 10
P.M
. after what he regarded as a “most fruitful day.”
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The next few days were spent in consolidating gains. Nowhere along
the front had initial objectives been fully achieved on D-Day or even D plus one, but the Allies held the initiative by putting pressure on the Germans everywhere. Each day the Germans attacked at one point or another, but all the counterattacks were beaten off with loss. None of them were concentrated; the Germans could not move enough reinforcements into an area. The continuation of the Transportation Plan and the concentration of fighter bombers on French highways made it almost impossible for the enemy to move columns to the battle by day. Still Rommel rejected the idea of a static defense built along a solid line and continued to probe, without much luck. On June 12 the 101st Airborne took Carentan and the link-up between the American forces was solid; the British and Canadians, who took on the bulk of Rommel’s armored counterattacks, also held firm. By the end of the first week of the invasion Eisenhower’s forces had consolidated a bridgehead eight to twelve miles deep and fifty miles wide.
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The Supreme Commander kept busy, holding press conferences, answering messages of congratulation, dealing with De Gaulle, talking to Churchill, gathering incoming information, and urging all his subordinates to redouble their efforts. At Bradley’s request he removed a division commander who had failed the test of combat. On June 9 he went to SHAEF Main at Widewing to catch up on all the business that had piled up during his absence, conferred with Eden about the diplomatic ban (it remained in effect), and had a long conference with Smith on the problem of the French invasion currency. He was delighted to learn that the Russians, as promised, had launched a major offensive in the Leningrad area, and he sent a message of congratulation to them.
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On June 10 Marshall, Arnold, and King arrived in London, ostensibly for a meeting of the CCS, in reality because they wanted to see the great invasion for themselves. They came to Widewing along with Churchill. Eisenhower gave them all a guided tour of the headquarters and especially of the war room, where the maps showed current unit positions. Churchill loved the set-up, and even Marshall was impressed. Eisenhower and Marshall discussed promotions, decorations, the need to speed the build-up, and the schedule of shipping divisions into France from the United States.
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On June 12 Eisenhower, Marshall, King, Arnold, and members of their staffs crossed the Channel in a destroyer and went ashore on Omaha Beach. They lunched at Bradley’s headquarters on C rations and discussed recent operations with some of the corps and division commanders. Ernie Pyle, the newspaper reporter, found them and complained that he could not get any news. Eisenhower said he
himself depended on the reporters for his information, but Marshall satisfied Pyle’s curiosity by telling him that the attack on the island of Guam in the Pacific was being launched that day.
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Marshall also praised Eisenhower, although characteristically not to his face. “Eisenhower and his staff are cool and confident,” the Chief reported to Roosevelt, “carrying out an affair of incredible magnitude and complication with superlative efficiency.”
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The trip to Omaha symbolized the success of OVERLORD. If that much brass could safely go ashore in France, the beachhead was clearly secure. More than ten divisions were now engaged on the Allied side, with more coming in every week. There were still problems, but the great invasion had worked. The artificial harbors, on which so much depended, were in place and functioning. The threat of FORTITUDE was still tying down the German Fifteenth Army at Pas de Calais.

There had already been enough drama in Eisenhower’s decision on the morning of June 5 to launch OVERLORD to satisfy anyone, but more was to come. On the morning of June 19 a severe storm struck the French coast, ripping up one of the artificial harbors and bringing unloading to a complete standstill. The Allies in fact suffered more from the storm than they had from the German resistance on D-Day. Group Captain Stagg wrote Eisenhower a note, reminding him that if he had decided on June 5 to delay until June 19 he would have run into the worst weather in twenty years. Eisenhower scribbled at the bottom of the message, “Thanks, and thank the gods of war we went when we did!” and sent it back to Stagg.
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Eisenhower’s gamble on the weather had paid off. What Churchill rightly called “the most difficult and complicated operation that has ever taken place” had put the Allies back on the Continent. The liberation of Europe was at hand.

On June 15 Butcher recorded, “last night Ike was concerned that Monty couldn’t attack” until Saturday, the seventeenth. “Ike was anxious that the Germans be kept off balance and that our drive never stop. But apparently Monty wants to tidy up his ‘administrative tail’ and get plenty of supplies on hand before he makes a general attack.… Ike also said,” Butcher added, “that yesterday we had made no gains, which he didn’t: like.”
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Less than two weeks after the exultation over the success of D-Day, came the letdown. It was caused by a variety of factors, one of which was the relationship between the Supreme Commander and the commander of the Twenty-first Army Group. For the next seven months, many of Eisenhower’s worries would center, one way or another, on Montgomery.

That the two men would have difficulty in dealing with one another was almost inevitable, given the contrasts between them. Eisenhower was gregarious, while Montgomery lived in isolation. Eisenhower mixed easily with his staff, discussing all decisions with his subordinates; Montgomery set himself up in a lonely camp, where he slept and ate in a wood-paneled trailer he had captured from Rommel.
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Montgomery wrote his directives by hand and handed them down from on high, while Eisenhower waited for general agreement among his staff and often had his G-3 officer dictate the final directive. Montgomery once told his chief of staff what he thought of this practice. “You can’t run a military operation with a committee of staff officers in command,” he explained. “It would be nonsense!”
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