Supreme Commander (34 page)

The President’s response was immediate and sharp. On June 17 he cabled Eisenhower to insist that “we will not tolerate control of the French Army by any agency which is not subject to the Allied Supreme Commander’s direction … nor are we interested in the formation of any government or committee that in any way presumes to indicate that it will govern in France.” In even stronger language, he added, “It must be absolutely clear that in North and West Africa we have a military occupation and, therefore, no independent civil decision can be made without your full approval.”
^18
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In another cable of the same day Roosevelt told Eisenhower, “for your very secret information … we may possibly break with De Gaulle in the next few days.” The President also cabled Churchill to point out that “it is an intolerable situation.… We must divorce ourselves from De Gaulle because … he has been interested far more in political machinations than he has in the prosecution of the war.…”
¹⁹

Late on June 17 Eisenhower returned to Algiers. The next morning he tried to get Washington to calm down a little. He told the President
that the “local French difficulties … have been magnified.” Much of the “acrimonious discussion” between De Gaulle and Giraud was more indicative of typical French politics than anything else. He had arranged to meet with De Gaulle and Giraud the next morning “to lay down in definite terms my minimum requirements” on the control of the French armed forces, and he expected to be successful. The question of Boisson was not on the agenda of the FCNL and Eisenhower advised Roosevelt not to make an issue of French West Africa, since to do so would give De Gaulle “the opportunity of breaking on an issue which he might falsely publicize as interfering in French civil administration.…” Eisenhower respectfully suggested to Roosevelt that nothing be done in Washington about breaking with De Gaulle until after the meeting. “I assure you, Mr. President,” he concluded, “that I am fully alive to the potentialities of the situation.…” In a cable to Marshall, Eisenhower pointed out that “De Gaulle has other and bigger fish to fry” and asked that the Chief, at an opportune moment, present his case to the President.
²⁰

More clearly than Roosevelt, in short, Eisenhower recognized De Gaulle’s strength. De Gaulle was enormously popular among French civilians in Algiers and had at least as much influence in the army as Giraud. To break with him and try to throw him to the wolves would, at the very least, touch off serious civil disorder in Algiers. HUSKY was only three weeks away and Eisenhower had no troops in the area to keep order.

Eisenhower also realized—as Roosevelt did not—that De Gaulle could not be intimidated or bribed. He was far stronger now than he had been in January at Casablanca, when the Allies had in effect offered him a secure position, a sort of recognition, and funds to carry on his work. If he had yielded to please them and joined Giraud, he could have become an important part of a Giraud government, probably the Minister of Defense. He would have had to follow Eisenhower’s orders and agree that France, when liberated, would be run by an Allied military government until the British and Americans chose to hold an election on their terms. But he would have received in return security, honor, prestige, and the friendship of the United States. By standing off at Casablanca he risked losing all. He had rejected the offer then, holding out for bigger prizes. There was no question but that he would do the same now.

But though Eisenhower saw these facts, he did have his orders from the President to carry out. The key to the Eisenhower-Giraud-De Gaulle meeting of June 19 would be Eisenhower’s ability to hold his temper.
De Gaulle was sure to make policy statements which would amount to insults. Eisenhower would have to try to soothe his feelings and keep smiling himself.

De Gaulle purposely arrived last and spoke first. He strode into the room in full uniform, his tall frame ramrod stiff, his Roman nose suspiciously sniffing the air. “I am here in my capacity as President of the French government,” he announced. “For it is customary that during operations the chiefs of state and of the government should come in person to the headquarters of the officer in command of the armies they have entrusted to him.”

De Gaulle looked around. No one could think of a response to his preposterous opening gambit, so he plunged on. “If you wish to address a request to me concerning your province,” he said to Eisenhower, “be assured that I am disposed beforehand to give you satisfaction, on condition, of course, that it is compatible with the interests in my charge.”

Eisenhower then politely asked De Gaulle to leave Giraud in charge of France’s armed forces. De Gaulle replied that “the organization of the French command is the province of the French government, not yours.” Eisenhower repeated his request, whereupon De Gaulle asked, “You who are a soldier, do you think that a leader’s authority can subsist if it rests on the favor of a foreign power?” Eisenhower spoke of his responsibilities and his need to have his line of communications through North Africa secure and in the hands of a man he could trust.

De Gaulle thought Eisenhower was acutely embarrassed to have to demand assurances from a head of government about his army leaders and did so only because of the pressure from Roosevelt. He admitted that Eisenhower was playing a strong hand insofar as the American general was directing the rearming of the French Army with American equipment. But he recalled World War I, when the Americans had fired only French cannon, driven only French trucks, flown only French airplanes. “Did we,” he asked, “in return … demand of the United States that they appoint this or that leader or institute this or that political system?” He then demanded that Eisenhower reduce his statements and demands to writing, and Eisenhower agreed to do so.

At this point Giraud, for the first time, spoke up. He began to discuss French problems and emphasized how utterly dependent upon the Americans the French were. De Gaulle mumbled that he had heard all this before and stalked out of the room.
²¹

Eisenhower chatted with Giraud for a few more minutes, then went
to confer with Cunningham and Alexander. They agreed that the best thing to do was nothing. Any unrest or disturbances in Algiers at the present time would only have the most deplorable effect on HUSKY, and the chances were good that in time the French would find their own way out of the tangle. “I hope you will say to the President,” Eisenhower concluded in his report of the meeting to Marshall, “that I beg of him to avoid any action that could increase our local difficulties until after HUSKY is at least a week old.”
²²

The President responded by insisting on the retention of Giraud and, returning to his old obsession, declaring, “I want it distinctly understood that under no circumstances will we approve the removal of Boisson from Dakar.” He added that he expected Eisenhower to accomplish the goals of his government in this area.
²³

On June 22 Eisenhower sent a long analysis of the situation to Marshall. He emphasized that “when the HUSKY forces begin loading within a very few days, there will be practically no repeat no troops west of Tunisia that could be employed for insuring tranquility.” He again begged Marshall to see to it that Roosevelt did not force matters to a crisis. Monnet had told him that any attempt to depose De Gaulle would be disastrous, and Eisenhower added that he felt De Gaulle could be controlled. Giraud, Eisenhower said, had strength in the FCNL because of his record of co-operation and more important because Roosevelt had personally given him support. “His great weakness is the uneasy feeling throughout the region, including the Army and the civil population, that he is reactionary, old fashioned, and cannot be persuaded to modernize the forces already organized. It must be admitted that he moves with ponderous slowness. He had no repeat no political acumen whatsoever.”
²⁴

The next day the situation brightened. The FCNL met and reached a compromise agreement. Giraud would be commander in chief of all French forces in North Africa, while De Gaulle would command all French forces elsewhere. Both were part of but responsible to a war committee that was in turn responsible to the FCNL. At AFHQ everyone was delighted, mainly because the officers there greatly misjudged De Gaulle’s political abilities. Eisenhower said he and his advisers had gone over the terms of the compromise “very carefully” and were “convinced that it assures the conditions prescribed” by the President. Eisenhower promised to watch the situation to make sure nothing was changed “by subterfuge, or otherwise except in the direction desired by us.”
²⁵
Smith wired Marshall to say that he had just talked with Giraud’s chief of
staff, who was delighted with the decree and considered it “a definite victory.” Smith commented, “From every point of view we are certain that the new arrangement is all that we could ask for and I am still surprised that it was put across without a flare-up.”
²⁶
The Americans, in short, thought that De Gaulle had been had.

The truth was that De Gaulle accepted the arrangement because he was sure he could bend the committee to his will. AFHQ officers saw what they wanted to see and, despite all evidence to the contrary, kept assuring themselves that De Gaulle was through. In reporting on the “local political mess” to Marshall, Eisenhower said, “I am quite sure that De Gaulle is losing ground, but strangely enough this is not resulting in a strengthening of Giraud.” He sensed a “growing weariness by the majority with the bickerings of individuals,” and thereby came close to putting his finger on one of the key elements in De Gaulle’s success—his persistence. De Gaulle was in it for the long haul. Unlike ordinary men, he would never get weary until he got his way.
²⁷

De Gaulle was certain things would begin to fall into place, and they began to do so almost immediately. On the morning of June 24 Boisson wired to Giraud to announce his resignation. This came as a great surprise. Giraud, fearing that Boisson had sent a similar resignation to De Gaulle, “and not wanting to be outfoxed” by having De Gaulle assume the prerogatives of government and accept the resignation, accepted it himself. Eisenhower rushed over to see Giraud and urged him to defer any action on Boisson until the FCNL could meet.
²⁸
Giraud thereupon withdrew his acceptance of the resignation.

Murphy meanwhile told the American government that, if Boisson insisted upon resigning, it should make the best of it. Roosevelt, who earlier had been ready to send regiments of infantry into Dakar to keep Boisson, had by now lost interest. Neither Murphy nor Eisenhower received instructions from Washington. The FCNL, meanwhile, met and decided to ask Boisson to remain at his post until a successor could be found. The Americans asked only that the successor be
persona grata
to them, and he was. By July 1 the whole thing was settled.
²⁹

De Gaulle then began to press for recognition of the FCNL as the sole French administrative body. This issue was far more important than Giraud’s position. Recognition would force Eisenhower and American officials to deal with the committee rather than the commander in chief, it would open the way for representatives of the FCNL to participate in Allied committees, it would permit the FCNL access to French credits held in the United States (estimated at a billion dollars in gold), and
most of all it would simplify the situation when the day of liberation came. If there were no recognition of the FCNL, nothing would prevent the Allied commander from signing another Clark-Darlan accord with some Pétainist official or with Pétain himself, from ignoring the Resistance, or from setting up a military occupation.
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Macmillan thought the committee ought to be recognized, and he was gradually converting the Americans at AFHQ to his view. He felt that the committee was acquiring a collective authority, that De Gaulle was by no means its master, and that it would make dealings much less complicated if AFHQ could deal with the FCNL instead of with personalities. Besides, he feared that if the committee broke down, as it was likely to do without recognition, De Gaulle would become the sole figure around whom patriotic Frenchmen could rally.
³¹

Churchill agreed with Macmillan. He was deeply concerned about De Gaulle because De Gaulle’s conduct had alienated Hull and Roosevelt so badly that the two Americans could hardly speak rationally about the man. The Prime Minister thought the solution was to submerge De Gaulle in the committee and allow it to demonstrate its value.
³²
On July 21 Churchill urged Roosevelt to help solidify Anglo-American relations with the FCNL. “What does recognition mean?” he asked. “One can recognize a man as an Emperor or as a grocer. Recognition is meaningless, without a defining formula.” The formula he wanted amounted to a recognition of the FCNL as the provisional government of France. Churchill added that Macmillan “reports that Eisenhower and Murphy both agree with this.…”
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Roosevelt’s response was to send a blistering cable to Eisenhower demanding to know what was going on. “Under no condition are you to recognize the Committee …,” Roosevelt warned.
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Eisenhower was “astonished” at the suggestion that he had intended to recognize the FCNL on his own authority. He assured Marshall, “I am quite well aware of the exclusive authority of the President in such matters, and I am sometimes disturbed that any rumor of such a kind can gain such force or atmosphere of validity as to create an impression that I would step out of my own proper sphere to this extent, or could impel, as in this case, the President himself to send me orders on the subject.” He then added that he, Murphy, and Macmillan felt that “some kind of limited recognition … would be helpful.”
³⁵

A period of negotiation between Churchill and Roosevelt followed. Eventually, in August, they reached an agreement of sorts. Roosevelt, roundly declaring that he would not “give De Gaulle a white horse on
which he could ride into France and make himself master of a government there,” chose to “recognize” the FCNL “as administering those French overseas territories which acknowledge its authority.” He went to great pains to emphasize that “this statement does not constitute recognition of a government of France or of the French Empire by the Government of the United States.”