Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (76 page)

Stanislav Shumovsky, a KGB New York station XY line officer, specialized in seeking aviation sources. In KGB messages he had the cover name
"Blerio," after the pioneering French aviation engineer who first flew
across the English Channel in 1909. Shumovsky, trained as an engineer,
held a cover job in the United States as a purchasing agent for the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. He used his visits to American aircraft and aviation components plants, ostensibly to examine products for
possible Soviet purchase, as opportunities to recruit industrial spies. He
traveled to California in 1935 and developed contacts that led to the eventual recruitment of three aviation sources: "Gapon," an engineer at Douglas aircraft; " Tikhon," a specialist involved in high-altitude flight; and "Falcon," a draftsman at Douglas. (All three remain unidentified.) The most
productive part of Shumovsky's West Coast swing, however, was "the
work with the inventor from Northrop with the cover name Needle. He
resisted but was ultimately convinced. A mechanism for dropping bombs
and a reloading mechanism for machine guns."52

"Needle" was Jones Orin York, born in Germany in 1890 but a naturalized American citizen. A KGB report explained Shumovsky's approach.
At a dinner for Northrop employees and the visiting Russians, "He met
"Needle." Last name-York. They don't pay him enough, and he wants to
start his own business. He showed Blerio [Shumovsky] a design for a
motor. Blerio suggested sending it to Moscow to get the opinion of people who work on similar things." With that as the opening, Shumovsky
proceeded with recruitment, and by January 1936 the KGB New York station reported, ""Needle" has been transferred over completely to agent relations. Blerio received from him the general shape and dimensions of the newest fighter from the Northrop company." (An annotation on the report noted that York's material was sent to the Tupolev aircraft design bureau.) Three months later he took a job at Lockheed to design the armaments for a new high-speed, long-range fighter. The KGB was delighted
with his productivity and attitude. A report enthused: "`Needle has a wonderful attitude toward his work. He carries out all of our assignments with
precision and care. He is extremely happy with the work and has repeatedly expressed his warm feelings with regard to the Soviet Union. He recently came to Eduard [unidentified KGB officer] with a request to allow
him a two-week vacation, which the latter did. This is characteristic of
Needle and underscores his discipline and seriousness."' York's material
was also of such value that in October 1937 Moscow Center told its KGB
New York station that a special technical committee was being formed
just to evaluate it. However, this proved to be overly optimistic. A second
Moscow Center message noted that "in light of the most recent changes
in the aviation industry" the committee was not formed. The "recent
changes" most likely referred to a new phase of the Terror that led to the
arrest of Andrey Tupolev and other leading Soviet aircraft designers.53

In June 1938 Shumovsky returned to Moscow but left contact protocols with other officers for keeping in touch with York. This coincided,
however, with the disruption of KGB operations in America, and it was a
year before the station dispatched one of its American couriers, Zalmond
Franklin, to the West Coast to renew contact. As the New York station explained to Moscow, he returned with disappointing news about its prime
aviation source: "We sent "Chap" [Franklin] to "Needle" [York] in Los
Angeles, but Needle had vanished, as his ex-wife told us. She said that he
had had other women and spent his money on them. She thinks "Needle"
has left the country." York, however, had only left California, not the
United States, and the KGB was able to restore contact on his return.
He continued to work as a productive aviation source until late 1943, receiving a $200 monthly stipend (equivalent to about $2,400 in 20o8 dollars). In his espionage career from 1935 to 1943 he was in contact not
only with Shumovsky but also Grigory Kheifets, chief of the KGB station
in San Francisco, as well as three of the KGB's veteran American couriers, Franklin, William Weisband, and Amadeo Sabatini. Included among
the materials he turned over to the KGB were extensive technical documents on Northrop's P-61 Black Widow, the Army Air Force's very advanced and highly successful radar-equipped night fighter, and the XP-58,
an experimental longer-range and more heavily armed version of Lockheed's P-38 Lightning.54

A 1947 retrospective KGB report summarized York's agent career and
explained his temporary disappearance in 1939:

Background on "Needle" Jo York-J. York, a U.S. cit., German, born c. 18go.
Airplane design engineer. Until '36-Northrop; '36-'37-Lockheed-'37-
'38-Douglas. Later returned to Lockheed. Recruited by Blerio [Shumovsky]
in 1935 and actively worked up to Oct. 1943. Cooperated on a fin. [financial]
basis and knew that it was for the USSR.

"In Jan. 1939 "Needle" suddenly abandoned his family, quit his job at the
plant, and left Los Angeles. It was later learned that he had arrived in NY and
attempted to meet with "Blerio" at the representative office of Narkomtyazh-
prom [People's Commisariate of Heavy Industry]. The meeting didn't take
place and "Needle," after leaving a letter for "Blerio," left for the New England region, the states of Vermont and New Hampshire. "Needle" returned
to Los Angeles in Jan. 1940 and soon thereafter appeared at the Soviet consulate, where he left his address and name, declaring that he was a friend of
the Soviet Union. Chap [Franklin] was sent to contact Needle, and Needle explained the reason for his sudden departure to him. It turned out that shortly
before his departure the FBI began to show intense interest in him; in particular, an FBI agent visited his wife and questioned her about him. While Needle
was in New England the FBI also took an interest in him, and Needle explained to one of its agents that he was in New England out of a desire to escape from the numerous relatives who were burdening him and out of a need
to strengthen his health."

... N. returned to LA and reported his whereabouts to the FBI. The next
day an FBI agent inquired about his contacts with Rus. engineers, with Blerio
in particular. He replied that they were purely professional acquaintances related to his line of work at the plant. Why did he take materials out? Overtime
work at home with mgt.'s permission. After that he wasn't bothered. In late
Aug. 41 Link [Weisband] renewed contact with Needle, in November 42 Link
was drafted into the army -* turned over to "Nick" [Sabatini]. The materials
on airplanes were given high marks. The last meeting with Nick was in late
1943. Needle gave Nick a package and said that it contained two reports.
There turned out to be only one. Soon afterward, in late Oct. 43, Nick detected a tail -* contact with Needle was broken off (Hypothesis: Needle's tail
- Nick) .55

Other documents fill in additional details. A message about Franklin's
reconnection with York in June 1940 noted York's report of FBI interest
in him and Moscow Center's concern, a likely explanation why his agent
relationship was not renewed until August 1941. The intervening year
without contact would have been sufficient to alleviate FBI suspicions. (It was also a period when the KGB's American stations were seriously undermanned.) The final passages of the 1947 summary indicated that
Amadeo Sabatini/"Nick" thought he had come under surveillance after
a rendezvous with York in October 1943. Fearing this indicated a renewal
of the FBI's interest in York, the KGB cut contact as a security measure.
It was, however, Sabatini who exposed York to the FBI in 1949, when he
provided the FBI a partial account of his work for Soviet intelligence (see
chapter 7) ss

Shumovsky received his engineering education at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT). He was, however, already a KGB officer
when he arrived at MIT, and his education was a KGB assignment to spot
potential sources. He found one. A 1944 retrospective KGB report highlighted one of his recruits:

Benjamin Smilg is "Lever," a US citizen, Jewish, born in Boston in 1913. Parents emigrated from Russia in 1905 with the assistance of the Jewish committee. Father is a cutter at a shoe factory. Brother works at the National cashregister factory. Family has a very friendly attitude toward the USSR. Upon
graduating from high school, thanks to exceptional abilities he was accepted at
the Massachusetts Inst. of Technology for a free education, where he was always one of the most brilliant students.... "Lever'' was a student in the same
group with "Blerio" [Shumovsky] beginning in 1931 and had a friendship with
him. He was recruited by Blerio in July 1934.57

After MIT, Smilg worked for the Budd Company (best known as a
manufacturer of automotive and railroad equipment but in the 193os attempting to break into aircraft manufacturing), then Glenn Martin (a
major manufacturer of naval aircraft), and finally-and best of all from
the KGB point of view-at the aeronautical laboratories at Wright Field
outside of Dayton, Ohio, where the U.S. military sponsored cutting-edge
research on aviation and tested new aircraft and airplane components.
The KGB New York station listed Smilg as an XY line source in 1935,
1936, and 1937, and the 1944 report noted: "He provided materials on a
dirigible, calculations on the vibration of bomber tail assemblies, NACA
materials." (NACA was the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, predecessor to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
and supervised much of the work at Wright Field.) Smilg boded well to
become a prime aviation source.58

But no sooner had Smilg arrived at Wright Field than he began to
raise difficulties. In January 1937 the KGB New York station told
Moscow:

"Before the new year, Blerio [Shumovsky] ... met with Lever [Smilg] in
Chicago. He currently works in the research division of Wright Field.... All
Wright Field employees are supplied with plenty of information regarding developments in aviation in the USA and other countries. Numerous reports
from the military attaches in Europe, with descriptions of the characteristics
of individual airplanes fighting in Spain.

Lever also said that, because WE is a repository of secrets from various
aviation companies and there is a fear that WE employees might give one
company's secrets to another, all employees-especially civilians-are kept
under constant surveillance. They are categorically forbidden to meet with
representatives from other companies, especially outside the walls of the establishment. Surveillance is set up so well that, no sooner has someone dined
with a company representative, than the next day he is summoned by the boss
for questioning and disciplining. Both for this reason and because, as a new
employee and a Jew, he would be shadowed even more closely, Lever asks that
we not meet with him for the next 3 months, at the end of which he will go to
Boston on vacation and then give us materials he will have accumulated and
agree on the future of the connection.... Despite Blerio's best efforts to convince him that it would be preferable to meet earlier and set up the connection, Lever held his ground, asserting that it would be better to lose 3 months
and afterwards begin regular work, than to get exposed from the start. Considering the complexity of the situation and the fact that we agree with some of
Lever's arguments, we will not meet with him until April. By that time, we will
have developed a system for contacting Lever that would allow us to receive
materials from him with ease, while minimizing the risk. Because Blerio is a
Soviet engineer, he will not meet with Lever after April to avoid compromising
the latter."

Even so, Smilg had not declined to provide information, only insisted on
providing it on his terms and with more delay than the KGB wished.59

However, this was just the beginning of Smilg's increasing resistance.
In August 1938 the KGB New York station reported:

"Between the 20th and 30th of Sept. '38, Lever [Smilg] informed Blerio [Shumovsky] that in view of the discovery of a German spy ring working, in part, at
Mitchell Field (the eastern base of the U.S. AAC [Army Air Corps]) and at
Seversky's factory which filled orders for fighters, the U.S. War Department is
taking special precautions to check up on its staff and increase vigilance. At
Wright Field, all the locks on doors, closets, desks, etc. have been changed.
Tables are searched more frequently. We have information that all workers are
being shadowed by detectives. Lever asked Blerio not to meet with him for
the next z months."

In view of increased security at Wright Field, Smilg's meetings with a Soviet official would be difficult to explain if noticed by American authorities. The KGB New York station responded quickly, telling Moscow:
""Goose" [Gold] was brought to Cincinnati specifically for a connection
with "Lever." He is a student at the University in the chem. department.
He is a good student, gets `excellent' grades, and is happy to have been
given the opportunity to get an education." Harry Gold ("Goose") was
then in transition. Thomas Black had recruited Gold originally as an industrial source stealing chemical secrets from his employer, the Philadelphia Sugar Company. Impressed by his reliability, however, the KGB
groomed him for work as a courier and agent handler for other industrial
spies. By sending him to Xavier University for graduate work in chemistry,
the KGB improved Gold's utility as an XY line agent while also providing
Smilg with a nearby American contact to whom he could deliver material
without the risk of being observed meeting with a Soviet official.00

It was a sensible plan, but Smilg didn't cooperate. Gold met with
Smilg in November 1938 and on a number of occasions thereafter, but
the latter found excuses not to deliver material and grew increasingly hostile. In March 1940 the New York station had to tell Moscow center:
"Lever [Smilg] made it clear to Goose [Gold] that he doesn't want to
work. He said that he had wanted to denounce Goose in November of
'38, but decided not to, b/c Goose was a Jew, and that would have been
detrimental to the entire race." Nor was Smilg the only technical source
going sour on the KGB. Stalin's purges had left the American stations undermanned, the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 had seriously undermined the anti-Fascist appeal of the Soviet Union and heightened public anti-communism, and the start of war in Europe had greatly enhanced
American internal security activities. The New York station told Moscow:
"The conditions of work on the XY line have worsened. The `Defense
Boom,' the increase in the operations of Amer. intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, the spy-mania campaign, the spread of Amer.
patriotism, and the persecution of liber. and left organizations. It has become more difficult to work. Some sources-"Lever," "Gifted," "Ural,"
and "Shrewd"-have been trying to stop working with us." Not much is
known of the other three recalcitrant technical sources. "Shrewd" was
completely unidentified. "Gifted" was also unidentified, but a 1943 message indicated that he was back in good standing as an active XY line
source. "Ural" was identified as Frank Ullman and described as an "Austrian Jew" and employee of Westinghouse who received a monthly KGB
stipend and had provided material on U.S. Army tanks. Ullman spent time overseas, presumably on assignments for Westinghouse, and the
New York station reported in 1942 that he had been in the Philippines at
the time of the Japanese invasion and interned."