Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw (16 page)

On the military front, the key issue centred on what would happen when the Germans finally retreated into the Reich, in particular on how the First Ally’s Underground would conduct itself towards the incoming Red Army. No one needed to be told, of course, that the years of Nazi oppression were likely to end in some form of popular outburst. But the planners needed to know something rather more specific. What sort of rising might occur? Where would it be based? Who would lead it? And how could it be channelled to maximum effect?

Discussions about a possible Polish Rising against the Germans had been circulating in Allied circles for months if not years. Both London and Washington were well aware of what they called Poland’s ‘Secret Army’ and of its potential usefulness. But no one had brought the discussions to a resolution. So Tabor now set about recovering lost time. As soon as he took up his post in the VI Bureau in April 1944 at 13 Upper Belgrave Street he pursued these questions with great energy.

At the time, the concept preferred by the exiled Government was for a ‘general rising’ in the rural areas, which would paralyse German communications, hinder the Wehrmacht’s retreat, and speed the Red Army’s advance on a broad front. Tabor’s priority was to gain British backing for the enterprise. He had little success. In a number of preliminary talks, he was repeatedly told of the logistical difficulties, of the great distances involved, and of the Soviet sphere of influence. On 25 April, he met Churchill in the company of another officer, who had been flown to
England with him, but the meeting was knocked off track by a heated exchange on the frontier question. When Tabor’s companion said that they would fight to the last for their rightful frontiers, Churchill responded gloomily: ‘Obviously, a decision to resist, regardless of the consequences, is the privilege of every nation, and it cannot be denied even to the weakest’.
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Nonetheless, the British Government continued to be bombarded with queries and requests both by Tabor’s team and by other Polish officials. British doubts were expressed at a variety of meetings. They conveyed a mixture of reluctance, irritation, and indecision, but not overt opposition. The definitive British answer, which was eventually issued by the Foreign Office, was constantly delayed. It had not been received by late July, when the commander of the First Ally’s ‘Secret Army’ proposed a Rising in the immediate future and when Premier Mick’s Cabinet approved the proposal.

In those same weeks, Gen. Tabor learned of two worrying developments. One of them concerned information that a colleague in London had sent a telegram to the Underground back home advising them to eliminate Salamander.
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The other concerned news that the British wanted to transfer the First Ally’s own Parachute Brigade to British command. Tabor was incensed by the alleged assassination plot, and protested to the Commanderin-Chief about ‘Gestapo methods’. He was much less upset about the Parachute Brigade. He advised that the British request be granted gracefully. Assistance to the Western Allies now, he argued, would create a moral debt that would be repaid later by Western assistance to the Underground.
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Few of Tabor’s colleagues knew much about his political views at this juncture. The report which he had prepared in the autumn of 1943, urging the Underground to work for ‘friendly relations with the Soviets’ ‘even at the cost of major concessions’, was not known in London. Nor was the conversation in which he had opined: ‘The Anglo-Saxons are not interested . . . France doesn’t count. So we have to show goodwill, reach an understanding with the Soviets, and go along with them.’ But one junior in the VI Bureau was regularly treated to this fare:

The Soviet Union is going to become the decisive power in all our territories. In that situation, [we] ought to enter agreements with Moscow, make the necessary concessions, and change our orientation from pro-Western to proSoviet.
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One may presume that Tabor let some of these sympathies be known when talking to British officials. If so, given the proSoviet attitudes then prevalent in London, he would not have caused a ripple.

Gen. Tabor’s big chance came in June when he was invited to accompany Premier Mick to Washington and to present his case for help for the Underground. On three separate days, with a large map and a good translator, he was able to make a professional presentation and to answer questions. Polish–Soviet relations always came up in one form or another. On 7 June, in the White House, he met President Roosevelt in person, and elicited the greatest interest, even excitement. In response to the inevitable presidential question about Soviet views on the Polish Underground, Premier Mick intervened and explained how contacts with the Soviets had tailed off since the Katyn affair and Gen. Sikorski’s death.
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It was not the smartest move. But on 12 June, Tabor had another opportunity when he met the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Supreme Allied Command.

A plenary session of the Combined Chiefs was held in Blair House on 12 June under the chairmanship of US Admiral William Leahy. British representatives included Gen. Redman and Lt.Gen. Macready, representative of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The delegation of the First Ally was ushered in when the agenda moved onto developments on the Eastern Front. It was headed by the Head of their Military Mission in the USA, who read out Gen. Tabor’s paper in translation, outlining the state of affairs under the German Occupation and in the Resistance movement. The questioning was led by Gen. Macready:

A colleague of Tabor’s said he wasn’t sure if the Commanderin-Chief’s assessment had been correctly conveyed. But Tabor did not flinch. The British delegates gave him a virtual standing ovation. They had heard exactly what they wanted.

The next morning, Gen. Tabor was the guest of the Planning Group of the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner of the CIA), chaired by Hugh R. Wilson. Once again, he was very favourably received; and once again, among other things, he was asked about the ‘Secret Army’’s activities in the eastern provinces and about relations with the Soviets:

The impression conveyed was that the ‘Secret Army’ was fighting hard, and that, in general, it was able to work with the Soviets. The Chairman closed the meeting by expressing the desire of the OSS to help the ‘Secret Army’ and to establish the fullest cooperation.

The visit to Washington gave a great boost to the exiled Government’s confidence in all respects. Though it coincided with the D-Day landings, President Roosevelt found time to receive the Premier on four separate occasions. The climate was exceptionally cordial. The guests were attended by the highest American officials, and were made to feel genuinely welcome. The President’s main message, repeatedly stated, was that the Premier should talk to Stalin directly and have ‘just a human conversation’. After all, he himself got along fine with the Marshal, ‘much better than my poor friend Churchill’. Stalin, he said, was ‘not an imperialist’, ‘just a realist’. The President even made encouraging noises on the frontier issue. Lvuv might not be lost. Indeed, he ‘did not entirely exclude’ agreement on Vilno. The Premier noted down the President’s words directly: ‘Don’t worry. Stalin doesn’t intend to take freedom from [you]. He wouldn’t dare do that because he knows that the United States Government stands solidly behind you. I shall see to it that [your country] does not come out of this war injured’.
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At the airport, the US Secretary of State, Stettinius, made a jovial comment to the First Ally’s Ambassador about the Premier. ‘Our friend Stan’, he remarked, ‘is a regular guy; and we shall do all we can to help in his undertaking.’
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What better assurance could a beleaguered statesman hope for?

Summing up the evidence then available, one might have drawn four firm conclusions. The First Ally appeared to have the full support of the Western powers. The Premier’s prospective meeting with Stalin would be crucial, but Stalin could be expected to agree to a compromise solution. Something could still be salvaged on the frontiers. And the Rising could go ahead. The highest military authorities in the Western Alliance had been informed. And no one had said that preparations should be stopped.
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In short, the Premier and Tabor had good reason to congratulate themselves. What is more, their Washington visit was to bear still richer fruit. During his talks with Roosevelt, the Premier had discussed a hefty American subsidy. In due course, he learned that Roosevelt had approved a massive grant of $10m in gold – $1.5m to be spent on civilian relief and $8.5m on support for the Underground army. He could hardly have received a stronger mark of approval.

As for Tabor, he received recognition of a different sort. Soon after landing in London, he was informed that, by the personal consent of the King, he would be awarded one of Britain’s most prestigious decorations – the Companion of the Order of the Bath. After months of anxiety, progress was being made.

The ceremony at which Gen. Tabor was decorated was attended by Lord Selborne, Gen. Gubbins, Air Vice Marshal Ritchie, and Lt.Col. Perkins together with Premier Mick and numerous Polish officers. In his address, Lord Selborne said that the award was being made in recognition of Tabor’s services to the Underground army. In the name of the King, he wished to express his admiration for the achievements of that army, which was fighting so hard and so long in such difficult conditions. The British Government and people fully appreciated the Polish struggle for the cause of the Allied Powers:

Seeing that there were grounds to hope that the hour of liberation was approaching, the Minister offered the General his most sincere wishes that the [First Ally’s] Armed Forces . . . would be able to free their country from the enemy in the very near future.
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As July wore on, however, Tabor must have experienced some anxiety. He had received the strongest possible backing from Roosevelt, and the greatest possible compliment from the British. His advocacy of the ‘Secret Army’ certainly appeared to be on much firmer ground than before his trip to Washington. On the other hand, the Soviets were advancing with lightning speed, and the day of reckoning for the First Ally was looming rather too rapidly. Several important ends had not been tied up with the British. Furthermore, he may well have suspected that he was not always privy to the most relevant developments.

Nonetheless, his own course of action was plain enough. He was the chief representative in London of the First Ally’s Underground forces; and it was his duty to continue to muster all the support he could. In this, the chief conduit to the highest British circles was SOE. Hence, as soon as he heard that his Government had approved an imminent Rising in principle, he arranged an appointment with Gubbins, the head of SOE.

Tabor’s key meeting with Gubbins and other SOE officers took place on 29 July 1944. Tabor told the assembled company that a Rising was expected to break out in Warsaw as soon as the Underground leaders judged it opportune, and that, in consequence, he was looking to the Allies for immediate support. In particular, he listed six demands:

Gubbins reacted positively. He stated that the overall policy of the Chiefs of Staff had not changed, but that ‘absolute priority’ would be given to the First Ally within the existing dispositions.
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The details of the meeting were duly passed on to their requisite destinations. On 30 July, Gubbins sent them to the Chiefs of Staff, stressing their urgency. Most importantly, having been primed by Tabor’s superior, Lord Selborne passed them to Prime Minister Churchill on 1 August, giving them his warmest endorsement: