Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America (22 page)

Probably the most notable—and most volatile—current dispute involves the China–Japan standoff over the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu Islands, to the Chinese) in the East China Sea. Until its economy became a global pacesetter, Beijing made no noises about ownership of the islands. China’s offshore power grabs center entirely around two things: claiming underwater oil and gas reserves, and protection of the sea-lanes that deliver China’s energy supplies.

Relations between the two neighbors, never easy, have frayed even further in recent years. China’s growing naval strength and newfound comfort at asserting its might internationally bode poorly for resolution. Touting their economic might, the Chinese believe that Japan must accept a “readjustment” in the power balance, including conceding ownership of the islands.

Nothing doing. Instead, on the 68th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, the Japanese unveiled the
Izumo
, the largest warship the country has built since World War II. Because the Japanese Constitution forbids aircraft carriers and prohibits Japan’s self-defense forces from taking offensive action, Tokyo called this ship a “helicopter carrier.” The Chinese didn’t buy it.

“It is an aircraft carrier, and Japan just called it ‘a helicopter destroyer’ to downplay its aggressive nature,” said Zhang Junshe, of the People’s Liberation Army Naval Military Studies Research Institute. He pointed out that the
Izumo
was much larger than many other countries’ aircraft carriers and could be easily adapted for the support of F35-B fighters.
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China’s Ministry of National Defense condemned the move, lambasting the “continuous military buildup” of its neighbor. “Japan should reflect on its history, adhere to self-defense and the promise of following the path of peaceful development,” the bureau said in a statement, warning the international community to be “highly alert.” In December 2013, Beijing struck back.

That’s when the Chinese announced their decision to establish an “air defense identification zone” (ADIZ) over the East China Sea. It prompted Vice President Joe Biden to visit Tokyo to show support for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and attempt to soothe our anxious ally. Beijing’s unveiling of the ADIZ made clear that the Chinese were playing for keeps in the East China Sea. As Asia-Pacific expert Hugh White explains, Washington’s Asian pivot was based on the “supposition that China wasn’t serious about asserting their primacy—and Washington underestimated China’s ambitions.”
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In the end, the Chinese military buildup can be viewed through the most traditional lens: Any growing power tends to seek expanded resources internationally, and that is what the Chinese are doing. With China’s enormous population and economic growth, Beijing will only become more assertive on the world stage. Beijing is now pursuing what Robert Kaplan calls a “resource-acquisition” foreign policy, as opposed to a “missionary policy” (one based on ideas) such as that pursued by the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.
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“They will deal with any regime provided they can get natural resources,” Kaplan says, “again for a totally legitimate purpose—to raise the standards of living for hundreds of millions of people into
the global middle class.”
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Indeed, as Kaplan points out, China is following the trajectory of many great mercantile empires—first by securing land borders and then by building a capable navy, branching out, and securing natural resources necessary to feed a hungry economy. Mercantilism is an economic policy, as opposed to a military or foreign-affairs doctrine. It emphasizes a positive balance of trade and accumulation of resources.

The military posture is a reflection of this reality, not the driver of it. Nonetheless, it cannot merely be accepted as a fait accompli. There is a realpolitik logic to what China is doing, but that doesn’t mean that American policy should acquiesce, or that the U.S. should not take substantive measures in response.

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In its effort to create the New Look, the Russian Ministry of Defense is attempting, at least in part, to reignite the patriotic zeal Russians felt for the Soviet-era armed forces. Moscow promises not only a refurbished military but also a new source of national pride. Its ambitious modernization program is a last-ditch attempt to break the cycle of weakness that has afflicted the Russian military since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The clearest indication of where the priorities—and thus strategies—lie is, unsurprisingly, where the money is going. And what’s most striking about the 10-year Russian military-modernization program is its de-emphasis on the Russian ground forces, once the heart and soul of the Red Army. In the Soviet era, the Red Army had been vital, because the USSR needed the ability to occupy its client states and credibly threaten a ground war in Europe. Now, Russian priorities are focused on protecting hydrocarbon export routes and bullying neighbors, tasks better accomplished through the sea or air. Thus, while the ground forces still must deal with internal terrorist and separatist
threats, equipping and maintaining them does not require the large-scale investments of the past. In the new era, the focus is squarely on the navy and air force.

For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, the navy has received top billing in a Russian military budget. The 10-year budget provides for 30 new submarines (both nuclear and diesel), 32 frigates and corvettes, and 10 amphibious landing ships. These programs show a dramatic turn away from the anti–aircraft carrier, anti-NATO capabilities that were developed by the USSR and haltingly maintained until fairly recently. The Russian navy is also undertaking a massive reorganization that will shift ships and focus away from the Baltic and Northern Fleets to the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets.

The navy also purchased two
Mistral
-class amphibious assault ships from the French.
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(For now, the $1.7 billion deal is going forward, though the French have made unconvincing threats about cancelling it if the Ukraine crisis is not resolved.
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) These ships will most likely make their way to the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets, granting those flotillas amphibious capabilities that were not fully developed even under the Soviets. The Mistrals are capable of rapidly delivering hundreds of soldiers and dozens of vehicles to a target location via helicopter assault. After the 2008 Georgian war, and the failures of Russian equipment and technology that occurred, one can see why the Russians would value this new technology in their southern waters.

The naval procurements paint a picture of stark transition from a NATO-centric navy to an Asia-centric navy. Russia is beginning a new phase in its naval history, with the Pacific Ocean and Black Sea holding a place of privilege that they have not occupied since Imperial times.

Unlike most current Russian subs, which are part of the Northern Fleet and deployed—even today—as anti-NATO resources, the new
Borei
-class nuclear submarines will almost certainly be assigned to the Pacific Fleet upon completion. With the addition of the Boreis,
Russia’s Pacific Fleet will become a powerhouse capable of rapidly delivering a truly frightening amount of nuclear firepower anywhere on the Pacific Rim. Naval power, especially seaborne nuclear power, is Russia’s only remaining trump card in the Far East. The Kremlin wants to keep it that way.

There is a brewing conflict between Russia, Norway, Denmark, Canada, and the U.S. over rights to the Arctic seafloor, which is suspected to be rich in hydrocarbons.
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A modern, rapidly deployable nuclear submarine force is essential if Russia wishes to defend its current Arctic holdings and pursue new claims. Additionally, Russia is hedging its bets that global warming will make the arctic coastline navigable, and it hopes to pursue trade opportunities along the mouths of the Yenisei and Ob Rivers.
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Russia’s Arctic ambitions will only be strengthened by its active funding of GLONASS, its native Global Navigation Satellite System. It is currently the only operational alternative to American GPS. While it provides all the advantages for Russia that GPS does for the United States, GLONASS also has a strategic edge: GPS satellites orbit in such a way that high northern latitudes are susceptible to lack of coverage, presenting a critical vulnerability. GLONASS takes advantage of this, and its satellites orbit in such a way that they provide the most reliable and consistent coverage in the Arctic Circle.
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With this edge in mapping, tracking, and exploration, Russian goals of Arctic dominance may be achievable.

While the Russian navy is turning its priorities away from the anti-NATO capabilities of the Cold War, the Russian air force still views its primary competitors as the NATO states. Russian leaders worry about the ability of Russia’s aging air fleet to defend Russian airspace, and keeping Russian aerospace products commercially competitive with Western products remains a priority. The air forces are dead set on maintaining parity with NATO capabilities and equipment and to
that end are fielding and developing world-class jets that can compete for foreign contracts.

Moscow is purchasing many MIG-35s and Su-35s, and, as noted earlier, both have outperformed NATO planes at international air shows and won lucrative contracts for their Russian manufacturers. In addition, if the PAK FA stealth fighter can stay on its development schedule, it will make Russia the second country to develop and field a native
fifth-generation
fighter design. The PAK FA is being developed by Sukhoi to be comparable to the American F-22 Raptor. Ultimately, Russia will maintain a cutting-edge air force because it is the only branch capable of global, meaningful power projection against every potential adversary, NATO included.

In sum, what the military reforms begun under Medvedev and continued under Putin indicate most clearly about Russian priorities is this: For the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia is ready, willing, and able to get serious about military modernization and buildup. The Russian 10-year plan is well funded to meet that challenge. It’s up to Washington to make sure that the United States can say the same.

WHY AMERICAN MILITARY SUPERIORITY ISN’T ALL THAT IT SEEMS TO BE

The U.S. Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu called it “Air Sea Battle 2028”—a huge war game that would “position U.S. air, naval, space, and special operations forces against a rising military competitor in the East Asian littoral with a range of disruptive capabilities, including multidimensional ‘anti-access’ networks, offensive and defensive space control capabilities, an extensive inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles, and a modernized attack submarine fleet,” according to an Air Force memo. “The scenario will take place in a notional 2028.”
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By the time it was over, U.S. planners had to be happy that 2028 was 20 years off, because the war game was an utter disaster. We lost to China at our own game, and the incident is widely regarded as part of the motivation for a shift in military strategy toward a concept known as Air Sea Battle (ASB). Losing the game also prompted the policy shift that became the Asian pivot itself.
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Indeed, at the 2012 Shangri-La Security Dialogue, former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said that the U.S. would commit 60 percent of its naval fleet to the Asia-Pacific by 2020.
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The 2008 war game slyly made mention only of a “rising military competitor” in the East Asian littoral, but that describes only one nation. Four years later, at the Marine Corps’ 2012 war games, retired Marine Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson made it explicit, saying of China: “They have the ability to stretch our defenses at the end of a long logistic line.” He went on: “We’ve been accustomed to having secure lines of communication, since 1945.” Now, in areas where we don’t—such as Afghanistan, where Pakistan has closed off key supply routes—“that’s messing us up,” he said.
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Problem is, we haven’t heeded the warnings of General Gregson. The programs the military originally devised in the wake of ASB 2028 have been cut or dramatically scaled back to the point that they do not come close to meeting our needs in the Pacific. The Obama administration’s solution to this has been to deplete our forces in the Atlantic in order to keep our fleet in the Pacific strong.

American policymakers, and certainly American citizens, have usually taken solace in the United States’ status as the world’s only superpower, with a military that rates second to none in both expenditures and capabilities. In a literal, objective sense, this remains true. But, practically speaking, it means less than meets the eye. This is not only because our military superiority is now so greatly taxed, and probably facing severe retrenchment; it is also because the Axis nations have
proven adept at devising tactics and weaponry explicitly calibrated to neutralize U.S. capabilities. Indeed, Vladimir Putin, in the 2012 article in which he called for the massive Russian military buildup, pledged also to deliver an “effective and asymmetrical response” to NATO’s planned European missile-defense shield (issues we will cover in depth in the next chapter).
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Spending figures—in which the U.S. dwarfs the world—tell only so much. How we are able to use, or not able to use, our assets in the real world means much more. The Axis does not strive for or need anything like parity in military force or spending. They seek only effectiveness in neutralizing the American behemoth, and they are succeeding.

Consider the 2008 Georgian war. A rusting, severely underpowered branch of Russia’s motorized armor proved sufficient to the task of invading and occupying a Western ally. Russian troops overran Georgia’s ports and strategic highways. Warplanes bombed cities. The West did nothing about it. The U.S. refused to arm its Georgian ally with anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles for fear of Russian retribution. So much for our overwhelming military superiority.

What manner of retribution would so intimidate the mighty U.S. military? The threat that Moscow could sell even more advanced weapons to Iran. The message would be: You defend Georgia against us, and we will defend Iran against you. The threat resonated hugely in the context of Iran’s nuclear program, which the U.S. might, one day, need to bomb from the air. Israel had sold air-defense missiles to Georgia. The same Russian threat intimidated the Israelis, with the added threat that Russia could supply comparable weapons to Hezbollah. The Israelis, too, backed off.