Resistance (14 page)

Early on the underground sent Jurek Wilner to the Aryan part of Warsaw. Here Wilner had contacted the Polish underground, the AK, and asked them for weapons and special guidance.
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At this point, very few had weapons and no definite plans for action. Some members of the
Å»
OB were preparing a manifesto.

The
Å»
OB youths were eager to work in a variety of ghettos. This required constant adjustments to different situations. Because of their extensive travels, they knew the particular methods which the Germans were likely to use, as well as about entries and exits of ghetto hiding places. Every possible move by their enemies was carefully studied. Conspicuously absent from all these underground plans were any considerations of withdrawals. “We do not wish to save our lives,” wrote Wilner. “None of us will come out of this alive. We only want to save the honor of mankind.”
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Wilner viewed any interruption in the Warsaw deportations as a breathing space for those who were left behind.
Å»
OB's plans differed from the plans of the Jewish Fighting Organization in Vilna (FPO), which was preparing to escape into the forests, where they
intended to fight. In this respect, the Vilna youths resembled the
Å»
ZW, which also tried to reach the forests. In the case of
Å»
ZW, however, a basic shortage of reliable evidence prevents historians from making clear assessments of their situation.

The first armed confrontation in the Warsaw ghetto was led by Mordechai Anielewicz. His plan was simple. He selected twelve fighters with pistols. They were instructed to join the lines of inmates who were ordered to go to the waiting freight cars, which were supposed to take them to extermination camps. It was prearranged that at a sign from their leader, the fighters would burst out of their places and attack the Nazis and their collaborators. This was a suicide mission. The Jews had pistols, with a limited supply of ammunition. The attackers had semi-automatic rifles with an ample supply of ammunition. Yet, the Jews had a temporary advantage of surprise, which they fully exploited. In no time the Germans recovered from their initial shock and regrouped.

Nevertheless, this first encounter was decisive for several reasons. Hundreds of Jews who stood by recognized that this chaotic situation offered an opportunity to disperse and to disappear. Most of them tried to do just that. In addition to this, also for the first time, the Germans were confronted with a real opposition and were shocked to see Germans being killed by Jews. One Jewish fighter, Hirsch Berlinski, who participated in this confrontation, noted how quickly the Jews were able to disarm several Germans, depriving them of their weapons. He also noted how a number of the SS men were killed and how others were wounded, while other Germans fled, losing their caps and weapons in the process.

The Germans retaliated by setting fire to the building that Anielewicz and his group had occupied. In the end, quite a number of the Jewish fighters reached the safety of a nearby factory.

Another encounter, in a different part of the ghetto, Zamenhof Street, took place between a Jewish group of fighters led by Yitzhak Zuckerman (
figure 2.5
) and the Germans. In this second encounter the Jewish fighters opened fire only when the German attackers had entered the building, offering a strategic advantage. One of the Jewish fighters was killed. The rest collected the arms abandoned by the retreating enemy and disappeared.

These two major encounters, by the Anielewicz group and the Zuckerman group, were part of the January 18, 1943, Warsaw ghetto uprisings, initiated by Heinrich Himmler's new commands, which were to destroy the ghetto. “As long as the ghetto exists, it constitutes a nest of revolt and anarchy . . . so the ghetto has to be finished off.” Apparently he was right.
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FIGURE 2.5
Yitzhak Zuckerman was the deputy commander of the Jewish Fighting Organization (
Å»
OB) and a leader of the Warsaw ghetto uprisings in January and April 1943. (Courtesy Yad Vashem)

The January 18 attacks upon the ghetto were turning points in the existence of the Jewish Fighting Organization. The Germans had anticipated only smooth and easy operations. Now, to their surprise, the Nazis were confronted with an unexpected loss of German lives. The ensuing losses made the Nazis realize that the battlefield was not confined to the front; it existed inside the ghetto. Zuckerman was convinced that this made possible the next ghetto uprising, which took place in April 1943.
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The AK was willing to assist the ghetto fighters by moving them to the forest. The Jews insisted on staying in the ghetto and continuing to fight.
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The AK's offer was, in part, prompted by the fear that Jewish ghetto fighting could spread to the Polish population in general. The AK had correctly assumed that a premature uprising was dangerous and doomed to failure.

In addition to a few successful skirmishes with the enemy within the ghetto, the Jews sent a message to the general population that
confronting the Germans was a real possibility. The crises and frustrations which the fighters had experienced during the big deportations evaporated during these confrontations. Moreover, attitudes toward the Jewish fighters had also changed, both in the ghetto and beyond. Even though these skirmishes were brief, the Germans had to invest a tremendous amount of effort trying to catch the fighters. They only succeeded in catching the sick and feeble ghetto dwellers they happened to come across.

The January Aktion lasted four days. The numbers of German police who had participated amounted to 200. With additional help, the final figure came to about 800. Precise numbers about the losses are elusive; all that was evident were the constant sirens of ambulances. Probably many more Germans and their collaborators were involved than the authorities were willing to admit. All in all, an operation which the Germans had expected to take an hour or two lasted for four days. This in itself was a huge accomplishment for the Jews.

On the outside, Poles were amazed at how effectively the Jews had resisted. Several AK publications began to refer to the Jewish fighters as brave men and women, and congratulated them on how successful their resistance was. It is unquestionable that attitudes toward Jewish fighters changed. These positive appraisals about Jewish resisters helped them significantly in future encounters.

As usual, the ghetto underground took advantage of any lull in hostilities, regrouping and replenishing their weapons and ammunitions. The Germans were also preparing for a final elimination of the Warsaw ghetto. In February 1943, Himmler began to set in motion plans for the ghetto's complete destruction. His plan was to offer the demolition of the ghetto to the Fuhrer as a present for his birthday. The date of Hitler's birthday, April 19, happened to coincide with the start of the Jewish Passover.

On April 19, when the German forces reached the Warsaw ghetto, the streets were empty. Most inhabitants were hiding in their bunkers, with entrances sealed and camouflaged.
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Zuckerman explained that “after a few days of fighting, the enemy saw that they could not conquer us easily. With this realization, the Germans attacked by setting fires. These fires spread rapidly, burning some valuable passages between Jewish positions and their possible places of retreat.”
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For the Jews, this spelled the beginning of the end.

The term “military” hardly describes the Jewish forces that confronted the powerful German fighting machine. Almost without
exception, the soldiers of the Jewish Fighting Organization and the Jewish Fighting Union were young men and women who had little military training. According to some estimates, there were 750 combatants in battle units, with some 500 in the ranks of the
Å»
OB and 250 in the
Å»
ZW.
Å»
OB members carried revolvers of various types. The Jewish fighters had from ten to fifteen rounds of ammunition and four to five hand grenades, mostly homemade. Apparently, the
Å»
OB had 2,000 homemade Molotov cocktails, ten rifles, and one or two submachine guns, confiscated from the Germans, along with an indeterminate supply of ammunition.
Å»
OB had also mined the entrances to some key positions in the ghetto area.
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Despite continuous appeals from the Jewish combat organization to the Polish government in London, the Poles had supplied only very limited quantities of arms, and what arms they did provide were in poor shape.
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Moreover, the Polish underground urged its people to engage in an uprising only at the “right moment.” But the “right moment” had to be fixed and decided upon by the moment itself. This meant that the Polish government would attack only when the Germans were vulnerable enough to be pushed back to their border and would not have the resources to retaliate against them.

The Polish authorities had expected the same kinds of reactions from the Jewish underground. But the Jews could not wait for the “right moment.” For them, it was life or death. The Polish government-in-exile and the AK feared that the Jews might indirectly involve them in “a premature, open conflict” with the enemy. The Poles were therefore reluctant to provide the Jews with adequate weapons. This reluctance applied to all Jewish situations in the ghettos, forests, partisans, and concentration camps.

A range of considerations had dominated and complicated the Polish−Jewish wartime relationships. One of these was probably dictated by Polish anti-Semitism. From the Polish perspective the Jews were cowards. Supplying the Jews with proper arms was hardly an option. Attempts to establish more cooperative contacts with the Jews and the AK failed. In contrast, the leftist Gwardia Ludowa not only accepted Jews into their fighting units, but they supplied them with weapons and ammunition. Still, the AK and the Polish government in London were better equipped than their leftist Polish counterparts and were in a position to do far more than the GL.

For the duration of the war and throughout Poland, Jewish resistance movements were largely isolated from other resistance groups. In the course of their exposure to persecutions, practically every ghetto had to face their enemy alone. Jewish communities that were prepared to fight were faced with the tragic realization that no one would come to their rescue. On the other hand, in every place where there was even a smallest crack in their walls of isolation, the Jews were ready to stand up to their enemy. This was the case in Warsaw, Bialystok, Krakow, and a range of other communities.
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Indeed, there is evidence as to how gratified Anielewicz was by the initial developments in the Jewish resistance. A part of his letter to Zuckerman, dated April 3, 1943, reads: “I had a feeling of great fulfillment . . . things have surpassed our boldest dreams . . . the Germans ran away from the ghetto twice . . . the dream of my life has come true. I have lived to see a Jewish defense in the ghetto in all its greatness and glory.”
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These successes had depended upon efforts to create new hiding places, as well as complex tunnels and invisible passages.
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One of these sophisticated shelters was at Mila 18, which offered refuge to the
Å»
OB leaders and many of their fighters. Neither the Germans nor their deadly fires changed the Jewish fighters' determination to die with what they defined as an honorable death. At Mila 18, most of the fugitives kept their last bullets for themselves, to commit collective suicide when there was no other way out. This is what, indeed, happened.

Even the German general Jurgen Stroop, who was in charge of burning down the ghetto with all its inhabitants, was amazed by the Jewish fighting spirit. Stroop was especially impressed by the presence of the heroic women fighters who had participated equally with the men.
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Despite Stroop's amazement, his total disregard of the loss of human lives is apparent in his last report, in which he notes drily: “The former ghetto has been completely destroyed; except for partially remaining portions of buildings. . . . Only five walls are left standing where no explosives were set.” Stroop concludes, “These ruins will yield enormous quantities of stone and scrap materials for further utilization.”
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Up to January 1943, the Germans had acted as if the ghetto belonged to them. Gradually, as Jewish submissiveness evaporated, the Nazis had to readjust some of their tactics. Basically this meant
that the Germans now had to enter the Jewish living quarters in search of their victims, who were no longer simply going to emerge willingly. When this happened the Jews would swiftly attack their enemies, depriving them of their guns and often their lives.

Zukerman describes what happened:

The first gang of four or five Germans that entered the house at Zamenhof 58; our people were hidden—some behind doors and some elsewhere. I was sitting in a room with my gun cocked. We heard them, we heard the shouts: “Raus! Raus!” (Get out!). No one left. Then, we heard them climbing the stairs. The sound echoed in the empty house. It was very tense. . . . I'll never forget that picture: Zacharia Artenstein was sitting in the first room and, as I recall, he was holding a book by Sholem-Aleichem; he sat and read, facing the door. They came in and there he was, sitting and reading a book. It didn't even occur to them to tell us to put our hands up. After they entered our room, Zacharia shot them in the back. Then we shot more of them and the Germans began to run away. After the first shot, they didn't even have time to take out their guns. They were so sure of themselves. One of the fellows threw a grenade at the fleeing Germans. I took the gun from the German who fell in the room. He was still alive; it was a pity to waste a bullet on him. But we did take their guns and grenades. Right after that, we heard a few of them run into the street, which was full of Germans. They started shouting and whistling. Regular Prussian shouts, mixed with pain.
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