Resistance (13 page)

Nachum Remba perished in a concentration camp somewhere in the vicinity of Lublin.
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Even as the 1942 Warsaw ghetto deportations were in full swing, many Oneg Shabbat archivists continued to work. They were racing against time. At this stage, unable to protect the Jewish people, they concentrated on saving Jewish history. This was their act of resistance. Ringelblum and his coworkers took steps to safeguard their
collected treasures. The Oneg Shabbat archives were sealed into ten large units, which consisted of metal boxes and empty milk bottles. Two parts of these units were buried in the ghetto on August 1942, at 68 Nowolipki Street. By February 1943, the rest of the archival materials were buried at 36 Swietokrzycka Street. These parts of the archives were later retrieved, one in 1946, the second in 1950. The third section seems to have been lost.
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When collecting historical evidence, Ringelblum was sensitive to the interdependence of facts. He was convinced that if presented in an orderly fashion, all evidence, ugly or uplifting, would be useful for those who would be reconstructing this history. Over time, Ringelblum lost his confidence that he himself would be the author of this history. But he never lost his confidence that the risks and difficulties associated with their clandestine collections and their preparations were worthwhile.

When on September 12, 1942, the deportations stopped, the ghetto population had been reduced by an estimated 300,000. Exact figures about the remaining ghetto prisoners are elusive. According to some estimates, only 10 percent of the Jewish inmates survived these deportations. Significantly, no one had any idea what the Germans aimed at doing with those who remained. What seemed clear was that for the occupiers Jews had no economic value and that their presence was attached to unknown political and propaganda measures.
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The general consensus among the remaining Jews was that they should have fought the Germans, preventing them from having such an easy time during the deportations. Young people in particular felt that they should have gone into the streets and set fire to the entire ghetto. There would have been victims, but not as many as 300,000. Many survivors were ashamed, and felt that this tragedy should never have come to pass. The determination to fight soon grew. At first, however, the deportations dominated all discussions. Some wanted to know why the Germans had refrained from eliminating all Jews. Others speculated that had they murdered all the Jews, the Germans would have deprived themselves of scapegoats for explanations of disasters, real or imaginary. Some noted that strangely enough the Germans failed to boast to the world that they had murdered millions of Jews. What was the reason? Similarly, some asked whether Hitler still wanted to keep his promise of freeing the world of the Jewish presence. Others determined
that the cultural climate was ripe for a vigorous resistance to the final Jewish annihilation.

Ringelblum's reunion with his family in the Warsaw bunker was a miraculous gift. Once more, this historian threw himself into writing. His friends, the Bermans, managed to visit him, supplying him with historical evidence, which he wanted to re-examine, clarify, and render more accessible to future historians. Faced with more evidence, Ringelblum would come up with new questions. At one point, when he received information about the Warsaw ghetto underground known as the Jewish Military Union or
Å»
ydowski Zwi
ą
zek Wojskowy (
Å»
ZW) and made up mostly of former Polish army officers, he asked “Why is there no more data about
Å»
ZW? Their traces must remain for history, even if we don't find them likeable.” This comment shows how concerned Ringelblum was about being objective and using reliable evidence. It also suggests how nonjudgmental he was. He consistently reiterated his position that no matter how we feel about a part of history, it has to be recorded and preserved in a fair and value-free way as possible.
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Although removed from the ghetto, Ringelblum followed the historical implications of the ghetto deportations that lasted from July 22 until September 12, 1942. These deportations had overlapped with the Jewish underground preparations by political groups—made up mostly of young people—such as Hashomer Hatzair, Dror, Akiva, and the vacillating members of the Bund, who had identified strongly with the Polish socialists. Only when the Bund recognized that the Polish socialists had no intention of uniting with them did they also join the Jewish Fighting Organization,
Å»
ydowska Organizacja Bojowa, also known as
Å»
OB.

The
Å»
OB was officially established on July 28, 1942. In addition to Antek Zukerman, other leadership positions were assumed by Shmuel Breslaw, Yosef Kaplan, Zivia Lubetkin, and Jurek Wilner. The official head of this underground was Mordechai Anielewicz.
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Earlier on,
Å»
OB began its operations by eliminating collaborators. The Nazis had relied on collaborators and placed them in high positions. The
Å»
OB had thought that by doing away with collaborators they would be strengthening their own anti-German operations. In the Warsaw ghetto, some of the converted Jews were identified as virulent anti-Semites. Jozef Szerynski was one of them. The Germans had appointed him as head of the ghetto police. The Jewish ghetto underground designated one of its valued members, Israel Kanal, to be Szerynski's assassin. But Kanal's bullet missed,
only wounding Szerynski in the cheek. Szerynski was soon accused by the Germans of stealing fur coats. Before the authorities meted out the “proper” punishment, Szerynski committed suicide.
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Another more dangerous collaborator was Yakov Lejkin. A converted Jew, he was known as a corrupt and enthusiastic supporter of the Nazis. Lejkin was assassinated during the Warsaw ghetto deportations. His killer was never identified.
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Next, the ghetto underground had ordered the killing of Alfred Nossig. Born in Lwow, Nossig was a journalist and a sculptor. After his assassination, some ghetto inmates had guessed
Å»
OB's involvement. The majority had approved of this act, yet hardly anyone spoke about it. Discretely,
Å»
OB continued to pursue its preparatory cleansing activities.
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To function more effectively this ghetto underground had to reconcile a range of differences among diverse groups. Eventually it included all major political and social streams of Jewish life. One conspicuous division, however, was with the
Å»
ZW, who were well equipped because of their former connection to the Polish Army and therefore did not need to join the other Jewish undergrounds. Relatively less evidence is available about the
Å»
ZW than about the
Å»
OB. According to some sources, the
Å»
ZW had three hundred fighters, all of whom were well armed.

In the bunker, one of Ringelblum's writing projects was a portrait of Mordechai Anielewicz, the twenty-five-year-old former leader of the Hashomer Hatzair group, a leftist political organization (
figure 2.4
). Ringelblum was impressed with Mordechai's idealism and with his devotion to his young followers. Anielewicz was also aware of Hashomer Hatzair's pro-Soviet orientations and how these might extend to
Å»
OB and to the PPR, the Polish Workers Party. He was interested in how diverse political systems were connected to Russian politics. Anielewicz cultivated his ties to the Polish Scout Organization. He was a quiet leader, willing to learn from his followers.

Early on, as the head of the Hashomer Hatzair youth group, Anielewicz had traveled to a number of ghettos, urging other Jewish youths to join them. These trips offered opportunities for the exchange of ideas within wider circles of young people. Such travels, however, were dangerous. The Nazis imposed the death sentence upon Jews found outside of the ghetto without special authorizations. The same punishment applied to Christian Poles who knowingly helped Jews move or stay outside of a ghetto.
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FIGURE 2.4
Mordechai Anielewicz (standing, far right) with other members of the Zionist youth movement in Hashomer Hatzair. Anielewicz was the head of the Jewish Fighting Organization (
Å»
OB), and one of the leaders in the Warsaw ghetto uprising. (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of Leah Hammerstein Silverstein)

Despite these risks, Anielewicz and many of his colleagues continued their tours, eluding the authorities' watchful eyes. They shared an eagerness to learn about the fate of the Jewish people. These trips offered fresh insights into the deteriorating conditions under which ghetto inmates were forced to live. Significantly, too, such travels confirmed to Anielewicz and the young leaders who had crossed their paths that worse was to come. Indeed, news about future anti-Jewish measures continued to spread. Soon added to this general news were more specific reports about the murder of the Vilna ghetto inmates' deportations from a number of ghettos: Slonim, Novogrodek, Lida, Lublin, and many others. Figuring prominently were details about the Warsaw ghetto deportations. Anielewicz and his comrades concluded that all Polish Jews were destined for annihilation.

He and many of his young colleagues agreed that they had to settle a central question: What kind of a death should the Polish Jews select for themselves? Should they face death in a passive way, without engaging in resistance, or should they stand up to their oppressors?

After the end of the big Warsaw ghetto deportations, Anielewicz and other young leaders insisted that in the future the killing of Polish Jews should not be made easy for the Germans. A consensus emerged that in the future the Germans would pay a high price for their crimes.

The moment Anielewicz turned from passivity to active resistance, all preoccupation with the promotion of cultural and artistic pastimes retreated into the background. These activities no longer seemed to matter. Also put to rest were endless debates between the youthful political leaders and the older Jews. From earlier discussions with the older generation, Anielewicz had learned that the more experienced Jewish leaders were opposed to fighting the Germans because they recognized that Jews would not survive direct confrontations with the occupiers. Unlike Anielewicz and his followers, they were ready to do all that was in their power to protect and prolong their lives. The young expected the Germans to murder them all; this was an inevitable fact. For them the question was how to die an honorable death.
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And so, the young fighters did not try to get illegal documents nor did they look for safe haven in the Christian world. Faced with annihilation, they remained idealistic. They had no wives or children. Their goal was to connect and to cooperate with others who were also ready to fight. In times of disasters one should not be concerned with committees and propositions.
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At such times, one had to rely on instinct.

Ringelblum felt that initially Jewish youths were too disciplined, and therefore incapable of assessing clearly their circumstances. To Ringelblum, this seemed to be one of the basic reasons why, during the Warsaw ghetto deportations, so many Jews lost their lives while their Nazi oppressors did not even pay with one dead German. This truth dawned on the young only when it was too late—after most of the Warsaw Jewry had already been murdered in Treblinka.

Still, as far as the preparations for resistance were concerned, Anielewicz threw himself into this job. Together with other groups and other political parties, he reorganized the Jewish underground. All who knew Anielewicz concur that he was one of the most dedicated activists in the movement. He bore no resemblance to other
leaders, who would send others into the line of fire and distance themselves from a fight.

The ghetto deportations were followed by a flood of self-accusations about Jewish passivity and complicity. Such reactions led to growing involvement with Jewish resistance. Attached to this was a growing interest, verging on an obsession, to build more sophisticated hiding places. Practically all of the remaining Jews wanted to participate, as Israel Gutman insists, “in the construction of shelters and secret places that would prolong Jewish lives.”
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Many of the ghetto activities were dictated by darkness, which practically guaranteed an absence of Germans and their collaborators, who had avoided unfamiliar places at night. The Jews took advantage of their nightly disappearances to construct new shelters. As mentioned previously, the ghetto turned into a community built on several levels. One was above the ground. Another, the newer one, was below the ground and consisted of a complex network of tunnels and underground bunkers. Ringelblum praised the ingeniousness with which the Jews created such inaccessible, secret accommodations.
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Shelters were also built close to the roofs. These offered opportunities to move from bunker to bunker without being detected. This secrecy meant safety to the Jewish underground, which was eagerly preparing for upcoming confrontations.