Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (18 page)

1. Muhammad Amin Ibn ‘Abidin,
   Hashiyat Radd al-Muhtar
   (Cairo: Mustafa al-Babi, 1966)
   ,
   6:413; Ahmad al-Sawi,
   Hashiyat al-‘Allamah al-Sawi ‘ala Tafsir al-Jalalayn
   (Beirut: Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-‘Arabi, n.d.)
   ,
   3:307–8. See also, Ahmad Dallal, “The Origins and Objectives of Islamic Revivalist Thought, 1750–1850,”
   Journal of the American Oriental Society
   , 113(3), 1993, 341–59. The same accusation of being the Khawarij of modern Islam is made in Sulayman b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab,
   al-Sawa‘iq al-Ilahiyya
   , 10, 28, 50–1; Yusuf b. Ahmad al-Dijawi, “Tawhid al-Uluhiyya wa Tawhid al-Rububiyya,”
   Nurr al-Islam
   , 1(4), 1933, 320, 329. The Shi‘i jurist known as al-‘Assar noted that the creeds of the Wahhabis and Khawarij were, in many respects, substantially the same; see al-Layasani (aka al-‘Assar),
   Risala fi Radd Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya
   , 135.
   

2. Wearing silk or gold is prohibited for men only. For a report in which the
   mutawwa‘un
   punished a young boy for wearing a wristwatch in the 1940s, see Al-Rasheed,
   A History of Saudi Arabia
   , 53. Apparently, the
   mutawwa‘un
   considered the wearing of a wristwatch an innovation (
   bid‘a
   ), but a pocket watch was considered acceptable.
   

3. Simons,
   Saudi Arabia
   , 152–9; Kostiner,
   The Making of Saudi Arabia,
   119; Van der Meulen,
   The Wells of Ibn Sa‘ud
   , 62–113. One scholar commented that the
   mutawwa‘un
   operated a system of terror against the inhabitants of lands they controlled; see Al-Rasheed,
   A History of Saudi Arabia
   , 62–3.
   

4. In 1912, King ‘Abd al-Aziz formed a fighting force known as the Ikhwan, which was constituted of Najdi religious zealots, strongly committed to the thought of ‘Abd al-Wahhab. The Ikhwan played an effective role in establishing and expanding ‘Abd al-Aziz’s control, but they eventually became dissatisfied with what they saw as ‘Abd al-Aziz’s liberalism, and willingness to cooperate with non-Muslims. ‘Abd al-Aziz tried to prevent the Ikhwan from raiding neighboring territories under British control, and also tried to restrain the Ikhwan from interfering with pilgrims coming to Mecca from outside of Arabia, whom the Ikhwan had a habit of attacking and punishing for engaging in un-Islamic practices. The Ikhwan rebelled against the King in 1929, but with the assistance of the British, who used airpower to massacre them, he crushed and disbanded their forces.
   

   Van der Meulen,
   The Wells of Ibn Sa‘ud
   , 65–8; Kostiner,
   The Making of Saudi Arabia
   , 117–40; Al-Rasheed,
   A History of Saudi Arabia
   , 62–71.
   

5. See, on these events and others, Michael Cook,
   Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong
   , 180–91; Van der Meulen,
   The Wells of Ibn Sa‘ud
   , 104–13. Reportedly, the Egyptian media severely criticized the Wahhabis over this incident; see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 27:463–8.
   

6. On this process, and the use of
   talfiq
   and
   maslaha
   in modern Islam, see Coulson,
   A History of Islamic Law
   , 197–217. Also see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 17:372–84.
   

7. Rashid Rida’s main work was a monthly journal, titled
   Majallat al-Manar
   , which he issued from 1315/1897 to 1354/1935. Rida wrote most of the articles of the journal himself. Eventually, the issues of the journal were collected and published in a multi- volume work. Below I cite the Dar al-Wafa’ edition of the multi-volume work, which contains all the issues of the
   Manar
   , save the Qur’anic commentary, which was published separately.
   

8. Rida severely criticizes al-Dijawi for attacking the Wahhabis; see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 31:745–50. Rida also chronicles his disagreements with a number of jurists from the Azhar, and the attempts made to bring reconciliation to their disagreements, which included the contentious issue of the merit, or lack thereof, of the Wahhabis; see 32:673–04. However, it is clear that the rift between Rida, on the one hand, and al-Dijawi and several other Azhari jurists, on the other, continued until 1933, the last year in which the
   Manar
   was published; see 33:34–1, 118–9 373–82, 682–3. During this era, one of the most poignant critiques of Wahhabism was written by an influential Shi‘i jurist, known as al-‘Assar (d. 1356/1937), who had lived and studied for a period of time in Mecca and Medina. Although a Shi‘i-trained cleric from Iran, al-‘Assar had studied Sunni law with Hanafi and Shafi‘i jurists. In 1343/1924, relying primarily on Sunni sources, he wrote a comprehensive and systematic refutation of the Wahhabi creed in which he strongly condemned their practice of
   takfir
   and fanaticism. Al-‘Assar argued that the Wahhabis were an aberration in Sunni history, and condemned the many injustices they committed in the name of Islam. Al-‘Assar’s text is intellectually impressive, but it does not seem to have been widely disseminated in the Arabic speaking Muslim world, and, apparently, Rida was not aware of the text. See al-Layasani (aka al-‘Assar),
   Risala fi Radd Madhhab al-Wahhabiyya
   , esp. 110–37, 152–74.
   

9. For Rida’s defense of his relationship with King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 27:548–55. For his defense of his support of the Wahhabis, see 29:531–8, 604–7.
   

87. Rida,
al-Manar
, 12:389–96; 16:776; 24:584–92.

88. Rida,
al-Manar
, 12:371–87, 525–8; 19–20:342–52; 29:40–51.

1. On philosophy, see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 5:727–70. For his condemnation of political despotism and advocacy of democratic government, see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 4:809–13, 7:899–912; 23:751; 27:357–9. For an article written on the same subject by al-Afghani, see, in the same source, 3:577–82, 602–7.
   

2. Although supportive of the juristic class and their tradition, Rida was also critical of overly conservative jurists who resisted the reformation of Islamic law; see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 1:462–6, 696–704, 822–6; 4:401–11, 441–8. This issue was one of the causes for the rift between him and the Azhar seminary in the early 1930s; see 33:33–49, 113–20, 130–3, 290–304. However, Rida was also concerned about the turmoil and divisiveness that could result from a too rigid adherence to the established schools of thought in jurisprudence; see 14:775–81; 28:423–32.
   

3. On Rida and his views regarding Salafism and Hanbalism, see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 8:614–20, 649–55; 29:185–96. Also, see the excerpt on Ibn Taymiyya; 24:473–8.
   

4. Rida was particularly critical of the fact that in Sufi orders a disciple surrenders his free agency to a master, and is expected to follow the rules set by the master blindly. He was also critical of the superstitious beliefs of some Sufi orders, and their practice of miracles. But Rida did not condemn the Sufi as heretics, or
   kafirs
   . For his criticism of Sufi orders, but his opposition to
   takfir
   , see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 1:404–16, 447–54, 598–601, 722–30; 2:401–6, 449–54, 481–8, 545–52; 3:617–23; 4:318–20; 6:12–20, 41–62, 109–15, 184–95,
   

   255–9, 286–93, 369–73, 406–12; 11:504–27, 911–17; 23:345–60; 27:556–8. On Shi‘ism and
   

   worshipping at gravesites, see 28:350–67, 429–49, 516–33, 593–601, 684–92, 776–81.
   

5. Among other things, Rida wrote a fascinating fictitious debate between a reformer and a conservative traditionalist. In this debate and in other articles, he acknowledges that adherence to juristic precedent is, in many cases, appropriate and even important. But he insists upon the necessity of rethinking certain classical law positions in response to the new challenges confronting Muslims in the modern age. Rida also argues for the importance of Muslims mastering history and philosophy in responding to the challenges of modernity; see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 3:635–40, 676–83, 715–25, 796–804; 4:51–60, 161–70, 205–17, 280–97, 521–9, 692–702, 852–66; 5:522–45, 570–8; 6:500–6, 539–44, 594–8, 766–70, 820–2, 696–9, 768–71, 853–6, 939–43; 7:121–33, 222–5, 253–8, 409–12, 449–53, 491–5; 12:615–21; 13:105–8, 529–38, 569–71, 665–80, 779–82; 14:137–8, 510–15, 743–50; 17:501–3. On closing the doors of
   ijtihad
   , see 7:374–80; 15:183–7. For an excerpt by Jamal al-Din al-Qasmi opposing the practice of
   takfir
   and criticizing the Ahl al-Hadith for attacking innovative jurists; see 15:857–74, 912–20; also see the excerpt in 17:41–53.
   

6. Rida, apologetically, defended the Wahhabis despite their insistence on
   takfir
   , destruction of Islamic monuments, attacking pilgrims to Mecca, and killing of innocents; see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 21:226–49, 281–4; 26:200–5, 320, 454–77; 29:162–80; 33:544–7. Rida argued that, even if the Wahhabis committed some excesses, their opponent, the Hashmite Sharif Husayn, did much worse; see 26:462–3. Rida critically noted that some of his contemporaries praised Muhammad Ali, Egypt’s ruler, for defeating the Wahhabis; see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 5:183. Rida strongly defended the Wahhabis over the Egyptian
   mahmal
   incident in 1926; 27:463–8. Also see his
   fatwa
   in favor of the Wahhabi Ibn Al Saud, and against King Husayn b. Ali, who seized control of Mecca in 1916; 24:593–618; 25:713–18. On the refusal of King Husayn to accept the Egyptian medical mission to Mecca, see 24:625–9. For a
   fatwa
   on whether King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz could declare a national holiday on the occasion of his becoming King of Arabia, see 30:521–3.
   

95. Rida,
al-Manar
, 12:818–32, 913–32; 14:849–53; 16:773–6; 19–20:129–69, 433–43, 278–88;

25:540–60, 604–21, 761–9. Rather tellingly, in 1928, Rida finally acknowledged that some Salafis and Wahhabis had nothing but disdain for jurists, like himself; see 29:618. This was indicative of the contradictions between his theology and nationalism – contradictions that Rida did not seem willing to confront openly.

1. On public interest (
   maslaha
   ) and Islamic law in Rida’s thought, see Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 9:721–70.
   

2. Admittedly, however, Rida argued that one of the reasons that he supported the Wahhabis was because the Bedouins of Arabia and the Ottomans had become areligious in many of their practices, and cared little for what Islamic law had to say about anything. In contrast, the Wahhabis were religiously committed, and, in principle, put Islamic law before social customs or politics. See Rida,
   al-Manar
   , 21:226–49. While Rida probably did believe this to be true, the vast majority of his writings focused on nationalistic considerations such as anti-colonialism and pro-Arab nationalism. For instance, Rida urged Muslims to support the Turkish Kemalists against the British colonialists; see 23:713–20. But when it became clear that Kemal Ataturk was pro-Western and anti-Islamic, Rida wrote opposing him; see 25:273–92; 27:356.
   

3. In the early twentieth century, Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis. The word
   salaf
   means “predecessors,” and in the Islamic context it usually refers to the period of the Companions of the Prophet and his successors. The term
   salafi
   has a natural appeal because it connotes authenticity and legitimacy. As a term, it is exploitable by any movement that wants to claim that it is grounded in Islamic authenticity. Although the Wahhabis referred to themselves as Salafis, the term did not become associated with the Wahhabi creed until the 1970s.
   

4. The Wahhabi notion of egalitarianism reached the point of prohibiting labels of respect intended to honor human beings, such as “Doctor,” “Mister,” or “sir.” Muhammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab argued that such prefixes were a form of associating partners with God
   

   (i.e.
   shirk
   ), and also were condemnable because they constituted an imitation of the Western unbelievers. Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab, “Awthaq al-‘Ura: al-Risalah al-Sadisa,” in
   Majmu‘at al-Tawhid
   (Damascus: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1962), 171.
   

5. My two books
   And God Knows the Soldiers
   and
   Speaking in God’s Name
   are primarily concerned with this phenomenon.
   

6. I recall one incident that, to me, represented the profound contradictions of the Salafabists, especially as regards women. A few years ago, I was lecturing in an Islamic center in Ohio when a Saudi leader of the community strongly protested that some of the women attending the lecture were sitting in the front row and were not hidden from the sight of men. The Saudi leader insisted that the women must promptly relocate to seats placed behind a curtain so that men could not see them. He insisted that the women sitting in the front row created the potential of
   fitna
   for others. Later on, I discovered that this man was a practicing gynecologist in Ohio, who treated the same women that he insisted should sit behind a curtain. The Salafabist obsession with excluding women from public life was the subject of my book
   Speaking in God’s Name
   . But as further evidence of this pervasive phenomenon, one should read the three-volume work written on the merits and importance of secluding women in Islam: Muhammad Ahmad al-Muqaddim,
   ‘Awdat al-Hijab
   (Riyadh: Dar Tayba, 1996). There is a highly accessible and remarkably misogynist literature that floods the Arab–Muslim book market, reproducing what is supposed to be the Islamic position on women, but which is also extremely deprecating to women. For instance, I recently picked up a short book published in Lebanon, authoritatively titled a
   responsa
   (
   fatawa
   ) for women by a Ph.D.-carrying Salafabist scholar: al-Sadiq ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Ghiryani,
   Fatawa min Hayat al-Mar’ah al-Muslimah
   (Beirut: Dar al-Rayyan, 2001). The author’s
   responsa
   reproduces the same misogynist determinations that have become commonplace in contemporary Muslim culture. For example, according to the author, a Muslim wife may not worship God by fasting without the permission of her husband because her husband may want to have sex with her during the day (p. 47); a woman may not speak with her fiance´ over the telephone because she may seduce him (pp. 59–60); a woman engaged to a man may not go out with him in public because she may seduce him (p. 62); a bride riding with her groom in a car driven by a relative must make sure not to wear perfume because she may seduce the driver, who is not her husband (p. 63); a woman who wishes to go to the mosque to learn the Qur’an must obey her father if he forbids her from going, and the father need not express any reason for his opposition (p. 77); a man who marries a woman with the intention of divorcing her after having his pleasure with her but fails to inform her of his intention does not commit a sin, and the marriage is valid (pp. 82–3); a woman may not refuse her husband sex, except if she is ill, and refusing a husband sex without compelling justification is a grave sin (
   kabira
   ). On the other hand, a husband may refuse his wife sex for a reason or no reason at all (pp. 86–7); as a legal matter, the voice of a woman is not an
   ‘awrah
   (a privacy that must be concealed from all except a
   mahram
   ), but nonetheless because of its seductive powers the voice of a women should not be heard in public, or in a private setting where it might cause sexual enticement (pp. 111–12); women should not mix with men even in public ways and even if women are wearing the
   hijab
   , and women should not travel unaccompanied by a male
   mahram
   (pp. 116–17); a woman may not chew gum because it is seductive (p. 122); women may not dance in front of other women in a wedding even if there are no men around because it might be sexually arousing (p. 130); women may not shorten their head hair because doing so is considered imitating men. However, women
   must
   remove any facial hair, such as a beard or moustache, because it is more feminine to do so, and because a woman must be sexually appealing to her husband (i.e. facial hair on a woman is not sexually appealing) (pp. 137–8, 146); women should not attend funerals or gravesites or convey their condolences to foreign men, so as to avoid sexual enticement (p. 149). I have dealt with very similar determinations in
   Speaking in God’s Name
   , and attempted to prove that such determinations are not objectively mandated by Islamic sources. In fact, these
   

   determinations engage in what I called textual authoritarianism by abusing the integrity of the text.
   

7. “
   Ahl al-Hadith
   ” is a broad term that refers to a literalist movement that claimed to adhere to the traditions of the Prophet faithfully, and without the corrupting influence of human interpretations. In the fourth/tenth century, there was an affinity between the followers of Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbali school of thought, and the Ahl al-Hadith – although the Ahl al-Hadith claimed not to follow any of the established schools of thought, and to simply be the adherents of the truth. On the Ahl al-Hadith, see Abou El Fadl,
   Speaking in God’s Name
   , 114; Abou El Fadl,
   And God Knows the Soldiers
   , 48, 78.
   

8. Of course, I will not speculate about what induced these liberal thinkers to defend Wahhabism, but the least one can say about their writing on this topic is that it is very selective and full of historical inaccuracies. For examples of such works, see Muhammad Fathy Osman,
   al-Salafiyya fi al-Mujtama‘at al-Mu‘asira
   [
   Salafis in Modern Societies
   ] (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1981). The author equates the Wahhabis and the Salafis, and also engages in lengthy and unequivocal praise of ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his movement; see especially pp. 31–87. Interestingly, the author was a professor in Saudi Arabia when he wrote the book. Another unabashed defense of the Wahhabi movement by a liberal scholar is: Muhammad Jalal Kishk,
   al-Sa‘udiyyun wa al-Hall al-Islami
   [
   The Saudis and the Islamic Solution
   ], (West Hanover, MA: Halliday Lithograph, 1981). This book, however, is a bit more balanced than Osman’s work. Interestingly, Kishk became the recipient of the influential King Faysal Award.
   

9. Muhammad al-Ghazali,
   al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyya Bayn Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Hadith
   

   (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1989).
   

10. Several major conferences were held in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to criticize the book, and the Saudi newspaper
    al-Sharq al-Awsat
    published several long articles responding to al-Ghazali in 1989. Notably, perhaps as an indication of Saudi influence and contrary to what one would expect, most of the books written against al-Ghazali were published in Egypt, and not Saudi Arabia. The following is a partial list of attacks on al-Ghazali’s books: Muhammad Jalal Kishk,
    Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali bayn al-Naqd al-‘Atib wa al-Madh al-Shamit
    (Cairo: Maktabat al-Turath Islami, 1990); Ashraf b. Ibn al-Maqsud b. ‘Abd al-Rahim,
    Jinayat al-Shaykh al-Ghazali ‘ala al-Hadith wa Ahlihi
    (al-Isma‘iliyya, Egypt: Maktabat al-Bukhari, 1989); Jamal Sultan,
    Azmat al-Hiwar al-Dini: Naqd Kitab al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyya bayn Ahl al-Fiqh wa Ahl al-Hadith
    (Cairo: Dar al-Safa, 1990); Salman b. Fahd ‘Uwda,
    Fi Hiwar Hadi’ ma ‘a Muhammad al-Ghazali
    (Riyadh: n.p., 1989); Rabi‘ b. Hadi Madkhali,
    Kashf Mawqif al-Ghazali min al-Sunna wa Ahliha wa Naqd Ba‘d Ara’ihi
    (Cairo: Maktabat al-Sunna, 1410). Also see Abu ‘Ubaydah,
    Kutub Hadhdhar minha al-‘Ulama’
    , 1:214–28, 327–9. At the time of the controversy, the influential Egyptian jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi remained conspicuously silent, but a few years after al-Ghazali died, he wrote two books; one about al-Ghazali’s life and the other about the controversy. In both books, he defended al-Ghazali’s piety and knowledge, but he stopped short of criticizing the Wahhabis; see Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
    al-Imam al-Ghazali bayn Madihih wa Naqidih
    (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risalah, 1994); Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
    al-Shaykh al-Ghazali kama ‘Araftuh: Rihlat Nisf Qarn
    (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1994).
    

11. By the 1990s, the only Islamic critics of the Wahhabis were Sufis and Shi‘is, but even Sufi scholars had become heavily influenced by the Salafabi methodology. It was not unusual to find Sufi scholars engage in the same literalist and myopic adherence to
    hadith
    as the Wahhabis. The main issues of contention between Sufis and Wahhabis, however, remained the validity of the doctrine of intercession and the lawfulness of showing reverence for saints. For a Sufi response to many of the doctrines of Wahhabism, see Muhammad Hisham al-Kabbani,
    Encyclopedia of Islamic Doctrine
    (Mountain View, CA: As-Sunna Foundation of America, 1998), 7 vols; for a response to Wahhabism by a Shi‘i scholar who does not cite Shi‘i sources but only Sunni sources, see Najm al-Din al-Tabasi,
    al-Wahabiyya Da‘awi wa Rudud
    (Matba‘at al-Hadi, 1420/1999).
    

12. This period has been described by some scholars as the liberal age of modern Islam; see Albert Hourani,
    Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798–1939
    (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Leonard Binder,
    Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development Ideologies
    (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988). For excerpts from the works of Muslim liberals, see Charles Kurzman (ed.),
    Liberal Islam: A Sourcebook
    (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). Also see Huseyn Hilmi Isik,
    The Religion Reformers in Islam
    , 3rd edn (Istanbul: Wakf Ikhlas, 1978), and Daniel Brown,
    Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought
    (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
    

13. The Qur’an proclaims that God does not change the fortunes of people until they first change themselves. Qur’an 13:11.
    

14. See Abou El Fadl, “Constitutionalism and Islamic Sunni Legacy,” 94–6.