Pirates of Somalia (36 page)

According to Hussein Hersi, his cousins left Somalia in two small attack skiffs, but both Matei Levenescu and Traian Mihai reported being attacked by one boat between ten and twelve metres in length. Is it possible that the
Victoria
hijackers departed Somalia in smaller skiffs, and then proceeded to hijack a Yemeni dhow somewhere in the Gulf of Aden, abandoning the vessel’s previous occupants in their skiffs?

“The Somali side of the Gulf is too well patrolled by foreign warships,” Hersi told me, “and the commercial ships stay two or three hundred miles away from the Yemeni coast. So the pirates go over to the Yemeni side; they pretend to be Yemeni fishermen, but at night they attack the actual Yemenis and capture their fishing dhows. “They’re always changing tactics, you know. The warships go this way, the pirates go the other,” he said, motioning in two directions with his hand.

It was not clear if Hersi was referring to his cousins’ gang in particular, or to the practices of Gulf of Aden pirates in general. But the dimensions of the attack ship described by Levenescu and Mihai fit the proportions of a small Yemeni dhow; and the fact that the
Victoria
was captured only 120 kilometres south of the Yemeni coast confirms that the pirates had been operating from the Yemeni side of the Gulf of Aden, and had quite possibly hidden from coalition forces by pretending to be Yemeni fishermen.

On the other hand, Computer’s psychic timeline, as reported by Hersi, allowed only eight hours between launching the mission and encountering the
Victoria
. If so, the pirates would have barely had enough time to reach Yemeni waters and hijack the dhow before meeting the
Victoria
(at a top speed of twenty knots, the hijackers would have needed almost seven hours just to reach the position where they encountered the
Victoria
).

Relationship with the Puntland Authorities

No blanket statement can define the “typical relationship” between pirate gangs and the Puntland government forces, which has ranged from direct armed confrontation to allegations of complicity and outright involvement. As evidence of possible corruption, Hansen cites Boyah’s statement that 30 per cent of ransom money goes to bribes (in my view an absurd claim, which Boyah has since retracted on multiple occasions). But another of Hansen’s interviews suggests a more evasive strategy: “We usually hide ourselves and put the ship we capture in (
sic
) far from the shore and move from place to place when we see [the Puntland police] around,” said a pirate named Sultan.

Their actions show that the
Victoria
gang came closer to adopting the latter approach, as illustrated from their flight from Eyl upon my arrival with government forces. Though Levenescu suggested that the purpose of their departure was to harvest drinking water, the timing of the trip may have been influenced by the sudden appearance of uniformed government soldiers in Eyl, several of them closely related to President Farole himself.

Finally, by electing to spend its money on soldiers’ uniforms rather than on bribes, the gang coped with the Puntland authorities through subterfuge rather than confrontation or negotiation. One must wonder if even this minimalist effort was necessary; when I was in Eyl I saw no local authorities worth bribing, and no military presence other than my own escort.

Appendix 3

Piracy Timeline

1991: The Somali state collapses as rebel factions descend on the capital, Mogadishu. President Mohamed Siad Barre flees the country.

J
ANUARY
12, 1991: In the first recorded piracy incident in modern Somalia, the cargo ship MV
Naviluck
is boarded by bandits off Puntland’s coast. Part of the crew is taken ashore and executed, while the boat is ransacked and subsequently set ablaze.

O
CTOBER
1993: US efforts to arrest warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid lead to the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident, in which eighteen US Army Rangers are killed by Somali militants.

M
ARCH
1995: The last UN peacekeeping forces withdraw from Somalia, leaving the country in a state of protracted civil conflict.

M
AY
5, 1998: A pan-clan conference held in Garowe proclaims the creation of Puntland State of Somalia. Garowe is chosen as the region’s capital.

N
OVEMBER
1999: Hart Security, a British private security firm, signs a contract to provide coast guard services in Puntland. The company operates there until 2002, when it is replaced by the Somali-Canadian Coast Guard (SomCan).

A
PRIL–
M
AY
2000: The Transitional National Government (TNG) is formed at the Somali National Peace Conference, held in Djibouti.

N
OVEMBER
2001: The election of Jama Ali Jama to the Puntland presidency sparks a brief civil conflict when Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed refuses to step down. Six months later, Yusuf emerges victorious.

M
AY
2002: The Somali-Canadian Coast Guard (SomCan), owned by a group of Toronto-based Somali businessmen, assumes coast guard duties in Puntland. The government dismisses the company in March 2005 after SomCan marines hijack a Thai fishing boat.

O
CTOBER
10, 2004: The TNG is reconstituted as the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and Abdullahi Yusuf is elected president. Shortly thereafter, General Mohamud Muse Hersi takes over the Puntland presidency.

D
ECEMBER
26, 2004: The Indian Ocean tsunami, one of the worst natural disasters in recorded history, strikes the eastern coast of Somalia, causing devastation in Eyl and other waterside towns. Dozens of submerged toxic waste canisters wash ashore, revealing the extent of illegal dumping in Somali waters.

J
UNE
27, 2005: The World Food Programme transport MV
Semlow
is hijacked by pirates under the command of Mohamed Abdi Hassan “Afweyne.” Attacks on food aid transports continue until the French navy begins escorting shipments two years later.

J
UNE
2006: The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a grassroots religious movement, seizes power in Mogadishu and much of southern Somalia. The ICU takes control of Harardheere and Hobyo, and briefly manages to suppress piracy.

D
ECEMBER
2006: US-backed Ethiopian forces invade Somalia, overthrowing the ICU and forcing its moderates to flee to Eritrea and Djibouti. Hardline ICU militias split off to form Al-Shabaab, or “The Youth,” and undertake a violent insurgency against the occupying forces.

O
CTOBER
28, 2007: A pirate attack group led by Abdullahi Abshir Boyah hijacks the MV
Golden Nori
, a Japanese chemical tanker, fifteen kilometres off the Somali coast.

A
PRIL
2008: President Hersi ceases to pay his Puntland security forces. Following the end of the summer monsoon season in August, piracy explodes.

J
ULY
2008: A rejuvenated SomCan enters into a one-year contract with the administration of President Hersi to resume its coast guard duties. The following year, President Farole declines to extend its contract.

S
EPTEMBER
25, 2008: Eyl- and Harardheere-based pirates jointly capture the MV
Faina
, a Ukrainian vessel transporting tanks intended for the government of South Sudan. After a four-month standoff, the pirates receive a then-unprecedented ransom of $3.2 million.

O
CTOBER
2008: NATO announces plans for a seven-warship counter-piracy task force in Somali waters. In the following months, the European Union and the United States deploy their own fleets, EU Naval Force Somalia (NAVFOR) and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151).

N
OVEMBER
15, 2008: Somali pirates associated with Afweyne hijack the MV
Sirius Star
, a Saudi supertanker carrying $100 million in crude oil. The attack occurs almost eight hundred kilometres south of Somalia, the farthest Somali pirates have ventured to date.

D
ECEMBER
2008: Kenya signs a memorandum of understanding with the United Kingdom to prosecute suspected pirates captured on the high seas. Similar deals follow with the EU and the United States.

J
ANUARY
2009: Ethiopian troops withdraw from Somalia, and Al-Shabaab quickly assumes control over much of the south of the country. The TFG merges with the exiled ICU leadership to form a 550-member parliament. Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, former ICU head, is chosen president of the new body.

J
ANUARY
8, 2009: Former Puntland finance minister Abdirahman Farole is elected president of Puntland. A former academic, Farole becomes only the third Somali civilian leader since 1969.

A
PRIL
8, 2009: Members of Garaad Mohammed’s pirate organization briefly seize the MV
Maersk Alabama
, the first US merchant ship to be commandeered in two hundred years. Four attackers flee the ship in the Alabama’s lifeboat, taking Captain Richard Phillips with them. After a tense four-day standoff, US Navy SEALs kill three of the pirates and take the fourth into custody.

M
AY
5, 2009: The MV
Victoria
, a German-owned container ship, is hijacked by a gang of Eyl-based pirates operating under the instructions of Abdulkhadar “Computer,” a reported psychic. The ship is released after seventy-five days, garnering a ransom of $1.8 million.

N
OVEMBER
6, 2010: Pirates release the South Korean oil tanker
Samho Dream
for a record-setting ransom of $9.5 million.

J
ANUARY
21, 2011: South Korean commandos storm the hijacked chemical tanker MV
Samho Jewelry
, freeing the crew and killing eight pirates. The rescue marked the first military assault on a commercial vessel whose crew had not barricaded themselves within a “safe room.”

F
EBRUARY
18, 2011: Pirates hijack the yacht S/V
Quest
four hundred kilometres off the coast of Oman. Surrounded by US warships, the pirates execute their four American hostages.

Acknowledgements

A
VERY SPECIAL THANKS TO MY HOST AND PARTNER
, R
ADIO
Garowe and Garowe Online (
www.garoweonline.com
) founder Mohamad Abdirahman Farole, his brothers Omar and Mahad, and his cousins, Abdirizak Ahmed and the redoubtable Colonel Omar Abdullahi Farole. I would also like to extend my deepest gratitude to my invaluable consultant, Somali-American journalist Yusuf Hassan. Finally, my thanks to my trusty bodyguards, Said and Abdirashid, who got me back alive—twice—and to Boyah, who welcomed me into his world.

To my parents, Maria and Kailash, unwavering in their support as this project developed from cockeyed suicide mission to unimagined success, and to Laura, for her love, understanding, and flawless application of
Marry Me
doctrine.

I am extraordinarily grateful to my unofficial editors, the friends who gave countless hours of their valuable time to help me become a better writer: Lauren Amundsen (who mercilessly beat the flowery metaphor out of me), as well as Kevin Weitzman, Geoff Burt, and Ross Gray.

I wish to thank all those who helped me along the way, from Toronto to Garowe, London, Nairobi, and beyond: Teddy Florea, Katharine Houreld, Kevin Mwachiro, Jamal Abdi, Rene Dalgaard, Hussein Hersi, Abdiwahid Mahamed Hersi Joaar, Said Orey, Ion Tita-Calin, Stig Jarle Hansen, Ryan Bigge, Avril Benoit, Reva Seth, Shin Imai, Bill Burt, Daniel Sekulich, Thymaya Payne, Mohamed Dahir Hassan, and the Kenyan prison service, especially Wanini Kireri, David Macharia, and Patrick Mwenda.

I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to Daniel Crewe and Lisa Owens at Profile, Vicky Wilson at Knopf, Noelle Zitzer at HarperCollins, Sarah Wight (my superbly-talented copyeditor), and in particular to my editor Jim Gifford, who saw beyond the CV.

Finally, my inestimable thanks to my agent, Rick Broadhead, for his tireless patience and hard work as I trod my first steps along a very unfamiliar path.

To those whom I have neglected to mention: please accept the omission as one of memory, and not of gratitude.

Notes

PROLOGUE: WHERE THE WHITE MAN RUNS AWAY

1.
All figures are in US dollars.

CHAPTER 1: BOYAH

1.
Name has been changed.

2.
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) corroborates part of Boyah’s claim: a 2005 report states that “[illegal] fishing is increasing day by day and destroying coral reefs, fish nursery areas, capturing endangered species and depleting fish stocks rapidly.” Also according to the report, illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing vessels “often take the fishing gear from the local fishermen, and sometimes even kill people in the process.” Illegal fishing ships, it continues, come as close as a kilometre to the coast, causing extensive damage to the local marine ecosystem. Mohamed Mohamud Mohamed and Mahamud Hirad Herzi,
Poverty Reduction and Economic Recovery: Feasibility Report on the Fisheries Sector in Puntland
(Bossaso: Ocean Training and Promotion/UNDP Somalia, April 2005),
http://mirror.undp.org/somalia/publications.htm
, 16, xiii, xiv.

CHAPTER 2: A SHORT HISTORY OF PIRACY

I am indebted to Stig Jarle Hansen for his excellent work on the history and origins of piracy in Somalia, much of which is reproduced in this chapter.

1.
Aidan Hartley,
The Zanzibar Chest
(London: Harper Perennial, 2004), 184.

2.
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat),
Garowe: First Steps Towards Strategic Urban Planning
(Nairobi: UN-Habitat, 2008),
http://www.unhabitat.org/pmss
, 4.