Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK (56 page)

Mexican Realities

Eldon Hensen was a cattleman from Athens, Texas. On July 19, he tried-for the second time in a week-to make contact with the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. He spoke by telephone with Maria Luisa Calderon, but did not state his business and refused to go to the Cuban Embassy because of the possibility that an "American spy might see him." At 6 feet 4 inches and over 200 pounds with a "powerful build" and a "Bob Hope ski nose," he probably had a point. Hensen did state that he was staying in Room 1402 at the Alameda Hotel and was leaving for Dallas the next morning on American Airlines.39

Hensen was in luck-or so it seemed. Miraculously, that same afternoon Hensen received a telephone call from a man who identified himself as a Cuban Embassy officer who suggested a meeting in a restaurant. Happy to have avoided American intelligence, Hensen agreed. When the two met, Hensen gave his Athens, Texas, phone number as OR-5-4787, and offered to "help" the Castro government "in the U.S.," traveling, providing"good contacts," and moving "things from one place to another." Hensen said he wanted money in exchange for his cooperation and said that he was under "financial pressure." The Cuban "played cagey," made no commitments, told Hensen he would check him out, said that some delay was inevitable, and warned Hensen "never again" to phone the Cuban Embassy because it was "too dangerous."

The reason it was too dangerous was that the CIA was always listening in, as they had been to Hensen's calls. Unfortunately for Hensen, the Cuban, while possibly from the Cuban Embassy, was not representing the Cubans at all. His loyalties were to the CIA, and he was probably a defector in place or double agent. Hensen walked straight into a web of deceit. The station's cable to headquarters afterward explained how they had pulled off this sleight of hand:

At Station request [redacted] posing as Cubemb [Cuban Embassy] officer made contact on house phone afternoon 19 July, alluded to call to Embassy, lured Subj [Hensen] to Hotel restaurant.... Subj [Hensen] family not aware of his trip to Mexi. Said this his second trip Mexi specifically to establish contact with Cubemb. Agreed accept phone call with key word "Laredo" as call from [redacted] contact.... [Redacted] believes [Hensen] had been drinking. [Redacted] witnessed meeting from nearby table.... [Redacted] (probably ODENVY, i.e., the FBI) informed 20 July, will pick up hotel registration card and handle stateside investigation.

The Mexico City CIA station said that the Cuban was available for further contact with Hensen in Mexico City if headquarters wanted the game to continue.

What the CIA station in Mexico City did to Eldon Hensen in July 1963 was to "step into" his reality and direct it a way designed to achieve the Agency's objectives-in this instance, to see what he was up to. This CIA capability, to enter surreptitiously into some- one's life to control or manipulate it, was made possible in this case by the telephone taps. In other cases it might have been photo surveillance, bugs, or agents and informants who provided the data necessary to play the game. The Hensen case makes it clear that this capability existed and was used in Mexico City in July 1963. It would be used again in September and October of that fateful year.

At approximately 10:30 to 10:45 A.M., Oswald, his revolver back in his pocket, left the Soviet Consulate. Kostikov and Yatskov, instead of going to the volleyball game, stayed to write the cable to KGB Central in Moscow. An hour later, 11:51 A.M., the CIA intercepted a telephone call [LE6] purporting to be from the Cuban Consulate. This was strange: The Cuban Consulate was always closed on Saturdays. Moreover, the woman doing the calling was not identifiable to the transcriber of the tape made from the call. It was not until "later" that she was identified as "Silvia Duran," although just how much later is not revealed.40 Stranger still is the CIA transcript, which the Lopez Report describes as "incoherent.""'

Here is the full CIA transcript of the September 28, 11:51 A.M., telephone call:

SILVIA DURAN: There is an American here who says he has been to the Russian consulate.

RUSSIAN CONSULATE: Wait a minute.

Silvia Duran is then heard to speak in English to someone apparently sitting at her side. This conversation goes as follows:

DURAN: He said wait. Do you speak Russian?

[OSwALD]: Yes.

DURAN: Why don't you speak with him then?

[OSWALD]: I don't know...

The person who was at the side of Silvia Duran and who admitted to speaking some Russian then gets on the line and speaks what is described as "terrible, hardly recognizable Russian." This person is later identified as Lee Harvey Oswald.

OSWALD: I was in your Embassy and spoke to your Consul.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: What else do you want?

OSWALD: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: I know that.

OSWALD: I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Why don't you come by and leave it then, we're not far.

OSWALD: Well, I'll be there right away.42

Prior to proceeding with an analysis, it should be pointed out that Mr."T"43 (for `transcriber"), who transcribed this intercept, claims the male speaker is identical with the man who would, in a telephone call three days later, state, "My name is Oswald."

We know from the Hensen story that the CIA station routinely and successfully impersonated people. The September 28 transcript should therefore be examined from two possible perspectives. From the first perspective, the call was both Oswald and Duran calling the Soviet Consulate. In this scenario, the Soviets were incorrect in their earlier conclusion that Oswald had "reconciled himself to the fact that he was not about to get a quick visa."44 Between the time of Oswald's visit to the Soviet Consulate and Duran's call an hour later, he had regained hope and had managed to get the Cubans to call in Silvia Duran on her day off and admit him into the consular offices, and then persuaded her to call the Soviet Consulate with whom she had, just eighteen hours earlier, reached the mutual conclusion that Oswald could not receive a visa inside of four months. From the second perspective, the speakers were not Oswald and Duran, but two impostors who had stepped into Oswald's "reality" and were trying to acquire intelligence information.

Let us examine the first sentence spoken by the Duran character: "There is an American here who says he has been to the Russian consulate." Less than twenty-four hours previously Duran had sent Oswald to the Soviet Consulate to get a Soviet visa and, when he had returned with his phony claim that it had been approved, Duran had telephoned the Soviets. Kostikov had confirmed Oswald's visit there. Why would the real Duran state the following day that Oswald "says he has been" if she already knew it to be a fact? On the other hand, if this "Duran" character had not yet seen any transcripts or listened to tapes of the previous day, she might not know that the real Duran had already verified Oswald's September 27 visit.

Upon closer analysis, the possibility emerges that her exact words were carefully chosen to reflect only what was known-possibly from direct observation. The Duran impostor would have known that Oswald had been in the Soviet Consulate but not necessarily whether the real Duran knew this. Thus, the wording suggests that this call was not made by the real Duran because she would have chosen words that were consistent with her information (from Kostikov) that Oswald had made the visit. We will set aside the problem of who actually received this telephone call,45 and emphasize that, of the two perspectives we are examining, Duran's opening line is more consistent with an impostor than with the real Silvia Duran.

After the Soviet said "Wait a minute," the Duran character put the Oswald character on the line. He said, "I was in your Embassy and spoke to your Consul." This was true, Oswald had just spent over an hour with the consul, Yatskov. Since Yatskov had, in all likelihood, entered the consulate overtly, an impostor could have had this information. This sentence, along with the Soviet reply, "What else do you want?" is consistent with what either the real Oswald or an impostor knew. Since Oswald's business was finished and because he had not even bothered to fill out the paperwork for a visa, it made no sense for Oswald to call back. But in a wraparound operation, the impostor would have had no way of knowing that Oswald had decided against submitting the application forms. Certainly, Oswald would not drag the Cubans in to work on a Saturday just to phone the Soviet Consulate and tell them that he had been there a few minutes earlier.

When the Soviet asked the Oswald character "what else" he wanted, his answer was not responsive. He said, "I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address." The first part of this sentence adds little except that the words "just now" identify the visit referred to as the Saturday morning session. The second part, that the Soviets had taken his address, seems too trivial to warrant the Cubans working on their day off. No wonder the Soviet reply was, "I know that." It is pertinent to point out that neither part of this sentence by the Oswald character is consistent with the fact that Oswald had not filled out a visa application form.46 They are, however, consistent with the perspective that the male voice belonged to an imposter who, with limited information, was winging his way, trying to keep the conversation going for some unknown (to us) purpose. It should also be pointed out that an impostor might well have assumed that the real Oswald had given an address, as would the Soviet speaker because he, too, presumably, had no personal knowledge of what Oswald and Yatskov had done. Apparently, the impostor presumed that it was safe to say that the Soviets had taken an address for Oswald. It was an educated guess that was wrong.

The Soviet's acknowledgment was perfunctory. At this point the Oswald character had to come up with something more substantive to justify his apparent presence in the Cuban Consulate and this telephone call. Here is what the Oswald character devised: "I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it." This is possibly what the Lopez Report was referring to with the remark that this transcript was "incoherent." How had the Soviet Consul managed to take Oswald's address without him knowing it? This is not consistent with what we might anticipate from Oswald, who should have been asking the Soviets to reconsider their refusal. It does, however, make sense if we think of the male voice as that of an impostor trying to keep the conversation going.

The Oswald character's tap dance was beginning to falter since Oswald could not have forgotten his addresses in the U.S., and would not have succeeded in getting the Cubans into the consulate on their day off just to ascertain his address at the Commercial Hotel and then call the Soviet Consulate to tell them that they had it. This line makes no sense at all from the real Oswald's perspective. "Why don't you come by and leave it then," said the Soviet, "we're not far." The Soviet must have hoped this would put an end to this seemingly aimless and pointless conversation. Indeed, the Oswald character was out of things to say, except, "Well, I'll be there right away."

The CIA later paraphrased the end of this call in a misleading manner: "The American then acceded to the Soviet official's invitation to come by and give the address."47 There is no evidence that Oswald or an impostor returned to the Soviet Consulate that day. Obviously the real Oswald had no reason to take an address to the Soviet Consulate if he was not going to fill out the visa application forms. To its credit, the HSCA probed further. According to the Lopez Report, another employee at the station had this to say about that call:

When [redacted] was asked why she had stated that it had been "determined" that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy on 28 September she said that it must have been because she had rechecked the [telephone] transcripts by this time as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. When asked why the memo said that there was no clarifying information on Oswald's "request" when it was known by this time that he was seeking a visa, [redacted] said that "They [the HSCA investigators] had no need to know all those other details.""'

How presumptuous it seems now that this CIA employee felt she had the power to decide what Congress had a need to know. This attitude and these tactics no longer serve the public interest. Hopefully, the recent passage of a law by Congress mandating the release of all information relevant to the case can overcome this kind of institutional arrogance and obstructionism.

Clearly, these "other details" are relevant to whether or not an impostor was doing the talking, and the impostor issue is fundamental to the larger question of whether the Agency ever used Oswaldwith or without his knowledge. An impostor might not have known for sure at the time of this call that Oswald was seeking a visa. Duran remains adamant to this day that this Oswald visit, and, therefore, this call, did not take place.49 Nechiporenko specifically denies that this call took place, and claims that call could not have gone through because the switchboard was closed.50 We could subject the remarks of the man who is supposed to be talking in the Soviet Consulate to a similar analysis, and suggest that he was also an impostor. Why didn't he ask for the address over the phone? Here, however, an already bizarre story becomes more so: The entire conversation becomes false and the deception target becomes the CIA station. While this is possible, it seems improbable.

The Lopez Report, written in 1978, was not constructed with the benefit of the third corner of the triangle: the Soviet angle. There is no question but that their records and recollections of details such as times and places are invaluable. Now we have the recollections of Yatskov, Kostikov, and Nechiporenko. Moreover, what they say buttresses Silvia Duran's testimony that neither she nor Oswald made this call. The man in this conversation later uses Oswald's name after Oswald has departed Mexico City. Therefore the man in this September 28 call cannot be Oswald. It is also interesting to ask this question: Was the Silvia Duran in this phone call real or an impostor?