Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK (55 page)

CALLER: Until when?

soviET: [hangs up the phone.]9

This call was recorded by the CIA's Mexico City station. A week or two later they identified it having been from Oswald. It was in Spanish, which poses a serious problem. The transcriber did not indicate the speaker was less than fluent, whereas in later calls, where Oswald supposedly spoke in Russian, the transcriber characterized the usage as "terrible" and "hardly recognizable."

Oswald's Marine friend Nelson Delgado claimed to have taught him a modicum of Spanish in 1959, but there is no evidence Oswald could have handled the above script without an accent. In 1978, Lopez concluded that "either the above detailed calls were not made by Oswald or Oswald could speak Spanish."" It seems odd that his Spanish would have been better than his Russian. Thirty years later came the Russian addition to the story. Valery Kostikov met and spoke with Oswald in the Soviet Consulate. "When I asked him if he spoke Spanish," Kostikov recalled, "he shook his head no.""

The first and third calls were not even included in copies of Oswald's "conversations" passed from the Mexico City CIA station to the U.S. Embassy legal attache four days after the assassination." The HSCA stated it had "not been able to determine why the 9/27 10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum." The Lopez Report was probably right to question whether Oswald had made these three calls. In addition to the impostor explanation is the possibility that they were not connected to either Oswald or an Oswald impostor. Oswald's name was never used in them, and the third call, made to the Soviet Consulate, may have been made when Oswald was already inside the building. After the publication of the Lopez Report, an internal CIA analysis rejected these three calls as having had any connection to Oswald."

For our purposes, it does not matter whether these first three calls were from Oswald or not. If it was Oswald, there is no real problem, because Oswald's focus was on the Cuban instead of the Soviet Consulate. On the other hand, if these calls were not made by Oswald, it does not necessarily mean the caller had to be an impostor. The most prudent interpretation is, therefore, that these calls were not made by Oswald or an impostor.

Oswald's first in-person contact was with the Cuban Consulate [DE fl, which he entered at around 11 A.M.," requesting an in-transit visa for travel through Cuba to the Soviet Union. Oswald reportedly showed Silvia Duran several documents, but apparently had no passport-style pictures of himself necessary for the visa. He left and returned [DE2], not at one P.M., as Duran recalls, but probably earlier-around 12:15 P.M., this time with the photos." This conclusion-that Duran's time was off by forty-five minutes-is necessary in order not to violate the logical sequence of events. Once Oswald gave Duran the photos, she filled out duplicate visa application forms for him and then explained he would have to get his Soviet visa before she could issue his Cuban visa. Thereupon Oswald went immediately to the Soviet Consulate [NE1], where he arrived at 12:30.

When Duran filled out Oswald's application, which he signed in her presence, he showed, among other things, his FPCC membership card for identification. Duran, however, was suspicious because Oswald had not been sent by the American Communist Party, which had a deal with the Cuban Communist Party allowing approved Americans to get visas immediately. Oswald's first visit to the Soviet Consulate lasted for about one hour, raising a time conflict with the third call to the Soviet Embassy [LE3] at 1:25 P.M., in which a "Man calls Soviet Consulate asks for the consul."19 Clearly Oswald could not be outside calling in to the consulate if he was already inside talking to Vice Consul Nechiporenko. As previously discussed, this call, like the first two, raises the issue of Oswald's Spanish-speaking abilities.20

At 12:30 P.M. Oswald rang the buzzer at the Soviet Embassy [NEI).21 The sentry alerted Kostikov, who met Oswald inside, spoke with him, and then turned him over to Nechiporenko. According to Nechiporenko, this is what happened next:

Even though I had seen the letter to our embassy in the United States, I nevertheless asked him if he had appealed to the Soviet embassy in Washington. Oswald said he had already sent a letter there and had been turned down. He later mentioned his fear that the FBI would arrest him for establishing contact with our Washington embassy. So as not to give the FBI additional cause to seize him, he decided to come to Mexico to follow through on his plan. I explained to Oswald that, in accordance with our rules, all matters dealing with travel to the USSR were handled by the embassies or consulates in the country in which a person lived. As far as his case was concerned, we could make an exception and give him the necessary papers to fill out, which we would then send on to Moscow, but the answer would still be sent to his permanent residence, and it would take, at the very least, four months."

Oswald, upset at this response, shouted, "This won't do for me! This is not my case! For me, it's all going to end in tragedy." Nechiporenko decided to end the meeting. He led Oswald out of the compound and told the sentry to tell Kostikov "that I had not promised our visitor anything."

Rejected by the Soviets, Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate again between four P.M. and five P.M. [DE3], during which the fourth and fifth telephone calls occurred. Duran recalled that Oswald came between five P.M. and six P.M., but, again, this was too late by about an hour. This conclusion is supported by the corresponding Duran phone transcript of this event and Nechiporenko's account, which corroborates the Duran call. Normal working hours had ended at two P.M., so the guard had to call Duran. The guard then escorted Oswald into Duran's office, where Oswald proceeded to lie to her, claiming that the Soviets had said there were no problems with his visa application. Suspicious, Duran called the Soviet Consulate at 4:05 P.M. [LE4] for confirmation. The CIA transcript of the intercepted call has this:

There is an American here who has requested an in-transit visa because he is going to Russia. I sent him to you thinking if he got a Russian visa that I could then issue him a Cuban visa without any more processing. Who did he speak to? He claims he was told there were no more problems.23

The unidentified Soviet asked Duran to wait and then could be heard in the background explaining to someone that Silvia Duran was calling about an American who said he had been to the Soviet Embassy. "Please leave the name and number," the voice from the Soviet Embassy instructed, "and we will call you back."24 As requested, Duran left her name and phone number.

At 4:26 P.M. [LE5], the Soviet Consulate called back. Kostikov came on the line and told Duran that Oswald's visa had not been approved. The CIA transcript has this exchange:

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: Has the American been there?

SILVIA DURAN: Yes, he is here now.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: According to the letter that he showed from the Consulate in Washington, he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have received no answer from Washington, and it will probably take four to five months. We cannot give a visa here without asking Washington. He says he belongs to a pro-Cuban organization and the Cubans cannot give him a visa without his first getting a Russian visa. I do not know what to do with him. I have to wait for an answer from Washington.

SILVIA DURAN: We have to wait too, because he knows no one in Cuba and therefore it's difficult to give him a visa. He says he knew it would take a long time to process the Soviet visa but hoped to await that in Cuba.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: The thing is that if his wife [Marina was actually in Texas] is now in Washington she will receive the visa for return to Russia. She will receive it and then can send it any place but right now she does not have it.

SILVIA DURAN: Naturally, and we can't give him a visa here because we do not know if his Russian visa will be approved.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: We can issue a visa only according to instructions.

SILVIA DURAN: That is what I will put in my plans.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY: We can't give him a letter of recommendation either, because we do not know him. Please pardon the bother.

SILVIA DURAN: No bother. Thank you very much.25

The CIA Spanish transcript26 is appended with an English note stating the man in the Soviet Embassy was "unidentified." More important, the transcriber wrote that "the person answering the phone is Silvia Duran.27 [emphasis added]" As we will shortly see, this notation was important, as was the fact that Duran had verified that Oswald had been in the Soviet Consulate that same day. Also noteworthy is how well this transcript fits with the recollections of the people in both consulates involved in the conversation. Finally, it is noteworthy that neither Duran nor Kostikov mentioned Oswald's name, a fact whose crucial importance will shortly become apparent.

Duran's check with Kostikov exposed Oswald's ploy. He became "excited" and quarreled with the Cuban consul, Eusebio Azcue.28 Oswald never went back to or contacted the Cuban Consulate again. However, he may have had further contact with Duran and other Cubans outside the consulate, a subject to which we will return later in this chapter. Duran, a Mexican citizen, was in the section known as the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Affairs, headed by Augustin Canovas. Duran worked closely with Luisa Calderon and Luis Alberu, the cultural attaches in the embassy. Alberu had been recruited as an agent of the CIA.29 Duran was an attractive twentysix-year-old woman, married with a daughter, who since 1962 had been the object of rumors of extramarital sexual liaisons, rumors that would come to include Oswald.

The 4:26 P.M, transcript suggests that a phone call was made or a cable was sent from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Oswald's presence had lit up Soviet and Cuban intelligence channels in all three national capitals. The Cubans sent a cable to Havana on September 27,30 and the Soviets sent a cable to Moscow on September 28.3' The response from Havana came on October 15, nearly two weeks after Oswald's departure.32 We can only wonder how the contents of the cable to Moscow mixed with what was already in Oswald's files in the Soviet Union.33

That Friday evening Kostikov joined Nechiporenko for a mug of beer [NE2] in a noisy cantina that was a "favorite spot among the local blue-collar crowd," and the day's events were discussed. According to Nechiporenko, Kostikov reported this to him:

As soon as I came back from lunch and the sentry passed on your message to me, I got a call from the Cubans. It was Sylvia Duran from the consulate. It turns out that our "friend" had been to see them after us and supposedly told them that we had promised him a visa, so she decided to call and double check. She asked specifically for me because this guy had given her a name that sounded like mine. I'd shown him my ID when he doubted I was a Soviet. I told her we hadn't promised him anything and that even if we did begin processing his visa, it would take at least four months. She thanked me and that's it.34

We should be careful to note that in this conversation, Kostikov had confirmed for Duran the fact that Oswald had been inside the Soviet Consulate.

When Kostikov arrived at the Soviet Consulate at 9:30 A.M. on Saturday morning to meet his colleagues for their regular volleyball game, Oswald was already sitting with Soviet consul Pavel Yatskov [NE3]." Oswald tried again to convince the Soviets to grant him a visa. Again they refused. Kostikov's account (as it appears in Nechiporenko's book) of the discussion includes this:

Throughout his story, Oswald was extremely agitated and clearly nervous, especially whenever he mentioned the FBI, but he suddenly became hysterical, began to sob, and through his tears cried, "I am afraid ... they'll kill me. Let me in." Repeating over and over that he was being persecuted and that he was being followed even here in Mexico, he stuck his right hand into the left pocket of his jacket and pulled out a revolver, saying, "See? This is what I must now carry to protect my life," and placed the revolver on the desk where we were sitting opposite one another."

Nechiporenko then "flew into the room" with his gym bag for the volleyball game at "a little after ten o'clock," as Yatskov was unloading the revolver. Eventually, Oswald "calmed down, evidently after having understood and reconciled himself to the fact that he was not about to get a quick visa."

Most important, Kostikov states that Oswald "did not take the [visa application] forms we offered him."" Nechiporenko escorted Oswald from the premises and they never heard from him again. As Oswald left the compound, he pulled his coat over his head to conceal his face from photographic coverage. Yatskov, Kostikov, and Nechiporenko then conferred, and decided that Yatskov and Kostikov immediately report the Oswald events in a coded cable to Moscow [KGB] Center. As a result, their team lost the volleyball game. At the time this might have seemed a high price to pay for the nutty performance they had just witnessed, but after the Kennedy assassination, they would come to refer to this telegram as their "life preserver."

This was the end of the line for Oswald's attempts to get a visa in Mexico City. He had not even bothered to fill out the application forms offered by the Soviet Consulate. None of the Mexican, Cuban, or Soviet officials again saw Oswald enter any of the consulates or embassies. Nor did they receive or hear about any calls made by him.38 Oswald's name did not appear in any of the CIA transcripts of calls intercepted from the time of his arrival Friday morning through the time that he left the Soviet Consulate at 10:30 A.M. on Saturday. That was about to change. The next set of transcripts bears no resemblance to the reality recalled by those who experienced the events firsthand. Something amazing was about to happen to "reality" in Mexico City. We will return to Duran's testimony on this subject in Chapter Nineteen when we deal with cover stories created after the assassination.