No Lack of Courage (24 page)

Supporting Canada's contribution was also President Hamid Karzai who, in February 2007, told Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay that “Canadians are putting their lives on the line to bring our [Afghanistan] country out of poverty and exploitation. They are coming here all the way from Canada with good in their hearts—and we are grateful.”
²⁰
He later addressed the Canadian Parliament and declared, “If the greatness of a life is measured in deeds done for others, then Canada's sons and daughters who have made the ultimate sacrifice can stand among the greatest of their generation. More than anyone else, Afghans very much understand that these sacrifices are for a great, good cause . . . the cause of security for all and the cause of peace.”
²¹

Medusa was also a major watershed for the army. Not only was it NATO's first battle, but it also marked the first deliberate, major Canadian combat offensive operation since the Korean War. “Medusa had a significant psychological effect both on Taliban and us,” offered intelligence officer, Captain Tim Button.
²²
Despite endless Cold War exercises where umpires would designate casualties and take soldiers and occasionally leaders “out of play” temporarily, Medusa forced the army to face the reality of war—mass casualties and a mission that still had to be completed regardless of dead and wounded. From combat drills, equipment purchases and modifications, training regimes, and focus, as well as individual soldier and leader psychological preparation, the army has grown from its Afghan experience overall, but specifically from Operation Medusa. The army has proven to itself, and anyone who may have still held the Cold War mythology, that it is anything but a peacekeeping force.

But in the end, as always, the soldier's perspective drills down to the core of the issue. With regard to Operation Medusa, Master-Warrant Officer Keith Olstad said it best when he concluded, “It had to be done.”
²³

Introduction

1
.    Walter Laqueur, an internationally renowned expert on terrorism and insurgency, asserts that “terrorism constitutes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted.” Benjamin Netanyahu, a former special operations soldier and prime minister of Israel, defined terrorism as “the deliberate and systemic assault on civilians to inspire fear for political ends.” In a similar vein, Brian Jenkins stated, “Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.” Finally, scholar Michael Walzer explained, “Terrorism is the random killing of innocent people, in the hope of creating pervasive fear.” He added, “The fear can serve many political purposes. Randomness and innocence are crucial elements in the definition.”

The American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) definition states, “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.” The U.S. Departments of State and Defense define terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against a noncombatant target by sub-national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” Within the context of NATO, terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use or
threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.” See Barry Davies,
Terrorism: Inside a World Phenomenon
(London: Virgin, 2003), 14; Benjamin Netanyahu,
Fighting Terrorism: How Democracies Can Defeat the International Terrorist Network
(New York: Noonday Press, 1995), 8; Michael Walzer, “Terrorism and Just War,”
Philosophia
, Vol 34, No. 1 (January 2006), 3; Roger W. Barnett,
Asymmetric Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power
(Washington, D.C.: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 16; John P. Holms,
Terrorism
(New York: Pinnacle Books, 2001), 20; and NATO Allied Administrative Publication 6, 2002, quoted in
Joint Doctrine & Concept Centre, Countering Terrorism: The UK Approach to the Military Contribution
(London: MOD, no date), 7.

2
.    UNSC Resolution 1368 recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter. It called on all states to work together urgently to bring to justice to the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of those terrorist attacks and stressed that those responsible for aiding, supporting, or harbouring the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of those acts would be held accountable. The resolution also expressed readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the UN.

3
.    General Rick Hillier,
A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War
(Toronto: HarperCollins, 2009), 475.

4
.    
Ibid
., 488.

Chapter One

1
.    Quoted in United Kingdom, Parliament, House of Commons Library, International Affairs & Defence Section, Research Paper 01/72, 11 September 2001: the response, 31 October 2002, 17.
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/re-search/rp2001/rp01-112.pdf
, accessed 7 March 2007.

The history between the Americans and Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda (AQ) was long-standing. They had tracked bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan. On 28 August 1998, the Americans were able to convince the Security Council to pass UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1193, which demanded that “Afghan factions . . . refrain from harboring and training terrorists and their organizations.” UNSCR 214, passed on 8 December 1998, affirmed that the Security Council was “deeply disturbed by the continuing use of Afghan territory, especially areas controlled by the Taliban, for the sheltering and training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts” and reiterated that “the suppression of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

The Americans continued their UN offensive. On 15 October 1999, the U.S. secured the adoption of UNSCR 1267, which expressed concerns about the “continuing violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights [in Afghanistan], particularly discrimination against women and girls,” as well as “the significant rise in the illicit production of opium.” The resolution specifically criticized the Taliban for offering “safe haven to Osama bin Laden and to allow him and others associated with him to operate a network of terrorist training camps . . . and to use Afghanistan as a base from which to sponsor international terrorist operations.” The Security Council demanded “that the Taliban turn over Osama bin Laden without further delay” so that he could be “effectively brought to justice.” The council also instituted the same economic and financial sanctions on the Taliban regime that had recently been imposed by the United States. The Taliban failed to comply and on 12 October 2000, the AQ attacked the USS
Cole
in the harbour at Aden, killing 17 U.S. sailors and wounding 39 more. To exacerbate the looming showdown, bin Laden took full credit for the operation, prompting the Security Council to pass UNSCR 1333 on 19 December 2000. This resolution reaffirmed the charges made a year earlier and added the stipulation that the Taliban were to ensure the closing “of all camps where terrorists are trained.” In addition, economic sanctions were strengthened, Taliban offices were to be closed in the territory of member states, landing
rights for Afghan national airways were revoked, and all assets linked to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda were frozen.

Once again the Taliban regime did nothing. As a result, yet another UNSCR was passed on 30 July 2001, which described “the situation in Afghanistan . . . as a threat to international peace and security in the region.” In the weeks leading up to 9/11, Afghanistan had already been identified as a major threat centre for American national interest. See
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1193
, 28 August 1998;
Resolution 1214
, 8 December 1998;
Resolution 1267
, 15 October 1999;
Resolution 1333
, 19 December 2000;
Resolution 1363
, 30 July 2001; Ahmed Rashid,
Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 80; Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon,
The Age of Sacred Terror
(New York: Random House, 2002), xiii and 289. See also Steve Coll,
Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001
(New York: Penguin Books, 2004) for a comprehensive account of the U.S./bin Laden/AQ interrelationship.

2
.    North Atlantic Council Statement, 12 September 2001, Press Release (2001) 124,
www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm
, accessed 7 March 2007; and NATO,
NATO Handbook
(Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), 232.

3
.    Statement by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, 4 October 2001,
www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004a.htm
, accessed 7 March 2007. See also Tom Lansford,
All for One: Terrorism, NATO, and the United States
(Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 126.

4
.    See
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368
, 12 September 2001 and
UNSCR 1373
, 28 September 2001.

5
.    See Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lange,
The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), 2–34.

6
.    “Chrétien: Canadian Troops ‘Will Do Canada Proud,'” 7 October 2001,
www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/1025062429054_20471629
, accessed 7 October 2001.

7
.    Canada,
How Are We Doing in Afghanistan?
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence,” June 2008, 1.

8
.    The CDS also articulated a series of CDS objectives:

The CDS retained full command throughout. The CDS assigned operational command (OPCOM) of the four components of the Operation Apollo contribution to the commander Canadian Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTFSWA), who also had authority to assign operational control (OPCON) of those forces to coalition commanders as required within the U.S. CENTCOM AOR to achieve coalition and national objectives. The role of the Canadian JTFSWA commander was that of Canada's senior national commander-in-theatre of Operation Apollo. He was responsible for supervising the operational readiness, administration, and discipline of Canadian task groups and elements deployed to Operation Apollo, as well as to monitor operations of task groups on behalf of CDS assigned under OPCON coalition commanders. The Canadian commitment also included a special operations task force from JTF 2.

9
.    The multi-national forces took control of Kandahar on 7 December 2001. American efforts then shifted to tracking down Osama bin Laden and his top AQ leadership. Canadian air, sea, and SOF elements remained to support the ongoing American and Coalition force efforts.

10
.  
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1378
, 14 November 2001.

11
.  The first of the ISAF troops deployed to Kabul on 22 December 2001.

12
.  Lieutenant-Colonel Pat Stogran was the commanding officer. During their six months in Afghanistan, 3 PPCLI Battle Group performed tasks ranging from airfield security to combat operations.

13
.  Canada,
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan
, Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, June 2007, 39.

14
.  John McCallum, “Stepping Up to the Plate,”
Washington Times
, 31 July 2003.

15
.  Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, presentation at the Army Strategic Planning Session 7, Cornwall, Ontario, 29 November 2003.

16
.  The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is a United Nations-mandated operation, but is NATO-led. It was authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1386, 1413, 1444, and 1510. UNSCR 1386 (20 December 2001), as well as UNSCR 1413, authorize ISAF to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace-enforcing). Furthermore, under UNSCR 1444 (27 November 2002) the role of ISAF remained to assist in the maintenance of security and to help the Afghan Transitional Authority (Afghan TA) and the initial activities of the United Nations in Kabul and its environs—nowhere else. However, UNSCR 1510 (13 October 2003) authorized the expansion of the ISAF mandate beyond the original provision of security in the Kabul area into the rest of Afghanistan. The first ISAF troops deployed as a multinational force (without Canadian participation) initially under British command on 4 January 2002.

17
.  On 9 October 2004, Afghanistan held presidential elections. Hamid Karzai won 55.4 percent of the popular vote and became president. More than 10 million Afghans registered to vote. Parliamentary and provincial council elections were held on 18 September 2005 and 6.8 million Afghans participated. On 19 December 2005 the national Assembly, composed of 249 members of the Wolesi Jirga (lower house)—all elected—and 102 members of the Meshrano Jirga (upper house)—some appointed—stood up.
Canada's Mission in Afghanistan: Measuring Progress
, Report to Parliament, February 2007, 11.