No Lack of Courage (20 page)

In the end, regardless of any long-term assessment of the success of Operation Medusa, it was critical to both the Government of Afghanistan and to the NATO alliance itself. And the two week ordeal was, in the words of Major Marty Lipcsey, the deputy commanding officer of TF 3-06, “quite a battle.”
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The brunt of the combat was born by the soldiers of the 1 RCR Battle Group, TF 3-06. Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie's assessment that “the soldiers under my command have proven their courage and determination time and time again,” was not based on false pride.
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But before Phase IV of Operation Medusa was fully underway the reality of the “long war” quickly became apparent to the Canadians and
their NATO allies.
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The struggle took an exponentially more difficult and dangerous turn. The enemy, faced with his lopsided defeat in Panjwayi, learned the lesson that he could not face NATO forces in a traditional, conventional attritional confrontation. The Taliban transitioned, as mentioned by Lieutenant-Colonel Williams, to more asymmetric means utilizing suicide bombers, IEDs, and intimidation of the local populace. “The Taliban reverted to their asymmetric tactics, which had made them far more dangerous,” acknowledged Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber, the MNB operations officer. “They've now re-infiltrated into this area, small groups of highly motivated fighters, tier one Taliban, many of them foreign fighters, Chechens, Tagiks, Arabs and they're now conducting a very effective asymmetric campaign that relies mostly on IEDs and IED ambushes.”
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Intelligence officer Captain Tim Button assessed, “Medusa achieved a 12 month effect. We watched how the Taliban changed the way they did business in a major way.” Button emphasized, “We will never again see them mass together to attack. We drove their commanders underground and they were unable to openly exercise their command. But not concentrating force also makes it harder to find them. We reinforced their need to act asymmetrically . . . We don't see large opportunities to target them.”
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The Taliban also focused on disrupting reconstruction. The Taliban tactics had become more difficult to counter and made the struggle for the support of the local people increasingly difficult.

Although senior Afghan and NATO officials had declared victory and started to pushed for reconstruction to begin, it was not quite as simple as that. Reconstruction and development were key drivers to winning the support of the people or, in the popular jargon, their “hearts and minds.” After all, it was important to demonstrate to the Afghans that there was benefit in supporting the government and coalition efforts—specifically, an increase in their standard of living. Up to that time all that the local nationals had seen was the destruction caused by the fighting. And, despite Brigadier-General Fraser's observation that “there has been battlefield damage largely because of where the Taliban went” and his pledge that “we will go back out there and we will help rebuild that,”
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the locals saw ISAF as largely responsible for the damage. More importantly, reparations seemed slow in coming.

The delay was not due to a lack of will on the part of ISAF or NATO at large. Senior commanders and politicians pushed hard for reconstruction to begin. However, “it's quite easy to kill people and break things compared to putting them back together,” noted Schreiber.
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The commanding officer of TF 3-06, Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie lamented, “We are under pressure to get on with reconstruction.” He understood it was “important for domestic consumption,” however, his problem, as he identified it, was that the “fight isn't won yet.” He explained, that the Taliban “was still very strong” and added that the enemy “must be defeated first for lasting reconstruction.”
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What many unfamiliar with counter-insurgency fail to realize is that security and development are not mutually exclusive activities. Rather, they are mutually supporting. There is no reconstruction and development without security, and no security without reconstruction and development. Each feeds the other. The local population must feel secure and safe from Taliban retribution if they are to assist the government and coalition efforts. Without adequate protection they will remain neutral and aloof at best, or at worst, passively or actively support the insurgent efforts.
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Haji Gailani questioned, “You have planes. You can hear the Taliban on your radios. And still you cannot force them out of here. How can we?”
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As one authoritative report concluded, “Security is the most basic precondition for civilian support of the government . . . the motivation that provides the only real long lasting effect is the elemental consideration of survival.”
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Without the support of the people, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to gain intelligence on enemy activity and intentions. A lot of effort has to be put into force protection, which detracts from reconstruction and development since there are finite resources in theatre. More importantly, it becomes extremely difficult to determine who is actually the enemy. “We're trying to win the hearts and minds of the people,” insisted Lavoie, “yet, we have to defend against the asymmetric threat.”
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One of his subordinates was blunter: “We still think everyone approaching us wants to kill us,” explained Captain Ryan Carey. “We have no choice but to plan for a fight right till we leave.”
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For the soldiers in the field, like those before them who have struggled with counter-insurgency throughout history, it was the asymmetric
nature of the conflict that created both frustrations as well as tangible delays in advancing the reconstruction and development agenda. Lavoie shrugged his shoulders as he admitted there was a full range of problems he and his troops faced. “The greatest source of frustration is intelligence,” he conceded. “There is frustration working in an environment where it is so difficult to identify friend from foe.” He explained, “Within Patrol Base Wilson (PBW) we know there are Taliban operatives . . . When senior ANA or ANP officers in the headquarters are sending the Taliban information on our plans it's difficult to operate.” Moreover, he added, “in the field a farmer drops his shovel and picks up an AK-47 and transitions from a non-combatant to a combatant seamlessly.”
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One young officer reinforced, “You don't know who your enemy is. One minute they will be walking down the street and have a woman and children surrounding them and the next the woman and children will disappear and he [the enemy] will be firing at you.”
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A British non-commissioned officer (NCO) described:

But the pressures, strains, and realities of the soldier fighting the battle and those of their superiors are not the same. In fact, they are not even compatible and the divergence between immediate interests and requirements grows wider as one rises up the hierarchal chain of command. To Lavoie and his men survival is a key, if not the primary, concern. They fought the daily running battle with the Taliban and knew, regardless of
the press reports and what their superiors were saying, that the Taliban was still very much active and deadly in their area of operations.

However, Lavoie faced a cascading flow of scepticism and concern, starting from political masters in a number of NATO countries, including his own, down through their national, as well as NATO, command chains. All were clamouring for results. It was not enough to declare victory in the press—NATO had to actually show it. Anxious to demonstrate that progress was being made to placate demanding national governments and politicians, the pressure on field commanders was enormous.

Lavoie constantly felt the pressure. “It's hard to convince headquarters of the reality on the ground,” bemoaned Lavoie. “They've never been forward—they have not visited the troops forward, yet they don't believe I can't start phase IV reconstruction even though I've lost seven guys on this road [Route Summit].”
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Route Summit was a new road that he was building between Highway 1 and Ma'SÅ«m Ghar in Pashmul, in order to increase security and provide a better road network to assist economic development in the area. The road project was a direct result of Operation Medusa.
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The BG had lost some men on the existing road in Pashmul because it was narrow and cut through close country, which was ideal for ambushes and IED placement. The governor had not come through with the promised ANA or ANP support to monitor the existing road so Lavoie decided to find an alternate route. He checked with brigade headquarters and no one said no, so he began to cut a great swath through the local cannabis fields.
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“I never thought I would be doing this,” shrugged Lavoie. “We're supposed to be doing Phase IV resettlement and reconstruction and the ANA are supposed to do security but they haven't shown up.” Lavoie pointed out, “Building the road is the only way to do it.” He explained it was short-term security for the region and his forward operating base (FOB) at Ma'SÅ«m Ghar, and long-term development and security for Pashmul as it provided access on a defendable high-speed road.
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But the project also had a negative side. With very few ANSF to assist with the static defence and security of the project, Lavoie was forced to use his battle group, already anaemic due to the casualties sustained during Operation Medusa, which had not yet been replaced, and
the commencement of the home leave travel allowance (HLTA) rotation system, which sent complete sections out of theatre at a time.
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Low on manpower and with virtually no assistance from the ANSF, Task Force 3-06 was forced to take up static locations at various FOBs and strong points to defend the road construction.
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Therefore, they surrendered the initiative and the ability to dominate the ground and became static targets tied to infrastructure.

To aggravate the situation even more, Lavoie noted that higher headquarters consistently tried to assign additional tasks, despite Lavoie's forces being stretched thin to provide security over the road construction and other FOBs within his AOR, all a direct result of a failure of host nation forces being made available to undertake static security tasks.
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“NATO headquarters,” Lavoie lamented, “often are unrealistic in their taskings—too often they have too great an appetite . . . I've had to say no on a number of occasions.”
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Lavoie sadly pointed out, “I've been forward on 15 of the 17 KIA [killed in action] to see the bodies being put into the body bags . . . That's a lot different than a casket being loaded on an airplane.” With frustration Lavoie insisted that “Higher HQ needs to see that.” He explained that that he was having difficulty convincing his seniors of the reality on the ground. “They've never been forward, the commander has not visited the troops forward, he hasn't seen the road . . . I lost seven guys out here and he's never come,” lamented the CO, “[yet he] doesn't believe we can't start Phase IV reconstruction.”
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And so, with the kinetic phase of Operation Medusa behind them, the soldiers of the 1 RCR BG began transitioning into the “long war.” Trying to both support reconstruction and development, as well as secure the wider area and fight the Taliban, TF 3-06 soon found themselves tied down in a static posture, which provided the enemy with the initiative. Embedded reporter Les Perreaux observed, “In those 19 days, soldiers attacked mercilessly to drive out Taliban forces and [then] watched helplessly as the Taliban drifted back in.”
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Not surprisingly, the Taliban seized on the opportunity and attempted to gain their own retribution for their costly defeat in September.

The daily routine soon turned into one of tedium punctuated by moments of terror. Soldiers endured the relentless heat and tolerated
the irritating and constant dust churned up by any movement whether vehicle, human, or wind. The fine talcum-powder-like sand covered everything and it was impossible to keep anything clean. To add to the misery, the unremitting sand fleas and flies tortured the soldiers without pause.

Nonetheless, TF 3-06, which had an area of operations spanning approximately 60,000 square kilometres, found itself protecting Route Summit, which cut a 100 metre wide swath straight through the marijuana fields and vineyards. Its wide berth and straight trajectory provided easy observation, control, and security. More importantly, this easily accessible road, which would eventually be paved, would furnish local farmers with an excellent route that would allow produce and trade to transit quickly from the fertile Arghandab River valley to Highway 1, the major artery leading to Kandahar City and elsewhere.

The brunt of the defence of the road fell to Charles Coy Gp. They soon found themselves in a constant battle of wits with the enemy. The Taliban harassed the thinly stretched troops persistently. During the night they would stealthily plant IEDs and mines in the sandy furrow that represented the road. In addition, the Taliban deployed small teams that would attempt to surprise and ambush the Canadian troops. They had already immobilized two bulldozers and several other vehicles through IED and mine strikes.