Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World (26 page)

Instead he stressed that Britain should convince the Egyptians that their future "and the ideals in which Egyptians believe are inseparably bound up with the victory of the United Nations.... The interdependence of Allied victory and Egyptian independence should be the main theme of British propaganda in this matter." The British should try to convince the Egyptians that it was in their national interest that Britain remain strong in Middle East so that Egypt could secure independence after the war. The respect of democratic traditions among educated Egyptians formed a "bond with English speaking peoples" and was "a reason why Egyptians should wish for an Allied victory over the anti-democratic Axis powers." Encouraging belief in democracy also strengthened the hand of the Wafd Party, which Lockhart described as "the upholder of the Egyptian democratic tradition" in contrast to "the Palace," that is, King Farouk and his advisers, "with its anti-constitutional tendencies and its readiness to listen to the anti-democratic propaganda of the Germans and Italians." 152

The Germans were also playing on the fear of Bolshevization of Europe and the Middle East. In response, Lockhart advocated that the British exercise caution when dealing with the Anglo-Soviet alliance and the success of Russian armies. British propaganda should assert that the Russians were fighting a national war and had no imperialist ambitions, and that "the best safeguard against extremist tendencies in Egypt as elsewhere lies in a progressive social policy designed to remove the conditions in which discontent and extremism flourish. 11153 The British message should stress the way American and British political institutions as well as French culture could contribute to a free, independent, and democratic Egypt. Yet in this impeccably liberal, enlightened, and long memo, Lockhart said nothing about how Britain should respond to Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda. His silence suggests that British intelligence officials and diplomats believed that a frontal challenge to Nazi Germany's anti-Jewish propaganda would only confirm in Arab minds the truth of Berlin's efforts to link "Britain and the Jews." This British reticence was profoundly ironic for in summer 1942, it was the forces under Montgomery's command that alone stood in the way of Rommel's victory. Again it is important to note, as Klaus Mallmann and Martin Cuppers have demonstrated, that had the German military been victorious in North Africa, SS units were prepared to travel to the region to murder the Jews in Egypt, Palestine, and elsewhere in North Africa and the Middle East.154

American intelligence officials were also trying to assess the impact of Axis propaganda in the region and to determine how best to respond. On August 15, 1942, Colonel Frederick O. Sharp and Captain Lawrence C. Thaw sent a report to the New York office of the War Department's Military Intelligence Division for the Near and Middle East, North Africa, and India about the "Attitude of the Moslem World toward the United Nations." Sharp and Thaw drew on the views of Francis Kettanch, the Chrysler Corporation's representative in the Middle East. They wrote, "It may be safely stated that upwards of three-fourths of the Moslem world are in favor of the Axis." They had that view because "the great majority of the Moslems believe Germany will win the war, and they wish to take the side of the winners." Sharp and Thaw advocated a "complete overhaul of American propaganda which to date has been very poor, in contrast to the German propaganda which has been excellent." Whereas the Muslims distrusted the British, French, and Italian propaganda, "strangely they believe the only truthful sources of information are the German and American." German propaganda had been "well organized to influence Moslem mentality throughout the world;" but American radio signals were hard to receive, came at inconvenient hours, and were poorly advertised. They called for a new transmitter in the region, more reports about American production figures to convince the Muslims that the United States could outproduce "any possible Axis combination;" as well as "a certain amount of Mohammedan religious propaganda." "Incredibly depressed standards of living" were one source of the willingness of the "Moslem masses" to consider a change "from British to Nazi masters. 11155

Thaw and Sharp wrote that "one of the major reasons for Islam's hostility to the United Nations" was what Muslims and especially Arabs "term the betrayal of Palestine by the British Government in the introduction and encouragement of a Zionist home in Palestine." Along with this anti-Zionist view, one shared by some other American military intelligence officers, Thaw and Sharp offered a sober view of "Pan-Islamism." "Pan-Arabism, they wrote, was "probably a dead issue" because the Arabs could not agree among themselves. "Pan-Islamism is quite another matter. Due to the fanatic religion of the Moslems, it is a very live, although dormant issue, that needs but a spark to send it flaming in rebellion against Britain. The best proof of the widespread danger of the ArabJewish problem is the fact that the Indian Moslems, who are not Arabs and have no Jewish question, contributed funds and propaganda in behalf of their Moslem brothers in Palestine. This at a time when the Arab King Ibn Saud maintained a detached neutrality." The Arab-Jewish problem in Palestine had "attained its present urgency with the penetration of German forces into Egypt" combined with other possibilities of German activity into the region. The general situation was "heavy with the threat of open revolt with its stab in the back danger to a retreating Allied force." Further, "the problem has been intensified by radio talks from the Grand Mufti and Younus [sic] Bahri urging the Arabs to rise, murder the Jews and seize their property. 11156

The Thaw-Sharp memo depicted a region brimming with hostility to the Jews. The Persians, "deeply resentful of the Jews," had murdered some and forced others to leave the country. Iraqi Muslims were "strongly anti-Jewish, anti-British and anti-foreign" despite the presence of a pro-British government in Baghdad. Thaw's and Sharp's views of Iraqi Jews echoed local prejudices. "It must not be lost that the Iraqian Jew is rather well off. They control the small banking, money lending, commerce and import-export business in the country, as well as owning large blocks of desirable real estate in the cities. It is not difficult for German propaganda to convince the Iraqian [sic] of the desirability of killing the Jews and seizing their property and business." Their assessment of Palestine was even more sober: "The majority of the Arabs in Palestine are fiercely anti-Jewish, generally distrustful of Great Britain and deeply resentful of the Balfour Declaration. While the moderates agree that the present is hardly the time to quarrel over the Jewish question, the radicals, who form a majority, see in the approach of General Rommel an ideal opportunity to murder all Jews and seize their property. Tales are current throughout Palestine of the planned division of Jewish property." They wrote that "the Egyptian Moslem is less fanatic than his brothers to the North and East" but anti-British and anti-foreign sentiment existed. The royal family was pro-Italian and the "upper class of Egyptian Moslems leans more toward the Germans, whom they admire, than the Italians, whom they despise. '1157

Thaw and Sharp concluded, "The generally pro-Axis sentiments of the Moslem world, accentuated by the Arab-Jewish problem, and the German successes in the Caucasus and North Africa, has created an explosive situation of grave danger to the Allied cause." Muslim views of Great Britain ran "from suspicion to open hatred." Britain's "conflicting commitments" to Arabs and Jews made it difficult for it to take the initiative. Hence an American commission should be sent to the region to assure the Muslim world that the United States had no imperialist ambitions and that it and the United Nations "had only the friendliest sentiments for Islam," favored "complete freedom for each of the Moslem states within the limits of their territorial and ethnical [sic] boundaries," and had "nothing against" formation of a Federation of Arab States. The United States would also "lend its services to a round-table settlement of the Arab-Jewish problem in Palestine along cantonal, federal or other lines agreed to by both parties." Adoption of such policies would "have an immense effect on Moslem opinion throughout the world, and would probably bring it behind the cause of the United Nations. 11158

This memo by Thaw and Sharp lacked diplomatic niceties and social scientific sophistication. It contained prejudices of the time regarding the Jews and commerce in Iraq. Its use of the singular "the Moslem" to refer to human plurality was offensive. Yet there was candor in their observation of the political importance of Islam, of the depth of Muslim antagonism to the Jews, and of the support for the Germans that they and Francis Kettanch were observing. They believed that German propaganda was striking a chord, in no small part due to its appeals to Muslims as Muslims and to its attacks on the Jews. The ThawSharp memo stands out for its willingness to refer frankly to "Pan-Islamism" at a time when most diplomatic dispatches were focusing on Arab politics more narrowly construed. It was one of the earliest reports about the impact of "PanIslamism" on the course of the war.

In early October Alexander Kirk again stressed the close interaction between the war and the political and propaganda battles. For the Allies, the situation in June and July had been grim. The British fleet was withdrawn from Alexandria on June 30. In the first week in July, refugees were allowed to take trains to Palestine without the need of tickets or a passport. American Embassy personnel, the Middle East Supply Center to Palestine, and prisoners of war were also transferred to Palestine. Preparations for the defense of Cairo and Alexandria began. Officers' wives were evacuated from Suez. Crowds gathered at the British Consulate seeking travel documents. Axis radio repeated the joint Declaration by Germany and Italy daily, and its endorsement by the ex-Grand Mufti of Jerusalem "was not without a certain effect." Yet "as the imminence of the Axis threat decreased [,] it ceased to attract any particular attention." Aside from the theft of material left on trains and careless handling of cargo at airports, Axis appeals to the Arabs to engage in sabotage against the British had not produced significant results.159 The Egyptian government had interned some persons for pro-Axis activity or under suspicion of such activity, but the number "was and is small, and persons so interned are said to be comfortably housed." The Egyptian calm in the crisis was "to a large extent a reflection of apathy on the part of the lower property-less classes who felt they had little to gain nor lose however the situation developed." With the Axis setbacks in late summer, Axis Arabic broadcasts stopped their predictions of imminent victory. Kirk concluded that the combination of British power, Egyptian government cooperation, and Rommel's defeat at El Alamein precluded the possibility of an Egyptian revolt against the Allies. 160

In fall 1942, Nazism's Arabic radio propaganda increased its Islamist appeals. On the evening of September 18, the Arab Nation station claimed that the appeal by the rector of Al Azhar University to Muslims to adhere strictly to the principles of Islam had "been welcomed and accepted with rejoicing by all Moslems." The announcer expressed sadness that "some Moslem rulers have adopted European principles and have appealed to Moslems to follow these democratic principles from which Islam is far removed. Democracy has nothing in common with Islam which has no connection to any European principles." The Arab and Muslim countries had a duty to adhere to their own traditions and customs "and not to follow European customs and principles which have nothing to do with Islam." Unnamed Europeans in Muslim countries wanted to exploit these countries and enslave their peoples. That state of affairs "will last as long as the Moslems do not keep to their creed" and remain unified following "Mohammed, the Prophet of God," who said "One Moslem is to another Moslem as the buildings standing close to each other, one supporting the other." 161 Later that same evening, VFA congratulated Al Azhar University on the celebration of its one thousandth anniversary. The Azharists were right to celebrate because the university had "remained for all these centuries a mosque in which prayers were held and in which the temporal and the divine met." Its many "eminent" Muslim graduates included "His Eminence Haj Mohamed El Husseini, the Grand Mufti of Palestine and the great Arab leader." He was "a son of El Azhar.... We pray to God that El Azhar may continue to be the guiding star of Moslems." Indicative of Axis efforts to woo the Egyptian monarch, the broadcast concluded with these words: "We also pray to God that he may grant long life to Farouk who has supported, as his late father did, Azhar and the Azharists." 162

The appeal to Islam continued the following evening in a Berlin in Arabic report about a meeting of the Islamic Society held in Berlin to commemorate the "memory of the martyrs who fell and are falling in this Holy War against Britain." Rashid Ali Kilani, a more secular figure than Husseini, struck a distinctively Islamist tone in his remarks.163 The "Semitic countries" took a great interest in the conflict between "two worlds-one shaken and declining" and another "just and happier" one that was arising because "the future of the Islamic world" depended on its outcome." Kilani said that England stood for "principles of imperialistic exploitation of Moslem peoples." The British "disregarded the sanctity of our religion" and had "tried to make of Palestine a Jewish country and change it into a weapon threatening the whole East." As Muslims, the Arabs wished the Indians success in their effort to gain freedom and independence from Britain. The Axis would try to deliver both Arabs and India "from their slavery." Kilani was confident that "all signs" indicated that Britain and her Allies were "heading for destruction" and that the "era of oppression will end in defeat." All of this was "a great omen for the weak nations, and for the Moslems. Our bitter enemy is [sic] Britain and Bolshevism, which aim to destroy everything sacred in humanity. The British know that they cannot exist with a flourishing Islam. They want therefore to exterminate this religion from the world. The reign of evil will disappear, the reign of justice and Truth will prevail." 164 This was one of many occasions on which Arabic-language broadcasts expressed solidarity with Muslims in India and with the pro-Nazi Indian nationalist leader Subhas Chandra Bose, who had also been in Berlin since 1941. 165