Julius Caesar (23 page)

Caesar well knew that in his absence he needed good friends, with power to exert on his behalf—so he bought them. One of the consuls for 51, a certain Paullus, Caesar obligated by paying off his massive debts; while he for his part agreed not to obstruct Caesar in any way during his year as consul. Since the other consul Marcellus was an
Optimate
and an enemy of Caesar this meant, in effect, that whatever Marcellus proposed was nullified by Caesar’s man. One of the tribunes of the people for the following year 50 was also bought, and C. Scribonius Curio proved to be one of Caesar’s wisest investments, for a tribune had the power of veto and Curio used this well in his interests. All Caesar’s enemies were endeavoring to get him back to Rome without the power of his army behind him, and with a successor appointed to take over his commands in Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and, above all, in this great new Gallic province to the west. Every time a proposal was made that a successor to Caesar should be appointed Curio vetoed it, thus prolonging a stalemate with Pompey that maintained the peace but kept the Romans in a tremor of fear. Curio also made a proposal of his own which seemed at the time a reasonable solution to the whole problem: Caesar would resign his governorship on condition that Pompey would equally resign from the governorship of Spain, exercised
in absentia.
Curio’s argument was lucid: “In view of the state of mutual suspicion between these two citizens, there are few chances of an enduring peace in Rome unless both men at the same time return to the condition of private individuals.”

Pompey, who had improved over the years in his capacity at political in-fighting, surprised most people by agreeing to the proposition. He promised to renounce his powers on condition that Caesar did the same. His thinking behind this was clear enough: he, Pompey, was secure enough in Rome and furthermore he had the backing of the
Optimates
, whereas Caesar, if he returned as a private citizen, would immediately have legal proceedings taken against him for events that had occurred during his previous consulship. Pompey, moreover, still had the veterans from his previous campaigns on call in Italy, whereas Caesar would be without any military support to hand.

Throughout this period Cicero, who was in Asia Minor, was in constant touch with one of his correspondents, Caelius, who wrote to him in August 50:

I have written to you often that I can see no chance of peace lasting as long as a year, and the nearer the inevitable clash, the clearer looms the danger. The issue over which the powers that be are going to come to blows is, that whereas Pompey is determined not to allow Caesar to become consul unless he gives up his army and provinces, Caesar is convinced that he cannot be safe once he has parted with his army. Caesar does, however, propose this compromise, that both should give up their armies. So all that show of affection and their detested alliance is not merely degenerating into bickering behind the scenes, but breaking out into open war.

Using his authority as a tribune, Curio managed to get the debate in the senate on the question of both Caesar and Pompey renouncing their proconsulships adjourned, and the matter was left as much in the air as before—but without the threat to Caesar of being left defenseless while Pompey held the reins of power in Italy. The ideal solution for the senators, of course, would have been to get rid of both Pompey and Caesar but, “who holds the armies, holds power,” as Caesar had remarked. The senators trusted neither man, but they feared Caesar the more.

It was probably on this account that they did achieve one significant action. Since the disaster and death of Crassus against the Parthians, the state of Syria had become of some concern, and the senate accordingly asked that one legion from both Caesar’s and Pompey’s forces should be detached and sent to reinforce this important province in the East. If their idea was to weaken each of the opponents equally they failed, for Pompey, while readily agreeing to their request, asked his associate Caesar to detach the legion that Pompey had lent him during the previous Gallic troubles and send it to Italy
en route
for Syria. This meant in effect that Caesar had to deprive himself of two legions, and Pompey of none. Caesar, although of course well aware of the ploy, agreed—on the surface readily enough. But he was determined to make this gift of the two legions something of a Trojan Horse within Italy. He knew that he could rely upon his own soldiers for their attachment to his cause. He had always known how to handle the legionaries, and his bravery in battle and military brilliance made him their favorite, while his successes naturally brought them money. As a parting gift, however, he saw to it that each soldier received a handsome gratuity and he then left with them and their officers the words with which he intended to fool his opponent. All the soldiers, they were to say, were worn out with Caesar’s incessant campaigns, they suspected him of seeking the monarchy, they would all desert him if it came to a conflict between him and Pompey, and all they wanted was to leave Caesar’s command, come home to Italy and serve under Pompey. The latter was, in due course, as deceived as Caesar had hoped:

Upon this Pompey grew presumptuous, and neglected all war-like preparations, as fearing no danger, and used no other means against him than mere speeches and votes, for which Caesar cared nothing.

(Plutarch)

These two legions, when they reached Italy, were not embarked and sent on to Syria but were posted to Capua north of Naples—on the grounds that the situation in the East no longer warranted their dispatch. Pompey relaxed and, when danger threatened and there were rumors of Caesar massing troops in Gaul, he smiled and said: “Wherever I strike the ground in Italy with my foot, legions will spring forth.”

The consul Marcellus, who had shown himself violently anti-Caesar (and nearly all of whose moves had been blocked by Curio’s veto), believing or pretending to believe the rumors that Caesar was massing troops in Gaul for an advance on Rome, asked the senate to declare Caesar an enemy of the republic. He further asked that the troops now stationed in Capua should be moved north to block any advance that Caesar might make. Curio once again opposed him, and brought evidence that the news was false. (Caesar had, in fact, stationed three legions in the south of Narbonese Gaul in case of any threat arising from Pompey’s legions in Spain.) Marcellus, acting on his own behalf and accompanied by the two consuls designate for the next year, now called on Pompey who was by arrangement waiting for them outside the city boundaries—where the authority of a tribune such as Curio was not valid. There Marcellus, backed by his colleagues, gave Pompey the authority to march against Caesar “in defense of the country.” He was entrusted with the command of the troops at Capua as well as others throughout Italy, and authorized to raise further troops as he saw fit. This arbitrary action by Marcellus, without the approval of the senate, had the result of precipitating the conflict which, in theory at least, it was intended to avoid. Pompey accepted the charge laid upon him and began at once to prepare orders for mobilization. Cicero, who had somehow or other managed to remain on good terms with both Pompey and Caesar, still hoped that some compromise could be effected between them. But, meeting Pompey on his way down to Capua in early December, he was told that war was now inevitable.

23

Across the River

CAESAR had spent part of the summer of 50 in a tour of his province of Cisalpine Gaul, where he had been received with such enthusiasm that one cannot help suspecting his election agents had been busy among the people well in advance. Certainly he had wanted the Romans to hear how popular he was among those whose lives he administered, and possibly hoped too that his enemies in that quarter would note how these hardy provincials (who had proved their worth in the legions) reacted to his presence. Now, in December, having made his dispositions for the troops in Gaul, he came back again to hear it confirmed that the two legions he had sent for the senate’s use in Syria were held in Capua, and that Pompey was in command of them and was preparing to mobilize others. Curio joined Caesar in Ravenna, straight from the capital, where, according to Appian, he feared for his life and “could no longer hope to serve Caesar’s interests’—being no longer tribune since December. Other supporters would follow him to Ravenna as the unlikelihood of any reconciliation between Caesar and Pompey became more and more obvious. Meanwhile in Rome another of Caesar’s protégés, Mark Antony, who had been elected as tribune in Curio’s place, was already busy doing his best to protect his interests.

In Cisalpine Gaul Caesar was busy seeing to the concentration of the single legion in Cisalpine Gaul, and arranging with great secrecy for other legions from Transalpine Gaul to start for Italy. With only one legion to hand, he was far outnumbered by the forces at Pompey’s disposal, and for this reason he temporized as far as possible and continued negotiations with the senate. It was far from certain, if it came to civil war between himself and Pompey, that his followers would be in the majority—and almost certain that they would be among the most disreputable. Ever since the days of Catiline, indeed ever since Caesar had begun to practice the political arts, he had made himself the champion of the bankrupt, the dispossessed, the unscrupulous and the ill-famed. If “the people” also followed him it was largely because they too, wittingly or unwittingly, had been bought. It was true that many members of the equestrian order were among his followers, as well as senior officers, the centurions and the soldiers, but most of the old ruling class looked on him askance.

Pompey, for his part, could lay claim to the support of a better and more well-established class of followers—differently, but not better-intentioned. When he had first come to Rome he had seen himself as Princeps, first above all, but he had gradually reconciled himself to being first among equals. Since his new marriage and his reconciliation with the
Optimates,
he had inclined toward their position. He had, after all, been a follower of Sulla and he never significantly changed. Earlier that year Cicero’s correspondent Caelius had analyzed the situation in Rome as he saw it:

I am sure of course that you realize that, in the case of a domestic dissension, men should support the side that is right so long as it is a matter of politics, but that when it comes to weapons and warfare then they must support the stronger side, taking the view that might is right. [Caelius finally chose Caesar’s.] Now in this quarrel I perceive that Pompey will have with him the senate and the judiciary, but that Caesar will have the support of all those who have anything to fear and nothing to lose. In any case, the latter’s army is infinitely better than Pompey’s.

Caesar knew this as well as anybody, but it is clear that right up to the last he hoped that he could maintain his official dignity, acting in accordance with the rule of law and the requirements of the senate.

Early in December he informed the senate privately that he would be willing to give up his command of Transalpine Gaul and content himself with Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and only two legions until such time as he was consul. Although on the surface this meant that he was relinquishing the fruits of all his endeavors of recent years, it still meant in effect that he would not be standing for consul as a private citizen. Marcellus and those of Cato’s persuasion remained adamant against making any concessions. Meanwhile Antony in his position as tribune continued to harass Pompey and his followers, carrying an edict through the popular Assembly requiring the immediate departure of the two legions for Syria and forbidding Pompey to mobilize any troops. While Cicero, who was now back in Italy, attempted to persuade Caesar to reduce his demands to Illyricum and one legion alone, and Cato spoke out against having any truck with him at all, one obscure senator proposed that Pompey should leave for his own province of Spain and thus armed conflict could be avoided. Naturally those who were dependent on the protection of Pompey indignantly rejected the suggestion. Prior to this, Curio had brought an official dispatch from Caesar in Ravenna that, if he was not allowed to keep his provinces pending the elections, then he and all other holders of military commands (by which he meant Pompey) should resign their authority simultaneously. This met with such antagonism from the senate that it was clear to the tribunes, Antony and Cassius, that no further dialogue was possible.

The senate now hastened toward the fatal decree: Caesar, by a date which should be fixed at once, must disband his army on pain of being considered an enemy of the State. Antony attempted to use his veto but was ruled out of court on a legal nicety, debate about which then kept the members busy for many hours. But the real decision had been taken, although it was not until three days later that the senate finally gave the charge to the consuls and others in authority in the vicinity of the city (this included Pompey) to “protect the interests of the state.” The two tribunes, Antony and Cassius, fled Rome disguised as slaves and made their way north to

Caesar, and no doubt a good many others followed them. They knew that this was the real declaration of war against Caesar. Short of handing over his proconsular commands and coming to Rome as a private citizen (to deliver himself to his enemies) Caesar had no option but to act as he did. Arms were already being requisitioned throughout Italy, mobilization had been ordered, and the man appointed to relieve him of his command was L. Domitius, a sworn enemy ever since his consulship.