Ike's Spies (10 page)

Murphy's loyalty to Dubreuil aside, the fact that the Americans benefited so directly from Darlan's death makes them at least suspect. Clark, in his memoirs, published in 1950, added to the suspicion because he expressed such delight over the assassination. “Admiral Darlan's death was, to me, an act of Providence. It is too bad that he went that way, but, strategically speaking, his removal from the scene was like the lancing of a troublesome boil. He had served
his purpose, and his death solved what could have been the very difficult problem of what to do with him in the future. Darlan was a political investment forced upon us by circumstances, but we made a sensational profit in lives and time through using him.”
⁵²

That almost sounds like a confession, but despite Clark's carelessly chosen words, and despite speculation linking Murphy with the conspirators, there is no direct evidence connecting Eisenhower, his chief subordinates, or the
OSS
with the murder of Darlan. Eisenhower's attitude was best expressed by his reaction to Roosevelt's message saying that if the French leaders would not cooperate “they will have to be replaced.” Ike was terribly upset, according to Butcher. He said that without the good will of the French Army, the Americans would have to take on the “man-wasting” job of providing civil administration for Algeria and guarding the lines of communication through North Africa. Instead of active assistance from the French, Ike said he feared there would be “passive resistance à la Ghandi, or possibly resumption of French fighting Americans ‘pour l'honneur.' ”

If FDR insisted on dictating to the French to the point that it brought on French resistance, Butcher noted, “Ike said he would of course carry out the order, but would then ask to be relieved, which would no doubt mean reversion to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and retirement.”
⁵³
Ike had come to admire Darlan and appreciate his cooperative spirit. He did not put the finger on the man.

Neither did Murphy or the
OSS
, if only because they did not have to do so. Anyone living in Algiers in December 1942 would have had to have been deaf and blind not to know that there were numerous plots to kill the little admiral. The analogy that fits is Saigon in 1963, where the
CIA
did not have to lift a hand against Diem but simply stood aside and let the South Vietnamese themselves do the killing. As Rosfelder makes so abundantly clear, in Algiers there were plenty of Frenchmen on the prowl for Darlan. And as de Gaulle's and Giraud's actions after the event indicate, there were many highly placed Frenchmen who were delighted to have the admiral out of the way, so much so that they made a hero out of the murderer.

ROMMEL
had just retreated across half of North Africa, following his defeat by the British at El Alamein in November 1942. When he reached the Mareth Line, a prepared defensive position, partly underground, along the Tunisian-Libyan border, Rommel turned on the British, who recoiled, then settled down to await reinforcements. The chase across Africa had been exhilarating, but to close in on the “Desert Fox” in his den was another matter altogether. Monty gave Rommel time to catch his breath and plan his next move.

The American II Corps was to Rommel's west and north, stretched out along the eastern dorsal of the Atlas Mountains. The front line was too long for the Americans to hold in strength, but neither Fredendall nor Eisenhower were overly worried. Intelligence indicated that any German attack would come from north of the II Corps line at Fondouk, which was a British and French responsibility.

According to Ike's intelligence reports, Rommel was fully occupied
by Monty, so General Jürgen von Arnim, who commanded the German forces in Tunis, would lead the offensive. Ike's G-2 (intelligence) officer at Allied Force Headquarters (
AFHQ
) was British Brigadier Eric E. Mockler-Ferryman. He reported that all available information indicated that von Arnim was going to draw on Rommel's Africa Korps for reinforcements, then attack through a pass at Fondouk, with the aim of scattering the French, then turning north, driving to the coast, to isolate Anderson's First Army.
¹

Eisenhower did not fully accept Mockler-Ferryman's judgment, but he did not have sufficient self-confidence to overrule his G-2. He was worried enough to go to the front to oversee preparations to meet von Arnim's attack. On February 13–14 he made an all-night tour of the front. He was disturbed by what he saw. The American troops were complacent, green, and unblooded. They had not received intensive training in the United States, as they were the first divisions to go to England in 1942. In November they had shipped out for North Africa, where operations were just active enough to prevent training but not enough to provide real battlefield experience. Officers and men alike showed the lack of training.
²

Ike was also upset at the disposition of the 1st Armored Division, which had been split into two parts, Combat Command A and Combat Command B (
CCA
and
CCB
), and was therefore incapable of operating as a unit. General Anderson had insisted upon keeping
CCB
near Fondouk to help the British meet the expected attack from von Arnim;
CCA
was to the south, near Faïd Pass.

General Paul Robinett commanded
CCB
, and on the night of February 13–14 he insistently told Ike that he was sure Mockler-Ferryman's information was wrong. Robinett said he did not expect an attack at Fondouk because he had sent patrols all the way across the eastern dorsal without encountering any enemy buildup. Further, air reconnaissance had failed to reveal any preparations for an attack. Robinett said he had reported this intelligence to his superiors, Generals Fredendall and Anderson, but they did not believe him. Ike said he did, and promised to change the dispositions the next day.
³

After his talk with Robinett, Ike drove south for a couple of hours, then paid a visit to
CCA
. Everything there seemed to be in order. Just after midnight he went for a walk into the desert. The
moon shone. Looking eastward, he could just make out the gap in the black mountain mass that was Faïd Pass. Nothing moved.

Shaking off the mood of the desert, Eisenhower returned to
CCA
headquarters and then drove toward Tebessa, Fredendall's headquarters. He arrived three hours later, around 5:30
A.M
. The Germans, he learned to his astonishment from a radio message, had attacked
CCA
, coming through Faïd Pass at 4:00
A.M
. Reports indicated, however, that it was only a limited attack, probably designed to draw off strength from the northern end of the line.
CCA
said it could hold on with no difficulty. Climbing into his Cadillac, Eisenhower drove on toward his advance command post at Constantine. Along the way he stopped to visit the famous Roman ruins at Timgad and did not reach Constantine until the middle of the afternoon, St. Valentine's Day.
⁴

The news he received when he got to his headquarters was bad. The attack out of Faïd Pass was much bigger and more aggressive than
CCA
had thought at first. The Germans had destroyed an American tank battalion, overrun a battalion of artillery, isolated two large segments of American troops, and driven
CCA
out of its position. Nevertheless, General Anderson continued to insist that Mockler-Ferryman's intelligence was correct and that the main attack would come at Fondouk. He refused to release Robinett's
CCB
to join
CCA
in the defense. Ike tried to speed a flow of reinforcements to
CCA
, but his main strategic reserve, the U. S. 9th Infantry Division, was unable to move with any dispatch because it had no organic truck transportation. As a result, outnumbered and inexperienced American troops had to take on German veterans led by Erwin Rommel himself. The result was one of the worst American defeats of the war.
CCA
lost ninety-eight tanks, fifty-seven half-tracks, and twenty-nine artillery pieces. It had practically been destroyed—half an armored division gone!
⁵

Fortunately for Ike, the German command setup was almost as muddled as the Allied one. Rommel and von Arnim operated independently. Von Arnim wanted to confine himself to limited attacks against Fondouk. Rommel was after much bigger results—he wanted to break through the mountains at Kasserine Pass, capture the great Allied supply base at Le Kef, then possibly drive on to Algiers itself. He wanted to turn a tactical advantage into a strategic triumph, destroying the II Corps, isolating the First Army, and thus reversing the entire position in North Africa. If all went well,
he could accomplish his objectives before Monty was ready to attack the Mareth Line.
⁶

Von Arnim was a vain, ambitious man who refused to cooperate in Rommel's bold (but wildly impractical) plan. Higher headquarters (Kesselring) had ordered him to give his best panzer division, the 10th, to Rommel for the original attack, but von Arnim had stalled and it was not committed on February 14. Ironically, this turned out to benefit Rommel, because the location of the 10th Panzer was, according to Mockler-Ferryman, the key piece of information. As long as those tankers were facing
CCB
at Fondouk, that was where Mockler-Ferryman insisted that the attack would come.

Over the next two days Rommel pressed his initial advantage. On February 20 the 10th Panzer, finally released to his command, moved into Kasserine Pass. It was too late. American reinforcements had arrived. The German offensive stalled.

That same day, February 20, Ike asked the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Alan Brooke, to replace Mockler-Ferryman “with an officer who has a broader insight into German mentality and method.”
⁷
It was the only time in his three-year career as Allied Commander in Chief that Eisenhower asked the British to relieve one of their officers on his staff. In a cable to Marshall the next day, Ike explained that “due to faulty G-2 estimates” Anderson had not become convinced “until too late that the attack through Faïd was really the main effort.”

Then, in guarded language, he added, “I am provoked that there was such reliance placed upon particular types of intelligence that general instructions were considered inapplicable. In this connection and for your eyes only, I have asked for the relief of my G-2. He is British and the head of that section must be a British officer because of the network of special signal establishments he operates, but Brooke has agreed to make available a man in Great Britain who is tops in this regard.”
⁸
The man was General Kenneth Strong. He stayed with Ike through the remainder of the war and the two officers established a close and effective relationship. Mockler-Ferryman returned to London to head the Special Operations Executive (
SOE
), which controlled sabotage and underground efforts in occupied France.

But what, meanwhile, was the origin of Mockler-Ferryman's
terrible mistake at Kasserine Pass? It was
ULTRA
. An entry of February 20 in Butcher's previously unpublished diary provides some of the details: “An explanation of the defeat, as seen by Ike, lies in a misinterpretation of radio messages we regularly intercept from the enemy. This source is known as ‘Ultra.' It happens that our G.2 Brigadier Mockler-Ferryman, relies heavily upon this source. It has frequently disclosed excellent information as to the intentions of the Axis. However, the interpretation placed by G.2 on the messages dealing with the place of attack—an attack that has been expected for several days—led Mockler-Ferryman to believe that a feint would be made where the attack actually occurred … and that the real and heavy attack would come in the north.”
⁹

What Butcher did not know was that Rommel's initial attack was as much a surprise to von Arnim and his superiors as it was to Mockler-Ferryman. Rommel, not for the first time, had disobeyed orders.
¹⁰