Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (28 page)

The Russians assembled a huge air armada against Army Groups Center and A for the January offensive. As stated above, the Russians later increased their air power in East Prussia even more by withdrawing aircraft from Courland and other sectors.
²¹
The Soviets retained a massive
concentration of artillery and aircraft in East Prussia into the first week April for the assault on Königsberg. Despite the forthcoming Berlin operation, Bagramian deployed approximately 5,000 pieces of artillery, 300 multiple rocket launchers, 538 tanks and assault guns, and 2,444 aircraft to storm Königsberg. Two to three entire air armies, parts of two additional air armies, and aircraft from the Baltic Fleet supported the attack. Bagramian also received sixteen engineer brigades, aside from regular corps and divisional sapper units—a considerable number considering the impending assault on Berlin.
²²

For the Berlin operation, the First and Second Belorussian and First Ukrainian fronts massed more than 190 divisions, 6,100 tanks and assault guns, and 7,500 combat aircraft.
²³
Of Zhukov’s eight general-purpose armies and two tank armies, one had previously been in East Prussia and two in Courland. Konev’s seven general-purpose armies and two tank armies included one formerly opposite East Prussia and one from Courland. For Rokossovskii’s simultaneous operation along the Oder, one army and a tank corps had come from Courland. In addition, of four air armies supporting the Berlin operation, two had been active in East Prussia in February.
²⁴
German units defending coastal sectors succeeded in tying down large numbers of Russian troops, but to no avail.

The entire premise behind the
Wellenbrecher
reveals an unusual paradox in Hitler’s thinking. In conversations with his closest associates, Hitler often referred to the danger from the East, of the “oriental hordes” that had constantly threatened Germany. A few months prior to his defeat at Stalingrad he claimed that his “greatest service” to humanity had been “saving Europe from the Asiatic onslaught.”
²⁵
Yet at the same time that he exaggerated the danger from the East, he consistently underestimated the Soviet Union’s strength. When the Russians launched their offensive at Moscow in December 1941, Hitler refused to believe they had brought up fresh forces. Dismissing OKH’s reports as exaggerated and pessimistic, he declared that the Soviets were attacking with their last reserves from Moscow itself. Following the Soviet winter offensive of 1942–43, despite terrible German casualties, Hitler maintained that the Russians had suffered such high losses in manpower that their collapse was only a matter of time.
²⁶
Ignoring all the evidence to the contrary, Hitler insisted to the end the war that the Soviets were running short of manpower and rejected Foreign Armies East’s estimates of Soviet strength as lunacy.
²⁷
In the war’s final six months Goebbels, too, frequently commented that the quality of Soviet replacements was poor, that the Soviets were running out of manpower, or that they had thrown just their last reserves into battle.
²⁸

Schörner, Gehlen, and Guderian

F
ROM THE START
Schörner had misgivings about the mission assigned to his army group. He requested Guderian’s support for his plan to break through to East Prussia and warned of the problems involved with seaborne supply. Although he acknowledged the army group’s task of tying down enemy forces, Schörner advised that considering the situation in East Prussia and Memel, this represented no long-term solution, and he again pointed out his concern for receiving supplies by sea in winter. The army group initially viewed its task as temporary, that of tying down Soviet armies until the crisis in East Prussia had passed; once the situation stabilized, the army group would launch its breakthrough attack.
²⁹
Despite Schörner’s personal reservations, as usual he outwardly displayed total agreement with Hitler’s order to hold Courland.
³⁰
By the end of December he had accepted the army group’s isolation and even provided Hitler an additional incentive to continue Courland’s defense. Schörner declared that besides the threat his forces posed to their flank, the Soviets had to capture Courland for political reasons—they had repeatedly boasted of Army Group North’s imminent destruction.
³¹

Gehlen also questioned the purpose of holding Courland, although his doubts surfaced later than Schörner’s. After the First Courland Battle Gehlen predicted that the Soviets would attempt to destroy Army Group North as quickly as possible, so the Baltic fronts could participate in an attack on East Prussia. To accomplish this, he believed, the Russians had postponed operations in other sectors and sent to Courland units originally intended for deployment elsewhere. Gehlen assumed that the Soviets felt compelled to do this because of the threat to their flank in East Prussia.
³²
By mid-December he had begun to wonder if the Soviets had changed their plans. He suspected they had already withdrawn units from Courland, opting instead to attack Army Groups Center and A before eliminating Schörner’s forces. Gehlen concluded that the Soviets realized they would need these troops for the coming offensives in Poland and East Prussia and that lesser forces would suffice to engage German troops in Courland.
³³
By the end of the year German intelligence had detected the withdrawal of three armies from Courland. Gehlen suggested that following the Soviets’ failure to dislodge Schörner’s armies in the Third Courland Battle, they would withdraw even more units. The remaining Soviet troops in Latvia would merely conduct holding attacks, to prevent the evacuation of Courland.
³⁴

Gehlen called for Courland’s evacuation only after the Soviets launched their winter offensive. As early as 15 January he concluded that
OKH could not restore the situation in the East without immediate reinforcements, and two days later German intelligence reexamined Army Group North’s position in relation to the overall situation. In this study Foreign Armies East revised its earlier estimates, finding that Army Group North had faced a smaller Soviet force than originally assumed and surmising that the Russians had withdrawn several armies from Courland. The Soviets, therefore, had given up their intention to destroy the army group. They would merely retain sufficient forces to stop a German breakthrough to East Prussia and conduct holding attacks to prevent the withdrawal of German units there. If the Germans attempted to evacuate the army group by sea, the Russians again would launch a determined offensive with the forces at their disposal.
³⁵
Without blatantly urging Courland’s evacuation, Gehlen pointed out that German forces there no longer tied down a disproportionate number of Soviet divisions—if they had ever had done so—and that the Eastern Front urgently required reinforcements.

On 20 January Gehlen warned that the Soviets were on the verge of isolating Army Group Center in East Prussia and that the decision of whether or not to hold East Prussia was closely linked to Courland. To leave the army group in Latvia, he cautioned, would mean its sacrifice in the long run. It would become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to attack from East Prussia to reestablish land contact with the army group. Gehlen contended that German forces in Courland no longer tied down a disproportionate number of Soviet divisions, so the army group had fulfilled its task. An attack from Courland to reach Army Group Center was the only logical step. Moreover, the combined forces of the two army groups stood a better chance of breaking through to the Vistula. As an additional reason for this solution, Gehlen claimed the navy could not supply armies isolated in both Courland and East Prussia for long.
³⁶
Thus, in late January 1945 Gehlen advocated giving up Courland and East Prussia to gain forces to defend Germany’s heartland.

Hitler, however, refused to abandon Courland and insisted upon the defense of East Prussia as well. At the beginning of February Gehlen maintained that although German resistance in both areas would tie down strong Soviet forces for some time, the Russians still had enough troops to attack Berlin. Two weeks later Gehlen characterized the situation in East Prussia as one of crisis. Even if East Prussia’s defense was essential to ensure the link to Courland, it did not justify the destruction of an entire army group in East Prussia. Arguing that the Soviets had withdrawn half their units initially opposite Courland and were at liberty to pull out further forces at any time, he restated his conviction that Army Group Courland
had fulfilled its task. The psychological value of holding Courland by no means compensated for the lack of reserves in Germany. He warned that since the evacuation would require quite some time, a decision must be made quickly.
³⁷
Gehlen therefore unequivocally called for the evacuation of the Courland divisions.

A week later Gehlen asserted that the
Wellenbrecher
doctrine had failed, denouncing it as a complete fiasco. Considering the ratio of forces, it worked to Germany’s disadvantage, especially in Courland and East Prussia, because the Soviets had not displayed inordinate concern for their flanks as had been predicted. The policy of tying down enemy forces on nondecisive fronts had in reality granted the Soviets a free hand with their armies in Courland and East Prussia. In fact, it was
Germany’
s forces that were tied down, since they could not be redeployed quickly enough, due to the transport situation at sea.
³⁸

Although Gehlen called for the evacuation of Army Group Courland beginning in January 1945, the chief advocate of withdrawing divisions from Courland was Guderian. After the situation in East Prussia stabilized in early November 1944, Guderian directed his attention to Courland and urged Hitler to evacuate the army group. He argued that the number of Soviet units tied down in Courland did not make up for the lack of forces in Germany. This subject caused numerous disagreements with Hitler. One reason Hitler offered in rejecting Guderian’s repeated demands to evacuate Courland was that the withdrawal would also release considerable Russian forces, which would appear at more vulnerable sectors of the front. The repeated Soviet offensives in Courland throughout the autumn of 1944 reinforced Hitler’s conviction.
³⁹
On 16 January, after the Russians launched their offensive against Army Groups A and Center, Guderian met with Hitler and again pleaded for Courland’s evacuation. This time he achieved some success, for Hitler agreed to withdraw one armored and two infantry divisions. From this point on, Guderian demanded Courland’s evacuation at practically every conference with Hitler, and on several occasions this led to heated arguments between them. On 28 March, following a bitter dispute concerning an unsuccessful attack by Ninth Army to relieve Küstrin, Hitler ordered Guderian to take six weeks’ medical leave.
⁴⁰
There is little doubt that their constant struggle over Courland was a major factor in Guderian’s dismissal.

Courland was not the first time Hitler had employed the
Wellenbrecher
doctrine, and he often emphasized the merit of holding positions to tie down enemy forces. This belief played a role, although it was not the determining factor, in two “bridgeheads” on the extreme southern end of the
Eastern Front. When Hitler withdrew Army Group A from the Caucasus in January 1943, following Sixth Army’s encirclement at Stalingrad, he ordered Seventeenth Army to defend the Kuban Peninsula. Zeitzler and Heusinger maintained that one reason for this was Hitler’s desire to tie down Soviet forces. In addition, a motive for Hitler’s decision in April 1944 to hold Sevastopol as long as possible was to tie down twenty-five to thirty Soviet divisions.
⁴¹
Both of these bridgeheads bound numbers of Russian troops greater than that of the Germans involved.

Moreover, in July 1944 Hitler insisted on the defense of the Apennine Position, partly because this held a large number of Allied divisions in Italy. A withdrawal to the Alps, he reasoned, would release considerable Anglo-American forces. Furthermore, one reason Hitler refused to evacuate Estonia in September 1944 was his reluctance to free one hundred Soviet divisions.
⁴²
Hitler’s declaration of several cities in eastern Germany as fortresses also aimed at tying down Soviet units.
⁴³
The
Wellenbrecher
doctrine played an influential role in Hitler’s decision to defend certain sectors on a variety of fronts.

The results of the
Wellenbrecher
doctrine, however, were mixed. Tactically it was successful. Army Group North/Courland clearly tied down superior Soviet formations until the end of 1944. Even in 1945 Russian divisions in Courland outnumbered German divisions by three or four to one. German forces in East Prussia engaged approximately ten Soviet armies until the beginning of April 1945. After that, six to seven armies remained to storm Königsberg and clear Nazi troops from Samland. By the time the Russians captured Pillau, Berlin’s surrender was only a week away. Army Group Center/North also fulfilled its task of tying down Soviet units, if at a terrible price. At least temporarily, stubborn German resistance in fortresses in eastern Germany held back large numbers of Soviet troops. At the end of January the defense of Poznan denied Zhukov parts of two armies, and portions of three additional armies with a great deal of artillery had been detached to besiege Fortress Schneidemühl and other strongpoints. The defense of such cities as Poznan, Schneidemühl, Elbing, Glogau, and Breslau not only forced Stalin’s commanders to leave troops behind to storm the German fortresses but seriously impeded the movement of supplies to forward Soviet armies.
⁴⁴

Hitler undoubtedly eased the pressure on Berlin in February and March 1945 by clinging to Courland, East Prussia, and West Prussia, but to what avail? In the meantime he was unable to strengthen the Oder front sufficiently. Stalin could well afford these odds, but Hitler could not. In fact, Stalin had the advantage. He withdrew nearly half the armies initially in
Courland with no perceptible ill effects and was at liberty to take more units from Latvia at any time. Yet there was a limit to the number of divisions Hitler could evacuate and still hope to retain Courland. Although the army group undeniably tied down numerous Soviet armies, Gehlen accurately pointed out that two German armies were equally, if not more so, compelled to remain in Courland. The German defense of Courland and East Prussia forced the Soviets to divert several armies from their drive on Berlin, but the Reich capital fell even without those forces. The relative speed with which the Russians captured Berlin underscores the strategic failure of the
Wellenbrecher
doctrine. If this was the main reason Hitler ordered the defense of bridgeheads along the Baltic, it resulted in catastrophe.