Hitler, Donitz, and the Baltic Sea (26 page)

The Soviet offensive in Pomerania from 10 to 19 February, although unsuccessful, nearly wrecked Dönitz’s plans. At the end of January Himmler had ordered Second Army to hold the sector Marienburg–Elbing at all costs to protect Danzig and Gdynia and also to facilitate reestablishing contact with East Prussia. On 17 February Weiss, at this time commander of Second Army, queried Himmler whether his forces should continue to shield West Prussia’s Baltic ports or withdraw to Pomerania to avoid isolation. Himmler replied that the army’s mission remained the protection of West Prussia with Danzig and Gdynia and the maintenance of firm contact with Eleventh SS Panzer Army in Pomerania. The same day Hitler, apparently for the first time, seriously considered a total evacuation of Courland to gain forces to defend the Reich.
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Fortunately for Dönitz the Soviets halted their attack on 19 February, before separating Second Army from the army group.

At a situation conference in late February Hitler called upon Dönitz to explain the importance of Stettin and Swinemünde for the war at sea. Dönitz had no difficulty with this question, and his list of reasons seemed endless. To begin, Dönitz insisted that Stettin and Swinemünde formed the nerve center for supply tasks in the eastern Baltic. Without them, all troop and supply transports would have to originate in the western Baltic, which posed several problems. The mine danger was greater in the shallow waters of the western Baltic, and the distance from ports in this area to Courland and East Prussia would nearly double the length of the journey. Swinemünde was a vital base for warships, and its loss would complicate engaging the Soviet fleet in the central and western Baltic and force a heavy concentration of ships in the West, where they were more vulnerable to air raids. The loss of shipyards in either port would further reduce the navy’s already limited repair capacity. Finally, the navy would lose its deepwater U-boat training area east of the island of Bornholm, where training currently proceeded, meaning that submarines could only train in the shallow, and thus less suitable, waters of the western Baltic. For these reasons, Dönitz declared, holding the Stettin area was of the greatest significance to the conduct of naval war. Hitler agreed and decided that the army’s operational measures must be made accordingly.
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The next day Hitler warned Army Group Vistula to beware a Soviet thrust to the Baltic in Pomerania with the goal of splitting up the army group and seizing Danzig, Gdynia, and Stettin. The Soviets’ seizure of these ports would seriously disrupt Germany’s lines of communication in the
Baltic. Hitler commanded Himmler to defend the Oder front against an expected Soviet thrust toward Berlin and to ensure that Germany kept possession of Danzig, Gdynia, and Stettin. As a precaution, OKH ordered the fortresses Königsberg, Danzig, and Gdynia to receive sufficient supplies to endure a three-month siege. This order came far too late; on the same day, 24 February, Rokossovskii launched his offensive in Pomerania. On 27 February Hitler, repeating Dönitz’s arguments, insisted upon the protection of Stettin and retention of north Pomerania and West Prussia. Otherwise, the navy’s supply services would be overstrained, Germany would lose its U-boat training areas in the Baltic, and troops in Pomerania could no longer threaten the Soviets’ northern flank.
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Yet Hitler’s order could not halt Rokossovskii’s troops, who reached the coast on 3 March.

Like German troops in Courland, Memel, and East Prussia before it, Second Army had to rely upon supply by sea. Dönitz was quick to point out that supplies to the beleaguered army must be shipped to Danzig and Gdynia, and Hitler thereupon emphasized that these two ports had to be held at all costs. On 12 March Dönitz informed Hitler that possession of the Hela Peninsula and the coastal strip between Hela and Danzig–Gdynia was indispensable for use of the ports. Hitler promised to instruct Second Army to this effect later that day.
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Once Second Army lost land contact with the Reich, OKH requested the navy’s evaluation of the importance of ports in eastern Pomerania. The navy responded that holding these ports was decisive to maintaining shipping to and from Courland, East Prussia, and, now, West Prussia. In other words, possession of Pomeranian ports was important for holding Courland and East Prussia.
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Dönitz endeavored to ensure Second Army received sufficient supplies. In doing so he not only demonstrated the navy’s efficiency but also underscored the necessity of retaining the ports.

Dönitz considered the question of Stettin’s evacuation acute. On 6 March he ordered all vessels in running order, excluding U-boats and motor torpedo boats, to leave this port. In the following days Dönitz frequently protested that the Stettin–Swinemünde sector was insufficiently protected. He suggested to Hitler an offensive to regain the lower Oder and the eastern side of the Stettiner Haff, so that shipping to Stettin could continue, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of these ports. Hitler was sympathetic but explained that the attack was unlikely.
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Hitler too was concerned about Stettin and Swinemünde. The loss of Pomerania infuriated the Führer, who, to Goebbels’s delight, blamed Himmler for the catastrophe. Hitler ordered additional artillery units sent to strengthen the Dievenow front, on the Baltic coast east of Swinemünde, and commanded
Dönitz to dispatch naval emergency units to the area.
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Furthermore, on 10 March Guderian instructed Third Panzer Army to form a defensive line as far east of the Oder and Stettiner Haff as possible, so that the navy could continue shipping from Stettin. Three days later Hitler ordered Army Group Vistula to attack to broaden the bridgehead east of the city. Although on 18 March Hitler demanded that the bridgehead east of Stettin be held as long as possible, he approved a proposal for its evacuation the next day.
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Meanwhile, Rokossovskii had directed his units to finish off German forces in West Prussia. Hitler continued to insist that Second Army defend Danzig and Gdynia and hold its positions as far west as possible. He also ordered the army to maintain a cohesive front, especially the connection from Danzig–Gdynia to Hela and to Army Group North via the Frische Nehrung. Dönitz continually emphasized to Hitler the importance of Danzig and Gdynia to the navy.
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On 16 March Burchardi reported that Saucken was claiming that he could not hold the present front without reinforcements and additional supplies of ammunition and heavy weapons. Burchardi suggested the Skl support Saucken’s plea, since it conformed to the navy’s own interest. The next day, during a situation conference with Hitler, Dönitz lectured Guderian that the key to holding the Danzig-Gdynia-Hela area was the delivery of sufficient weapons and ammunition, and he requested the army to allocate adequate supplies for the purpose.
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Rokossovskii, however, did not grant the Germans time to deliver more supplies. His troops continued to push the Germans closer to the sea. Burchardi informed the Skl that Saucken’s troops could not hold their lengthy sector, and he urged the Skl to preserve the cohesion of the front between Gdynia and Danzig. But on 22 March the Soviets reached the Bay of Danzig near Zoppot, separating German troops defending Danzig from those in Gdynia. Hitler ordered Dönitz to support the army with naval gun-fire; Dönitz replied that warships had shelled Soviet troop concentrations in the area on a daily basis since 10 March.
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For the next two days Hitler insisted upon the heaviest action of all naval forces against Soviet troops in the Zoppot area, regardless of dwindling ammunition stores.
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Nevertheless, the Soviets captured Gdynia on 28 March, and Danzig fell two days later. With both cities lost, Dönitz urged Hitler to hang on to the Hela Peninsula in order to deny the Soviets use of ports in the Bay of Danzig and to supply the remaining German troops in East and West Prussia. Hitler instructed Army Group North that Second Army must hold its present positions, including the Hela Peninsula, to prevent the Russians from using these ports.
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Questioned by Hitler as to whether the navy could guarantee
Hela’s supply, the grand admiral replied in the affirmative but warned that the lack of coal was a cause of concern. Twice in the next ten days Hitler instructed Second Army of its mission. He considered Hela’s defense essential to preventing the Soviets from using ports in the Bay of Danzig and ordered troops holding positions at the mouth of the Vistula to maintain the link to East Prussia over the Frische Nehrung and keep Danzig’s harbor under artillery fire.
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During the first days of April Hitler made similar demands on the troops fighting around Oxhöft, insisting they fight to the last man to tie down Soviet forces and deny the enemy use of Gdynia. On 1 April Burchardi updated the Skl that he doubted that troops in this sector could hold on for long. Events proved Burchardi correct. On the night of 4–5 April, on the corps commander’s initiative, the survivors at Oxhöft were evacuated to Hela. As for the troops in the Vistula Delta, on 27 April Jodl claimed their task was to continue to disrupt the Soviets’ use of Danzig with artillery fire.
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Dönitz continued to fret about the defense of Swinemünde and Stettin, and he sought Hitler’s aid to preserve them. On 25 March, at Dönitz’s request, Hitler again ordered more artillery sent to the Dievenow front, and two weeks later OKH turned down Army Group Vistula’s appeal to revoke Stettin’s fortress classification. As late as 16 April, the date the Soviets began their final assault on Berlin, Dönitz complained to Hitler that the front near Stettin was too weakly defended. Hitler replied that he could not send a division to that sector as Dönitz requested, but he promised to send some flak.
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As part of the Berlin operation, Second Belorussian Front attacked the Oder front south of Stettin on 20 April and achieved a breakthrough in the center of Third Panzer Army’s sector by the 25th. In view of the situation at Berlin, Gen. Hasso von Manteuffel, Raus’s successor as commander of Third Panzer Army, saw no choice but to withdraw his flanks. Dönitz protested to Gen. Gotthard Heinrici, who had replaced Himmler as Army Group Vistula’s commander, that everything must be done to defend Swinemünde as long as possible. The next day Jodl ordered Fortress Swinemünde held even if Third Panzer Army continued to withdraw.
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Only on 28 April, the day after the Soviets captured Stettin and two days prior to Hitler’s death, did Dönitz agree to Swinemünde’s evacuation.
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Soviet tanks reached Rostock on 2 May, and two days later the last ship sailed from Swinemünde. Troops on the Hela Peninsula and at the mouth of the Vistula held out until Germany’s surrender. On 3 May Jodl informed Saucken to prepare his troops and any refugees in their area for evacuation. Of an estimated 150,000–180,000 troops remaining
in East and West Prussia, over 42,000 were evacuated from Hela, plus more than 25,000 from Swinemünde. The rest surrendered to the Soviets on 9 May.
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From January to the first week of May 1945, hundreds of thousands of German soldiers fought in several bridgeheads along the Baltic coast, as had hundreds of thousands of others since October 1944 in Courland and at Memel. The common soldier continued to fight against overwhelming odds primarily to hold open ports for civilian refugees to flee to the West.
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Possible reasons why Hitler ordered his armies to continue the struggle are the subject of the following three chapters. A few points, however, deserve comment before that analysis of Hitler’s Baltic strategy.

Guderian’s role in the battle for the Reich, especially the initial stages, is of particular interest, because in his memoirs he portrays himself as the would-be savior of East Prussia. Yet the order of 15 January to withdraw two armored divisions from Army Group Center for Army Group A originated in response to a request from Guderian. On 14 January he informed Hitler that Army Group Center presumably would be able to hold its positions but that the Soviet breakthrough in Army Group A’s front posed a serious threat to Upper Silesia. Guderian insisted that this danger could be averted only if he received powerful forces for a counterattack. The following day, once the divisions had been ordered to the south, Guderian pointed out the danger at the junction of Army Group A’s Ninth and Fourth Panzer armies, and he requested Hitler’s approval for his own decision to transfer the two divisions to the Pilica River sector, about midway between Warsaw and Kielce. There was no indication that he objected to the withdrawal of the divisions from Army Group Center, merely to their destination. Yet in his memoirs Guderian bitterly condemned Hitler for this order.
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Furthermore, Guderian wanted to take two additional divisions from Reinhardt on 17 January, but Hitler decided in favor of the army group.
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Two days earlier Reinhardt had requested permission to shorten his front in order to gain forces, and despite Guderian’s opposition, Hitler sided with Reinhardt.
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Guderian’s portrayal of these events in his memoirs is a good example of an attempt to shift the blame for his own mistakes to Hitler.

For his part, Dönitz did all he could to hold on to his Baltic ports. As the threat to East Prussia increased, he spared no effort to assist the army. The Second Task Force offered invaluable assistance in its role as a “fire brigade” for divisions fighting on land. Heavy guns from warships provided hard-pressed units with relief whether they were evacuating ports, launching attacks, or desperately attempting to hold positions. In the month of February, plus January’s last three days, the Second Task Force fired 7,120
shells in support of the army in several operations. These actions occurred despite shortages of ammunition for ships’ guns—ammunition that could no longer be manufactured.
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Hitler’s interest in the assistance provided to the army is evident from his conversations with Dönitz.
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