Guantánamo (45 page)
Authors: Jonathan M. Hansen
Within days of the coup, hospital morgues overflowed with victims; within weeks, the death toll exceeded fifteen hundred. Summary executions of entire families were not uncommon, as journalists described the worst violence they had seen in years. The scale of the violence was matched only by its audacity. Aristide supporters were cut down outside churches and in public squares. Brothers were taken out in front of siblings. Fathers were murdered before their children's eyes. In all, the coup displaced as many as two hundred thousand refugees, roughly half of whom fled to the Dominican Republic, while the other half, Frantz Guerrier and Yolande Jean among them, took to the sea.
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43
Â
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, the George H. W. Bush administration suspended the forced repatriation of Haitian refugees. It
was no longer plausible to argue that Haiti was free of political persecution. In early October, as the number of Haitian boaters mounted, the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command toured the Guantánamo naval base in anticipation of using it to hold fleeing Haitians. The first refugees to arrive there in the aftermath of the coup were not Haitians but rather a group of seventeen American missionaries who had escaped the violence in Haiti in four boats. Rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard on October 10, the missionaries were unloaded at the naval base before being flown home to the United States.
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was no longer plausible to argue that Haiti was free of political persecution. In early October, as the number of Haitian boaters mounted, the commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Command toured the Guantánamo naval base in anticipation of using it to hold fleeing Haitians. The first refugees to arrive there in the aftermath of the coup were not Haitians but rather a group of seventeen American missionaries who had escaped the violence in Haiti in four boats. Rescued by the U.S. Coast Guard on October 10, the missionaries were unloaded at the naval base before being flown home to the United States.
44
Early the next month, the Coast Guard began picking up increasing numbers of Haitian boaters in the Windward Passage and Old Bahama Channel. Official government narratives of this Coast Guard sweep describe it as a “rescue” operation. There is no doubt that many of the boats departing Haiti were unseaworthy and overloaded, and that countless refugees perished in the exodus. But a
rescue
that ended up returning the vast majority of refugees to face persecution, torture, and sometimes death in Haiti did not feel beneficial to the Haitians. At the very least, the experience of interdiction was profoundly alienating. “They burned our clothes, everything we had,” Yolande Jean recalled, after having been picked up by a Coast Guard boat; “the luggage, all the documents we were carrying.” The Americans gave the Haitians no explanation. “They just started towing our belongings, and the next thing we know, the boat was in flames. Photos, documents. If you didn't have pockets in which to put things, you lost them.” Jean managed to save a few precious papers by hiding them in a pocket.
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Moreover, the same presumption that inspired AMIO informed the policy of President Bush: the United States had the right to seize any Haitian boat bound no matter where, and detain, if not repatriate, its crew.
rescue
that ended up returning the vast majority of refugees to face persecution, torture, and sometimes death in Haiti did not feel beneficial to the Haitians. At the very least, the experience of interdiction was profoundly alienating. “They burned our clothes, everything we had,” Yolande Jean recalled, after having been picked up by a Coast Guard boat; “the luggage, all the documents we were carrying.” The Americans gave the Haitians no explanation. “They just started towing our belongings, and the next thing we know, the boat was in flames. Photos, documents. If you didn't have pockets in which to put things, you lost them.” Jean managed to save a few precious papers by hiding them in a pocket.
45
Moreover, the same presumption that inspired AMIO informed the policy of President Bush: the United States had the right to seize any Haitian boat bound no matter where, and detain, if not repatriate, its crew.
On November 10, two Coast Guard cutters carrying nearly five hundred refugees pulled into Guantánamo Bay and dropped anchor. The base commander, Captain William C. McCamy, dispatched a medical team to care for the refugees aboard the cutters. Two days later, alarmed by what his team found, McCamy informed Washington that for the safety and health of all concerned he would off-load the refugees onto the base.
46
The Haitians were taken to a hastily erected holding area known as Camp Bulkeley, out on the area known as
Radio Range (after the old radio antennas that once enjoyed unencumbered access out into the Caribbean), along the Cuban coastline. By mid-November, the number of boaters departing Haiti reached new heights. To forestall the exodus, President Bush resumed forced repatriations on November 18. A temporary restraining order out of district court in Miami halted the president's order the following day, prompting the president to establish a refugee camp at Guantánamo Bay. Four thousand Haitians came ashore at Guantánamo on November 20.
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The Haitians were taken to a hastily erected holding area known as Camp Bulkeley, out on the area known as
Radio Range (after the old radio antennas that once enjoyed unencumbered access out into the Caribbean), along the Cuban coastline. By mid-November, the number of boaters departing Haiti reached new heights. To forestall the exodus, President Bush resumed forced repatriations on November 18. A temporary restraining order out of district court in Miami halted the president's order the following day, prompting the president to establish a refugee camp at Guantánamo Bay. Four thousand Haitians came ashore at Guantánamo on November 20.
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The majority of Haitians detained at Guantánamo were deposited in Camp McCalla, which consisted of six separate facilities located on the old airfield on Windward Point. Once Camp McCalla was completed, Bulkeley was reserved for special usesâto hold “screened-in” Haitians awaiting transfer to the United States, for example, and, later, for screened-in Haitians with HIV/AIDS. Still another facility, known as Camp 7, was used as detention camp for uncooperative refugees. A “Joint Task Force” (JTF) consisting of army, navy, air force, and marines personnel commanded the camps. The organization of the camp followed standard military design, and included sections for families, unaccompanied minors, and adult men and women. The camps could accommodate up to 12,500 refugees at one time.
Determined to foster the refugees' cooperation, camp officials charged the Haitians with electing representatives and maintaining their living quarters (excepting sanitation). The JTF solicited volunteers to help with food preparation and, in some instances, with translation in the asylum screening process. To further encourage good behavior, guards provided refugees with cigarettes, games, balls, tools, construction material, and other “luxuries.” U.S. officials also furnished the Haitians with a newspaper entitled
Sa K'pase
(
What's Happening
), prepared by the Military Information Support Team, known by the acronym MIST, a branch of the Psychological Operations command. Published in both English and Haitian Creole, the paper informed refugees of the rules and recent development in the camps, along with rosy accounts of life back in Haitiâapparently designed to speed voluntary repatriations.
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Sa K'pase
(
What's Happening
), prepared by the Military Information Support Team, known by the acronym MIST, a branch of the Psychological Operations command. Published in both English and Haitian Creole, the paper informed refugees of the rules and recent development in the camps, along with rosy accounts of life back in Haitiâapparently designed to speed voluntary repatriations.
48
The distinction between a refugee camp and a prison is razor thin, and rests on the degree of trust and civility between the refugees and
their guards. Boredom and restlessness, the bane of many a detention operation, proved a challenge from the beginning. With little to do and even less space in which to do it, the social interactions between the mostly male U.S. military personnel and the screened-out Haitians especially deteriorated quickly. Guantánamo was “like hell,” one witness recalled. Having fled Haiti after seeing his father and brother murdered by thugs who had been searching for him, this man couldn't bear to be “treated like animals.” In the camps, he reported, “there are thousands of us. Children everywhere. There is so much confusion. Nobody knows what's happening.” From the beginning, U.S. State Department officials pressured INS interviewers to screen
out
(i.e., return to Haiti) as many Haitians as possible, which made for tense relations between captives and captors. “If a cutter heading for Port-au-Prince still has space, more screened-in people will be questioned again,” the same witness testified, or “if a person's story had even a small inconsistency, then he is told âyou are lying' and sent back” to Haiti.
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their guards. Boredom and restlessness, the bane of many a detention operation, proved a challenge from the beginning. With little to do and even less space in which to do it, the social interactions between the mostly male U.S. military personnel and the screened-out Haitians especially deteriorated quickly. Guantánamo was “like hell,” one witness recalled. Having fled Haiti after seeing his father and brother murdered by thugs who had been searching for him, this man couldn't bear to be “treated like animals.” In the camps, he reported, “there are thousands of us. Children everywhere. There is so much confusion. Nobody knows what's happening.” From the beginning, U.S. State Department officials pressured INS interviewers to screen
out
(i.e., return to Haiti) as many Haitians as possible, which made for tense relations between captives and captors. “If a cutter heading for Port-au-Prince still has space, more screened-in people will be questioned again,” the same witness testified, or “if a person's story had even a small inconsistency, then he is told âyou are lying' and sent back” to Haiti.
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Confined for days on end in small camps, with limited social contact and little to keep them busy, it wasn't long before the Haitians began to feel like prisoners. As early as mid-December, after only three weeks in captivity, a demonstration broke out in Camp Bulkeley. Within several days, it spread to Camp McCalla, where Haitians confronted military guards with homemade weapons: tent poles, wooden rods ripped from cots, and chunks of asphalt. More than anything, the situation called for a mediator with knowledge of Haiti. When JTF commander George H. Walls tried to intervene, he was struck by a piece of asphalt; intervention by a representative of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) accomplished little besides clarifying that the demonstrators wanted to speak to representatives in the United States. By December 15, when Walls called home for backup, the Haitians and their captors had come to regard one another as enemies.
The cultural chasm separating the two communities, already significant, yawned perilously that night, when U.S. soldiers dispatched to keep tabs on the demonstrators witnessed “what appeared to be a voodoo ritual.” According to an official account, some of the Haitians “wrapped themselves in white sheets and walked to the four corners of the compound, which represented the four corners of the earth, to
consult with the spirits.” The Haitians “then drew strength from the earth by lying down on the ground near what appeared to be a makeshift voodoo shrine,” which, the chronicler notes, “typically includes representations of Christian and voodoo religious figures and other objects shrouded with symbolic meaning, such as candles or glass jars.” So menacing did this ritual seem that “the general and his staff worried that the next step might be a blood sacrifice of some sort.” With no more knowledge of Haitian culture than the State Department team described in
Civiletti
, the U.S. officers were left to interpret the Haitians' actions on their own. “One officer thought some of the Haitians believed that a sacrifice would hasten the arrival of the âmagical bird' that would take them to Florida. Another officer remembered hearing about a threat by the malcontents to start throwing babies over the fence if their demands were not met within 48 hours.”
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consult with the spirits.” The Haitians “then drew strength from the earth by lying down on the ground near what appeared to be a makeshift voodoo shrine,” which, the chronicler notes, “typically includes representations of Christian and voodoo religious figures and other objects shrouded with symbolic meaning, such as candles or glass jars.” So menacing did this ritual seem that “the general and his staff worried that the next step might be a blood sacrifice of some sort.” With no more knowledge of Haitian culture than the State Department team described in
Civiletti
, the U.S. officers were left to interpret the Haitians' actions on their own. “One officer thought some of the Haitians believed that a sacrifice would hasten the arrival of the âmagical bird' that would take them to Florida. Another officer remembered hearing about a threat by the malcontents to start throwing babies over the fence if their demands were not met within 48 hours.”
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The Americans' interpretation of the Haitians' behavior could have been catastrophic. By the time the 302 marines dispatched from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, descended on McCalla II at four o'clock on the morning of December 17 with fixed bayonets, the Haitians had been thoroughly dehumanized, their grievances dismissed. Wanting nothing so much as a taste of American freedom, they had become the dark, demonic
Other
that Americans feared in Haiti going back centuries. Only extraordinary discipline on the part of the refugees themselves prevented “Operation Take Charge” from becoming a bloodbath. “There is no question the Haitians were taken completely by surprise,” read the government report, “and it was not a pleasant surprise. Grim-faced marines, some holding rifles, encircled the camp. Marine engineers wearing flack jackets and helmets and armed with breaching tools moved swiftly to make gaps in the wire through which the [marines], equipped with riot gear, entered the compound.” When “the stunned migrants offered no resistance,” the disturbance came to an end.
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Other
that Americans feared in Haiti going back centuries. Only extraordinary discipline on the part of the refugees themselves prevented “Operation Take Charge” from becoming a bloodbath. “There is no question the Haitians were taken completely by surprise,” read the government report, “and it was not a pleasant surprise. Grim-faced marines, some holding rifles, encircled the camp. Marine engineers wearing flack jackets and helmets and armed with breaching tools moved swiftly to make gaps in the wire through which the [marines], equipped with riot gear, entered the compound.” When “the stunned migrants offered no resistance,” the disturbance came to an end.
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Â
In early December the district court in Miami replaced its temporary restraining order with a preliminary injunction, demanding that the Bush administration “implement and follow procedural safeguards adequate to ensure that Haitians with bona fide claims of political persecution
are not forcefully returned to Haiti.” Though overturned the following month, the injunction forced the INS to confront its dismal record in recognizing the real threat of political persecution confronting a broad class of Haitian refugees. For a time, the judicial intervention improved screening procedures at Guantánamo Bay. By mid-January 1992, the number of Haitians screened into the United States jumped precipitously to 85 percent, before falling back to 45 percent in February, then to a mere 2 percent in April. Overall, between October 1991 and June 1992, U.S. officials carried out some thirty-six thousand screening interviews at the naval base, “screening in” more than ten thousand Haitians, or roughly 28 percent.
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Which is not to suggest that 28 percent was enough, or that Americans had finally overcome their anti-Haitian prejudice. Rather, it is simply to observe that the record could have been (indeed, had been) worse.
are not forcefully returned to Haiti.” Though overturned the following month, the injunction forced the INS to confront its dismal record in recognizing the real threat of political persecution confronting a broad class of Haitian refugees. For a time, the judicial intervention improved screening procedures at Guantánamo Bay. By mid-January 1992, the number of Haitians screened into the United States jumped precipitously to 85 percent, before falling back to 45 percent in February, then to a mere 2 percent in April. Overall, between October 1991 and June 1992, U.S. officials carried out some thirty-six thousand screening interviews at the naval base, “screening in” more than ten thousand Haitians, or roughly 28 percent.
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Which is not to suggest that 28 percent was enough, or that Americans had finally overcome their anti-Haitian prejudice. Rather, it is simply to observe that the record could have been (indeed, had been) worse.
From the first, the State Department pressured INS interviewers to reduce the number of screened-in Haitians to an absolute minimum, which explains the rapid monthly decline in admittees in early 1992. In mid-December 1991, just as Frantz Guerrier's dental clinic was torched, the State Department informed the INS that “at this time we have no reason to believe the mere identification of an individual as an Aristide supporter put that individual at particular risk of mistreatment.”
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In early February, Commander Walls joined the everything-is-dandy-in-Haiti chorus, insisting that the repatriation of screened-out Haitians was going “smoothly,” and that the returnees faced “no retribution,” a claim he reiterated mid-month. In fact, neither the screening process nor the return of the exiles to Haiti was going smoothly, as more candid government reports allowed. Since mid-November 1991, when the Coast Guard first began picking up more and more refugees, the screening process had been slow, chaotic, and inefficient. In early February, INS agents lost the records of nearly two thousand screened-in refugees, a mistake that proved deadly for at least one of them. At the moment that Commander Walls was assuring the public about Haitian conditions, a young woman named Marie Zette was returned to Haiti despite protesting what she knew to be a death sentence. A few days later, at Guantánamo, Zette's name came up for transfer to Miami; there had been a mix-up. Zette's stay of execution came too late. Back in Haiti, she was murdered in her bed by
Tonton Macoutes. News of her fate arrived at Guantánamo later that month, borne by members of her fleeing family.
54
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In early February, Commander Walls joined the everything-is-dandy-in-Haiti chorus, insisting that the repatriation of screened-out Haitians was going “smoothly,” and that the returnees faced “no retribution,” a claim he reiterated mid-month. In fact, neither the screening process nor the return of the exiles to Haiti was going smoothly, as more candid government reports allowed. Since mid-November 1991, when the Coast Guard first began picking up more and more refugees, the screening process had been slow, chaotic, and inefficient. In early February, INS agents lost the records of nearly two thousand screened-in refugees, a mistake that proved deadly for at least one of them. At the moment that Commander Walls was assuring the public about Haitian conditions, a young woman named Marie Zette was returned to Haiti despite protesting what she knew to be a death sentence. A few days later, at Guantánamo, Zette's name came up for transfer to Miami; there had been a mix-up. Zette's stay of execution came too late. Back in Haiti, she was murdered in her bed by
Tonton Macoutes. News of her fate arrived at Guantánamo later that month, borne by members of her fleeing family.
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Much of this migrant operation (“Operation GTMO” in military parlance) recapitulated the patterns of government behavior described in
Civiletti
. Some U.S. officialsâCommander Walls comes to mindâseem simply to have accepted uncritically assurances by their colleagues that all was well in Haiti and that returnees would be greeted warmly upon arriving home. Others deliberately misrepresented the evidence before their very eyes. INS official Gunther Wagner, for example, having led three survey missions to Haiti, claimed that “95 to 97 percent of the [Haitian] people obviously have had no problems, and therefore would not be eligible for asylum.” The majority of the asylum claims made by Guantánamo refugees, Wagner alleged, were simply “fraudulent.”
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Civiletti
. Some U.S. officialsâCommander Walls comes to mindâseem simply to have accepted uncritically assurances by their colleagues that all was well in Haiti and that returnees would be greeted warmly upon arriving home. Others deliberately misrepresented the evidence before their very eyes. INS official Gunther Wagner, for example, having led three survey missions to Haiti, claimed that “95 to 97 percent of the [Haitian] people obviously have had no problems, and therefore would not be eligible for asylum.” The majority of the asylum claims made by Guantánamo refugees, Wagner alleged, were simply “fraudulent.”
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