Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (34 page)

31 Diop’s work provided: Martin Bernal,
Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilizations
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987).

32 The first dogma: Edward Said,
Orientalism
(London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 300–301.

33 Here, too, the tendency: Nationalist politicization of cultured identities was often a response to Orientalist history writing. It is this simple historical insight that is missing in the post-9/11 warning contained in a piece on Occidentalism: “But one thing is clear in this murky war, it is that we should not counter Occidentalism with a nasty form of Orientalism. Once we fall for that temptation, the virus has infected us too.” The problem, of course, is that a history of the disease shows that its course has been the reverse, from Orientalism to Occidentalism! See Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, “Occidentalism,”
The New York Review of Books
, January 17, 2002, p. 7.

33 The nationalist response: David Crawford, “Morocco’s Invisible
Imazighen,” The Journal of North African Studies
7, no. 1, spring 2002, pp. 59, 66.

33 How else are we to understand: All three estimates are cited in Crawford, “Morocco’s Invisible
Imazighen,”
p. 61.

34 Arabic-speaking: For a historical account, see Boubacar,
Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade
, pp. 10, 15, 53.

35 “Afro-Arab integration”: The book was intended to act as a beacon, bringing a fresh and healing perspective to civil conflicts then rife across the African continent. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sudan,
Peace and Unity in the Sudan: An African Achievement
(Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 1973), pp. 58-59.

35 “One sees that in all things”: Ernest Renan, cited in Said,
Orientalism
, p. 149.

38 Karen Armstrong has located: Armstrong,
Battle for God
, pp. 175–77.

40 “The modern point of view”: Susan Friend Harding,
The Book of Jerry Falwell: Fundamentalist Language and Politics
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp. 62-63.

41 The founder, Bob Jones: Armstrong,
Battle for God
, pp. 215, 268.

41 The first wave followed: Ibid., pp. 268-75.

42. Televangelists started the national: Harding,
Book of Jerry Falwell
, p. 77.

42 Speaking on the “Nebraska tragedy”: Ibid., p. 23.

42 When Falwell founded: Ibid., pp. 17, 22, 79, 158, 161, 162, 190.

43 Though thirty of thirty-two: Phyllis Schlafly,
The Power of the Christian Woman
(Cincinnati: Standard, 1981), p. 117, cited in Armstrong,
Battle for God
, p. 311.

44 In his speech at the opening: Sara Diamond,
Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States
(New York: Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 1, 237; Harding,
Book of Jerry Falwell
, pp. 19-20.

45 When Renan published: Nikki Keddie,
An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din ‘al-Afghani
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 87-97.

46 On the other, this very necessity: Bassam Tibi,
The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 1988), p. 70; cited in Armstrong,
Battle for God
, pp. 156-58.

46 There is a major debate: Schulze has pointed out that “in Islam there was no religious power that had to be separated from worldly power, since Islam had no clergy and no priesthood … so it would be senseless to burden Islam with a problem of Christian dogmatics.” Schulze,
Modern History of the Islamic World
, p. 3. Whereas Schulze’s insight illuminates mainstream Islam, I shall later point out that it needs to be modified in light of developments in contemporary Shi’a Islam.

46 However, Schulze points out: I am thankful to Tim Mitchell for driving this point home over and over again.

47 This is why it makes: Samir Amin has made the point succinctly: “These movements are commonly designated ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ in the West, but I prefer the phrase used in the Arab world: ‘Political Islam.’ We do not have religious movements,
per se
, here—the various groups are all quite close to one another—but something much more banal: political organization whose aim is the conquest of state power, nothing more, nothing less.” Samir Amin, “Political Islam,”
CovertAction Quarterly
, winter 2001, p. 3.

47 The split between: For a political analysis of Indian Islam, see Ayesha Jalal,
Self and Sovereignty, Individual and Community in South Asian Islam Since 1850
(New York: Routledge, 2001).

47 Contrary to what: Writing of Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Ayesha Jalal observes:

The Aligarh movement which he fathered was to be seen as the purveyor of modernist and rational thinking among the Muslim elite and, ironically enough, also the harbinger of latter-day Muslim political “separatism” and “communalism.” By contrast, his more culturally exclusive Muslim opponents, harbouring anti-colonial feelings and sentiments of Islamic universalism, steeped themselves in religious structures at
madrasas
and
maktabs
only to end up squarely on the side of an inclusionary and “secular” Indian nationalism.

See Jalal,
Self and Sovereignty
, pp. 77-78.

48 He called for the institution:

He had never thought much of the Turkish khilafat and still less of Gandhian non-cooperation. In his opinion, “no sincere Muslim could join [the khilafat movement] for a single minute. In November 1922, Iqbal was among the few who acclaimed the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s decision to abolish the sultanate and appoint a new khalifa stripped of any temporal authority. Seeing it as the correct exercise of collective as opposed to individual ijtihad, Iqbal later declared that among the Muslim countries of the world “Turkey alone ha[d] shaken off its dogmatic slumber, and attained … self-consciousness” through the exercise of “her right to intellectual freedom.” Muslims in the rest of the world, including India, were “mechanically repeating old values, whereas the Turk … [was] on the way to creating new values.”

Jalal,
Self and Sovereignty
, pp. 244-45.

49 The six-point program: The program included: (1) the interpretation of the Koran in the spirit of the age; (2) the unity of Islamic nations; (3) raising the standard of living and achievement of social justice and order; (4) a struggle against illiteracy and poverty; (5) the emancipation of Muslim lands from foreign dominance; and (6) the promotion of Islamic peace and fraternity throughout the world. See Armstrong,
Battle for God
, pp. 218-26. On disavowing violence, see Richard Mitchell,
The Society of the Muslim Brothers
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969); cited in Talal Asad, “Comments (Yet Again) on Political Islam in the Middle East” (Graduate Center, City University of New York, October 11, 2002, mimeographed).

49 But the society soon split: Schulze,
Modern History of the Islamic World
, pp. 134-35.

50 This demands a jihad: A Muslim thus seeks unity between the personal and the political. Any attempt to fence off any area from this overall religious effort would be a violation of a cardinal Islamic principle,
tawhid
(unification). It is the principle of tawhid that Bernard Lewis cites as the basis of his claim that Islam has no doctrinal room for a secular accommodation. In doing so, he not only turns his back on historical Islam but also identifies Islam doctrinally with one particular interpretation.

50 The lesser jihad: Farish A. Noor, “The Evolution of Jihad in Islamist Political Discourse: How a Plastic Concept Became Harder,” Social Science Research Council, available at
http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/noor.htm
. Ayatollah Khomeini wrote an article titled “The Greater Jihad” in 1972. The title referred to one of his favorite hadiths, whereby the Prophet says after returning home from a battle, “We are returning from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad.” It is from this perspective that politics is the lesser struggle and the spiritual transformation of self and society the larger struggle.

50 Tomaž Mastnak: Mastnak,
Crusading Peace
, pp. 64-65.

51 Among the Berbers: For a historical account, see Boubacar,
Senegambia and the Atlantic Slave Trade
, pp. 25, 46, 51-52., 58, 81, 94–95.

52 The third time jihad: Tariq Ali,
The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads, and Modernity
(London: Verso, 2002), pp. 41-42, 73–74.

53 It is estimated: Francis M. Deng,
War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 49-52.

53 To realize that end: Schulze,
Modern History of the Islamic World
, pp. 116-117.

54 He defined “the ultimate”: Sayyid Abul A’la Mawdudi,
Let Us Be Muslims
, ed. Khurram Murad (London: Islamic Foundation, 1985), pp. 285, 288.

54 With both eyes focused: Ibid., p. 295.

54 He also secularized: Ibid., p. 297.

55 Mawdudi was the first: Euben,
Enemy in the Mirror
, p. 74; Armstrong,
Battle for God
, pp. 236-38.

55 Even if Qutb: Schulze,
Modern History of the Islamic World
, p. 176. 55 His first book: For a short biographical sketch, see Hamid Algar, “Introduction,” to Sayyid Qutb,
Social Justice in Islam
, trans. John B. Hardie, rev. with an introduction by Hamid Algar (Oneonta, N.Y.: Islamic Publications, 2000), pp. 1-17.

55 Qutb explained his objective: Qutb,
Social Justice in Islam
, p. 19.

57 Modernization through the natural: Sayyid Qutb,
Milestones
, rev. trans. with a foreword by Ahmed Zaki Hammad (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990), pp. 91-94.

57 “Islam is a declaration”: Ibid., pp. 49-50, 46.

58 Here, Qutb echoed: Ibid., p. 9.

58 Acting as a trustee: Schulze,
Modern History of the Islamic World.
On Ali Shariati, see p. 178; on Ayatollah Khomeini, see p. 223.

60 “Mankind today is”: Qutb,
Milestones
, pp. 5-6.

Chapter Two: The Cold War After Indochina

64 A joint resolution: Ignacio Ramonet, “State-Sponsored Lies,”
Le Monde Diplomatique
, available at
http://mondediplo.com/2003/07/01ramonet
.

65 After Tet: Charles Mechling, Jr., “Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal by Fire,” in
Low-Intensity Warfare: Counter-Insurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties
, ed. Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 41-45.

66 Even at the end: Alfred W. McCoy, “‘Fallout’: The Interplay of CIA Cover Warfare and the Global Narcotics Traffic,” paper presented to the conference the Civil War and Cold War, 1975-1990: A Comparative Analysis of Southern Africa, Central America, and Central Asia (Institute of African Studies, Columbia University, New York, N.Y., November 14-15, 2002, mimeographed), pp. 2-3.

66 To defend the freedom:
The Opium War
The Compilation Group of the History of Modern China Series (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976).

66 In a monumental historical study: The material on the growth of the opium and heroin trade in Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle is based on Alfred W. McCoy,
The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade
(New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), pp. 18-19, 162-63, 222-23, 290–91, 349, 376-77.