George F. Kennan: An American Life (19 page)

The embassy library received over a hundred Soviet and foreign newspapers daily, subscribed to between 350 and 400 periodicals, and maintained a collection of over a thousand books while forwarding additional copies to the legation in Riga and to the Division of Eastern European Affairs library in Washington. However moth-ridden and roach-infested it may have been, the Mokhovaya was now a major research center on Soviet affairs—so much so that department officials were beginning to grumble about the number of dispatches they were receiving, some of which seemed “unnecessarily voluminous.”
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The work was “very hard, very delicate, and quite thankless,” George wrote. “We don’t try to see anything of the Russians any more, except for a few official parties. It’s too risky for them.” The isolation of foreigners had never been greater, and the group that remained got smaller, more ingrown, and increasingly bored with each other. Social life within the embassy was, if anything, more intense. “Have been out every single night [except] last night,” Annelise added on January 2—George was back in Vienna for a medical checkup.

It helped that there was now, for recreation, an American dacha outside Moscow, which several of the embassy bachelors had purchased. Not far from Stalin’s own country retreat, it had a log house, a tennis court, a garden, horses to ride, and a high wooden fence. There was something very comforting, Charlie Thayer remembered, “about driving through those big wooden gates after a long hard day trying to understand the Russians.... [T]he GPU seemed to disappear from existence.”
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The Kennans used the place regularly. “We had the feeling we could go out at any time,” Annelise remembered. Surrounding the dacha, George explained, was “the most wonderful riding country you can imagine. We make a point of saying good-day to all the peasants. They look as though they were seeing a ghost, and grope uncertainly for their hats. They think maybe the Revolution was all a bad dream, and that the masters are back in the saddle.” On one memorable occasion, George, Grace, and Stalin drove back from their respective dachas on the same road at the same time. As his limousine passed, the dictator “stared gloomily out of his window at Grace and myself and we stared back.”
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Still, Moscow was a difficult place to raise children. When Grace fell ill with bronchial pneumonia, no nurse dared enter a foreign embassy. A Russian doctor did come, but only after receiving permission from the Foreign Office, which also had to approve the use of a portable X-ray machine. “For one whole day,” George admitted, “I literally didn’t dare to hope that she would live.” He worried that “we wouldn’t even be able to find a priest to bury the little girl.” Grace recovered dramatically, however, and was soon sitting up and pestering everyone, being as naughty as one can be with “feet firmly on this earth.”

“I feel that I am ripe for a transfer,” Kennan confessed wearily at the end of this December 1936 letter to Jeanette. For in addition to the hardships of life in Moscow, he and his colleagues were developing “a doctrinaire skepticism which cannot be a good thing. We know so thoroughly the limitations of our job that it seems hard to see its possibilities.... [W]e have the psychology of old men.” The time had come to turn things over to people “whose experience is less and whose enthusiasm is greater. It will do us all good.”
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That opportunity came quickly enough. Bullitt’s successor, Joseph E. Davies, arrived on January 19, 1937, with ample enthusiasm but no experience whatever. He was, like Bullitt, a friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt, but there the similarities ended. A lawyer, campaign contributor, and the new (but third) husband of Marjorie Merriweather Post, one of the richest women in the world, Davies was in every sense a political appointee. He was sleek, self-confident, hungry for publicity, and proud of
not
being a diplomat. He knew nothing of the Soviet Union but was sure that powerful men were the same everywhere and that he could, through the force of his own personality, get through to its leaders. All of this placed Davies at odds with the disillusioned Bullitt and the staff he had left behind. Davies “drew from the first instant our distrust and dislike,” Kennan recalled. “We doubted his seriousness.... We saw every evidence that his motives in accepting the post were personal and political and ulterior to any sense of the solemnity of the task itself.” At the end of the new ambassador’s first day in Moscow, Kennan and several other young career officers gathered in Henderson’s rooms to consider “whether we should resign in a body from the service.”
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They did not, but the State Department was sufficiently concerned that it sent one of its most trusted investigators, J. Klahr Huddle, to assess the situation. “It is difficult to express just what happened to the staff of the Moscow Embassy when Mr. Davies arrived,” Huddle reported back. One problem had been the difficulties of importing into the country all that the Davieses had wanted to bring. This included an entourage of sixteen aides, servants, and relatives, as well as a phalanx of freezers filled with the food they would consume while in residence at Spaso House. They demanded transportation on private trains—a concept unfamiliar to the Soviet railway authorities—together with Leningrad docking facilities for Mrs. Davies’s yacht, the
Sea Cloud.
The ambassador showed up at his Mokhovaya office only twice before returning to the United States in March, but he left behind three thousand envelopes to be stamped, sealed, and mailed: these contained fund-raising appeals for the Mount Vernon Girls School in Washington, of which Mrs. Davies was a trustee.

A man of broad knowledge in many fields, Davies was reluctant to acknowledge, Huddle noted, “his lack in the present one.” Soon after arriving he asked Henderson to produce, on two days’ notice, briefings on all the other European states, specifying their leadership, population, culture, religion, economy, alliances, and the status of their relations with the U.S.S.R. He quickly developed a dislike for Kennan, Huddle reported, which was unfortunate, “because Kennan prides himself on his knowledge of Russia, is very sensitive, and does his best work with a little encouragement and praise.” Overall, Huddle concluded, the ambassador in his first two months at Moscow had “very seriously” imperiled the morale of the embassy staff, and “when I arrived, [it] was almost at the breaking point.”
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George confirmed this to Jeanette: it would be some time before the effect wore off, and “I can take my profession seriously again. If I had had a little money, you would probably already have seen me trooping back to Wisconsin to start life over again.” Annelise added that the Davieses “are just awful.... I am trying to calm [George] down as best I can and just laugh it all off,” but “[i]t is worse than I ever could dream it to be.” The problem, Kennan later explained, was that men like Davies required underlings “to cover up their mistakes, to toss them meaningless baubles to keep them occupied, [and] to go on doing the important things under the surface.” By March, the staff could at least look forward to the temporary departure of the “Davies ménage,” at which point, Kennan predicted, “the sun will begin to shine, the flowers to peep through the ground, and the little birdies will arrive from the South and tell us what a nice world it is after all.”
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The second of Stalin’s purges was going on that winter, which made the atmosphere all the more oppressive. “[E]verybody was so scared,” Annelise remembered. Davies gave a dinner for thirty-six people, of whom six were soon executed, “including the man who sat next to me.” The ambassador insisted on attending the trials, but before doing so asked Kennan to

He then brought a furious Kennan along to whisper translations of the proceedings: “During the intermissions I was sent, regularly, to fetch the ambassador his sandwiches, while he exchanged sententious judgments with the gentlemen of the press concerning the guilt of the victims.”

Davies assured the State Department that the trial had established “a definite political conspiracy to overthrow the present Government.” He was careful to point out, though, that the trials had not been fair by American standards, because the accused had been denied counsel, were forced to testify against themselves, and their guilt had been assumed from the start. He also saw to it that the department got another perspective. Noting that “Mr. Kennan has been here a great many years and is an exceptionally able man, thoroughly familiar with Russia,” Davies took the unusual step of forwarding his interpreter’s assessment of the trials, along with his own.

They were not that far apart. Kennan’s report emphasized the ease with which confessions could be coerced but acknowledged that the defendants had “probably done plenty, from the point of view of the regime, to warrant their humiliation and punishment.” What really happened might never be known: “[t]he Russian mind, as Dostoevski has shown, . . . sometimes carries both truth and falsehood to such infinite extremes that they eventually meet in space, like parallel lines, and it is no longer possible to distinguish between them.” In a significant acknowledgment of Kennan’s expertise, Robert Kelley, now the director of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, sent both reports to the secretary of state, Cordell Hull: they represented, he observed neutrally, “two points of view based on different methods of approach,” differing “only in degree” in their conclusions.
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Embassy security was another of Kennan’s concerns. While the Davieses were back in the United States, Thayer discovered a crude listening device—lowered on a fishpole in the Spaso House attic—in the wall behind the ambassador’s desk. Intrigued, the staff tried to catch the culprit, a project that required the rigging of trip wires, alarm bells, and in one instance Kennan’s spending an uncomfortable night in the billiard room with a nonfunctioning flashlight and an empty revolver. The results, in the end, were inconclusive. Davies was “displeased that we had ever inaugurated them,” fearing that they would compromise his public image of popularity with the Soviet leadership. It hardly mattered, for the ambassador “was not in the habit of saying things of any consequence, either in the bugged study or anywhere else.”
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“[Q]uite frankly I think that [Kennan] has been here quite long enough—perhaps too long for his own good,” Davies had by then written the State Department. “He is of a rather high-gear, nervous type” and had been ill “ever since I have been here.” Given his health along with the difficulties of raising a young family in Moscow, it would be good for all concerned if Kennan could be transferred to a post where living conditions were easier. The loss to the embassy would be serious, but it was “not fair to Kennan not to give him a chance to get well.”
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Kennan, for his part, was ready to go: as his comments about the “psychology of old men” suggest, he had been ready even before the Davies “ménage” appeared on the scene. “This has been, for me, the most unhappy winter on record,” he wrote Jeanette at the end of March from Yalta, where he had taken a few days off to visit Chekhov’s last home. But winter was coming to an end, “and with it, I hope, will end my sojourn in Russia. Life has its ups as well as its down[s], and we’ll see what a new post, a new chief and new surroundings will bring.”
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He was not displeased, therefore, when the State Department informed him in June that he would be reassigned to the American consulate in Jerusalem: “I sent to London for a bunch of books on the Palestine Mandate and prepared to forget, for a time, that Russia had ever existed.” But Kennan was horrified to learn, almost simultaneously, that the department had eliminated the Division of Eastern European Affairs, his administrative and intellectual home in Washington. Kelley, its chief, was as surprised as everyone else, and the library he had assembled was broken up—although not before Bohlen had rescued several hundred of its most valuable books and hidden them in an attic. “I was shocked,” Bullitt wrote R. Walton Moore, the State Department counselor. “[T]he division which Kelley built up was the most efficient in the world in its handling of these highly complicated questions.”
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The official explanation was efficiency. Eastern European Affairs was to be merged, along with its Western European counterpart, into a single Division of European Affairs. Moore confirmed rumors, however, that the White House had ordered the change: someone had persuaded the president, perhaps unwisely. Just who was unclear. Kennan suggested long afterward that if there ever had been “the smell of Soviet influence” within the government, this moment was more plausible than any that Senator Joseph McCarthy’s followers had identified. There is no conclusive evidence for this allegation, but it is reasonable to assume, from the fact of Davies’s appointment, that Roosevelt wanted a new approach to Moscow. It’s certainly possible, then, that the new ambassador had at least some role in shaping this new arrangement.
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However it happened, Kennan saw that Soviet-American relations were henceforth to have “the outward appearance of being cordial, no matter what gnashing of teeth might go on under the surface.... [N]ot only were we career officers in Moscow an impediment, but so was the Division of Eastern European Affairs.” The president, it appeared, knew nothing about, or cared nothing for, what they had accomplished. “We could never forgive F.D.R. that he had done this to us.” And so “I could only conclude that my approach to Russia had outlived its usefulness.”
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