George F. Kennan: An American Life (18 page)

Bullitt was in his final months of service in Moscow: he would spend the summer and fall working for Roosevelt’s reelection, with the understanding that the president would then appoint him to some less demanding overseas post. With help from Kennan and his colleagues, the ambassador prepared a series of valedictory reports on what two and a half years of diplomatic relations had accomplished. The record was sparse: trade remained unimpressive, negotiations on debts and claims had broken down, there had been no further progress on the new embassy chancery, and the previous summer the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had hosted a meeting of the Third International, the organization dedicated to spreading revolution throughout the world. American communists attended, a blatant violation, Bullitt believed, of Litvinov’s promise to Roosevelt, in 1933, that the Soviet Union would refrain from interfering, in any way, in the nation’s domestic affairs. “[I]t must be recognized,” the ambassador warned dramatically in what the staff referred to as his “swan song” dispatch, that “communists are agents of a foreign power whose aim is not only to destroy the institutions and liberties of our country, but also to kill millions of Americans.”
⁴¹

“People have sneered at Bullitt for the enthusiasm and optimism with which he approached his task in Russia, and for the meagerness of the results obtained,” Kennan wrote in 1938. That was, he thought, not fair: “It was a gallant try, . . . in a profession where risks are unavoidable.” He himself, however, had never shared Bullitt’s optimism: Kelley’s training had left him without illusions as to what diplomacy could accomplish in Moscow. Kennan also knew, from Russian history, that hostility toward the outside world was not new. To make this point, he prepared a report taken wholly from the dispatches of Neill S. Brown, the U.S. minister in St. Petersburg from 1850 to 1853. They had been found, Kennan claimed, in a pile of rubbish in what was left of the American legation there. “Secrecy and mystery characterize everything,” Brown had written, of the reign of Nicholas I. “Nothing is made public that is worth knowing.” The Russian government possessed, “in an exquisite degree, the art of worrying a foreign representative without giving him even the consolation of an insult.”

Delighted, Bullitt forwarded Brown’s observations to the State Department as an accurate picture of life in the Soviet Union in 1936: “
Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose
.” Kennan saw in them the need to regard Bolshevism, “with all its hullabaloo about revolution,” not as a turning point in history, but as only another milepost in Russia’s “wasteful, painful progress from an obscure origin to an obscure destiny.” Nothing in Brown’s dispatches or in Kennan’s training, however, anticipated the horrors of Stalinism. If the purges continued, he concluded in another study written for Bullitt, “there would be nothing left of the Soviet system of government but rule by a small irresponsible group” whose authority rested only on “bread and circuses” and repressive police power: “in short, fascism.”
⁴²

This did not mean, though, that relations with the U.S.S.R. were useless. Bullitt’s “swan song,” in which he warned of the Soviet desire to “kill millions of Americans,” concluded on a wholly different note: “We should neither expect too much, nor despair of getting anything at all.” There is no way to know who drafted which portions, but the recommendations that followed—a patient balancing of competing pressures over a long period of time with a view to producing growth in desired directions—sounded more like Kennan’s methods for achieving physical health and psychological stability than like Bullitt’s emotional volatility:

The future of Soviet-American relations would therefore depend chiefly on the United States. “[W]e should guard the reputation of Americans for businesslike efficiency, sincerity, and straightforwardness. We should never send a spy to the Soviet Union. There is no weapon so disarming and effective in relations with the communists as sheer honesty. They know very little about it.”
⁴³

Whoever drafted it, the conclusions of Bullitt’s “swan song” anticipated with eerie precision the most famous essay Kennan ever published: his briefly anonymous 1947 “X” article, in
Foreign Affairs
, on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.”
⁴⁴
Bullitt, more than anyone else, launched Kennan on the trajectory that led to that achievement. He gave Kennan his first big break by asking him, on the spur of the moment, to help open the Moscow embassy. He nursed Kennan through a year-long health crisis that, without steady behind-the-scenes support, could easily have ended his career. He consistently praised Kennan’s work in reports to the State Department: Bullitt’s critical personnel assessments spared no other member of the Moscow embassy staff. “Nothing but Mr. Kennan’s health,” he concluded in the last of these, “can prevent him from becoming one of the most valuable officers in the [Foreign] Service.”
⁴⁵

Kennan knew what Bullitt had done for him. His generation of Foreign Service officers, he wrote his former boss after his ambassadorship to France was announced in September 1936, had been trying to save themselves “from the comfortable philistinism or the decadent estheticism which are the refuges of most of our older colleagues.” Bullitt had understood and sympathized with these efforts. It would seem “very strange not to have your guidance in the Moscow work—especially for me, who can recall our associations in this work from the very beginning.” The Americans there would “plug along,” but “the last vestiges of the novelty of opening up a new territory are gone. Our work is routine—and no longer adventure.”
⁴⁶

SHORTLY AFTER HIS DECEMBER 1935 TRIP TO TOLSTOY’S HOME AT Yasnaya Polyana—with its unexpected assistance from the GPU and its unanticipated evocations of boyhood winters in Wisconsin—Kennan asked the State Department for permission to return to the United States. He had not been there for over two years, he pointed out, and on that visit he had taken only seventeen days of leave before departing with Bullitt for Moscow. Annelise and Grace would be traveling to America in February: it would be Grace’s first trip there. Moreover, “my wife expects another child to be born in April. I should naturally like to join her soon after the child has been born.”
¹

There were legal as well as sentimental reasons for the request. A new law had raised the possibility that children born abroad might be denied American citizenship if one parent lacked that status. Annelise was not yet a citizen, so there was little choice, George recalled, but for her to make the long winter voyage back before the baby arrived, after which “I had to come over and fetch them all back to Russia.” The trip would strain finances, he told Jeanette, but with luck there would be enough “to see Annelise and Grace to the United States and the next youngster into the world. Then we’ll see where we stand.”
²

Joan Elisabeth Kennan was born in April at Jeanette’s home in Highland Park, Illinois, and George got there in mid-May. The expanded family vacationed for a few weeks at the Hotchkiss cottage on Pine Lake, just north of Nagawicka—the family compound there had long since been sold. George read Charles Beard’s
The Open Door at Home,
listened to radio coverage of the Republican national convention, and wrote a letter to Bullitt “wishing that there were another opportunity—just at this time—for one of those high and wide discussions which we have had on only too rare occasions.” What he wanted to talk about, though, was not Russia, but America.

The journey home, Kennan reported, had been a reintroduction to capitalism, of which he had seen little recently except Norway and Austria, which had been too idyllic and too depressing, respectively, to be representative. Germany, as he passed through it, had been a “great garden, well-kept and blooming, . . . populated by clean and healthy people.” London had been full of business activity but striking for its social stability: he had forgotten that such a thing existed. So “I got back to this country almost a complete convert to the horrors of capitalism, ready to forgive even radio advertising, . . . and the Saturday Evening Post.”

Once home, however, his optimism began to fade. He acknowledged the high living standard, the political liberties, the freedom of expression. But there was also chaotic municipal growth, an increasingly spoiled countryside, and an absence of public regulation, all of which left “little for the future but retrogression.”

Geography insulated the United States from the international consequences of ineffectiveness, but “no oceans can spare us the internal consequences.” Only “strong central power (far stronger than the present constitution would allow)” could rescue individuals from economic hardship and social injustice. “And I’m afraid that’s what’s coming.”
³

Kennan’s letter set forth concerns about his country that would remain with him for the rest of his life: anxiety over the way unrestricted capitalism eroded community; a sense of environmental dangers that was well ahead of its time; frustration over the extent to which domestic political pressures, responding to private interests, shaped public policy; fear that this would weaken the United States in a world dominated by more purposeful states; and finally a striking lack of faith in the health and durability of democratic institutions. “I hate the rough and tumble of our political life,” George had written Jeanette the previous year. “I hate democracy; I hate the press . . . ; I hate the ‘peepul;’ I have become clearly un-American.”
⁴

The problem, he conceded many years later, was “not just that I had left the world of my boyhood, . . . it was also that this world had left me.” It had of course left everyone else too, but the process had been so gradual that most Americans hadn’t noticed. Only expatriates, returning after years spent abroad, could really see what was happening. “Increasingly, now, I would not be a part of my country, although what it had once been would remain a part of me.” Allegiance would be “a loyalty
despite
, not a loyalty
because
, a loyalty of principle, not of identification.”
⁵

The Kennans sailed for Europe in mid-July 1936, sharing the SS
Manhattan
with the “gum-chewing supermen” and “hefty amazons” who would represent the United States at the Berlin Olympics. Upon arrival in Hamburg,

George, Annelise, Grace, and Joan went by way of Kristiansand, Oslo, Copenhagen, and Helsinki to Leningrad, where the fortress of Kronstadt at the harbor entrance provided a grim welcome. Getting to the Moscow train was an ordeal, followed by terror when family, luggage, and George got separated in the midst of huge crowds. Reunited, they arrived the next morning in a rainstorm with no one to meet them, and so made their own way to the Mokhovaya, “drenched, disorganized, and entirely happy to be again among the people whose friendship and understanding still made Moscow the nearest thing in the world to home.”
⁶

Home, to be sure, had its problems. The Mokhovaya, constructed only of brick, wood, and plaster, was already falling apart, leaving cracks from which there emerged, according to an American inspection report, “countless moths, which feed upon the insulating material within the walls,” along with “roaches and other insects against which a constant battle must be fought.” Varying gas pressure made cooking uncertain, while electricity remained erratic. The building was poorly heated in winter, but when the weather was hot and the windows were open, layers of oil, soot, and dust blew in from the traffic on the street outside. Bathrooms doubled as laundry facilities, and servants slept in kitchens and halls. “Our friend Durby [Durbrow] had fought with our cook and fired her,” George wrote Jeanette. “We hunted for another one but couldn’t find any, and finally had to take the old bitch (she is generally referred to in this manner) back. We still have no nurse.”
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Nonetheless the living quarters were better than those of most other foreigners in Moscow, and the work that went on in the offices below was remarkable.

“It is not an exaggeration to say,” Kennan noted with pride the following year, “that by the beginning of 1937 the American Embassy at Moscow, which had started from scratch three years before, had become one of the two or three best-conducted and best-informed missions in the city.” He and four other Foreign Service officers sent the State Department 329 dispatches of an “original informative or reportorial” character in 1936, comprising 3,857 pages. Topics ranged from Soviet relations with the United States and other countries through the operations of the Communist International, Stalin’s first purge trials, the successes and shortcomings of the Soviet economy, the new draft constitution, and the activities of Americans living in the U.S.S.R. There were also reports on slum clearance, fish exports, fur auctions, sausage casings, and the All-Union Conference of Engineers’ Wives. At the department’s request, Kennan himself produced a 115-page analysis of Russian documents relating to the purchase of Alaska in 1867.