France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (75 page)

The matter was revisited right after Munich. At the beginning of October there was a luncheon given by American Ambassador Bullitt, with Daladier, Guy La Chambre and Jean Monnet. Daladier made the case for the purchase of American planes, proving how the weakness of France’s air force explained “the huge defeat at Munich.” Bullitt was so impressed that he traveled to the United States to study the issue. Charles Lindbergh, who had been in France in September, confirmed Daladier’s conclusions. Daladier decided to send Jean Monnet who had very many American friends, to meet with President Roosevelt. In order to get around the embargo of the Neutrality Act, Monnet was also to examine building assembly lines in Canada that would use component parts made in the United States. Monnet arrived in the United States on October 18. He met with the president at his private home in Hyde Park along with Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau and William Bullitt. Roosevelt decided to increase American production to 15,000 planes per year, allowing the fulfillment of France’s needs. Morgenthau suggested that France make the repatriation of capital funds that had fled the country compulsory and promised to help—which implied instituting exchange controls.

Monnet returned to France on November 4 and his recommendations were of the greatest interest to Daladier. However, the appointment of Paul Reynaud as Minister of Finance excluded the possibility of exchange controls. Monnet suggested ordering 100 planes for April 1939, followed by increasing quantities (700 bombers and 700 fighters by July) 2,500 at the beginning of 1940.

The meeting of the Permanent Committee of National Defense on December 5, 1938
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was exceptionally important. Paul Reynaud the new minister of finance, was immediately opposed to financing 1,000 modern planes that would cost 2.5 billion francs. The budget of the branches of the military for 1939 was 15 billion with military spending at 25 billion, 8.5 billion of which was allocated to the air force that would probably insufficient. He could only spare 800 million—because he promised not to have any long-term borrowing for six months. Thus, 1.7 billion had to be saved from the agreed budget.

Guy La Chambre felt that the savings should not be made on investments for the air force that required 2,000 planes manufactured in France.

Gamelin agreed to equip the air force especially in fighter planes. But, according to him, “from the viewpoint of the supreme conduct of the war” the navy and, above all, the ground forces had priority. “We have lost the support of 30 Czechoslovak divisions.”… “Our ground forces are smaller in numbers; they can only keep their value through equipment.” As for tanks, “we must accelerate the delivery of standardized matériel.”… “In a country with a very low birth rate you need very modern war equipment.” Paul Reynaud agreed, but he said that “it’s impossible to hold our borders and handle Italy without British help.” The Germans were now working fifty-two hours per week.

The committee then began to cut some appropriations for propaganda, gas masks, some investments, uniforms, and stockpiles for the navy. By the end of the meeting they were short only by 340 million! As of December 9 Daladier felt he could issue the purchase order of 1,000 planes in July 1939. Roosevelt had already made sure that U.S. aircraft production reached 10,000 planes in 1939.

Jean Monnet was immediately sent to the United States on a second mission, arriving in Washington on December 16, 1938, accompanied by Roger Hoppenot, the head of Guy La Chambre’s cabinet, and two officers. Roosevelt stated that he was very much in favor of the French plans and waved away all the objections offered by his advisors. The French, however, wanted planes that went faster than 500 km/hour which the
Americans did not manufacture. Monnet then asked whether they could test the very latest prototypes, namely the Curtiss P40. The air force and especially its commander General Arnold was against it. Besides, secrecy was suddenly lifted when on January 23, 1939, Colonel Jacquin and Captain Paul Chemdlin boarded a Douglas airplane for a demonstration flight. When the American pilot pushed the plane to the limits it crashed with the two Frenchmen miraculously escaping death. Since there was a large crowd, all the Americans found out that the United States, a neutral country, was allowing French air force officers on their most modern prototypes. Roosevelt had to publicly state that he approved the sale of planes to France. In the end Monnet ordered 555 planes in February for 60 million dollars without prejudice to what may follow and returned to Paris in March.

There would be no other French orders to the United States until the war began. The work done by Guy La Chambre and La Grange succeeded in obtaining the support of the Senate air committee. The show of Franco-American friendship satisfied a segment of public opinion that was worried about France’s problems in developing its own production. Daladier went so far as to offer to resume payments of war debts up to 300 million dollars in gold (about one-tenth of the amount). Bullitt was delighted but Roosevelt did not want to send the proposal to Congress because he was hoping to get a revision of the Neutrality Act and was fearful of upsetting the atmosphere. He also rejected the building of a French aircraft factory of Amiot planes in the United States. At the beginning of May Jean Monnet returned to the United States for the third time to find that negotiations could not be carried any further but he attempted to offer a broad plan to resolve the debt issue. This was also to be rejected.

The negotiations with the United States prompted French diplomacy to constantly examine American rearmament plans
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and the failed attempt by Senator Pittman with the administration’s support to lift the embargo on weapons and munitions in time of war as the Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, stipulated.
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When the war broke out in September, out of the 555 planes ordered, France had received 200—and only fighter planes. Since the embargo had not been lifted, any export of aircraft had to stop until a new law was passed in November 1939 canceling the embargo. A conclusion emerges from all the numbers and negotiations: Since the start of 1938 and especially following Munich, France made a remarkable effort to catch
up on its air force lag compared to Germany. The large increase in military spending and the percentage allowed the air force out of that total (from 12.3% in 1934 to 23% in 1938),
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the standardization, the studies, massive purchases of machine tools, assembly line manufacturing, the start of new investments in building new plants, the coordination, and purchasing overseas would have allowed France to become a great air power…in 1941. She could not catch up with Germany, but France and Great Britain together could outclass Germany.

The obvious conclusion is that the effort came several years too late. But why?

The two main air ministers of the time, Pierre Cot
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and Guy La Chambre,
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were critical of one another at the hearings of the parliamentary investigative commission in 1945. The former was more in favor of bombers, while the latter wanted more fighters. Yet their viewpoints were similar.

It is also not possible to point to the law of August 11, 1936, that nationalized war-related industries in a very flexible way. It actually had two great advantages, allowing to do away with a plethora of midsize and small companies that, due to their size, had to work in competition on a small scale and to group them into a few large national companies. After that a remarkable geographic decentralization, encouraged by Pierre Cot, was enacted.

The explanation by prototypes is far more convincing. Assembly line manufacturing was unknown prior to Pierre Cot. Until 1930 there were 332 different prototypes manufactured. On January 1, 1930, the ministry of air would order 115 planes…of 37 different models.
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The perfectionism, the “absence of boldness” within the ministry and among the manufacturers did not reach assembly line production under the pretense that new prototypes were going to be ready. In launching Plan I Pierre Cot had planned for models to be built in series but the industry was not yet ready for it, which explains its lack of organization until 1936 and the need for the consolidation that Pierre Cot, who had returned to the ministry of air, brought about. “Guy La Chambre having a more favorable political position within the government and no doubt better advice, drew from the reports on foreign industry and the progress of the Luftwaffe a simple but excellent idea, to build in large series.”
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Pierre Cot prepared Plan V; Guy La Chambre would reinforce it and get it passed.

Both ministers had to overcome the resistance of both the administration and the high command, whose competence was overestimated.
Guy La Chambre would state later on, “Had the high command not indulged in its penchant for perfection and had been content with the equipment we offered it would certainly not have experienced in the area of attack planes and dive bombers the kind of acute deficiencies we suffered from during the battle.”
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Basically France started too late and for a time did not plan big enough. The rebound was vigorous but it came so late that in 1938 it could not counter Hitler’s bold moves, or in 1939 deter him from going to war and in 1940 hold out long enough to confirm the rigorously correct statement within the realm of possibilities. “We will win because we are the strongest.”

3.

B
ATTLE
P
LANS

As of November 1938 the status of the “alliances” was not good. There no longer was a Czechoslovak army that could be relied on, depriving France of a committed ally, with a minimum of thirty divisions, the Skoda works, and potentially strategic locations for the air force. Poland, having taken part in the kill, felt only contempt toward France and still believed in an endless romance with Germany. Belgium was more riveted than ever to its policy of “independence;” had she not sent reinforcements to the French border during the September crisis? Great Britain was determined to limit any promised help to the specific event of a violation of French territory and was politely avoiding French offers to hold military discussions.

Everything changed in March 1939. True, with the disappearance of Czechoslovakia, France’s net loss turned into a gain for Germany. Poland, on the other hand was now feeling threatened. Public opinion was way ahead of the pro-German Beck and Pilsudsky’s disciple, Marshal Rydz-Smigly. As early as the end of February there were anti-German demonstrations, described in detail by Léon Noël. Poland needed France even more so as it rejected any help from the Russians. Since February, Great Britain, believing a threat existed against the Netherlands, was suddenly interested in holding staff talks with France. Chamberlain’s “conversion,” potentially allowing for a much closer collaboration was modeled on what had been achieved between the two countries, without a
formal alliance thanks to the Entente Cordiale from 1904 to 1914.
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It should be pointed out that in the spring of 1939 the immediate danger was so palpable that other friendly but further removed countries, such as Yugoslavia and even Romania, were ignored.

It was clear as early as April 1939 that Poland was the most threatened country if only because of its refusal to let Germany reannex Danzig. The March 31 guarantees, proclaimed by Chamberlain, held military implications. In a telegram dated April 7, Ambassador Léon Noël was asking insistently for the “immediate reinforcement of the Polish army.” But Poland lacked the funds. It became necessary for Great Britain and France to provide the funding. Léon Noël was pessimistic about an army of brave men but with inadequate equipment. The air force required an almost total overhaul despite the dazzling impression it made (a brilliant presentation at the aeronautics show in Paris in January): 3 factories, soon to have 2 more, 6,000 workers, 500 planes, all of them obsolete.
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Stockpiles were certainly insufficient even though “it is impossible to secure precise information.” Poland lacked heavy artillery and tanks and wanted to order them from France. Léon Noël was hoping there would be a staff meeting in the short term.
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That report prompted the Quai d’Orsay to inform Daladier as early as April 10.
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When consulted, Gamelin said he was against sending more arms because, he said, “our entire production is required by our ground and air forces.” But he was ready to contact Rydz-Smigly and coordinate Franco-Polish military discussions. Daladier immediately accepted.
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Gamelin wrote to the Marchhal and got him to delegate his minister of military affairs,
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General Kasprzycki to travel to France. He arrived in Paris on May 15. Earlier he had prepared a note, working on the assumption of a long war. Poland had to hold out, which meant building fortifications with expert French assistance, getting help with armaments, having stronger ties to Romania and Russia—it was well known that the Pilsudsky legacy precluded the Poles from accepting any help from the Red Army on their soil.
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Kasprzycki’s arrival was closely followed by Hitler’s April 28 cancellation of the German-Polish declaration of 1934 and Colonel Beck’s May 5 answer to that initiative. Ambassador Léon Noël was attempting at that time to tone down the excitement of the Poles, his basic principle being to avoid underscoring the certainty of French military help. The minister of public works, Anatole de Monzie, traveled to Poland to inaugurate a railroad financed by French investments (April 21–27). Like
Léon Noël, he was very noncommittal regarding possible French intervention.
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