Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (196 page)

17
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 39. The original document is in
Nihon gaik
ō
bunsho: Nichiro sens
ō
, 5, pp. 233–34, 252–54.

18
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 40.

19
. Isaac Don Levine,
Letters from the Kaiser to the Czar
, p. 172.

20
. Ibid., p. 175.

21
. Dennett,
Roosevelt
, p. 219. The American ambassador to Germany, Charlemagne Tower, reported this to the president in a letter dated June 9.

22
. Dennett,
Roosevelt
, p. 220. In a letter dated June 4, the kaiser wrote Ambassador Tower, “Considering the grave dangers to all of us, which might arise in case something serious happened to His Imperial Majesty, I have written him a letter counselling him to open negotiations for Peace.” He told Tower, “Unless peace is made, they will kill the Tsar.” See also Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 41.

23
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, pp. 43, 45.

24
. Dennett,
Roosevelt
, pp. 224–25, 225–26. The Japanese text is in
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, p. 173.

25
. Dennett,
Roosevelt
, p. 226.

26
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 48.

27
. Quoted in ibid., p. 47.

28
. Roosevelt was aware of the danger of causing the czar and the Russian government to suspect he was pro-Japanese (
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, p. 103).

29
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, pp. 176, 177.

30
. Quoted in Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 51.

31
. When the American ambassador George von Lengerke Meyer went to see the czar to persuade him to consent to direct negotiations, the czar finally yielded and then suddenly confessed, “You have come at a psychological moment; as yet no foot has been placed on Russian soil; but I realize that at almost any moment they can make an attack on Sakhalin. Therefore it is important that the meeting should take place before that occurs” (quoted in Dennett,
Roosevelt
, p. 194). On March 31 an order was issued for the Japanese Thirteenth Infantry Division to assemble, for the purpose of occupying Sakhalin (
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, p. 106).

32
. Kaneko,
Nichiro sen’eki
, p. 225. Kaneko wrote that on June 8 Roosevelt urged him to send a message to the Japanese government, advising it to seize Sakhalin before negotiations began and even specifying the number of troops and gunboats that would be needed. Roosevelt believed that unless the Japanese occupied Russian territory, they would be in a weak position at the conference table. Exactly a month after Roosevelt gave this advice, Japan sent two gunboats and a mixed brigade to Sakhalin. Kaneko said he was not sure if this action was inspired by Roosevelt’s advice. See also Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 46.

33
. The emperor’s reliance on It
ō
during the war began earlier. When It
ō
decided to send Kaneko to America, he admitted that it would be better if he himself went, but the emperor had made it clear he needed his counsel and would not let him go abroad (Kaneko,
Nichiro sen’eki
, p. 16).

34
. Matsumura Masayoshi,
Nichiro sens
ō
to Kaneko Kentar
ō
, pp. 234–41; Akabane Shigeru,
Nichiro sens
ō
shiron
, pp. 287–311. Colonel Akashi Motojir
ō
, who was based at the Japanese legation in Stockholm, operated a network of spies that provided him with information on conditions in Russia. He was enabled by Konni Zilliacus, a Finnish patriot, to meet various Russian revolutionaries, including Lenin, and generously backed them. Zilliacus said of Akashi’s activities, “Half the people to whom Japanese money is distributed don’t know where it comes from—and the other half don’t care” (quoted in Noel F. Busch,
The Emperor’s Sword
, p. 122).

Soon after the end of the Russo-Japanese War, a booklet called
Rakka ry
ū
sui
describing Akashi’s secret activities was published by the Russian state police. His cooperation with Russian revolutionary elements may have helped the success of antigovernmental movements in 1905 and 1917. An English translation of parts of
Rakka ry
ū
sui
was published in Helsinki in 1988. Japanese intelligence activities during the war are described in John Albert White,
Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War
, pp. 138–42. E. J. Dillon wrote, “The strikes, the demonstrations, the subterranean agitation, the spread of revolutionary leaflets, and the brisk, illegal traffic between Finland and Russia, were in varying degrees evidences of Japanese propaganda” (
The Eclipse of Russia
, p. 184).

Kaneko Kentar
ō
recalled in later years that the celebrated historian and author Henry Adams, whom he described as the “brain” (
chiebukuro
) of John Hay, the secretary of state, had advised him that Japan should send secret agents to Finland and Sweden to stir up the people there and create unrest. Kaneko and Adams met in Washington on January 15, 1905 (Kaneko,
Nichiro sen’eki
, pp. 70–76; Busch,
Emperor’s Sword
, p. 122; Elizabeth Stevenson,
Henry Adams
, pp. 315–16).

35
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, pp. 82–83. The original instructions given to the Japanese emissaries on June 4 are listed in
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, p. 198. They differ somewhat from the demands made at Portsmouth. For example, at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the demand that Vladivostok be demilitarized was removed from the list.

36
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, pp. 84, 61.

37
. Okamoto,
Japanese Oligarchy
. p. 117.

38
. Esthus writes, “From the records that are available, it is impossible to determine conclusively whether Komura was deliberately misleading his government on the Sakhalin question” (
Double Eagle
, p. 151). Komura did not inform the Japanese government of the Russian proposal to divide Sakhalin until the czar’s decision had already been reported in the press. President Roosevelt wrote the kaiser proposing binding arbitration on the money question, but Komura could not be reached for confirmation. Esthus thought that Komura’s failure to respond may have been deliberate (p. 153).

39
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, pp. 281–84.

40
. Ibid., 11, pp. 286–87.

41
. The full English text sent by Katsura to Komura is in Morinosuke Kajima,
The Diplomacy of Japan
, 2, pp. 349–50.

42
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 158.

43
. Kajima,
Diplomacy of Japan
, 2, p. 351.

44
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 159.

45
. Ibid., p. 164.

46
. Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore,
As The Hague Ordains
, p. 346. The reference to Kronstadt may simply equate this Russian naval port with the similar Portsmouth.
Il Strenuoso
is an ironic reference to Theodore Roosevelt’s love of the strenuous life.

47
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 165.

48
. Ibid., pp. 171, 173.

49
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, pp. 314–15.

50
. Esthus,
Double Eagle
, p. 188. He quotes a letter written by Roosevelt on September 6.

51
. Theodore Roosevelt to Takahira Kog
ō
ro, September 8, 1905, quoted in ibid.

Chapter 56

1
. Iguchi Kazuki,
Nichiro sens
ō
no jidai
, pp. 127–28. Iguchi declared that without Britain’s support, Japan lacked the fighting strength to pursue the war with Russia. The Japanese, as yet incapable of casting the main and secondary guns for their battleships and armored cruisers, depended on the British not only for the guns but also for charging the missiles fired. The British also supplied the Japanese navy with 20,000 tons of coal each month.

2
. Ian H. Nish,
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
, p. 289. Britain decided that it could not “permit any ship now in the Black Sea to take part in warlike operations,” and at Britain’s request, Turkey refused to allow vessels of the Russian Black Sea Fleet through the Straits.

3
. Nish wrote that “Britain may have given the impression of being more a neutral and less an ally” (
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
, p. 292).

4
. Sir Claude MacDonald to Charles Hardinge, British ambassador to Russia, December 23, 1904, quoted in Nish,
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
, p. 299.

5
. Nish,
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
, p. 303.

6
. Telegram, Hayashi Tadasu, Japanese minister to England, to his government, quoted in ibid., p. 309.

7
. The English text of the agreement is in Nish,
Anglo-Japanese Alliance
, pp. 331–33.

8
. Ibid., p. 346. Prince Arthur’s father, also called Prince Arthur of Connaught, had made an unofficial visit to Japan in 1890, spent mainly in sightseeing and acquiring “curios.” It is surprising that the son, rather than the father, should have been assigned so important a task as the conferment of the Garter, but the father was occupied in India.

9
. Lord Redesdale,
The Garter Mission to Japan
, pp. 1–2.

10
. Ibid., pp. 5–6.

11
. Ibid., pp. 7–8.

12
. Ibid., p. 8.

13
. It is described in detail in ibid., pp. 16–20.

14
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, p. 492.

15
. Hinonishi Sukehiro,
Meiji tenn
ō
no go-nichij
ō
, p. 184.

16
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, p. 493.

17
. Redesdale,
Garter Mission
, pp. 22, 23.

18
. Ibid., p. 25.

19
. Ibid., p. 29.

20
. The name by which William Adams (1564–1620) became known after he decided to live permanently in Japan.

21
. Redesdale,
Garter Mission
, pp. 76–81.
Yoi, yoi, yoiya, sa
, the burden of the song, has a vaguely felicitous meaning.

22
. Nish,
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
, pp. 350–51.

23
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, pp. 374–75.

24
. Ibid., 11, pp. 376–79.

25
. Ibid., 11, pp. 380–81. See also Kim Un Yon,
Nikkan heig
ō
, pp. 187–88.

26
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 11, pp. 381–84. Kim gives a shortened but very similar account (
Nikkan heig
ō
, pp. 183–91). According to Woonsang Choi, the last utterance of Emperor Kojong was “Assent to your proposal would mean the ruin of my country, and I will therefore sooner die than agree to it” (
The Fall of the Hermit Kingdom
, p. 46).

27
. For an account of the opinions expressed, see Katano Tsugio,
Rich
ō
metsub
ō
, pp. 217–18. The Koreans called attention to the paradox that Japan, the ostensible defender of Korean independence, proposed to rob the country of its independence.

28
. Choi,
Fall of the Hermit Kingdom
, p. 47.

29
. Ibid., p. 47.

30
. Ibid., p. 48.

31
. Katano gives a vivid description of It
ō
’s asking each cabinet member by turn whether he was for or against the treaty (
Rich
ō
metsub
ō
, pp. 221–22). Vague responses were tallied as “not opposed” and marked O, and only the determinedly opposed were marked X. Katano does not give his source. See also Peter Duus,
The Abacus and the Sword
, pp. 190–92.

32
. Kim,
Nikkan heig
ō
, p. 195. Choi gives an account of how Japanese officers dragged the defiant acting prime minister into a side room where, the other cabinet ministers feared, he was likely to be killed (
Fall of the Hermit Kingdom
, pp. 48–49). This action by the Japanese induced several of the cabinet ministers to consent to the treaty. Choi says of the different accounts of the conference, “All authors vary little in describing the substance of the conference scene, namely its coercive nature” (p. 54). However, Duus states that the acting prime minister left the room in so highly agitated state that he accidentally wandered into the women’s quarters (
Abacus
, p. 191, citing Japanese authorities). Petrified by his mistake (and the shrieking of the women), he had fainted dead away. The discussion continued without him. The marked discrepancy between the two accounts suggests that neither may be completely reliable.