Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (194 page)

Chapter 52

1
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 176–77.

2
. Ibid., 10, p. 181.

3
. Ibid., 10, pp. 184–87.

4
. Ibid., 10, p. 187. As of February 7 there were 17 survivors, 108 dead, and 85 unaccounted for. Some of the survivors died in the hospital (p. 198).

5
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 187.

6
. See chapter 48.

7
. Ian H. Nish,
The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War
, p. 31. The provisions of the treaty were not fully divulged until 1922.

8
. Nish,
Origins
, p. 39.

9
. Ibid., p. 41. According to Andrew Malozemoff, at a meeting of the Russian czar and the German kaiser in August 1897, the czar had assented to a temporary visit by the German squadron to Kiaochow Bay in time of need (
Russian Far Eastern Policy
, pp. 96–101). The Germans, taking advantage of this agreement, entered the bay in November 1897. The Russians, who were not seriously concerned, decided in December to send a squadron to occupy Port Arthur temporarily, following the Chinese proposal. Malozemoff writes, “William II was delighted. On December 17 he conveyed his approval of the action through the Foreign Office. On the nineteenth he himself telegraphed to the Tsar: ‘Please accept my congratulations on the arrival of your squadron at Port Arthur.’ On the same day, he charged Baron Osten-Sacken [the Russian chargé in Berlin] to convey to Nicholas II the message: ‘Your enemies, whether they be called Japanese or English, now become my enemies; and every troublemaker, whoever he may be, who wishes to hinder your intentions by force, will meet the German squadron side by side with your warships.’”

10
. For the Nishi-Rosen Convention, see Malozemoff,
Russian
, p. 110. Baron Roman R. Rosen, the Russian minister to Japan, later termed this agreement a “rather lame and pointless convention.”

11
. Malozemoff,
Russian
, p. 146. See also
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 224–25.

12
. Malozemoff,
Russian
, pp. 172–73. Count Sergei Witte recalled It
ō
’s visit in these terms: “Unfortunately, he was received coldly …. In the end we countered his proposal with our own, which did not accept the basic wishes of Japan. We sent our draft proposal to Ito, who was by this time in Berlin: he did not respond to it, nor could he have, for seeing how his friendly proposals had been received in Petersburg, he no longer opposed having an agreement with England, by which she would pledge herself to support Japan in a quarrel with Russia, an agreement that would lead to a war that was disastrous for us” (
The Memoirs of Count Witte
, trans. Sidney Harcave, p. 303).

13
. According to Nish, “It is broadly accepted that Open Door ideas developed in the brains of Alfred Hippisley, one of the senior officials of the Chinese Maritime Customs, and William H. Rockhill, a junior of John Hay at the State Department in Washington” (
Origins
, p. 55).

14
. The literal translation of
kokury
ū
as “Black Dragon” may account for this society’s sinister reputation.

15
. Nish,
Origins
, p. 95.

16
. Quoted in ibid., p. 17.

17
. Witte,
Memoirs
, p. 307.

18
. Nish,
Origins
, p. 142.

19
. Erwin Baelz,
Awakening Japan
, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, p. 249.

20
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 243.

21
. Ibid., 10, p. 261. The prince would later be known as Chichibunomiya.

22
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 275, 346. Akasaka Detached Palace, as it came to be known, was completed in 1908, but during the Meiji period it was not used by the crown prince or anyone else. When the emperor examined an album of photographs of the completed palace, his only comment was “Such extravagance!” a blow to the architect Katayama T
ō
kuma, who had made several journeys to Europe and America to study buildings erected for royalty and the very rich. The palace is mainly in neobaroque but contains elements of many other styles. The materials used were equally varied. As Dallas Finn, the author of a study of surviving Meiji-period buildings, wrote, “Wherever he could, Katayama used Japanese materials:
hinoki
wood for rafters, native copper for roofing, Ibaraki granite for sheathing, Kyoto silk, and thirteen million local bricks. For the interior, however, he had to import, as he put it, the best from everywhere: marble from France, Morocco, Spain, and Italy; plate glass and carpets from England; heating, plumbing, and electrical equipment from the United States, and mantels, mirrors, mosaics, and chandeliers from France. France also provided furniture and a pervasive ambience” (
Meiji Revisited
, p. 236).

23
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 300.

24
. Ibid., 10, p. 306.

25
. Ibid., 10, p. 308.

26
. Ibid., 10, pp. 318–19.

27
. Ibid., 10, pp. 325–27.

28
. Ibid., 10, p. 355.

29
. Ibid., 10, pp. 366, 368.

30
. Ibid., 10, p. 381.

31
. Ibid., 10, p. 364.

32
. Ibid., 10, p. 392.

33
. Ibid., 10, p. 395.

34
.
Mori Senz
ō
chosaku sh
ū
zokuhen
, 5, p. 12.

35
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 399–400.

36
. For details, see ibid., 10, p. 406.

37
. Ibid., 10, p. 405. For an English rendition of the seven demands, see Nish,
Origins
, p. 146.

38
. They were Yamagata Aritomo, It
ō
Hirobumi, Katsura Tar
ō
, and Komura Jutar
ō
(
Ō
yama Azusa,
Nichiro sens
ō
no gunsei shiroku
, p. 27).

39
.
Ō
yama,
Nichiro sens
ō
, p. 28. See also
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 409–10.

40
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 416.

41
. Ibid., 10, p. 417.

42
. Ibid., 10, pp. 423–26.

Chapter 53

1
. The text is in
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 444–49. Copies of the memorial were also sent to Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, Count Matsukata Masayoshi, Navy Minister Yamamoto Gonnohy
ō
e, Foreign Minister Komura Jutar
ō
, and Army Minister Terauchi Masatake.

2
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 452.

3
. Ibid., 10, p. 458.

4
. The nine were It
ō
Hirobumi, Yamagata Aritomo,
Ō
yama Iwao, Matsukata Ma-sayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, Katsura Tar
ō
, Yamamoto Gonnohy
ō
e, Komura Jutar
ō
, and Terauchi Masatake. These men have been referred to as the “oligarchs” who ran Japan at the time. For an extended treatment of this subject, see Shumpei Okamoto,
The Japanese Oligarchy and the Russo-Japanese War
.

5
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 460.

6
. Ibid., 10, p. 464.

7
. Ibid., 10, p. 469.

8
. Ibid., 10, p. 475.

9
. Ibid., 10, p. 479. For a translation of the six points, see Ian H. Nish,
The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War
, pp. 184–85.

10
. Andrew Malozemoff,
Russian Far Eastern Policy
, p. 224.

11
. Witte’s memoirs gives August 13 according to the Julian calendar, then used in Russia. Other accounts give August 28, the date in the Gregorian calendar, used elsewhere in Europe and in Japan.

12
. Count Sergei Iulevich Witte,
The Memoirs of Count Witte
, trans. Sidney Harcave, pp. 315–16.

13
. Ibid., p. 365.

14
. Ibid., p. 366.

15
. Malozemoff,
Russian
, p. 226.

16
. Witte,
Memoirs
, p. 368.

17
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 477. See also Okamoto,
Japanese Oligarchy
, pp. 94–95. He quotes the diary of Dr. Erwin Baelz, who recalled, “On the train I met a fashionably dressed Japanese man. He told me, ‘the people’s indignation toward Russia is no longer under control. The government should declare war immediately. Otherwise, there will be, I fear, a civil rebellion. In fact, even the throne is threatened.’” Baelz commented, “Life is easy for such irresponsible men as this man” (diary entry, September 25, 1903). Okamoto quoted from the Japanese translation made by Baelz’s son, Toku Baelz. The English translation does not contain this entry.

18
. Malozemoff,
Russian
, p. 238.

19
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 484. See also John Albert White,
The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War
, pp. 102–3.

20
. Text of the first exchange of Japanese and Russian proposals is in White,
Diplomacy
, pp. 351–52.

21
. The text is in
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 516–17; the translation of the second exchange of proposals, in White,
Diplomacy
, pp. 352–54.

22
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 542. The new Russian proposals were probably the work of Alekseev and Rosen (Malozemoff,
Russian
, p. 243).

23
. Malozemoff,
Russian
, p. 243.

24
. Witte,
Memoirs
, p. 366.

25
. Alexis Kuropatkin, diary entry, December 28, 1903, quoted in Malozemoff,
Russian
, pp. 243, 245.

26
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
10, pp. 545–46.

27
. The text is in ibid., pp. 549–50; the translation of the Japanese proposal and the Russian counterproposal of January 6, in White,
Diplomacy
, pp. 354–55.

28
. White,
Diplomacy
, pp. 112–13.

29
. Okamoto,
Japanese Oligarchy
, pp. 99–100;
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 555–62.

30
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 503–4.

31
. Ibid., 10, p. 508.

32
. Erwin Baelz,
Awakening Japan
, trans. Eden Paul and Cedar Paul, p. 240.

33
. The text is in
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 568–69; the translation in White,
Diplomacy
, pp. 356–57.

34
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 569; White,
Diplomacy
, p. 355.

35
. The reasons that the Japanese submitted the fourth set of proposals, although they were convinced it would do no good, differ. In addition to the need for more time to assemble the transport fleet in Sasebo (
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 575), White suggested three possible reasons: (1) the natural reluctance to become embroiled with a formidable adversary, (2) the natural reluctance to be considered an aggressor, and (3) the Japanese desire to prove itself a worthy and acceptable member of the society of nations (
Diplomacy
, p. 120).

36
. The text of the fourth Japanese proposal is in
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, pp. 577–79; the translation, in White,
Diplomacy
, pp. 356–58.

37
.
Meiji tenn
ō
ki
, 10, p. 582.