Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (107 page)

Kim arrived in Shanghai on March 27. On the following day while Wada was out on an errand, Kim was reading a book in bed when Hong broke into his room and shot him twice. Kim crawled from his bed to the corridor, only to be shot from behind, this time fatally. The brilliant, erratic, charming victim was forty-three years old.
¹⁷

Wada bought a coffin for Kim and arranged with the captain of the
Saiky
ō
maru
, the ship on which Kim and the others had come to Shanghai, to take the coffin back to Japan. However, the night before the ship was to sail, a man from the Japanese consulate ordered Wada to wait. When Wada refused to delay, the consulate informed the settlement authorities, who took the coffin and turned it over to the Chinese.
¹⁸
Li Hung-chang, informed of the murder, ordered the coffin and the murderer to be sent to Korea aboard the warship
Wei-yüan
. Both the Chinese and Japanese governments seemed to be eager to be rid of a troublesome idealist.

When the coffin reached Korea, the government had Kim’s body removed. His head, hands, and feet were severed and hung from poles with an inscription proclaiming him a traitor; the torso was left lying on the ground nearby.
¹⁹
The vengeance of the Korean government did not stop with this atrocity: members of Kim’s family were also executed.
²⁰
Hong Chong-u was given a hero’s welcome.

The Japanese were outraged by Kim Ok-kyun’s murder. Their feelings of hatred were directed toward the Chinese in particular for their role in the incident. Hayashi Tadasu, the deputy foreign minister, wrote in his memoirs that he was sure the outbreak of war with China a few months later was precipitated by the murder of Kim Ok-kyun and the Chinese involvement in the crime.
²¹

Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote sympathetically of the murdered man, expressing anger that the Chinese had turned the corpse over to the Koreans, and horror over the shameful mutilation of the corpse by the Koreans. He accused the Chinese of having violated the Treaty of Tientsin, which provided for China and Japan to cooperate in maintaining order in Korea, attributing misguided Chinese policies to the “rottenness at the core” resulting from the obstinate refusal of the Manchu rulers to permit progress. He predicted that a clash would be unavoidable if the Chinese continued to consider Korea as a vassal state. and expressed doubt that China would be able to maintain its independence if it showed no signs of progress.
²²

There was still, however, no immediate reason for opening hostilities with China. This would be provided by the rebellion staged by a Korean religious group called the Tonghak. In April and May 1894 this group rose in rebellion throughout the provinces of Cholla and Ch’ungch’ong.
²³
The founder of the Tonghak movement, Ch’oe Che-u (1824–1864), had urged his followers to drive out Western influences and restore the native Korean beliefs, which he called Eastern learning (the meaning of
tonghak
). Although in principle he opposed Confucianism because its doctrines had originated in China, a foreign country, his religion was in fact a mixture of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism; its chief enemy was Christianity.
²⁴
The government prohibited the Tonghak movement not so much because of its teachings as because of its popularity among the peasants, whom the authorities feared might be incited to rise in rebellion.

Ch’oe Che-u was eventually captured and beheaded by order of the government—as a Catholic. Some Tonghak religious practices superficially resembled those of Roman Catholicism, then being persecuted in Korea, which prompted the police to give an anti-Christian zealot a martyr’s death. Having lost its founder, the Tonghak religion went underground but maintained its hold over the peasantry, for whom its appeal was not its mysterious spells and incantations but its promise of equality and this-worldly benefits.
²⁵

The religion grew in numbers despite the prohibition, and by 1893 the southern half of the Korean peninsula was under the control of the Tonghaks. In January of that year, the new leader, Ch’oe Si-hyong, called a meeting of believers at which he demanded the exoneration of Ch’oe Che-u and the end of the prohibition of the Tonghak religion. In March a delegation of believers went to Seoul to beg for an admission of Choe’s innocence. They remained prostrated on the ground before the main gate of the palace for three days and three nights, imploring the king to exculpate the founder of their religion.
²⁶
Although their petition was not granted, they had succeeded in demonstrating the strength of their convictions. From this time, the Tonghaks’ antiforeign slogans proliferated; originally directed against Europeans, they came now to include the Japanese. The peasants had only a vague notion of Europeans, but they all had personal experience of unscrupulous Japanese merchants who bought their rice crops and lent them money at usurious rates.

The Tonghak believers, emboldened by the fears their movement aroused in the Korean government, plastered the walls of foreign legations and consulates with antiforeign slogans and shouted abuse at the foreign diplomats inside.
²⁷
Even the Chinese legation was not spared the abuse. Yüan Shih-k’ai, the representative of the Chinese government, realizing that these actions might easily escalate into much larger disturbances, sent an urgent message to Li Hung-chang asking for two warships. Li immediately sent the
Ching-yüan
and the
Lai-yüan
to Inch’on. Members of the Japanese legation, fearing attack, armed themselves with swords and readied themselves for action.

Mutsu Munemitsu’s account of the circumstances leading up to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War is of particular importance because he not only was an alert observer of the events he describes but, as foreign minister, was actively involved in decision making. His record of the war,
Kenkenroku
,
²⁸
opens with a consideration of the Tonghak revolt:

Some have regarded the Tonghak as a type of religious group, imbued with a mixture of Confucianism and Taoism. Others have considered them to be an association of political reformers. Others have seen them merely as a lawless gang spoiling for a fight. Here, we are less concerned with their character and motivation than with the simple fact that in April and May of 1894, a group of insurgents calling themselves Tonghak rose in rebellion throughout the provinces of Cholla and Ch’ung-ch’ong. After they had pillaged homes and expelled the local officials in these provinces, they continued their rampage toward Kyonggi Province and occupied Chonju (the capital city of Cholla) for a time.
²⁹

The reactions in Japan to the Tonghaks’ early successes were mixed. Some favored sending Japanese troops into Korea in order to help the feeble Korean government suppress the revolt. Others believed that the Tonghaks were reformers whose aim was to rescue the suffering Korean people from a corrupt government. In recent years, some scholars have discounted the importance of the Tonghak religion to the rebellion, insisting that (despite its garments of religion) it was essentially a peasant movement.
³⁰

At first, observers believed that the Tonghaks were not strong enough to overthrow the existing regime, but when the Tonghaks approached Seoul, the Korean government panicked and appealed to Yüan Shih-k’ai for help in putting down the revolt. On June 2 Mutsu had word of the Korean request from Sugimura Fukashi, the chargé d’affaires at the Japanese legation in Seoul, and at once informed the cabinet of his intention to send “a substantial number” of Japanese troops to the peninsula in order to maintain the balance of power between the Japanese and the Chinese. The cabinet concurred unanimously, and the prime minister went to the palace to obtain the emperor’s approval. The emperor gave his consent in a brief rescript stating that during this period of revolts and disorders in Korea, troops would be sent to protect the lives of resident Japanese.
³¹

The Japanese minister to Korea,
Ō
tori Keisuke (1832–1911), who happened to be on a leave of absence in Japan, was sent back to Korea on June 5 with instructions to devote his full energies to achieving the Japanese objectives of national honor and a balance of power with China. Insofar as possible, a peaceful solution should be sought. Mutsu wrote, “In the event a Sino-Japanese conflict occurred, we were determined to have the Chinese be the aggressors, while we ourselves assumed the position of the aggrieved party.”
³²

Through the minister plenipotentiary to Japan, Wang Feng-tsao, the Chinese government informed the Japanese government that at the request of the king of Korea, it was sending “a small number” of troops to Korea in order to suppress the Tonghak faction. According to Mutsu, Wang “had foolishly concluded that Japan was too debilitated internally to engage in conflict with another power.”

The Chinese had obtained this impression from the endless, acrimonious debates in the Diet, a political phenomenon unknown in their own country. Exasperated by the constant attacks on himself and his cabinet, It
ō
Hirobumi said that even though five years had passed since the constitution was put into effect, members of the Diet were still wandering like “lost sheep.” Each political party tried to outdo the others in opposing the government, even if this was harmful to the future of the country. It
ō
’s solution was for the emperor to summon the leaders of all parties and command them to hearken to the imperial will.
³³
It is not clear whether It
ō
actually submitted this request; in any case, Meiji did not react.

Noticing the sharp divergence of views expressed in the Diet, the Chinese could not easily appreciate (and the exasperated It
ō
sometimes forgot) the intense patriotism of the Japanese, which would sweep away divergences if ever their country was threatened by another. The assumption of the Chinese that their army and their navy were superior to Japan’s was shared by many Japanese. Hayashi Tadasu wrote, “Before the Sino-Japanese War, Japanese would laugh at the backwardness of the Chinese and speak of them with contempt, but they were in fact extremely afraid of them.”
³⁴

On June 7 Mutsu wired instructions to Komura Jutar
ō
(1855–1911), the Japanese chargé d’affaires in Peking, directing him to notify the Chinese that the Japanese government, in keeping with the Treaty of Tientsin, intended to send troops to Korea. The Chinese replied that they were acting in compliance with a Korean request for assistance in subduing a rebellion. This, they said, was in keeping with their traditional practice of protecting tributary states. The last words could not be passed over without comment by the Japanese. Mutsu in his reply stated that “the Japanese government did not and never had recognized Korea as a tributary state of China.”
³⁵
Throughout the ensuing war, the Japanese never ceased to insist on this point, but the fact remained that the Koreans had asked the Chinese—and not the Japanese—to protect them.

Ō
tori arrived in Inch’on on June 9 and proceeded to Seoul, accompanied by 300 Japanese marines. He was followed by a battalion of army troops. In the meantime, the Tonghaks had become discouraged and had virtually ceased their advance on Seoul, the direct cause of the Chinese presence. Discovering that Seoul was surprisingly calm,
Ō
tori recommended that no large body of Japanese troops be sent to Korea, but this did not alter Mutsu’s belief that “the issue would be settled by whichever side enjoyed superior troop strength.”
³⁶
On June 11 a mixed brigade under the command of General
Ō
shima Yoshimasa left Ujina for Inch’on. By the fifteenth of the month, the Tonghak rebellion seemed to have ended, but the Chinese and Japanese armies showed no signs of leaving the peninsula.
³⁷

At this juncture It
ō
proposed that the Chinese and Japanese cooperate to terminate the rebellion and, when this had been accomplished, send commissioners to improve Korea’s internal administration, especially finances and military preparation. If the Chinese refused to join the Japanese, the Japanese would assume sole responsibility. The plan was sent to the emperor for his approval, but he seemed uneasy about the provision (which Mutsu had added to It
ō
’s original plan) that Japan would act unilaterally if necessary. He sent the chief chamberlain to question this provision. Mutsu came to the palace to explain in detail, and the emperor finally gave his consent.
³⁸

As Mutsu had expected, the Chinese were unwilling to accept the plan. On June 21 the Chinese minister reported that his government had rejected the Japanese plan, for three reasons:

First, as the disturbance in Korea had already been quelled, it was no longer essential for Chinese forces to act on behalf of the Korean government in finishing off the rebels. It followed that there was equally no need for China and Japan to act jointly in suppressing the disturbance. Second, while the Japanese government’s ideas about Korea’s future might well be excellent ones, it was for the Koreans themselves to reform their country…. Finally, the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin obliged both Japan and China to withdraw their troops as soon as the disturbance occasioning their dispatch had been quelled. A mutual withdrawal of Japanese and Chinese troops at this point was thus completely justified and required no further discussion.
³⁹